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Although the war in Gaza is still in its early stages, Israel must begin learning from it now. The next challenge, a war in the north, might be imminent. The primary lesson taught by the war in Gaza is that no military-size terror threat should ever again be allowed anywhere on Israel’s borders. Such threats should be removed by force on the other side of the border. A concentrated force-design process, focused on four or five plans, in addition to basic preparations will enable the creation of a sharper and readier military force. Israel should focus on embarking on about two years’ worth of preparations for the next war.
© IDF Spokesperson
In order to complete the eradication of the Hamas organization in Gaza, a ground offensive in southern Gaza will be required. A serious challenge in executing this offensive is that the majority of the population, following their evacuation from northern Gaza, is now in the south, effectively doubling the population in that area. If Israel is to deprive Hamas of its last defenses against the IDF, continue its impressive compliance with international law, and fulfill its commitment to the Americans to conduct a war based on shared values, it will have to move the Gazan population away from expected combat zones in urban areas of the south. As Egypt will not accept the use of Sinai as a haven for Gazan citizens, other solutions are being considered, including establishing protected areas in the South or relocating Gazans back to the north. But it might also be worthwhile to advance a plan led by the Americans, with international and regional participation, to establish temporary accommodation camps for the residents of Gaza in the Negev. This plan would also involve international assistance for returning Israeli residents of the Gaza envelope.
The majority of Russian commentators agree that the events occurred as a result of mounting mass dissatisfaction in the North Caucasus, with the Jews and Israelis as a formal pretext for the events. However, there are also attempts to determine the actions of specific players who may have intentionally organized  pogroms in the Northern Caucasus. Some of these hypotheses are of a propagandistic nature, while others require more in-depth analysis if sufficient supporting arguments can be found.
One cannot fail to notice that the conflict between Israel and Palestinian Arabs occupies a distinct place in the ideological and political discourse accompanying post-Soviet armed conflicts, primarily the Russian-Ukrainian and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts. This can involve the use of allusions and symbols associated with the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, aimed at ideologically justifying one's position and demonizing the opponent. It also pertains to the attempts of direct participants in post-Soviet conflicts and/or external actors to leverage fluctuations in Israel's relations with the "Palestinian National Authority" (PNA) in Ramallah, which governs the Arab enclaves in Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley (or, the “West Bank of the Jordan River”, in international discourse) on one hand, and the enclave of Islamic fundamentalists in the Gaza Strip on the other.
The Oslo Accords GPO - Avi Ohayon P.M. Yitzhak Rabin shaking hands with PLO chairman Yasser Arafat (R) on white house lawn as U.S. Pres. Bill Clinton looks on.
Thirty years after its euphoric launch, the “Oslo peace process” between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) stands as the worst calamity to have afflicted Israelis and Palestinians since the 1948 war, and the most catastrophic strategic blunder in Israel’s history. By replacing Israel’s control of the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians with corrupt and repressive terrorist entities that indoctrinated their subjects with burning hatred of Jews and Israelis, as well as murdered some 2,000 Israelis and rained thousands of rockets and missiles on their population centers, the Oslo process has made the prospects for peace and reconciliation ever more remote. By deflating the fighting spirit and combative ethos of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), it has weakened Israel’s national security and made the outbreak of a multi-front war—a scenario that effectively vanished after the 1973 war—a distinct possibility. By transforming the PLO (and, to a lesser extent, Hamas) into internationally accepted political actors without forcing them to shed their genocidal commitment to the Jewish state’s destruction, it weakened Israel’s international standing and subjected it to sustained de-legitimization campaigns. And by deepening Israel’s internal cleavages and destabilizing its sociopolitical system, it has created a clear and present danger to the Jewish State’s thriving democracy, indeed to its very existence.
In June 2023, Israel quietly approved the development of Gaza Marine, a small offshore gas field near Gaza that will benefit both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas in terms of revenue and energy independence. Why was the deal approved by the most right-wing Israeli government to date, and how does this relate to the Lebanon maritime border deal from October 2022?
On May 9, Israel initiated a direct attack on the senior commanders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza while ignoring Hamas, its third such attack since November 2019. The operation was Israel’s response to an escalation of rocket and mortar fire by Palestinian Islamic Jihad, an escalation that was itself a response to the death of a senior member of the group’s West Bank branch while on hunger strike in an Israeli prison.  Hamas, the sovereign ruler of Gaza, preferred, as in the two previous bouts between Israel and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, to sit the fight out, choosing instead to maintain the ceasefire to which it agreed after Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021.
From their earliest days, Hezbollah and Hamas have seen immense value in closely monitoring Israel’s media. However, their reliance on open source information has proven a double-edged sword, as both groups have been misled into making poor strategic decisions. Either Hezbollah or Hamas is likely to identify the current crisis in Israel over the new government’s proposed reform of Israel’s judiciary as an opportunity to act against it. They might be surprised, however, by Israel’s response.

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