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Syria

After a three-and-a-half-year marriage of convenience, Turkey and Russia have come to realize that they are fighting on opposite sides of two proxy wars: one in Syria and the other in Libya. This comes after Russia sold Turkey $2.5 billion worth of S-400 air defense systems, won a multibillion-dollar nuclear plant contract, signed up for a lucrative natural gas pipeline, and widened the gap between NATO and its part-time member Turkey.
Israelโ€™s air force has been unrelenting in its determination to prevent the introduction by Iran into Syria of a massive supply of precision-guided missiles to be used against Israel. The IAF is also striking consistently and forcefully at Tehranโ€™s attempts to establish a local Iranian-run weapons armament industry in Syria. With these efforts, Israel is forcing Iran to take these projects underground. That is an expensive propositionโ€”and all the more difficult following the reimposition of US sanctions.
In a recent press conference, Defense Minister Naftali Bennett presented a goal for IDF activity in Syria: โ€œTo cause Iran to give up its attempt to entrench itself in Syria.โ€ Unlike the common tendency toward ambiguity in defining strategic objectives, Bennett dared pronounce a clear and measurable goal. But is the goal he presented achievable? And is it right to declare a strategic goal in that way?
Turkey expects Chinese support for its incursion into Syria against the Kurds, but in return, China expects Turkey to turn a blind eye to its persecution of Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. Turkeyโ€™s refusal to fully recognize Kurdish rights is thus intertwined with Chinaโ€™s brutal crackdown in its troubled northwestern province. Both parties justify their actions as efforts in the fight against terrorism.
In light of recent regional events in general and the Turkish invasion of Syria in particular, Israel needs to reconsider the underlying strategic rationale not only of its covert activities in the neighboring countries but also its more overt conduct. Otherwise it could find itself, in case of war with the northern axis (Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria), winning battles but having trouble ending the campaign with a strategic achievement.
The withdrawal of US forces from the Kurdish areas of northern Syria will help strengthen Iranโ€™s standing in the country, make Russia the leading power in the region, and possibly lead to the resurgence of ISIS terror. All these outcomes will have far-reaching policy implications for the Middle Eastโ€™s pro-Western actors and for the war on jihadist terror.
The American withdrawal from Syria has produced chaotic results โ€“ but as with many aspects of President Trumpโ€™s presidency, it offers an opportunity to view realities with a new clarity. The nature of Turkey under ErdoฤŸan, European weakness, and the unwillingness of America to support indecisive military missions have been revealed. These realities demand new approaches to European defense and to Middle Eastern engagement and disengagement.

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