Russia – A Partner or an Adversary? A German View

By June 1, 1998

New BESA Publications 

Russia – A Partner or an Adversary?
A German View

Jorg Kastl
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University


On May 27 1997, Russian President Yeltsin and NATO Secretary General Solana signed in Paris the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security.1 Its preamble says: the Western Alliance and Russia do not regard each other as adversaries. This statement leaves one other question to be addressed: has Russia already turned from an adversary into a partner? George Smiley, the notorious British spy-master in John le Carre’s novel, The Secret Pilgrim, put it clearly: “can we ever trust the Bear?”2 Mr. Smiley gave two answers. The first one was “no, we can never trust the Bear, the Bear doesn’t trust himself.” His second one was: “Yes, we can trust the Bear completely. The Bear needs us so desperately that we may safely trust him to need us.”

I shall first give the reasons why the West needs Russia as a partner. I shall then show that Russia is suffering from an identity crisis and is therefore still a precarious partner. Finally, I shall ask whether the West can help tame the Bear.

Why do we need Russia as a partner?

In Europe there is no public speech on Russia in which you do not find the following sentence: “The security of Europe cannot exist without Russia.”3 Indeed, without Russia there won’t be a comprehensive disarmament of nuclear and conventional weapons; no barrier to the proliferation of ABC arsenals; no assistance in regards to unsafe nuclear reactors in Russia; no common efforts to fight international organized crime and drug traffic.4 Russia’s enormous geographical extension, its big population and wealth in natural resources makes it a “potential stabilizer of Eurasia.”5 If Russia forsakes its out-dated imperial illusions and concentrates all its forces on modernizing its backward society and economy, it will be of immense use to Europe, and particularly to Germany. If on the other hand, Russia were swallowed up by anarchy and chaos, this would do immense harm. In this case, Europe would have to look after its security without or even against Russia.

Russia deserves Western empathy. It weathered out the disintegration of the Soviet empire without blood-shed; it admitted Germany’s unification without one shot; it withdrew in time the armed forces from East Germany and the Baltic Republics; it let masses of Russian Jews and Germans emigrate. Although the Eastern empire is not yet an ideal democracy, its citizens can today think, say and print what they like, without fear of being sent to the Gulag.

Germany has specific reasons to look closely at what happened in Russia. The relations have been tragic, but they have also been fruitful. Over the last century German technicians, bankers and entrepreneurs contributed with their know-how and money to Russia’s development.6 Both nations can look back to mutually enriching cultural exchanges. At present, Germany is Russia’s first trading partner among the Western countries and its biggest individual financial creditor.7 President Yeltsin declared that Russia’s relations with Germany enjoy the first among all its other priorities.8 According to Federal President Herzog there is no alternative to partnership in German-Russian relations.9

Russia in quest of its identity

There has hardly ever been a society in the modern world that has experienced so deep a collective identity crisis as Russia’s towards the end of this century. It had been led to believe that the planet would one day belong to Communism. It had been proud of the huge empire. It had lived a shabby life, but it felt at ease as long as the neighbor didn’t fare any better.

And then, all of a sudden, Communism breaks asunder, and with it the empire and the economy! The new leaders, the canniest of the old nomenklatura, jump in time on to the train of history.10 They prescribe to the bewildered nation a turn by 180 degrees – a shock therapy in democracy and market economy. Above all, when privatizing collective property, they grab the tastiest and biggest part of the cake for themselves. The hitherto autocratic state loses its authority. Arbitrary government, infighting oligarchic clans, corruption, crime and anarchy are now rampant. The glorious Army, before the nation’s pride, is now an incompetent bunch of paupers.

 

The ordinary Russian faces growing unemployment and misery. In his eyes it is not Communist mismanagement, but the market-economy combined with democracy that is responsible for his decline. He may admire the “West” in many areas and hanker after its products, but the Western concept of a liberal market and society is for him now a dirty, “un-Russian” word. The Moscovite mental tradition wants the materialistic and individualistic West to be decadent and Russia to be spiritually and socially superior – the catch-words being: “dukhovnost” (spirituality) and “sobornost” (responsibility towards the collective).11

However, only 15 to 20 percent of the Russian population long for the restoration of the past. There is a deep gap between young and old, and between reformist cities like Moscow, Tver or Nizhny-Novgorod and the backward hinterland.12 Two-thirds of the generation between 17 to 26 years in such cities regard themselves as satisfied, and one third even hopes that the standard of living will improve this year. On the other hand, in less developed regions only 5% of the youngsters are satisfied. In this context, it is worth noticing that almost 90% of the respondents in this poll reject fascist ideas and less than 5% long for socialism.13 No, the Communists as a nostalgic alternative are dead.14

The man on the street is simply tired: his life has been too trying. In spite of unpaid salaries, prohibitive consumer good prices, the disastrous situation of the armed forces – he prefers calm to revolutionary change. At the same time, even at the cost of his fresh political freedoms, he longs for a “derzhava”, a powerful state, that would bring stability and order.15 The disdain for civic liberties is deep-rooted. Even such an independent mind as Alexander Herzen wrote in 1851: “Liberalism, as an exotic plant, cannot take roots in Russian soil !”16

We must understand: it is almost impossible to digest almost over night ideas and modes that people in other countries have been able to get used to over centuries. Unfortunately, the political class is equally ill-prepared to face soberly the reality around. Intellectuals and politicians alike are still thinking in patterns of Russia as a “great power” (velikaya derzhava) and in Bolshevik categories of “Kto Kogo” (Who against whom?). They are indulging in self-pity over the loss of the Soviet empire and accuse the capitalist “west” of having destroyed it in order to get hold of Mother Russia’s vast natural resources. It does not even touch their mind that it might be appropriate to start reflecting on Russia’s responsibility for the crimes committed in the past against its own citizens, against the former colonial subjects and against the so-called satellite countries.

Do the Russians belong to Europe? Only five percent in the regions west of the Ural clearly identify themselves as “Europeans”.17 This tiny enlightened elite belongs to business and, as stated earlier, to the younger generation. The overwhelming un-enlightened majority regards itself as neither European nor Asian, but as a hybrid – as Eurasians.

Rhetoric and deeds in Russia’s foreign policy

A country that in its present form is only six years old, a country in crisis – such a country is unable to steer right from the start a straight course in international affairs. Russia’s foreign policy since l991 can be divided into three phases. Russian politicians called the first phase the “romantic” one. This phase, during which Moscow “focused only on relations with the US”, lasted at the latest until 1993.18

But can one call “romantic” the way in which Russia treated the former Soviet Republics, the then “near abroad”? Its army interfered in the Moldavian province of Transdnyestria; it instigated the Abkhasians against Georgia, thus compelling Tbilisi to join the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and to accept Russian garrisons on Georgian soil; it exerted pressure on Azerbeidzhan by arming Armenian units fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh and intervened in the civil war in Tadzhikistan.19 Tension existed between Moscow and Kiev over the Russian minority, the sovereignty of the Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet and over borders. However, President Yeltsin managed to keep the tension under control – against hysterical outcries from the “patriotic” camp.

The second, “realistic” phase in Moscow’s foreign policy set in when Yeltsin had the unruly duma stormed and when “patriots” and Communists gathered the majority of votes in the ensuing elections. Responding to the reactionary trend, the Kremlin started stressing Russia’s national interest and “traditional” spheres of influence over the “near abroad”.

The tone became even more “realistic” and shrill when Central and Eastern European countries started knocking at the doors of the European Union (EU) and NATO. Since the Union of well-fed and self-satisfied West Europeans was unable for some time to let them in, they insisted with all the more impatience upon joining NATO.

The entire political class in Russia reacted irrationally. President Yeltsin proclaimed: “We cannot admit a new division of Europe.” He threatened with a “Cold Peace” in Europe. Russian generals, politicians and diplomats orchestrated a cacophony of even more dire threats. The loudest warning was that NATO expansion would result in a dramatic surge of the most violent nationalism in Russia.

These tactics bring to mind Soviet tricks, when in the early 80’s Moscow’s politruks launched a massive propaganda campaign against NATO’s decision to station tactical nuclear missiles in response to Soviet missiles SS 20 and 21. Their aim was to impress the adversary, either by threatening him or by foretelling fateful consequences for the internal stability of the USSR.

This trick did not work with NATO then nor did it do so with the Central and Eastern Europeans later. Moscow’s harsh words, the assault on the Duma and the blood-bath in Chechnya strengthened their doubts that Russia had turned into a domesticated Bear. But it was not only fear of Russia that drew them to the West. They regarded themselves as its integral elements and were sick of living any longer in a no-man’s land.20

The Eastern applicants received a mixed welcome from the Allies. The USA were the first to champion NATO’s opening towards the East. Germany was the second strong advocate. Federal President Herzog explained why: “If we do not stabilize the East, the East would destabilize us.”21 Indeed, Germany, situated hitherto on NATO’s Eastern fringe, needs for her own stability an internally consolidated and outwardly friendly environment. “Berlin is closer to Prague than to Munich, closer to Warsaw than to Brussels, and closer to Budapest than to Paris.”22 And it is definitely safer for Germany to help stabilize the other side of its Eastern borders in convoy with its allies than being forced to do it alone.

In addition to the moral motive, that Germany could not show the door to Czechoslovakia and Poland, the first victims of Nazi aggression, there was a decisive geo-strategic argument.23 The enlarged European house needs, to stay stable, the counterweight of the US. Exactly the fact that NATO can rely on America’s power makes it so attractive to the new applicants from the East. It allows for “involving Germany in a wider framework”, as stated by Mr. Brzezinski, former security advisor to President Carter. He argued that this “allows to cope with Europe’s central security problem of the 20th century: how to cope with the reality of Germany’s power.” Or as a German MP chipped in: “We wanted to bind Germany into a structure which practically obliges Germany to take the interests of its neighbors into consideration. We wanted to give our neighbors assurances that we won’t do what we don’t intend to do anyway.”24

Deeds against Rhetoric

The Founding Act between NATO and Russia, mentioned at the outset, offered the Russians a face-saving opportunity when NATO invited the Czechs, Hungarians and Poles to join the Alliance. Russia had to swallow the bitter pill, recognizing that it was too weak to fall back into open confrontation with the West. George Smiley had been right when suggesting that the Bear desperately needs Western capital, know-how and markets. And against all dire forecasts, public opinion in Russia took NATO’s decision with remarkable calm!

Foreign Secretary Primakov, a sharp bazaar-dealer, made the best of a bad situation when negotiating with a NATO team on each letter of the Final Act. The document contains all the elements of a Code of Good Behavior.25 A newly established Permanent Joint Council is “the principal venue of consultation between Russia and NATO.” It meets twice a year and operates by consensus.

By this opening Russia got the chance of cooperating ever more closely with the West. However, it got as well the chance to cause trouble within the Alliance. According to Henry Kissinger, NATO has hitherto been a family club, mastering most successfully its tasks: managing efficiently upcoming crises through open consultations with like-minded nations, and maintaining a credible system of deterrence. The center of allied decisions had been the Permanent NATO Council. With the new NATO-Russia Council in tandem, the distinction between the two may get blurred sooner or later, and for Russia it might be easier to play off one ally against the other.

The Act states clearly that neither side has a right of veto, but Russians sustain already that the council has an “effective veto for Russia.”26 Quarrels on how to interpret the text are likely to ensue. In November 1997, I listened to Mr. Primakov in Buenos Aires. He expressed satisfaction then with the first session of the new NATO-Russia Council, since further meetings would lead to a new NATO. I don’t like a NATO that is to Mr. Primakov’s liking.

The Two-Pronged Diplomacy

A third phase in Russian diplomacy began last year. It is characterized on the one hand by a growing degree of pragmatism and, on the other, by a sharpened anti-American bias. The decision-makers in Moscow are not only the President, the Prime Minister or Mr. Primakov; their decisions are influenced by the new oligarchs behind them. Each lobby brings to bear the interest of its respective trade – the follow-up organizations of the KGB, the energy lobby, the armaments industry or the big bank-bosses. This oligarchic lodge has obviously sensed that the country stands to gain by giving up, at least in passing, some of its most obvious losers.

At home, the constant exchange of invectives between government and parliament has turned into a round table affair where both sides condescend to mutual compromises.27 This change is due to the middle-of-the-road Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, and it is due to the legislators.28 The deputies have much to lose. While the canniest group of the old Party jumped, as I said, on time on to the train, the rest want “simply to jump back on the train with their comrades”, namely by striking private deals with the administration.29 If the President made true his frequent threats and dissolved the Duma, the deputies could not be sure to be reelected.30

As to the “near abroad”, Moscow’s imperial dream of resuscitating the old Soviet Union via the CIS has been dashed. Its immediate neighbors felt growingly irritated by its arrogant stand and are least persuaded of Russia’s good intentions. Early in January, five Heads of Central Asian republics declared their determination to seek direct access abroad for their oil and gas, independently from the CIS. In parallel, Georgia, the Ukraine, Azerbeidjan and Moldava moved closer together in a regional grouping. Moscow had as well to readjust its approach elsewhere. Peace in Chechnya has been preserved, in spite of provocative actions on both sides. A border treaty was signed with Lithuania. Negotiations on a friendship treaty with Rumania were initiated, plans given up to annex Byelorus and tensions relaxed in Transdnyestria, Nagorno-Karabakh and Tadjikistan.

When the NATO summit formalized the invitation to the three candidates at its Madrid Summit last July, it invited those states relatively far from Russia that have no reason to feel uneasy. On the other hand, regions close to Russia, as the Baltic Republics or the Ukraine, were only given the assurance that the Alliance stays open to other members later.31

Furthermore, NATO garnished the Founding Act with a garland of pretty gestures. Secretary General Solana and the Ukrainian President Kuchma signed a Charter on Partnership. The Charter grants no formal security guarantee, but it stresses at least the key importance of an independent Ukraine and adds with a hint at Russia, that no state is entitled to regard parts of the OSCE area as its sphere of influence.32

Quickly, Mr. Yeltsin signed with President Kuchma a Friendship Treaty that contains the usual range of vocabulary to be found in such documents.33 On February 27, he concluded an economic accord that opens the way for large-scale Russian investment in the Ukraine that might lead to its buy-out. Many Russians would not contradict a Moscow professor who confessed: “We all see the appearance of independent Ukraine as a temporary thing.”34

The Balts have justified reasons to seek NATO’s protection, since they had been part of the Soviet Union, are in part bordering Russian territory and have strong Russian minorities in their midst. Right from the start, Moscow made it adamantly clear that it would never tolerate the inclusion of these states into NATO.

President Yeltsin offered them last October a security guarantee instead, and invited other nations, such as the US, France and Germany to join a new security system. The Balts rejected the offer out of hand. They do not regard their big neighbor as a partner. The Allies acknowledged that to invite the Balts against Moscow’s stiff-necked resistance right from the start would have been an outright slap in its face. Thus, the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation simply stressed that they were serious candidates in the future.35

While most Europeans feared the Bear’s fury, President Clinton went farther than his allied friends. He signed a bilateral treaty with the Presidents of the three republics on January 16. The treaty is a valuable gesture, although it does not contain a security guarantee.36 The President could not have done more. He has to secure the admission of Poland, Hungary and Czechia in Congress and would risk a sharp nay from it, if he had tried to extend the American security guarantee to a vastly larger and more exposed area.

Returning to Russia’s two-pronged diplomacy: Towards the West, President Yeltsin began using the tactics of “bear-hugging almost any foreign leader available to be hugged.”37 He had started with his “friend” Chancellor Kohl; he congratulated President Chirac and praised him for his doubts regarding NATO expansion and for being as keen as Russia on creating a multipolar world system.38 Mr. Yeltsin courted, among others, Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto at a “summit without neckties”, exploiting Japan’s desire to profit from Russia’s energy and natural resources in the Far East, and aiming in the end at a Peace Treaty.39 He proclaimed a “strategic partnership” with China. And above all, Russia has been participating even before 1997 in the Bosnian peace-keeping units.

On the other hand, the competition with the arch-rival, the US, is sharpening. Russia feels more and more hurt by the advance of US influence in areas it had hitherto regarded as its classical hunting ground: the Balkans, and in particular the Caucasus and Central Asia. A big game has started for the exploitation of the energy resources there.

Russia struggles for a multipolar world, thus undercutting the US hegemony.40 However, it does it short of a show-down, for this would reveal its weakness and risk Western tolerance. Examples of this part of the “two-pronged diplomacy” are sudden round trips by Russian leaders through Latin America and Russian diplomacy in the Middle East.41 As we are now witnessing, Russian challenge of the US shows itself most acutely in Iraq. After Mr. Primakov excelled as “master mediator” and Mr. Yeltsin warned that Mr. Clinton was about to trigger off a world war, UN Secretary General Anan’s mission is now being celebrated in Moscow as a major victory.42 The gains of these tactics are obvious: they do not only yield applause at home, they help also restoring Russia’s international prestige and enhancing Arab sympathies.

Western reactions

Since the implosion of the Soviet Union, the Alliance has been in agreement: the reborn Russian state needed help and consideration. When NATO opened the door eastwards, it was self-evident: Russia needed help as well to save its face. The West endeavored to strengthen reform and democracy and did not see any alternative to President Yeltsin. It considered it more important to tie Russia into cooperation in arms control, than to take too seriously its increasing pin-prickings.

Chancellor Kohl became the foremost advocate of Russian desires and took pains to act as an interpreter of Moscow’s thinking in Washington. He proposed to allay Russia’s pre-occupations by making offers that satisfied its security requirements. But has Russia ever been rational in its unilateral security requirements? Has just this not been its historical tragedy?

The Russians are trying hard to convert the OSCE into the institution that should crown the new “European Security Architecture” and subordinate NATO to it as a regional alliance. To this end, they are urging upon a “European Security Charter” for that conglomerate of 54 haphazard states stretching from North America to Kirgisztan. European diplomats are supporting Russia’s demand for giving the Charter binding force under international law, even though this would curtail US influence in Europe.43

The Russians played so masterly their part of concerted indignation that some European allies feel obliged to soothe their anger and are hoping to integrate Russia into more cooperation within a network of international organizations.44 Against strong reservations Russia was pushed into the Council of Europe in Strasbourg. An Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between Russia and the EU came into force in December last. Russia is now member of the International Monetary Fund and of the World Bank. It has been accepted to the Paris Club of Western creditor states. With European support President Yeltsin, who is heading an underdeveloped country, that is unable to pay the salaries of its soldiers and employees, now sits as a respected No. 8 at the table of the G7, the club of the world’s most industrialized nations. The next step towards full recognition will be Russia’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) and OECD. In sum, the West has been rather benign in its concessions and full of confidence that it will be able to domesticate the Bear.

The conclusion: Russia – a precarious partner

True partnership is based on mutual calculability, understanding and compromise. Is Russia already compromising? Yes, signs of a growing sense of rationality can be noticed. But it is calculable? No, it is not yet! Most Russians still call in question the status quo in Europe. They do not challenge it openly today, but they dream of a change for tomorrow, that is as soon as they will have regained fresh strength.

How seriously can we take an autocracy with a mentally or physically frail autocrat as its head? The Russian constitution of 1993 has given all power to President Yeltsin, but the new tsar is either sick or absent-minded or suddenly exploding. The court around him is in disarray. When making statements abroad, he keeps his men at home busy to correct them.

In spite of some silver lining on the horizon, Russia is still in a deep economic, financial and social crisis. The man expected to run this sick empire lacks seriousness and clarity. In spite of his frequent announcements the urgently needed army reform is far away. There is no agrarian reform yet; the tax system continues to be in shambles. And, above all, the society still lacks the rule of law. As the Economist wrote, Mr. Yeltsin “seems to view declarations of intent as an acceptable substitute for action.”45 I may add: he is consistent only in so far as he knows to put the failure or absence of economic and political reform to the account of the scapegoats in his ever-changing cabinet.

There are unending rumors in Moscow about Mr. Yeltsin’s possible crown-prince, but the candidates change as swiftly as the ministers in his cabinet. Speculations about the future men in the Kremlin are entirely irrelevant, what is relevant is that the Bear continues being unpredictable.

It is therefore premature to count on the assumption that Russia will stay where it is today after six years of its existence: an incomplete democracy, but no dictatorship; uncomfortable, but dangerous only for its weakness; economically stagnant, but not anymore on a downward slope. Hopefully, all this may change for the better, but it may also change for the worse.

The Europeans in particular have done little to strengthen the enlightened minority, emboldening instead by their sometimes obliging posture the un-enlightened majority. They turned a blind eye to the Russian outrages in Chechnya; reacted with forbearance to the violation of the Treaty on the Reduction of Conventional Forces in Europe; they are patiently awaiting the ratification of the Start II Agreement by the Duma and are passing over in silence Russian pilferage of art treasures.

I conclude: First, as long as we cannot fully trust the Bear, the West will need a strong and cohesive NATO as a fire-brigade. Second, in any case, with Russia as a partner or without it, Europe will keep needing the US as guarantee of equilibrium. And third, the Europeans should start behaving accordingly and should stop indulging in illusions about a “security identity” of their own!

All the niceties the West has showered down on the Russians have hardly gained their respect or fully convinced them that they have to change their old-fashioned mind. Europeans must learn from them: it pays off to play the part of the ever complaining, ever demanding, of the very difficult client. They should make it understood: uncooperative behavior will have its cost and political and economic benefits must be deserved. Thus, Russians may learn one day to take realities into account.

 


Notes:

1. Internationale Politik (IP), Bonn, 9/1997.

2. John Le Carre’, The Secret Pilgrim, London 1990, 359 f.

3. e.g. Chancellor Kohl in Frankfurter Allegemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 3/12/1996 or Foreign Secretary Kinkel in Tagesspiegel (Tgsp.), 10/12/1996.

4. Former German Foreign Secretary Genscher at the German-Russian Forum in Bonn 19/2/1997.

5. Graf Lambsdorff in Moscow, 4/4/1995, Friedrich-Naumann-Stiftung.

6. Federal President Herzog in Moscow, 1/9/1997: Bulletin (Bull.) of the Federal Press Office, No. 71, p. 849, 10/9/1997.

7. Ibid.

8. FAZ, 2/9/1997, p. 1/2: President Yeltsin to President Herzog.

9. President Herzog before German-Russian Forum in Bonn, 16/2/1998, Bull. No. 14, 24/2/1998, p. 164.

10. Financial Times, 8/9/1997, p. 6.

11. G. Simon, Auf der Suche nach der “Idee fur Rusland”, Osteuropa, 12/1997.

12. Ibid., c.f. footnote 12.

13. FAZ, 13/2/1998, p. 12: Study undertaken on behalf of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation by the Russian Independent Institute for Social and Ethnic Problems.

14. Financial Times, 8/11/1997, p. 6.

15. Survey by the All-Russian Center of Public Opinion Studies in 1996/7: Transitions, Prague 10/1997, p. 4: To be sure, over 90% of respondents supported a genuine freedom of the press which they do not think exists given the control oligarchic economic lobbies exert over the media. 82% appreciated the freedom to travel abroad and 81% were for presidential, parliamentary and gubernatorial elections. A large majority also enjoy the right to own private property and laws protecting the individual from state intrusion.

16. A. Herzen, Briefe aus dem Westen, German translation, Nordlingen 1989, p. 336.

17. FAZ, 10/10/1997, p. 41: according to a poll quoted there.

18. Presidential advisor S. Karaganov, Financial Times, 8/9/11/1997, p. 4.

19. FAZ, 6/3/98, p.12.

20. J. Kastl, European Security without Russia?, Ausenpolitik, Stuttgart, 1/97, p.33 f.

21. President R. Herzog, Die Grundkoordinaten deutscher Aussenpolitik, IP, 4/1995, p. 7.

22. President Herzog in Berlin on 25/9/1997: Bull. No. 78/97, p. 917, 6/10/1997.

23. c.f. Einleitung zur Deutsch-Tschechischen Gemeinsamen Erklarung, FAZ, 11/12/1996.

24. NYT International, 7/12/1997, p. 14: German MP Karsten Voigt (Social Democrat).

25. IP, 9/1997, p. 76-84.

26. Ibid.: S. Rogov, Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada; FAZ, 20/10/1997, p. 6.

27. Tgsp., 28/12/1997, p. 2.

28. GUS-Barometer, No. 13, December 1977, p. 3.

29. Ibid.

30. FAZ, 4/10/1997, p. 1 f.

31. Bull., 31/7/1997, No. 64, p. 766, art. 6 & 8.

32. I.P., 9/1997, p. 114, art. 1 & 2.

33. I.P., 12/1997, p. 128-136.

34. Financial Times, 10/3/1997, p. 29.

35. I.P., 9/1997, p. 103 f.

36. Tgsp., 16/1/1998, p. 1; FAZ, 16/1/1998, p. 6.

37. Economist, 1/11/1997, p. 47.

38. FAZ, 19/9/1997, p. 13: Gleichgewicht und Hegemonie; FAZ, 26/9/1997, p. 1 f.

39. NYT, 3/11/1997, p. 4; Tgsp., 24/2/1998, p. 2.

40. I.P., 12/1997, p. 126-128.

41. La Nacion, Bs. Aires, 25/11/1997, p. 9; Mr. Primakov visited Brazil, the Argentine, Columbia and Costa Rica, Mr. Nemtsov Chile, Venezuela and Mexico.

42. FAZ, 5/2/1998, p.1.

43. FAZ, 20/12/1997, p. 7: The OSCE agrees upon a “Document Charter”.

44. W. Ischinge, Director of Political Affairs at the German Foreign Office: Nicht gegen Rusland, I.P., 2/1998, p. 33-40.

45. Economist, 14/2/1998, p. 29.