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Iranian nuclear program

Israel’s ship of state, facing rough seas, is at high risk and requires clearer rules of navigation. During this period of deep complexity, Israel will need to clarify its strategic direction. The terrorists of Hamas are the tip of Iran’s much larger spear. Israel’s current war against jihadist criminality could thus turn into a wider and more damaging war with Iran. Such a war could emerge as a “bolt from the blue” or incrementally. Ultimately, it could involve the United States, Russia, China, Pakistan, and/or North Korea. How might Jerusalem prevent or manage any such derivative conflicts? Israel must consider whether there is a productive role to be played by the “Samson Option.”
Samples recently collected by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors at two Iranian sites showed traces of radioactivity. Tehran had not reported any nuclear activity at these sites and denied IAEA inspectors access to them until just a few months ago. The findings suggest that Iran, in violation of the JCPOA nuclear agreement it signed in July 2015, has continued to conduct activities related to nuclear military development.
The recent killing of Mohsen Fakrizadeh, the “father of Iran’s nuclear program,” is another in a long series of attempts to disrupt Tehran’s dogged drive for nuclear weapons. These strikes, which have ranged over decades, have included the killings of Iranian nuclear scientists, cyberattacks on the Iranian nuclear program, and mysterious explosions at the regime’s nuclear sites. Yet no one, including the US, has conventionally attacked Iran’s nuclear sites despite the clear and present danger posed by a nuclear Iran to American national interests and general international security. Why not?
Tehran has announced it is withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear deal following the killing by the US of Quds commander Qassem Soleimani. It also stated, however, that it will continue to cooperate with the IAEA and expressed its willingness to return to the deal if the economic sanctions are lifted. This suggests that despite its repeated violations of the nuclear deal over the past year, Iran is reluctant to escalate conflict.
The new DG of the IAEA, Rafael Mariano Grossi, charged upon taking office on December 3 that Iran has not yet provided an explanation for uranium particles found at a Tehran warehouse. He also protested the abusive behavior of the Iranian authorities toward the IAEA inspector at the end of 2019. However, he has not addressed Iran’s violations of the 2015 nuclear agreement, suggesting that he would like to avoid an antagonistic relationship with Tehran.
Iranian president Hassan Rouhani’s recent announcement of the renewal of uranium enrichment at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, as well as high-level Iranian gloating about recent progress in the development and operation of uranium enrichment centrifuges, may indicate that Tehran intends to withdraw from the 2015 nuclear agreement and effect a breakout toward nuclear weapons production in 2020. 

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