Maj. Gen. Yisrael Ziv, Head of the IDF Operations Branch:

"Syria's game of doublespeak will have to end one day soon"

Together with IDF History Department, the BESA Center hosted a November conference on "Israel and Protracted Wars," looking at lessons to be learned from the fedayeen attacks of Israel’s early years, the War of Attrition, the struggle in south Lebanon, and the first (1987-90) and second (2000-2004) Palestinian uprisings.


Also participating were Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Shay, head of the IDF Military History Dept., Dr. Zeev Drori of Ben-Gurion University, and BESA Center experts Dr. Avi Kober, Dr. Ron Schleiffer and Prof. Efraim Inbar.

Brig. Gen. Golan warned that the Hizballah posed a real danger to Israel for the long term – and not just in Lebanon. At least 30 percent of the terror attacks in Judea and Samaria, he said, are today sourced in the money or operational assistance of Hizballah. This organization has thousands of Iranian-supplied missiles, spread across southern Lebanon, with the ability to hit Haifa.

He described Syria as "less a patron than a partner" to the Hizballah. "One day, we will have to deal with the Hizballah," Golan said, "and it won’t be a simple matter.”

Maj. Gen. Almog discussed the success of the border fence he built around the Gaza Strip, and its implications for IDF operations. "The fence around Gaza has been 100 percent effective in stopping Palestinian cross-border infiltrations into Israel, he said. "In response, the Palestinians adjusted their tactics, and increased their attacks on soldiers and civilians within Gaza, while beginning to launch rocket attacks over the fence against civilian targets in the Negev. As we move to complete the security fence around Judea and Samaria, this dynamic can be expected to repeat itself," Almog warned.


IDF Operations head Gen. Ziv confirmed Golan’s assessment, adding that Iran was directly involved in a recent Hizballah attempt to fly a pilot-less drone into Israel from Lebanon, and that “Syria’s game of doublespeak will have to end one day soon.”

NEW PUBLICATIONS

Economic Aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
by Dr. Gil Feiler (Hebrew)
(BESA Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 59)
Focuses on the Palestinian economy, the PA’s (in)ability to disconnect from the Israeli economy, Arab assistance to the PA, and Arab oil power in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Next Stage in Israel-Palestinian Relations
(BESA Colloquia on National Security No. 17, Hebrew)
This publication summarizes the content of a BESA Center conference in January 2004, including presentations on Arafat’s political legacy (B. Rubin), Palestinian civil war (S. David), the financing of Palestinian terror (G. Feiler), European Mideast policy (K. Becher), and the "two-state" solution (Y. Alpher, S. Sandler and A. Gilad).

Rabin and Israel’s National Security
By Prof. Efraim Inbar (Hebrew)

The Oslo War: A Tale of Self-Deceit
by Prof. Efraim Karsh
ISBN 0802117589

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by Dr. Hillel Frisch

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by Prof. Eytan Gilboa

No.3, February 27, 2005
The IDF and the Intifada
by Prof. Stuart Cohen

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Strengthening Strategic Ties with Turkey

Over the past decade, the BESA Center has conducted extensive and continuous strategic dialogues with military and academic experts from Turkey — presaging the trade and military industry relationships that developed from these talks, and foreshadowing the establishment of formal diplomatic and defense ties between Israel and Turkey.

In February, the BESA Center hosted in Israel its sixth annual “U.S.-Israel-Turkey Strategic Triologue,” co-sponsored by the Ankara-based Center for Eurasian Strategic Studies (ASAM) and the U.S.-based Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). The off-the-record talks focused on Iraq, Iran and trilateral relations. A public conference followed on U.S. Mideast policy, geopolitics in the southeastern Mediterranean, the Iranian threat, fighting terrorism, and Turkey’s EU accessions talks.

In January, the BESA Center and the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosted a conference on “Turkey: Whereto!” in memory of the late Israeli ambassador to Turkey, David Granit. Papers given at this conference focused on Turkey’s political system (Prof. Ersin Kalaycioglu of Isik University), Turkish Islam (Mr. Abdullah Bilici of Zaman newspaper), the political economy of Turkey (Dr. Gil Feiler), Turkish foreign policy (Prof Barry Rubin of GLORIA), and Turkish-EU relations (Prof. Amikam Nachmani of BESA). Mr. Ran Curiel, deputy director general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and Mr. Feridun Sinirlioglu, Ambassador of Turkey to Israel, delivered greetings.

Ali Çarkoğlu, an associate professor at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at Sabancı University in Istanbul, delivered the annual Madame Madeleine Feher European Scholar-in-Residence Lecture on “Public Opinion and Turkish Foreign Policy.”

Dr. Michael Radu of FPRI, Gen. (ret.) Ergin Celasin, former commander of the Turkish Air Force, and Dr. Armagan Kuloğlu (l. to r.) at the February strategic triologue.

Prof. Harvey Sicherman of the Foreign Policy Research Institute speaking at the February strategic triologue.
however, weren't willing to listen.”

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about the meaning of Oslo. It was the well-

Arafat was clear to his own people at all times
would continue to wear Israel down. Indeed,

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Karsh said that Arafat never intended to bring
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Karsh: "Are we Israelis any smarter, any more
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Palmer said that Arafat never intended to bring
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and Islamic Jihad as required by the Oslo

accords, and tacitly approved the murder of

hundreds of Israelis by these groups; created

a far larger Palestinian army (the so-called

police force) than was permitted by the

accords; reconstructed the PLO's old terrorist

apparatus, mainly under the auspices of Tanzim,

Fatah's military arm; and frantically acquired

prohibited weapons through the use of large

sums of money donated to the Palestinian

Authority by the international community for

the benefit of the civilian Palestinian population.

Karsh warned that the Taba talks conducted
under the auspices of Ehud Barak and Yossi

Beilin on the eve of Israel's 2001 elections
put Israel in an even worse position than the

infamous Camp David talks of summer 2000.

"At Taba, the PA was given most of the West

Bank, plus land within pre-1967 Israel, and

some 'right of return' for refugees!

Karsh: "Are we Israelis any smarter, any more
cautious today? Or will we once again be
swayed by visions of peace and by international

pressure to 'build-up' Abu Mazen without
really forcing him to dismantle the terrorist
groups?"

Prof. Asher Susser of the Dayan Center
explained that Abu-Mazen was
concentrating power within Fatah, while
seeking to reach an agreement with Hamas.

"Muhammad Dahlan will be Abu-Mazen's
enforcer; and Dahlan will be Marwan
Barghouti's rival for PA leadership in the
future," Frisch predicted.

Parliamentary elections pose a real problem
for Abu Mazen, Frisch explained. Fatah wants
more time to reorganize and hold internal
elections before going to a broader vote, while
Hamas is demanding early parliamentary
elections.

Frisch agreed with Susser that Abu Mazen
would not compromise with Israel on basic
issues. "Abu Mazen will not settle for anything
less than what is promised in the Geneva
talks. His strategy is: Geneva or nothing. Thus,
Israel should not be so quick to rush into
negotiations," he said.

Sharon's strategy, Inbar explained, was to avoid
bringing the PA to a state of complete collapse
and to pay lip service to the notion of
a Palestinian state while intending to prevent
the establishment of a Palestinian state far
into the future. Inbar himself spoke in favor
of an arrangement whereby Egypt and Jordan
would assume greater-than-ever responsibility
for the territories, essentially bringing about
the separation of the West Bank from Gaza
over time.

Profs. Efraim Karsh, author of Arafat's War

The Palestinian war of terror against Israel
launched in 2000 is “a direct and inevitable
consequence of the 1993 Oslo accords – the
worst blunder in Israel's history,” according to Prof. Efraim Karsh, who heads
the Mediterranean Studies Programme at
King's College London. Of particular concern
to Karsh is the degree of Israeli self-delusion
that allowed Arafat to develop his military-
terrorist infrastructure. "With the benefit of
hindsight, the extent of the Israeli leap of faith
in Oslo appears nothing short of mind-boggling."

Karsh said that Arafat never intended to bring
about the establishment of a Palestinian state
in the West Bank and Gaza. Rather, “he sought
to establish a base from which the Palestinians
would continue to wear Israel down. Indeed,
Arafat was clear to his own people at all times
about the meaning of Oslo. It was the well-

known ‘strategy of stages’. Israelis enraptured
with Peres’ notions of a ‘New Middle East’,
however, weren’t willing to listen.”

In his book, Karsh writes that from the
moment of Arafat's arrival in Gaza in July 1994,
the PLO chieftain set out to build up an
extensive terrorist infrastructure in flagrant
violation of the Oslo accords. He systematically
failed to disarm the terrorist groups Hamas

and Islamic Jihad as required by the Oslo

accords, and tacitly approved the murder of

hundreds of Israelis by these groups; created

a far larger Palestinian army (the so-called

police force) than was permitted by the

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apparatus, mainly under the auspices of Tanzim,

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"At Taba, the PA was given most of the West

Bank, plus land within pre-1967 Israel, and

some 'right of return' for refugees!"
After the U.S. Elections: American Politics and the Middle East

Just two days after the November U.S. elections which catapulted George W. Bush to a second term as U.S. president, the BESA Center convened a select group of experts to survey the scene and consider U.S. policy options in the Middle East. Among the speakers were: Professors Amatzia Baram, Eytan Gilboa, Robert Lieber, Joshua Pollack, Barry Rubin and Max Singer, along with Ambassador Yoav Biran, Dr. Erin Lerman and Mr. Zvi Rafiah. AIPAC Israel Office director Wendy Singer gave a closed briefing on the newly-elected U.S. Congress and the congressional agenda.

Prof. Eytan Gilboa of the BESA Center said that the Middle East is high priority for the second Bush Administration. "Bush has to win and get out of Iraq, within two years. Iran is also a ticking (nuclear) bomb. Both of these issues are higher priorities than the Arab-Israeli conflict," Gilboa posited. Prof. Amatzia Baram of Haifa University predicted marginal "but sufficient" American success in Iraq, and said that the administration needs to significantly advance the pace of economic development in Iraq.

Col. (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman of the American Jewish Committee said that "Bush is no longer fixated on Iraq. He is getting around now to Iran, and will start pressing Iran through diplomatic, economic and other inducements." He warned of severe repercussions to the global economy from disruptions in the flow of oil should a military attack be launched on Iranian nuclear facilities.

In a live teleconference hook-up from Washington (courtesy of the U.S. Embassy), Washington defense consultant Joshua Pollack warned that the U.S. has very few good policy options for dealing with Iran.

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Creative Peace Proposals for the Future: How About a Three-Way Land Swap?

In December, the noted geographer Prof. Yehoshua Ben-Arieh presented at the BESA Center his proposals for a three-way land swap involving Israel, Egypt and the Palestinian Authority.

Ben-Arieh, a former rector of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, suggested that the Egyptians give the Palestinians territory along the Mediterranean in the Sinai Desert in order to allow for the economic development of Gaza and help ensure the emergence of a viable Palestinian state.

In exchange, Israel would transfer a piece of territory in the southern Negev to the Egyptians and allow the paving of a road directly connecting Egypt to Jordan – something the Egyptians have long desired. In the third leg of Ben-Arieh’s proposed land swap, the Palestinians would cede to Israel territory in Judea and Samaria (presumably allowing Israel to maintain settlement blocs in the area).

The BESA Center invited three individuals to comment on Ben-Arieh’s proposals: Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit, a former chief of IDF military intelligence; Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan, a former IDF deputy chief-of-staff and national security advisor to the prime minister; and Mr. Yisrael Harel, former chairman of the Council of Communities in Judea, Samaria and Gaza.

Gazit welcomed the land-swap principle, but noted that Ben-Arieh’s plan does not address the central Palestinian demand for refugee “return” to the West Bank. The central political problem with the plan, in his view, was Egypt. "The Egyptians will do nothing to help Israel out of its dilemmas," he said. "They’ll be responsive, if at all, only to American and European pressure and inducements."

According to Dayan, the National Security Council studied the possibility of land swaps in 2001-02, and rejected the concept. "It’s like asking a member of the family to donate his liver or another organ to bring about family peace," he said.

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continued on page 5
Studying the Strategic Legacy of Yitzhak Rabin

Former Mossad Director Efraim Halevy:
"The Oslo Accord was as full of holes as Swiss cheese, force-fed to Rabin by Peres"

To mark publication of the Hebrew edition of Prof. Efraim Inbar’s book Rabin and Israel’s National Security (Tel Aviv: Israel Ministry of Defense Publishing House, 2004) the BESA Center convened an October conference to further study the late prime minister’s strategic legacy.

The main speaker at the October conference on Rabin’s strategic legacy was former Mossad Director Efraim Halevy, who critiqued the Oslo Accords as “full of holes as Swiss cheese, force-fed to Yitzhak Rabin by Shimon Peres.”

“Some top government officials who were kept in the dark during the secret Oslo talks were deeply insulted when the agreement was revealed. I wasn’t,” said Halevy. “I was glad not to have been part of this deeply-flawed accord.”

On the other hand, the almost blind faith in the power of the accords to transform the conflict and the willingness to forgive almost any Palestinian transgression of the accords – hallmarks of Shimon Peres’s camp -- increasingly made Rabin uncomfortable. Because he was murdered, one can only speculate as to how long Rabin would have countenanced PA violence before halting the process.”

The landmark book draws on unpublished materials and interviews with important sources, including Yitzhak Rabin himself, to offer a systemic study of the late prime minister’s strategic thinking. When first published in English six years ago (Johns Hopkins University Press and the Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1999), the book was awarded a prize of distinction by the Israel National Committee for the Commemoration of Presidents and Prime Ministers. Haaretz lauded the updated 2004 Hebrew version of the book as “an illuminating analysis of the road of Rabin from 1948 to his last day.”

What should Israel do today? Dayan: “Continue with unilateral redeployment and the building of the security fence. Retain key settlement blocs and the Jordan Valley. Block any advancement of the dangerous Geneva Accord or any agreement that would allow in Palestinian refugees.”

Yisrael Harel rejected the entire concept of Israeli land concessions, arguing that a never-ending dynamic was being created which would demand increasingly greater Israeli withdrawals. "What will happen if and when Israel withdraws to the 1967 lines?" asked Harel. "With 3.5 million people on 5,500 sq. km. of land, the Palestinians will draw in other Palestinian 'refugees' from elsewhere in the Arab world, and by the year 2020 their number will reach 9 million. They will then demand more land of Israel, and no 'fence' will be able to block this demand." Harel’s proposal: Connect the 96 percent of Palestinians now living on 42 percent of the land in the West Bank with the Kingdom of Jordan. “That is their state.”

Dayan wanted to launch an “Israeli road map for peace” in response to famous President Bush’s June 2002 Mideast policy speech, “but Sharon, Peres, Lieberman and Lapid were all opposed,” Dayan recalled.
Palestinian national movement has propagated to break away from the psychological mold the Tragically, Palestinian society seems to enjoy and savor gory images of maimed Israeli with the severed limbs of dead Israeli soldiers, sickening sights of Palestinian militias playing We are confronted by a society that is table were unsuccessful. All political attempts to shift the chances for a cease-fire, but failed to implement may be. The Palestinians received innumerable and Israel's countermeasures, harsh as they blame for the morally despicable acts of terror after September 2000. It is they who are to chosen the path of violence, particularly so moral responsibility. The Palestinians have yet have to confront the terrorists militarily. In this context, the BESA Bulletin offers its readers a rare peak inside the BESA Center, where the researchers engage in considerable closed-doors debate on Israeli policy. One such debate, between professors Efraim Inbar and Stuart Cohen about the ethics of Israeli retaliatory policy, spilled onto the pages of The Jerusalem Post, reprinted below.

Stop Saying Sorry
by Prof. Efraim Inbar

Israel's Foreign Ministry and the IDF Spokesman almost automatically issue statements of deep sorrow when a military operation results in Palestinian civilian casualties. Such apologetic responses are echoed by Jewish organizations abroad, magnifying the impression that Israel has done something wrong.

Such statements are usually viewed as a hypocritical ritual. Nobody really takes them seriously. Moreover, this Pavlovian instinct to apologize is counterproductive since it implies an acceptance of responsibility for those losses. This is the usual message conveyed by the international media.

Yet the Palestinian losses are clearly not Israel's moral responsibility. The Palestinians have chosen the path of violence, particularly so after September 2000. It is they who are to blame for the morally despicable acts of terror and Israel's countermeasures, harsh as they may be. The Palestinians received innumerable chances for a cease-fire, but failed to implement a single one. All political attempts to shift the Palestinians from violence to the negotiation table were unsuccessful.

We are confronted by a society that is mesmerized by bloody attacks, relishes the sickening sights of Palestinian militias playing with the severed limbs of dead Israeli soldiers, and savors gory images of maimed Israeli bodies, victims of a bus explosion.

Tragically, Palestinian society seems to enjoy even the sight of its own dead. Rather than break away from the psychological mold the Palestinian national movement has propagated so successfully for years it seems to prefer the role of victim. Israel's apologies only reinforce such a dysfunctional preference. In all probability, in view of the way they cynically use civilians in the war, the Palestinian militia leaders hardly shed a tear for their own casualties. They send children to detonate themselves among Israelis and use civilians to shelter their gunmen. Palestinian terrorists disregard all rules of civilized combat by using schools, hospitals and mosques as sanctuaries and smuggling explosives in Red Crescent ambulances, clearly endangering the safety of their own sick.

They fully understand that the international press loves pictures of bleeding mothers and kids and have no qualms about providing eager pro-Palestinian journalists with them. Many of the incidents involving civilian casualties are in fact carefully staged productions.

The Palestinians excel in the conduct of psychological warfare – a euphemism for successful lying and false impressions about the nature of the violent conflict in which they are engaged. They are excellent students of Nazi- and Soviet-style propaganda. Accidental Palestinian civilian casualties of Israel's self-defense measures add fuel to the widespread psychotic hatred of Jews; yet they are the result of a strategic folly partly orchestrated by the Palestinian leadership.

It is Yasser Arafat and his lieutenants, together with the leadership of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, who have not lifted a finger to change the disastrous course taken by Palestinian society. It is they who bear the main responsibility for the suffering of their compatriots, while Palestinian society at large bears the rest because it does not rise up against this leadership. Moreover, the Palestinians are to blame for much suffering in Israel.

So Israel is ill-advised in expressing regret. What it should do is expose blatant Palestinian lies to the press; and in those cases where it is clearly established that casualties were the collateral damage of justified military activity, Israel should point out systematically that all casualties are the result of Palestinian terrorism. The Palestinians do not deserve any apologies – just condemnation for their outrageous behavior.

These repeated apologies are also counterproductive in a strategic sense. Expressing sorrow and extending sympathy projects softness, when what is required is an image of determination to kill our enemies. Only such an image can help Israel acquire a modicum of deterrence against the bestiality on the other side.

In contrast to Palestinian society, Israel has never demonstrated joy over the death of its enemies. While most Israelis probably feel some empathy for the plight of innocent Palestinians, the bitter truth is that the costlier the violent struggle becomes to the Palestinians, the greater the chance of seeing an end to the terrorist campaign against Israel.

War is a competition in inflicting pain, and the Palestinians must bear pain in even greater dosages than they have become accustomed to. This is the main lesson from Egypt's decision to disengage itself from the military attempts to destroy Israel. Only when the price of continued conflict became unbearable for the Egyptian elite following several bloody wars did President Anwar Sadat come to Jerusalem. The calm along the Egyptian-Israeli border is predicated on a strong Israel and an Egyptian evaluation that a military adventure might be too costly.

Implanting a similar cost-effect appraisal within the Palestinian collective consciousness is the strategic goal of Israel's military efforts. Palestinian casualties of all kinds are therefore the necessary condition for putting an end to Palestinian terrorism. There is no reason to apologize for trying to bring about peaceful coexistence.

(May 29)
Why We Have to Say We’re Sorry
by Prof. Stuart Cohen

My colleague, Jerusalem Post columnist and political science professor Efraim Inbar, advises both Israelis and Jews abroad to stop issuing statements of regret whenever an IDF military operation results in civilian Palestinian casualties. Such apologies, he maintains, send the wrong message: “What is required is an image of determination to kill our enemies.”

That argument is seriously flawed. It is based on a false reading of the realities of the wider world in which Israel lives. It also entirely ignores the domestic costs that Israeli society would undoubtedly incur were Inbar’s advice to be followed. A less emotionally-charged analysis points in an entirely different direction.

Obviously, Israel must continue to employ whatever force is required to uproot the evil of Palestinian terrorism and destroy the gang of criminals who are its perpetrators and instigators. At the same time, however, Israel’s own interests mandate that even while we punish the guilty, we also feel and express remorse whenever IDF actions harm Palestinian noncombatants. That conclusion is not only mandated by Judaism’s heritage of moral sensitivity; it also reflects two utilitarian considerations.

First, there are the contours of Israel’s strategic horizon. These cannot be restricted solely to the narrow confines of the Israeli-Palestinian battlefield. Only a disarmingly narrow-minded view of the world can disregard the policies and interests of Israel’s principal strategic partners: the United States, Turkey and India. And only a naively obtuse analysis refuses to recognize that those policies are increasingly swayed by international public outrage over what is widely considered to be Israel’s bullying insensitivity to Palestinian pain.

We will get nowhere by simply bemoaning the fact that Israel is the victim of double-standards. Hard-headed realism demands that we think more rationally. If the only friends we have expect us to openly apologize for “collateral damage,” then that’s what we shall do. We don’t need the Turkish premier to warn us that the probable costs of not doing so far outweigh the very uncertain benefits.

The second reason why Israelis should continue to feel and express genuine remorse over unintended Palestinian deaths is even more compelling. We need to do so in order to remind ourselves that, notwithstanding the horrors of the struggle forced upon us, we can and shall retain our commitment to humanitarian norms of behavior.

Ethics aside, even at the level of grand strategy—properly understood—this is surely a far more salient message than is a brutal posture designed to signal indifference to the pain of the other side. What is at stake, in the last analysis, is the complexity and quality of the entire fabric of Israeli life.

As recent reports of the alleged behavior of individual border police officers indicate, this war might already have seriously scarred some of our youth. For our own sakes we have to take every step possible to stop that rot.

Not to apologize for the unnecessary and unintended deaths of our enemies is to run the risk of a domestic spillover—in which Israeli society runs the risk of becoming inured to violence against Arabs and Jews within our borders.

http://www.besacenter.org
"The Israeli mainstream thinks that Arab women have remained in the 16th century. This is simply not right. Arab women in Israel are pioneers of the Arab world. When you see Arab women as modern, and understand that they want to be a part of the Israeli experience, it could improve prospects for coexistence."
-- Dr. Mordechai Kedar,
Christian Science Monitor, April 14, 2004

"Targeted killing by Israel of Hamas leaders has a threefold aim: to decapitate Hamas, causing it to writhe ‘like a snake without a head’; to force its leaders to spend more time worrying about safety than planning attacks; and to improve the climate for recruiting collaborators by sowing dissension in the organization."
-- Maj. Gen. Avraham Rotem,
Philadelphia Inquirer, April 20, 2004

"Even with leadership underground and its mid-level ranks decimated by assassinations, Hamas’ secretive cells still have the operational capacity to mount suicide attacks. Right now they are less interested in small attacks—they would like to carry out a mega-attack."
-- Dr. Gil Feiler,
Los Angeles Times, June 21, 2004

"Factional fighting within Fatah has so far been couched in euphemisms because Arafat remains a figure of at least respect if not reverence among most Palestinians. While the factional fighting continues, Hamas is waiting in the wings to collect the goodies."
-- Prof. Efraim Inbar,
New York Times, July 21, 2004

"The Palestinian experiment has failed miserably. In more than 75 years, it has failed to create a responsible political leadership, nor will it apparently succeed at this task in the foreseeable future."
-- Prof. Efraim Inbar,
Financial Times, August 18, 2004

"Sharon doesn’t like to be blackmailed. If Netanyahu and the NRP leave the government, Sharon will have no choice but to go to elections."
-- Prof. Shmuel Sandler,
Washington Post, October 31, 2004

"In terms of Israel’s options in making a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities, we have to ask: What is the reliability of the intelligence picture? What would be the response of the opponent? What is the point of no return in terms of nuclear development, and what would be the international response?"
-- Dr. Dany Shoham,
Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2004

"After Arafat’s demise, Sharon’s going to say, ‘I’m waiting for my partner, and there’s only one provision—dismantle terrorist organizations—and I doubt that any Palestinian leader can deliver that.’"
-- Dr. Hillel Frisch,
Washington Post, October 30, 2004

"In the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the track record of non-governmental organizations has been abysmal. Like the United Nations, today they’re part of the problem, not the solution. With their multi-million-dollar (and euro) budgets, superpowers such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, Christian Aid, Oxfam, and dozens of smaller allied groups in the region have contributed to incitement to terrorism—when they should support reconciliation."
-- Prof. Gerald Steinberg,
Wall Street Journal Europe, January 10, 2005

Research News

Stuart Cohen has been awarded a three-year grant by the Israel Science Foundation for his current research into "The Rediscovery of Warfare in Contemporary Jewish Law", an innovative study of the ways in which contemporary rabbis in Israel are confronting the challenges posed by Israel's military experience. He published "Dilemmas of Military Service in Israel: The Religious Dimension" in The Torah U-Maddah Journal (Vol. 12, 2004, published by Yeshiva U.).


Efraim Inbar published “Israeli-Turkish Relations – Business as Usual” in Seyfi Tashan (ed.) Contemporary Issues in International Politics (Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 2004), and “Israel-Turquos” in Outre-Terre: Revue Française de Geopolitique (No. 8, 2005).


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Shmuel Sandler published Bringing Religion into International Relations (with Jonathan Fox, New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004). He continues to edit the Jewish Political Studies Review and recently published a special issue on “Global Anti-Semitism” (16/3-4, Fall 2004).
