It is likely that France does not have enough resources to prioritize both Ukraine and Armenia at the same time. Concentrating on two tracks at once, especially when resources are scarce, may lead to their inefficient allocation across both tracks.
Israel
Although the war in Gaza is still in its early stages, Israel must begin learning from it now. The next challenge, a war in the north, might be imminent. The primary lesson taught by the war in Gaza is that no military-size terror threat should ever again be allowed anywhere on Israelโs borders. Such threats should be removed by force on the other side of the border. A concentrated force-design process, focused on four or five plans, in addition to basic preparations will enable the creation of a sharper and readier military force. Israel should focus on embarking on about two yearsโ worth of preparations for the next war.
Currently, Russia is in the process of forming a new state ideology, one that holds conservative values. The Russian Orthodox Church plays a significant role within this ideology. Consequently, the political significance of conservative circles within the Russian Orthodox Church concerning the Jewish question is becoming pronounced.
After the Second Karabakh War (2020) and especially after the outbreak of the war in Ukraine (2022), France saw a number of new diplomatic opportunities opening up for it in the southern post-Soviet space as Russia's traditional influence waned.
Thirty years after its euphoric launch, the โOslo peace processโ between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) stands as the worst calamity to have afflicted Israelis and Palestinians since the 1948 war, and the most catastrophic strategic blunder in Israelโs history. By replacing Israelโs control of the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians with corrupt and repressive terrorist entities that indoctrinated their subjects with burning hatred of Jews and Israelis, as well as murdered some 2,000 Israelis and rained thousands of rockets and missiles on their population centers, the Oslo process has made the prospects for peace and reconciliation ever more remote. By deflating the fighting spirit and combative ethos of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), it has weakened Israelโs national security and made the outbreak of a multi-front warโa scenario that effectively vanished after the 1973 warโa distinct possibility. By transforming the PLO (and, to a lesser extent, Hamas) into internationally accepted political actors without forcing them to shed their genocidal commitment to the Jewish stateโs destruction, it weakened Israelโs international standing and subjected it to sustained de-legitimization campaigns. And by deepening Israelโs internal cleavages and destabilizing its sociopolitical system, it has created a clear and present danger to the Jewish Stateโs thriving democracy, indeed to its very existence.
- Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos
- August 13, 2020
- Paper No. 1690
The recent visit of Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis to Israel was highly symbolic. This year marks the 30th anniversary of the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. It may well be possible for Jerusalem and Athens to cooperate with Turkey, though doing so will require all parties to be realistic about what is possible right now in view of the current state of relations with Ankara.
- Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos
- July 29, 2020
- Paper No. 1665
Ankaraโs moves in the Eastern Mediterranean, while very risky, have partly vindicated President Recep Tayyip Erdoฤan. At a time when his regime is faced with serious challenges at home, his Mediterranean adventures have been good for Turkey at the regional level. Other powers will have to consider how to respond to Turkeyโs moves. Washingtonโs lukewarm support for the trilateral partnership of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece, for example, has not met the high expectations of those countries, which continue to function as a pillar of stability in the Basin.
- Dr. George N. Tzogopoulos
- June 14, 2020
- Paper No. 1605
While the construction of the EastMed pipeline remains a key goal of the Israeli-Greek-Cypriot cooperation during the COVID-19 period, economic adjustments will have to be made. The US has yet to actively support the project, making its implementation difficult. In the interim, the three countries can expand their cooperation by concentrating on other areas such as the fight against the virus, the relaunching of their economies, the battle against antisemitism, and synergies in the defense sector and cybersecurity.
- Dr. Max Singer
- May 8, 2018
- Paper No. 825
Israel has neither the power nor the motivation to significantly influence the outcome of the war for control of all the pieces of Syria. Israelโs objective in Syria is to prevent Iran from building military facilities there that increase its ability to attack Israel. The only way Israel can achieve this is by destroying any such facilities that Iran builds, or by convincing Iran not to build any threatening facility out of fear that Israel will destroy it.ย ย
- Dr. Spyridon N. Litsas
- March 11, 2018
- Paper No. 765
The Eastern Mediterranean has entered a new period of high volatility, with Israel and Greece in the eye of the storm. Both countries are facing an upgraded strategic challenge from Turkey and Iran. This is not simply an interstate problem but a broader crisis that will influence the future geostrategic physiognomy of the Eastern Med.