הגנה אקטיבית בפני רקטות וטילים: לקחי עופרת יצוקה ומלחמת לבנון השנייה

מלחמת לבנון השנייה ומבצע "עופרת יצוקה" הוו דגם בזעיר אנפין למלחמות העתיד. איראן וגרורותיה סוריה, החזבאללה והחמאס אינם משקיעים כמעט דבר במערכות נשק "קלאסיות" של מלחמה בעצימות גבוהה. במקום זאת הם בונים ורוכשים כמויות עצומות של טילים ורקטות. בכל מערכה עתידית יהיה העורף הישראלי כולו נתון למתקפה עזה של טילים ורקטות בעוצמה שלא ידענו כמותה. מאמר זה סוקר את אמצעי המענה של ישראל למתקפת הרקטות

An Offensive Strategy for Israel on the Second Battlefield: The Global Media

Israel requires an offensive strategic information strategy, involving the establishment of a "second-battlefield" professional hierarchy with clear modes of operation, in order to overcome brutal media delegitimizing of Israel.

The Mideast Axis of Destabilization

The Iran-Syria-Hizballah-Hamas alliance has acted during the last 15 years as an "axis of destabilization" in the Middle East, achieving major strategic victories at the expense of moderate Arab states, and US, European, and Israeli interests.

The Threat of Al-Qaeda and Its Allies in Lebanon

Clashes between the Lebanese army and the al Qaeda-affiliated Fatah al Islam organization in north Lebanon, and similar attacks against UNIFIL forces in south Lebanon, reflect the challenges of radical jihadi Sunni Islam on the stability of the country and the region. The Lebanese government's ability to face these challenges appears limited, with the degree of its success largely dependent on international support and the consent of local power brokers such as Hizballah and the Palestinians.

The Palestinians and the Second Lebanese War

Many have suggested that Israel's questionable military performance in the Second Lebanon War have impacted negatively on Israel's ability to deal with the Palestinians. However, in reality the recent war revealed that the tendency to see the conflict in broader terms, such as a clash of civilizations, is very much exaggerated.

The Second Lebanon War

There were five central problems in Israel's management of the summer 2006 war in Lebanon: adherence to the rules of "post-heroic" warfare despite its limitations; playing into the enemys hands; operation on the basis of false assumptions and beliefs; violation of basic military principles; and hesitancy on the part of Israel's leadership. The outcomes of the war can be seen on the battlefield, on the grand-strategic level, in terms of victory, and in longer-term perspective.

Strategic Follies: Israel’s Mistakes in the Second Lebanese War

Israel's political and military leadership was ill-prepared for the war against the Hizballah in the summer of 2006. A series of strategic mistakes on the part of Israeli leaders denied Israel a military victory and squandered an important opportunity to destroy the majority of Hizballah's military presence in Southern Lebanon, settle scores and enhance Israel's deterrence. Hopefully, Israeli leadership will be better strategically prepared so as to attain a clearly-defined victory in the next round.

Proportionality in the Modern Law of War: An Unenforceable Norm, or the Answer to Our Dilemma?

Proportionality has become a common term, widely used by human rights organizations, politicians, soldiers and laypersons, but its precise legal meaning is little understood. The goal of this paper is to clarify the parameters of the use of the term and identify the problems confronting attempts to apply it. The final section of the paper mentions various solutions to these problems and alludes to the concepts application in the context of the present war between Israel and Hizballah.

Time to Tame Syria

The current Israeli operation in Lebanon focuses on removing the threat posed to Israel by Hizballah missiles and on destroying Hizballah's military infrastructure. Israel's use of force is fully justified and proportionate, considering the magnitude of the threat. However, Israel should be targeting Damascus, as subduing Syria is the key to rolling back Hizballah and weakening Iran and its radical Islamist influence in the Middle East.