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Syria

Despite the Assadโ€™s regimeโ€™s longstanding pretense to raise the banner of all-out war against Israel, since the October 1973 War the Syrian-Israeli border on the Golan Heights has been conspicuously quiet. Today, as Syria no longer capably functions as a sovereign state, a strong Syrian president with firm control over the state is a vital interest for Israel.
The sarin attacks in Syria of August 2013 and April 2017 resemble one another closely. They reflect a strategic mode that might be repeated yet again by Assad, as long as he remains fully backed by Russia and Iran. At the same time, the geopolitical shift suggested by the recent US military response in Syria marks a desirable turn with consequential implications regarding the ongoing relationships among the US, Syria, Russia, and Iran.
Israelโ€™s Arrow recently made its combat debut with the interception of a Syrian anti-aircraft missile. Remarkably, the 1991 vintage Arrow missile defense system managed to track, engage, and destroy a type of target never envisaged during its design. This sent a powerful message that Israel's missile shield is reaching maturity. The political repercussions of the interception raised questions about its advisability, but the repercussions of a non-interception might have been even more severe.
Israel's recent raids against Syrian targets are lawful and law-enforcing. Facing an increasingly dangerous Hezbollah, Jerusalem correctly understands that even a failed state has legal obligations not to assist in terrorist assaults against Israel. These obligations, concerning Syria in particular, are authoritatively codified in treaty-based and customary international law. Moreover, in consequence of Syria's active and unambiguous complicity with Hezbollah, Israel has a corresponding obligation to prevent and/or mitigate such terrorist crimes. This obligation, which Israel is undertaking well within the limitations of humanitarian international law, is owed both to citizens of the Jewish State and to the broader community of nations.
Groupthink seems to be guiding Israelโ€™s Syria policy, which remains limited to the prevention of the flow of โ€œgame-changingโ€ weapons to Hezbollah and the establishment of a Hezbollah/Iranian Revolutionary Guard military presence in southern Syria bordering the Israeli Golan Heights. The recent major changes in the balance of power in favor of Iran and its allies in Syria call for a more interventionist and publicly declared Israeli strategy in support of Syriaโ€™s rebels to balance against Iran and its allies.
The recent US sanctions against 18 senior Syrian officers for chemical weapons (CW) employment seem to represent little more than a last-ditch compensation for the hands-off record of the outgoing Obama administration. However, despite their poor timing, these sanctions are considerably more meaningful than they might at first appear.
Events in Aleppo are playing an important role in Iranโ€™s strategic plan to establish an overland corridor that would give it access to the Mediterranean coast. Since the cityโ€™s fall, Tehran has been urging non-state groups to come under its wing in return for massive and comprehensive support. The intensification of the Shiite-Sunni conflict acts as a barrier between Iran and its potential clients.
Chemical weapons (CW) continue to be employed frequently in Syria and Iraq. While the scale of attacks has been relatively minor so far, the possibility remains that the Islamic State (IS) might attempt a high-impact WMD attack. Hezbollah, too, which is present in both Syria and Lebanon, might wish to be โ€“ or indeed, already may be โ€“ equipped with CW

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