Russia vs. Ukraine: From Interstate to Interethnic Conflict

In an attempt to change the vector of the Russian-Ukrainian confrontation, President Volodymyr Zelensky issued a decree “On the territories of the Russian Federation historically inhabited by Ukrainians” and submitted it to the National Security and Defense Council. The Ukrainian leadership concludes that to end the war, it is necessary to destroy the Russian Federation as an empire seeking expansion and revenge, using a combination of military and propaganda means.

Biden’s Ukraine Policy – Disconnect Between Rhetoric and Action

The hesitancy by the Biden administration to withhold advanced weaponry damaged the Ukrainian counteroffensive and may have led to Russia’s current upper hand in the conflict. As Russia has now adapted to the war, it will be much harder to change the momentum back.

Hungarian Irredentism in Transcarpathia

At this point, it appears that tensions between Ukraine and Hungary related to the situation of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Transcarpathia are by no means over. It seems that it could be significantly eased if Ukraine is accepted by the EU with the opening of borders and harmonization of Ukrainian legislation with EU norms concerning the rights of linguistic and ethnic minorities.

BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 5 (February 2024)

In February 2024, the materials prepared by the Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program at BESA covered a wide array of countries and sub-regions, including Ukraine, Russia, Moldova, Armenia, and Central Asian states, focusing on both internal and external aspects of political development.

Concerning the Law “On the Indigenous Peoples of Ukraine”: the Inevitable Conflict After the War

The interests of the Crimean Tatar national movement, which seeks to establish a full-fledged national-territorial autonomy, and Ukraine as a unitary state do not coincide. After the return of Crimea to Ukrainian control, a conflict between them is inevitable,

BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 2 (November 2023)

In November 2023, the BESA Post-Soviet Conflict Research Program published a series of texts, half of which focus on the recent surge of anti-Semitism in the region of interest, and the rest on the recent dynamics of military supplies in the South Caucasus, Russian-Georgian relations, and the electoral behavior of Kazakhstan's Russian-speaking minority.

BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 2 (November 2023)

BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Digest No. 1 (September-October 2023)

Hamas Terrorist Invasion of Israel and Its Possible Implications for Ukraine

One cannot fail to notice that the conflict between Israel and Palestinian Arabs occupies a distinct place in the ideological and political discourse accompanying post-Soviet armed conflicts, primarily the Russian-Ukrainian and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts. This can involve the use of allusions and symbols associated with the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, aimed at ideologically justifying one's position and demonizing the opponent. It also pertains to the attempts of direct participants in post-Soviet conflicts and/or external actors to leverage fluctuations in Israel's relations with the "Palestinian National Authority" (PNA) in Ramallah, which governs the Arab enclaves in Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley (or, the “West Bank of the Jordan River”, in international discourse) on one hand, and the enclave of Islamic fundamentalists in the Gaza Strip on the other.

How Russia Tries to Use the Central Asian States After the Invasion of Ukraine

For a significant period, Russian policy in Central Asia has differed from its approach toward Ukrainian or Georgian issues. It was characterized by fewer elements of ideology and greater pragmatism. Pragmatic elements that "softened" Russian foreign policy in the Central Asian direction persisted until 2021, owing to various factors. Russian officials, to some extent, recognized the multi-vector foreign policies of Central Asian countries, leading to a more accommodating stance toward the region. Central Asia was perceived as having limited prospects for NATO and EU expansion, partly due to the presence of authoritarian regimes and its geographical distance from Europe. This made Moscow's influence appear less threatened compared to regions like Ukraine. Global strategic considerations compelled Putin to acquiesce both Chinese and Turkish influences in Central Asia. Putin's personal limited interest in Central Asian affairs and the influence of regional leaders on Russian decision-makers sometimes fostered an atmosphere of pluralism. Russia shared a common enemy in the form of radical Islam with both the West and secular regimes in Muslim countries.

Attempt to Capitalize on Neutrality: How Central Asian States Shape their Policies on Russian-Ukrainian Conflict

Common trends in Russia's relations with Central Asian countries during the Russian-Ukrainian war.