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Marking 25 Years to the Camp David Accords
Elyakim Rubinstein: “Palestinian Terror Makes Peace a Fantasy”

Last September, the BESA Center and the Menachem Begin Heritage Center convened a symposium on Palestinian-Israeli relations to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Camp David Accords that set the parameters for the Egypt-Israel peace treaty and autonomy talks with the Palestinians. Lecturers included Camp David negotiators Ambassador Meir Rosenne, Dan Pattir and Elyakim Rubinstein, as well as professors Shmuel Sandler, Gerald Steinberg and Eytan Gilboa.

Rubinstein’s revealing lecture drew significant attention. At the time he was the secretary of Prime Minister Begin’s cabinet. (After lengthy service in this post spanning the terms of five prime ministers, Rubinstein went on to become a judge, Attorney General, and most recently, a Supreme Court justice). Rubinstein decried the fact that Arab governments “had turned ‘Camp David’ into a ‘dirty word’ – signifying their disapproval of Egypt’s ‘separate’ peace deal with Israel”.

In remarks that drew Israeli headlines, Rubinstein related to the controversy ongoing to this day over the “promise” that President Jimmy Carter claims he received at Camp David from Prime Minister Begin to freeze settlement construction for the entire period of negotiations over Palestinian autonomy. Begin denied this emphatically, allowing that he had agreed only to a three-month freeze. “I recently checked with Supreme Court President Aharon Barak – who was the Israeli legal advisor at Camp David”, said Rubinstein. “He was in the room when Begin and Carter had this discussion; and Barak affirms Prime Minister Begin’s assertion”.

Rubinstein also lamented the state of affairs reigning in Fasser Arafat’s Palestinian Authority. “There is no authority and no rule of law over there”, said Rubinstein. “It is a legal jungle, where total wantonness applies. Arafat carries the blood of many on his hands. Only politics stops us from bringing him to justice as a war criminal.”

“The saddest thing of all – inexcusable, in fact – is that Palestinian terror has made us despair; terrorism makes peace seem like a mirage – a fantasy – to most Israelis”, continued Rubinstein. “For this, we can never forgive the purveyors of terror”.

BESA EXPERT OPINION

Gaza Withdrawal? Do it Right
by Prof. Efraim Inbar

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon seems intent to bring about a decision on unilateral withdrawal from Gaza. Any attempt to evacuate the thousands of settlers will be met with bitter resistance, undoubtedly reinforced by many thousands of settler supporters determined to make the withdrawal as messy as possible. Israel will face a rerun of the heart-breaking pictures of the 1979 struggle over Yamit. But this time the withdrawal has no peace quid pro quo – just the sober realization that the Palestinians are unable to deliver anything but the continuation of terror.

The wisdom of the disengagement will be judged by history. Yet if Israel decides to go through with the proposed plan, it is not too late to make several changes that will generate positive dynamics to its implementation. It is a big mistake to remove the three settlements in northern Gaza adjacent to the 1967 border. The dismantling of these settlements only reinforces expectations among the Palestinians and the international community that Israel will eventually withdraw to the 1967 borders. Continued on page 2.
It is counterproductive to repeat the dangerous precedent set by Menachem Begin in 1979. President Bush’s statement about demographic realities in the territories has to be put to the test immediately. Otherwise it remains meaningless, and we will be left with only the impact of total withdrawal.

Israel also should reconsider the decision to hold onto the Philadelphia corridor that serves as a wedge between Gaza and Egypt. This corridor will continue to attract considerable Palestinian military efforts and generate tension and casualties. The position that Israel should control all entries into Gaza is not tenable in the long run.

Furthermore, creating contiguity between Egypt and Gaza bestows certain advantages. An opening to Egypt might serve as a demographic safety valve for the Palestinians. The diversion of the demographic pressures of heavily populated Gaza toward Egypt, and the prospects of a Hamas state there, might force Cairo to adopt a more assertive role in the evacuated territory.

Israel has an overwhelming interest in breaking the link between Gaza and the West Bank. With over one million Palestinians in the Egyptians’ lap, the Palestinian issue would take a different form, even making it Egypt’s responsibility to establish a Palestinian state in Gaza – although they might refrain from doing so in accordance with their behavior when Gaza was under their control (1948-67).

While Cairo is not inimical to the Palestinian bleeding of Israel, it has a peace treaty with us and is susceptible to American pressure. That might limit its nuisance potential.

The Israeli search for international agencies to take over the property and infrastructure to be left behind in order to bring about some equitable distribution is misguided. It is unlikely that any humanitarian organization would be able to withstand the pressure of the Palestinian gangs trying to take over the houses of the Jews and loot whatever was left. Moreover, involving international organizations has never served Israel well; it just complicates Israel’s freedom of action. Flirting with notions of cooperation with international relief organizations reflects naive thinking about the nature of international relations.

Finally, Israel’s intention to continue with existing arrangements in supplying electricity, water, gas and fuel is unwise. So is a decision to allow Palestinian access to the Israeli labor market, which should be denied. Let the ungrateful Palestinians look for work in Egypt, or elsewhere.

Unilateral withdrawal is the opportunity to depart from policies that have allowed the Palestinians to wage war de luxe. Our attempt to differentiate between the civilian population and the terrorists in order to limit support for violence failed, inevitably Israel could never implement a strategy of winning Palestinian hearts and minds because Israeli carrots could never overcome the intimidation applied by Palestinian terrorists’ sticks.

Following our withdrawal, the Palestinians in Gaza should suffer. This is the only way to dissuade them from viewing Israeli withdrawal as capitulation.

Indeed, Palestinian polls show that at least two-thirds of the Palestinians see Sharon’s withdrawal plan as a victory for their armed struggle “against the occupation.” Therefore, demonstrating that the Palestinians are even in worse shape after the Israelis leave Gaza is essential to discourage terror and maintain a modicum of deterrence.

Withdrawal accompanied by significant deprivation is not only what the Palestinians fully deserve for their incredible anti-Semitism and support for the terrorist campaign against Israel; it also makes strategic sense.

In the absence of Palestinian willingness to enter into a dialogue with Israel that might lead to a reasonable territorial compromise, inflicting pain is the only way left for Israel to influence the learning curve of the Palestinian society and lead it into greater pragmatism. Considerable Palestinian suffering might lessen the pressure for additional withdrawals. This is the rationale of unilateralism.

(Adapted from The Jerusalem Post, April 25, 2004)

Klaus Becher, associate research fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, and visiting scholar at the BESA Center (under the auspices of the German Academic Exchange Service) lectured in January on “German Participation in International Operations Since 9/11: Military and Political Dimensions”.

Fiamma Nirenstein, correspondent in Israel for the Italian daily La Stampa and a lecturer in Mideast History at LUISS University in Rome, lectured in January at the BESA center on “The Dangerous Mix of Anti-Semitism and Anti-Zionism in Europe Today”.

Walter Russell Mead, Henry Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, lectured at the BESA Center in March on “Evaluating the Foreign Policy of the Bush Administration”. He said that “Bush has generally made the right decisions but needs to make better use of America’s ‘sticky power’ to ensure long term implementation”. He criticized the Clinton administration for “going for broke” at the Barak-Arafat summit at Camp David, leaving the Mideast “with nothing”. He argued that “America needs some sort of regional peace process –something that in the dark, if you squint, will at least look like a process; some forward dynamic that we can be for – even if peace is not in the offing!”

www.besacenter.org
The BESA Center Honors Zeev Bonen
BESA Center Researcher Caps Forty Years of Service in Israel's Military Industry

In May, the BESA Center convened a seminar on “Security-Related Technologies” to mark publication of Dr. Zeev Bonen’s new book Rafael: From the Laboratory to the Battlefield, which recounts his service to Rafael, the weapons development authority of the Israeli Ministry of Defense. Considered a founding father of Israel’s missile program, Bonen served Rafael for 35 years, and rose to become president and director-general. Bonen built Rafael into a first-class military industry employing more than 7,000 workers, including 2,000 scientists.

A Cambridge University Ph.D. and a senior research associate at the BESA Center, Bonen has been behind, or privy to, development of almost every indigenous Israeli weapon system over the past few decades – including the Python air-to-air missile, Popeye air-to-ground missile, Barak naval missile, and major systems in electronic warfare, anti-tank weaponry, electro-optics, ELINT, heavily-armored APCs, and more.

Former Israel Air Force Commander Maj. Gen. (res.) Eitan Ben-Eliyahu opened the seminar with a discourse on the interplay between advanced weaponry and air force tactics and fighting doctrine. Giora Shalgi, current Rafael director-general, spoke about Israeli national policy in weapons development. He argued that Israel needs to strike a balance between the safeguarding of key firms as national centers of excellence (such as Elta in radar development, El-Op in optics and Rafael in missiles) and a desire to open the military industries for competition. Immediately thereafter, former Defence Ministry budget chief Imri Tov spoke about the need to streamline the military industries.

Longtime Rafael Director-General Dr. Zeev Bonen, today a BESA Center senior research associate, responded to Meridor’s remarks, stressing that indeed Rafael always had strived to develop weapons systems that were flexible and dual-purpose, such that they could be configured to meet changing military contingencies. He warned against the trend in military industry to focus exclusively on profitability through export. “Profitability is a fine emphasis, as long as the industry stays well-attuned to the needs of the Israeli military. This has been, and must remain, Rafael’s main focus – responding to the IDF’s needs and winning Israel’s wars”, Bonen concluded.

Dan Meridor, a former minister, former chairman of the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and chairman of a national commission on reform of the military doctrine, spoke about the need of the political echelon to overcome the conservatism of military institutions and guide the military industries in focusing on the correct technological challenges – the challenges that Israel is likely to face ten years down the road.

Zeev Bonen responded to Meridor’s remarks, stressing that indeed Rafael always had strived to develop weapons systems that were flexible and dual-purpose, such that they could be configured to meet changing military contingencies. He warned against the trend in military industry to focus exclusively on profitability through export. “Profitability is a fine emphasis, as long as the industry stays well-attuned to the needs of the Israeli military. This has been, and must remain, Rafael’s main focus – responding to the IDF’s needs and winning Israel’s wars”, Bonen concluded.

BESA IN SINGAPORE
BESA Center director Prof. Efraim Inbar (at left) was received in the spring by the president of Singapore S.R. Nathan (center) for a strategic briefing on Mideast developments. At right is Barry Desker, director of the Singapore Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies.

STUDYING THE SECURITY FENCE
In January, BESA Center associates conducted a strategic tour of Israel’s security fence, accompanied by a senior commander of Israel’s Border Police and by the senior assistant to the Minister of Internal Security.
BESA Center Seminar

Intelligence and Security Policy in Israel

As part of expanding its research activities into the field of intelligence, the BESA Center convened a conference in March on ‘Intelligence and National Security in Israel’. The conference brought together former senior practitioners and experts of military intelligence to discuss the role of intelligence at critical junctures in Israel’s history. This conference focused on three periods in Israel’s past: 1948-67, 1967-73, and 1973-79. A future conference will examine the 1979-2004 period.

Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Shai, head of the IDF Military History Department, reviewed Israel’s local intelligence gathering capabilities in the Gaza Strip and its military applications during the years of constant ‘Fedayeen’ raids into Israel, in the early 1950s. Although Israel’s intelligence services were at the time small and inexperienced, Shai demonstrated how they quickly adapted to integrating intelligence and operations in countering the Fedayeen threat.

Dr. Yigal Shefi of Tel Aviv University’s Security Studies Program presented new findings on leadership in the Jordan Valley. (The IDF killed 150 terrorists, but over 30 Israeli soldiers were killed mainly in fighting with the Jordanian army during later stages of the operation). Michaelson argued that the IDF’s intelligence was excellent with regard to the PLO, but severely flawed in relation to the Jordanians.

Col. (res.) Amnon Biran provided a rare, fascinating look into intelligence planning of some of the IDF’s most secret military operations during the War of Attrition in the early 1970s, including commando raids deep inside Egypt. Col. (res.) Hagai Man, who was the intelligence officer of IDF Northern Command during the Yom Kippur War, described the key role that intelligence played in defeating the Syrian and Iraqi invading forces in 1973.

Dr. Shlomo Shpiro of the BESA Center, who coordinated the conference, delivered a lecture on Israeli-German intelligence cooperation. He described the assistance provided by the Mossad for German intelligence efforts in Eastern Europe, and the assistance provided by the IDF for German armaments projects in evaluation of captured Soviet weapon systems. He argued that the covert intelligence relationship has also enabled Israel to obtain important military technologies and hardware from Germany at relatively low cost.

Col. (res.) Dr. Efraim Kam of TAU discussed the difficulties faced by military intelligence in making the transition from wartime to ‘peace-time’ intelligence operations and the role of intelligence in political decision-making. Maj. Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit, a former head of IDF military intelligence, discussed the rebuilding of the intelligence branch after the Yom Kippur War disaster.

The keynote address was given by Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Malka, also a former head of IDF military intelligence, who examined the intricacies of day-to-day interaction between intelligence and politics, and evaluated the different attitudes held by successive Israeli prime ministers towards military intelligence; attitudes that ranged from disdain to almost complete dependence.

Col. (res.) Beni Michaelson, former head of the IDF Military History Department, delivered an in-depth account of the role of military intelligence in the planning and implementation of the controversial 1968 IDF operation in Karameh, aimed at eliminating the PLO leadership in the Jordan Valley. (The IDF killed 150 terrorists, but over 30 Israeli soldiers were killed mainly in fighting with the Jordanian army during later stages of the operation). Michaelson argued that the IDF’s intelligence was excellent with regard to the PLO, but severely flawed in relation to the Jordanians.

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Regional Demography Threatens Israel?

Dr. Yitzhak Ravid, a well-known defense analyst and a founder of the Center for Military Studies at Rafael, lectured at the BESA Center in June on “The Demographic Implications of Uncontrolled Population Growth in the Immediate Region”. His detailed lecture focussed on the populations of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Palestinian Authority.
BESA MARKS ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY
Dr. Thomas Hecht Honored at Jerusalem Reception

The BESA Center marked its tenth anniversary in March with a gala reception in Jerusalem honoring Dr. Thomas O. Hecht of Montreal, the center’s founder.

Attending the ceremony were many Israeli diplomats who in the past have worked closely with Dr. Hecht in advancing the pro-Israel agenda in America and Europe, including Ambassadors Yehuda Blum, Efraim Halevy, Meir Rosenne, Yitzhak Meir, Yitzhak Levanon, Alon Liel, Shalom Cohen, Yoram Ettinger, Daniel Gal, Harry Hurwitz and Jeremy Issascharoff. Canadian Ambassador to Israel Donald Sinclair and his wife Jill attended as well.

Reception guests lauded the BESA Center’s decade of achievement. Since its founding in late 1993, the Begin-Sadat Center has published more than 75 original research papers and seven books, and run more than 400 symposia, research seminars, conferences and international conferences. The center has earned international recognition for its work, garnering the support of foundations ranging from the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs to the Naumann and Adenauer Foundations (Germany), the Bradley and McCormick Foundations (USA), and NATO.

In many important policy areas, BESA Center has evinced strategic prescience – identifying issues of emerging concern far ahead of the pack. BESA Center researchers Professors Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, for example, were the first to generate a debate about the problematics of Palestinian statehood in important international publications such as the IISS’s *Survival*.

Dr. Gil Feiler was the first to study the politics of the Palestinian economy and the intricacies of international funding for the Palestinians. Dr. Danny Shoham, a biochemist with the Israeli defense ministry, published detailed studies warning of the dangers from Arab chemical and biological weapons, long before anyone else took note of the growing threat.

Prof. Efraim Inbar and Dr. Amikam Nahmani were pioneers in identification and development of Israel-Turkey strategic relations, a powerful partnership that has now become a linchpin of Mideast security. The extensive defense ties that now exist between Israel and India also were preceded by several years of rapprochement conducted mainly by Israeli academics from the BESA Center with colleagues from the Indian academic, defense and military establishments.

At the reception, Ambassador Blum and Dr. Hecht could be heard reminiscing about their youth in Bratislava and their close relationships with Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Hecht related that after the establishment of the fascist state of Slovakia by the Nazis in 1939 he and all other Jews were expelled from the public schools; and thus he became a classmate of Yehuda Blum’s in the Jewish School of Bratislava.

Their next meeting was 43 years later over lunch at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. The year was 1982. Blum was Israel’s ambassador to the U.N. and Hecht a member of Begin’s entourage attending his address to the United Nations General Assembly. “I recall that Begin was regaling us with vignettes from his recent meeting in the White House with President Ronald Reagan,” says Hecht. “The three of us were in awe of the distance each of us had traveled – from central Europe of the Holocaust years to the Prime Minister’s Office, the White House, the UN and leadership in the Canadian Jewish community.”

Prof. Stuart Cohen’s pioneer, in-depth studies of the changing relationship between Israeli society and the IDF now serve as the basis for IDF manpower policies and long-term force planning. Prof. Gerald Steinberg was among the first to warn of Iran’s accelerating drive for nuclear weaponry.

The BESA Center’s “National Strategic Plan for Efficient Use of Israel’s Limited Water Resources,” developed over two years by an interdisciplinary and inter-university team of experts at the BESA Center, was adopted by a cross-party parliamentary group as the basis for legislation on national water policy.
Will Europe Learn from its Middle East Failures?
by Prof. Gerald M. Steinberg

Europe’s policies towards Arab-Israeli peace efforts and promotion of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation have produced few if any successes. On the contrary, the evidence shows that these initiatives have been unrealistic and without credibility, while European-Israeli relations are characterized by intense confrontation.

The Venice Declaration (1980), the Berlin Declaration (1999), the “roadmap” and the embrace of the “Geneva framework” have all ended in failure. While the U.S. and Israel recognize that Arafat’s rejectionism will not change, Europe continues to demonstrate its support, undermining the possibility of replacement, thereby reducing Europe’s role even further.

These failures cannot be attributed to divisions within Europe -- this is one area in which there is a wide consensus. Instead, Europe’s failures result from policies based on myths and an ideological framework that is blind to the role of force in maintaining stability.

In a broad sense, Europe’s policy is based on the belief that stability in the Middle East will result from the creation of a Palestinian state. This theology was formed in the aftermath of the 1973 war and the oil boycott, and since then, Europe has consistently blamed Israel for the absence of peace, while ignoring the Palestinian goal of rolling back the 1947 UN partition resolution and the creation of Israel.

After the 1993 Declaration of Principles, Europe became the primary financial backer of Arafat’s Palestinian authority, turning a blind eye to corruption. European funded textbooks, activities of the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, and the PLO Negotiation Support Unit, were instrumental in promoting the Palestinian anti-Israel agenda.

Beyond such funding, Europe’s policies consist of a flood of declarations from Brussels, repeating fixed slogans, without substance. Serious policy evaluation is rare, reflecting the absence of a debate on core assumptions. The EU’s Institute for Security Studies published its first analysis of Arab-Israeli issues in 2003, repeating Europe’s dominant pro-Palestinian narrative, beginning with the 1967 war, erasing the Arab aggression of 1948, and claiming that the removal of post-1967 Israeli settlements and “occupation” will end Palestinian rejectionism and violence.

Demonstrations demonizing Israel are commonplace in Western European cities, and increasingly linked with anti-globalization and anti-Americanism.

This narrative produces distorted analyses and reflects a deep hostility to Israeli democracy. A report by the Centre for European Policy Studies claims that “Ariel Sharon’s promenade on the al-Aqsa esplanade [not Temple Mount or Haram e-Sharif - GMS] on 28 September 2000 dealt the final blow to the moribund Oslo peace process...Israel has carried on expanding settlements contrary to the Oslo agreement [these agreements do not stipulate the freezing of settlements - GMS] as well as reoccupying militarily the West Bank....The reoccupation, devastating use of force, curfews, closures, checkpoints, and human rights and humanitarian law violations, are resulting in a rapidly rising number of civilian Palestinian casualties.” This tendentious version patronizingly absolves the Palestinians of responsibility and ignores continued terrorism.

These policies are amplified by Europe’s Kantian ideology and faith in diplomacy’s ability to resolve conflicts through the Versailles model. As a result, Europe has opposed efforts to manage the conflict, while promoting unreachable “permanent status agreements”. However, in the Hobbesian Middle East, where force is employed for political and ideological objectives, European approaches such as “constructive dialogue” and trade incentives are ineffective.

Similarly, Europe is blind to “hard” security factors, such as Palestinian use of the Gaza airport to import weapons forbidden under Oslo. The EU also maintained the fiction of separate charitable and military “wings” of Hamas and Hezbollah, and the myth that Israeli military strategy against terror is “counter-productive.” Policy makers, journalists and academics dismissed the decline in Israeli casualties following “targeted killings”, and in December 2002, the European Council condemned Israel for “excessive use of force” and “extra-judicial killings,” declaring that they “do not bring security to the Israeli population”. Similar rhetoric came from European leaders after the attacks on Hamas leaders in 2004.

As a result, Europe has lost credibility among Israelis. The simplistic images of “Palestinian victimization” and Israeli power (“excessive use of force”) are dismissed, and terms such as “apartheid” and “racism” are seen as anchored in European biases, including anti-Semitism.

Europe is also guilty of “immoral equivalence” in comparing Israeli actions to protect its citizens with Palestinian terror. In response to the operation in Jenin against terror networks, Patten denounced the IDF for “trampling over the Geneva Convention...” The EU’s Institute for Security Studies has made the false claim that “the two parties considered that they would have more to gain from acts of violence than from negotiations and agreements.”

If Europe seeks to play a useful role, fundamental changes are necessary, including a rediscovery of Hobbesian realism. But as long as European politicians, academics and journalists are unable to question the myths and recognize their failure in the Middle East, there is little opportunity for change.

BESA Center Hosts its Ninth Annual Ambassadorial Briefing

Twenty-five ambassadors participated in the BESA Center’s June annual briefing for the diplomatic corp. Prof. Gerald Steinberg (r.) argued for unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, settlement leader Mr. Yisrael Harel (l.) argued against, and Dr. Hillel Frisch (second from l.) discussed Arab perspectives on the initiative. The session was hosted by Canadian Ambassador Donald Sinclair (second from r.), Prof. Efraim Inbar is at center. The BESA Center also hosts an annual strategic briefing for military attaches, and frequent ad-hoc briefings for visiting foreign government officials and military personnel.
An overflow audience of students, faculty, diplomats, military cadets and journalists packed the BESA Center’s January seminar on “The Next Stage of Israel-Palestinian Relations”. Headlining the seminar was the noted political scientist Prof. Steven David of Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore.

“A Palestinian civil war is not only desirable, it may very well be necessary in order for a stable Palestinian authority to emerge,” argued David. “History has shown us that civil wars often have a positive effect on nation-building. In the Palestinian case, the central authority must obtain a monopoly on power, ending the multiplicity of armed militias that currently run amok in the West Bank and Gaza. Palestinian society needs its Altalena”, he concluded, referencing Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s decision to establish firm central authority in the early days of Israel by blowing-up an Irgun arms supply ship (the Altalena) before it could dock in Israel.

In a wide-ranging talk on Yasser Arafat’s political legacy, Prof. Barry Rubin of the GLORIA Center warned that Western hopes for emergence of an alternative political leadership in the territories were illusory. “Arafat always will block the development of any alternative leadership,” he said.

Dr. Hillel Frisch of the BESA Center argued that Israel’s security fence and its effective counter-insurgency strategy in the territories is transforming the Israel-Palestinian conflict from a war of suicide-bomber penetration into a conflict along borderlines and fences. Thus, he said, Israel’s escalation strategy has basically worked in reducing the violence.

Mr. Yossi Alpher of “bitterlemons.org” argued that the “clock is ticking on the two-state solution,” unless Israel moves quickly to allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. Prof. Shmuel Sandler of the BESA Center argued for the de-linking of Gaza and the West Bank in discussions over the Palestinian future.

In his concluding address, Maj. Gen. (res.) Amos Gilad, Head of Politico-Military Bureau in the Israel Ministry of Defense, called for “patience”. “Israel has no credible Palestinian partner for peace at present”, he said. “The best we can do is manage the conflict, while taking measured unilateral steps to protect Israel without closing-off diplomatic options for the future”.

**NEW PUBLICATIONS**

- The Pax Americana and The Middle East: U.S. Grand Strategic Interests in the Region After September 11
  by Bradley A. Thayer
  (BESA Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 56)

- The Indian-Israeli Entente
  by Efraim Inbar
  (BESA Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 57)

- Palestinian Strategy and Attitudes
  by Hillel Frisch
  (BESA Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 58)

- Europe and Israel: What Went Wrong?
  by Dimitris Keridis
  (2003 Madeleine Feher European Scholar Lecture)

Publications available through the BESA Center at office@besacenter.org or Tel. +972-3-531-8959
RESEARCH NEWS

Stuart Cohen continues his ongoing study of relations between the IDF and Israeli society, and is developing a new research project on modern halachic attitudes towards warfare. He lectured on ‘The Future Structure of the IDF Reserve System’ at the Herzlya Conference on ‘The Balance of Israel’s National Security’ in December; and on ‘The Religious Dimension of Military Service in Israel’ at the 16th Orthodox Forum hosted by Yeshiva University in New York in March. He now heads the new MA program in security studies at the BIU political studies department, and a continuing education program for senior reserve officers in the IDF Ground Forces Command.


Avi Kohner initiated a workshop on the Iraq war for a forum of instructors from the IDF’s National Defense College, Command and Staff College and Tactical Command College. He lectured on the war in Iraq at an international conference on ‘TR and the Iraq War’ held at Haifa U. in November; and on ‘From Blitzkrieg to Attrition: Israel’s Attrition Strategy from the 1950s to the Second Intifada’ at the annual RSA conference at Haifa U. in May.


Dany Shoham published “The Islamic Chemical and Biological Weapons Threat” in D. Bukai (ed.) The Strategic Threat of Islam (New Leaf Press, USA), “Virul Pathogens of Humans Likely to be Preserved in Natural Ice” in S. Rogers (ed.) Life in Ancient Ice (Princeton University Press); and ‘Libya: The First Real Case of De-Proliferation in the Middle East?’ in Disarmament Diplomacy (No. 77, May/June 2004).

Shlomo Shpiro published “Intelligence, Peacekeeping and Peacemaking in the Middle East”, in Plate W. & de Jong B., Peacekeeping Intelligence (OSS, Virginia, 2003) He lectured on “EU-Israel Security and Defense Cooperation” at the Israel-Europe Policy Network, on “Intelligence Services and Political Transformation in the Middle East” at the annual International Studies Association (ISA) conference in Montreal.

Gerald Steinberg published “The Vanuatu Myths and Israeli Deterrence Policy” (JCPA April 2004), “Learning the Lessons of the European Union’s Failed Middle East Policies”, (JCPA January 2004), and “Where Credit is Due: Reclaiming Begin’s Contribution to Making Peace” (Menachem Begin Heritage Center). He addressed a meeting of the Middle East Academic Project, spoke at Chatham House in London on “Unilateral Disengagement”, at the University of Pennsylvania Sholom Asch Center on “Conflict Management vs. Resolution”, and at the annual academic seminar of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna.

The BESA Center invites research proposals on current strategic affairs from qualified academics and ranking military officials.