

The New Terrorism and the Peace Process

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Thank you for your kind invitation to speak on "The New Terrorism and the Peace Process." Under Efraim Inbar's inspired leadership the Begin-Sadat Institute has consistently produced rigorous analysis of pressing security issues that has been both useful and interesting, which is a high standard for institutes of strategic studies in any country. So I am very pleased to be here today.

I know that everyone in this auditorium understands what "peace process" means, since Israelis have lived with it virtually every day for thirty years. But what is the "new terrorism" and what does it have to do with the peace process, let alone Israeli interests?

Before I turn to this question, however, I think it would be worthwhile to establish the backdrop of the new terrorism by saying a few words about the old terrorism and the peace process. This means, for the most part, talking about Hizballah and Hamas. To be sure, there are other groups that could attempt to influence the peace process--Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), for example--but these lack the infrastructure, experience, funds, and human resources to press a sustained campaign of terrorist attacks within the green line or on the Israeli side of the Lebanese border. Indeed, PIJ in particular seems to be in its weakest state in years, at least since the death of Fathi Shqaqi; and its current leader, Ramadhan Shallah, seems ineffectual in comparison to his predecessor.

So let us start with Hizballah. Since Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizballah has exercised a significant degree of discipline in the south, refraining from attacks against military or civilian Israeli targets. The group has also quietly dropped claims to residual bits of disputed territory along the border and refrained from inflammatory rhetoric. Its clear focus has been on making effective political use of the widely held perception in Lebanon

that it forced the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Exploiting this perception successfully, however, requires Hizballah to deliver the economic goods to the impoverished south. Without an influx of funds from Beirut and revitalization of economic life, Hizballah's victory will not long inspire electoral loyalty. By the same token, violent confrontation with Israel that invites retaliation against local infrastructure will forfeit Hizballah's hard-won popular support. The inhabitants of south Lebanon want their peace dividend. The elections of late August-early September have concentrated Hizballah's mind on these factors.

There is no doubt that the death of Hafiz al Assad and his replacement by his untested son Bashar has contributed to this calm. Had the father lived on, one would have expected Syria, following Israeli withdrawal, but in the absence of a settlement, to encourage attacks across the border to maintain pressure on the Barak government in the hope of ultimately compelling it to accept Syrian sovereignty over the northeastern shore of the Kinneret while abandoning security arrangements on the plateau itself. Assad the elder would have tested Israel's resolve by this point. Bashar is in no position to risk a confrontation with Israel that he might, in the view of those waiting to see him falter, lose.

A combination of circumstances--elections in Lebanon and succession in Syria--have contributed to the fairly stable situation in Lebanon until now. It is possible that this benign situation will prove durable. Lebanese security forces could consolidate their role in southern Lebanon, Hizballah could complete its transformation into a political party -- having achieved its objective of ridding Lebanon of Israeli forces -- and continue to focus on the competition for state resources on behalf of Lebanon's Shi'a community. Iran would be forced to pursue its interests in Lebanon within a non-violent political process by influencing Hizballah's legislative agenda and political platform. And despite its diplomatic progress on the Arab side of the Gulf and closer ties to western Europe, Iran elects not to challenge Syria in Lebanon because it cannot afford to alienate its only ally in the Sunni world.

That is one scenario. In another scenario, elements in the Iranian regime that cannot be reconciled to an Arab-Israeli peace attempt to disrupt it, or

simply to reduce Israeli security by killing Jews. As Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said in his New Year's address, Syria is a traitor and the Zionist entity must be annihilated. Khamenei has *de facto* control over the state agencies capable of carrying out terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. The IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) and MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security) can act with tremendous audacity and effectiveness while effectively covering their tracks in order to minimize the possibility of retaliation. Although it is true that President Mahmoud Khatami has appointed both MOIS ministers during his Administration, the assassination of regime opponents within Iran by MOIS officers during this period show that his control over the agency is at best incomplete. For this reason, Iran remains a security concern for the US, even as it tries to repair relations with Tehran, especially in view of Attorney General Janet Reno's 1999 statement that the United States had information indicating the involvement of Iranian officials in the 1996 bombing of the US Air Force Khobar Towers residence in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

Iran's surveillance of its overseas adversaries gives Tehran the option of striking them in a way that its military could not. Iran's 1997 attempt to smuggle a 'super mortar' into Europe via the port of Antwerp appears to be of a piece with these tactics: such a weapon would be ideal for an accurate, devastating stand-off attack against a defended location, such as a US or Israeli embassy. The same kind of mortar was used by Iran in 1996 to demolish the headquarters building of the dissident Mujahedin e-Khalq (MEK) in Baghdad. Further evidence of Iran's activity was provided during 1996 when an Allied unit raided an Iranian terrorism and sabotage training facility in the Bosnian town of Fojnica. Established by official representatives of Iran, the facility stored booby traps, explosives and assassination manuals. The Fojnica discovery led NATO to demand that President Alija Izetbegovic sharply reduce the official Iranian presence in Bosnia.

Iranian-sponsored violence in Europe has not only been directed at US and NATO interests. The September 1992 killing of three dissidents and a translator in the Mykonos restaurant in Berlin led a German court to issue

an arrest warrant for Ali Fallahian, former head of Iran's MOIS. The prosecutors charged Supreme Leader Khamenei and then President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani with approving the operation. Another dissident, Reza Maslouman, was murdered in Paris in 1996 by an attacker allegedly linked to the MOIS, who has since been extradited to Germany for trial. French investigators have also implicated Iranian operatives in the 1991 murder of Shahpour Bakhtiar, a former official and dissident, in Paris. Then, of course, there were the Hizballah attacks against the Israeli embassy and Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires and the destruction of the US Embassy annex in Beirut as well as the US Marine Corps barracks there.

The message here is that Iran is capable of fostering a violent backlash against the peace process by extending the war to offshore targets, especially if a combination of effective law enforcement, intelligence collection, and counter-terrorism cooperation between Israel and the PA imposes real operational constraints on Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad. There is evidence that Iran is encouraging the formation of a shadow Hizballah, separable from the evolving Hizballah political party in Lebanon, to carry on the fight even if Syria limits militants' options within Lebanon. And the long-time head of Hizballah's Islamic Jihad Organization's external operations, Imad Mughniyah, is probably capable of making this work.

Why would this happen now, when reformers have swept conservatives from power in the Majlis? The answer may well be that one thing has nothing to do with the other. Reformist constituencies care in the first instance about domestic political and social issues and have not yet focused on foreign policy. Even there, what they see would not necessarily indicate that there were problems. So the vote should probably not be construed as a referendum on the regime's policies toward Israel. And Khatami has not yet consolidated his power; indeed, he may never succeed. Yet until he has done so, he is unlikely to put his modest gains at risk by challenging a determined effort by hard-liners to undermine the peace process.

Turning from Hizballah to Hamas, we see a driven organization. First, there are "inside" and "outside" leaderships with differing agendas, both hit hard by the prospects for peace. To the external observer, they do not appear to

know just what to do. Is it a nascent political party, on the verge of opting to maximize its interests through a political process--one that will implicitly legitimize the Oslo process and the Palestinian authority (PA)? Or is it engaged in a principled resistance that cannot end until the occupation of Palestine ends? Both these postures appear to be sustained, for the moment, simultaneously by the leaders of Hamas. Thus, while Sheikh Yassin makes conciliatory statements vis à vis the PA and Hamas puts forth, gingerly, proposals for a truce with Israel, terrorist cells are engaged in pre-operational activities in various locations, most recently, as we have seen, in Taibe. Is this a good cop/ bad cop game, or is it the manifestation of deep confusion, even crisis within the organization?

Hamas is under enormous pressure. Its popularity is diminishing as Arafat's authority has stabilized; perhaps his authority is even on the rise in the wake of his "principled" refusal to negotiate sovereignty over Jerusalem. In Jordan, King Abdullah has expelled important elements of the Hamas leadership and made it clear that Hamas provocation would have to end. Abu Marzuk, Khalid Mishal, Ghowsheh, are seeing their maneuvering room steadily reduced. And Jordanian intelligence cooperation with Israel appears to have recovered from the after-effects of the assassination attempt on Mishal. At the same time, both Israel and the PA have scored notable successes against Hamas operational capabilities by taking down bomb factories, killing Yihya Ayyash and the Awadallah brothers, and preempting attacks by the Taibe cell and others. Hamas itself has helped by apparently eliminating Muhi ad-Din Sharif, who may have perished not by inadvertent suicide, but rather at the hands of Hamas members seeking to tone down the violence and clear the way toward legitimization of the organization.

My impression is that Hamas *qua* Hamas will have to abandon terrorism in order to preserve and advance its political gains and, by extension, the practical benefits that Hamas members derive from their participation in the organization's activities. Whether this journey will end in the transformation of Hamas into a *bona fide* political party is, at this point, difficult to predict. Tentative steps have been taken in this direction through the creation of a so-called front of essentially anti-Arafat opposition groups. Evolution into a party will be a painful step for many in the group to accept and may be

preceded by renewed intramural violence, although the movement as a whole has been remarkably successful in drawing the line on large scale violence among Palestinians. If Hamas does make a decisive break with violence it has a fig leaf readily at hand in the form of the doctrine of *sabr*, sometime rendered as the strategy of stages, which would reassure skeptical core constituencies. Strictly speaking, *sabr* is the counsel of patience during times when *jihad* must be suspended because conditions are too unfavorable to press the fight. This suspension can, as a practical matter, last forever.

All this is well and good, but is it too optimistic? A comparison with British experience with the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Spanish with the Basque resistance ETA, and French with the Corsican liberation movement suggest that groups in the agonizing process of transformation to political parties, or of dissolution, can splinter and generate intense violence.

As the Provisional IRA moved toward Sinn Fein's strategy of political participation in a devolved government in Belfast, part of the organization broke away, reverting to the line that the IRA had originally followed in the 70s and 80s: The absolute necessity of expelling the British from northern Ireland by making it impossible for them to rule by any means other than direct administration -- and in such a way as to force them to take actions that would be politically unsustainable in London, just as they delegitimized the British presence in the eyes of even the uncommitted local Irish populace. (Many in this audience will detect a strong similarity between this strategy and that of the Irgun, especially after 1944.) It is easily forgotten now that up until fairly recently, when the IRA and Sinn Fein learned to use one another to advance their separate objectives by a good cop/bad cop strategy, that relations between fighters and the politicians was fraught with tension. With the 1998 Good Friday Agreement between the Loyalists, Sinn Fein, Republic of Ireland and Great Britain, this tension re-emerged. Two radical groups split from the IRA--the Continuity IRA and Real IRA--rejected the political process and promised a return to war. The result, four months after the Good Friday Agreement, was the horrific bombing in the town of Omagh, which killed 29 and wounded hundreds.

The broad analogy with Hamas is clear: One part of a bifurcated organization begins to develop a stake in the political process, leaving behind the hard men, those with blood on their hands, who cannot make the necessary psychological transformation, or who are guilty of too many crimes to escape prosecution if they come in from the cold. (It is to encourage the transformation of the latter group that prisoner releases and amnesties are such an essential part of peace agreements.) These individuals remain underground, increasingly isolated, leading an anxious, clandestine existence, which they and their compatriots justify to themselves as the price of righteousness and of victimization by traitors. Group psychodynamics reinforce these attitudes and ultimately drive members toward greater levels of violence, which validate the trajectory of the group's path, while ensuring that the eyes of the world, and most especially the eyes of the comrades, who betrayed the cause, are upon them. For Hamas adherents in particular, the self-justifying functions of the attacks are enhanced by the belief that death will guarantee them everlasting redemption.

Hamas, it seems to me, is at this brittle and dangerous stage. Again, predictions of how the group will cope with the intense pressures it faces cannot be made with any confidence. But as Hamas copes, Israel will remain at risk of potentially very bloody attacks.

The New Terrorism and the Peace Process

Some here who follow events in the US will recall that Americans woke up at Christmas to learn that someone named Ahmed Ressam had been arrested trying to smuggle a carload of explosives into the country. Although he had been affiliated with an Algerian terrorist organization, it was soon revealed that he was connected to Usama bin Laden and had accomplices already in the US as well as one arrested at about the same time trying to enter the US elsewhere. Recollections of the east Africa bombings and the World Trade Center bombing flooded back.

What does this have to do with Israel and the peace process? It emerged that the conspiracy I just described came to light after the arrest by

Jordanian authorities of 16 would-be terrorists of three different nationalities who had gathered in Jordan from Afghanistan to carry out attacks against Americans and possibly Israelis entering Jordan by bus. Under the false floor of a farmhouse outside Amman, police uncovered 75 drums of explosive, easily enough to achieve the group's goal of the leveling the 400-room Amman Radisson, which was scheduled to be filled with American tourists. The cell had also amassed an arsenal of semi-automatic guns and ammunition, which were to be used against tourists at two sites, one on the Jordan River, associated with John the Baptist, and Mt. Nebo, the summit where, according to the Bible, Moses died after glimpsing the land of Israel. Both places are favorites of American evangelical Christians. The ringleader, Khalil ad-Deek, was subsequently extradited by Jordan from Pakistan, which has become a hotbed of a particularly radical kind of Islamist activity. (It has since emerged that the Lebanese authorities have just sentenced 25 detainees for terrorist offenses, based on their association with bin Laden.)

If the individuals arrested in Jordan were trained and indoctrinated by bin Laden, then Jordan has a problem and if Jordan has a problem, so does Israel; because these attempts will continue, and even intensify, as the old paradigm of predominantly state-sponsored terrorism is joined by a new, religiously-motivated terrorism that is unconstrained by the limits on violence that state sponsors have observed themselves or placed on their proxies; or that national liberation movements seeking a place at the bargaining table have adopted on their own. Militants of this kind are unlike those in Hamas or Hizballah, let alone secular groups such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine or the PLO of prior years. They are animated not by a practical political agenda, or negotiable secular concerns, but by religious passion. Until now, they have focused their animus on the US, but their sudden appearance in Jordan suggests that their focus is broadening to include Israel, which, as I will show, is believed to control America; and the Hashemites, which, like Sadat are believed to have forfeited their right to rule by making peace with Israel. As the peace process lurches towards a denouement, these jihadists -- who originate in other lands -- will not be bought off by an Israeli-Palestinian agreement that Muslims in their view have no right to make; or seduced into a Jordanian

political process which they believe is fundamentally illegitimate. If this turns out to be the case, Israel is in for a potentially rough ride.

In discussing this phenomenon, I will necessarily be dwelling on the American experience with it, because, as I have pointed out, it is America that has been the main focus of these groups until now. Bear with me, nevertheless, and keep those December arrests in Jordan in mind as you do so.

The new terrorism has emerged during the 1990s: the 1993 World Trade Center bombings in New York, and related conspiracies; the 1996 Oklahoma City bombing; the 1998 East Africa bombings; and the Tokyo sarin-gas attack in 1995. These attacks were the harbingers of a new and more threatening terrorism, one that aims to produce casualties on a massive scale. Although the new terrorism stems from many causes, and cannot be considered the invention of any one individual, the face of this phenomenon belongs to Usama bin Laden, the exiled Saudi who has marshaled a network of operatives in more than 50 countries. Some believe that religiously motivated terrorism will persist for many years, and that its Islamic manifestation will remain a threat regardless of bin Laden's fate.

Four developments mark the advent of this new form of terror:

- * The emergence of religion as the predominant impetus for terrorist attacks;
- * the increasing lethality of attacks;
- * the increasing technological and operational competence of terrorists; and
- * the demonstrated desire of these terrorists to obtain weapons of mass destruction.

RAND terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman has shown that the proportion of terrorist groups motivated predominantly by religious concerns has

increased sharply. More importantly, he has demonstrated that the increase in religious motivation correlates with an increase in lethality. For 1995, Hoffman's data show that religiously motivated terrorists were responsible for a quarter of all incidents in that year, but caused nearly 60 percent of all fatalities. Moreover, he says that in 1996, the last year for which he has data, 'Groups driven in whole or in part by a salient religious or theological motive committed 10 of the 13 most lethal terrorists attacks'. These groups, he notes, put 'political issues and struggles within a sacred context', thus giving them the most charged ontological significance. The solution they seek amounts to the restoration of a golden age of religious belief and practices, whose passing left the community vulnerable to the depredations of the enemy. The essentially religious goal of moral restoration becomes the basis of a political response in the form of a confrontation with the enemy within and without. In this framework, the warriors believe themselves to be engaged in a struggle ordained by God, to restore the world to a perfect state. The violent acts they must carry out are 'sanitized' because they are symbolic, enacted on a cosmic stage. Given these stakes, the intensity of the violence cannot be confined by prudential calculations.

Although jihadists are a significant problem, the threat of intensified violence posed by terrorists motivated by other radical religious traditions, including the American Christian Patriot movement, Israel's Jewish messianic militants and Japan's Aum Shinrikyo. All these share a world-view characterized by a life-or-death struggle with the 'other' in order to redeem the world. The Oklahoma City bomber thought he was engaged in a struggle to free the US from the grip of Jews and Freemasons and restore it to a religiously and racially pristine state. Aum Shinrikyo intended to precipitate an eschatological battle that would destroy a corrupted world but leave the group's members intact. Yigal Amir sought to restore the perfect world that existed in the second century BC, when the Hasmonean state, which had overthrown an infidel occupier and its Jewish collaborators to take power, ruled a large and unitary land of Israel.

In the case of the jihadists, the restored world would recreate the early Caliphate of the seventh and eighth century when, in their understanding of Islamic history, a righteous leader ruled over an undivided *umma*

(community of believers), achieving a perfect unity of religious and political authority over the lands of Islam. In the modern recreation of this ideal, non-believers would be subdued or destroyed, the Quran would form the sole legitimate basis for governance and community life, and Muslim leaders who did not strive to restore the sovereignty of God to his lands would be judged apostates, and condemned.

These were the beliefs of the conspirators in a series of Jihadist conspiracies directed against the US, which, if successful, would have caused casualties in the tens of thousands. The cleric connected to many of the conspirators in these cases, Sheikh Umar abd ar-Rahman, has provided the inspiration for these acts of radical, religiously motivated violence. The so-called 'Blind Sheikh', abd ar-Rahman had emigrated to the US from Egypt. It was he who articulated the justification of apostasy for the 1981 murder of President Anwar al-Sadat and attempted murder of President Mubarak in 1995. He also led al Gama'a al Islamiyya, an extremely violent group responsible for the massacre of 72 people, mostly Western tourists, at Luxor in Upper Egypt in 1998.

In a planning session for bombing targets in New York City, he put the imperative of jihad to his co-conspirators as follows:

They were to do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the grenades, with the missile ... against God's enemies ... to break and destroy the morale of the enemies of Allah ... [destroying] the structure of their civilized pillars. Such as the touristic infrastructure which they are proud of and their high world buildings which they are proud of and their statues which they endear and the buildings in which they gather their leaders. God the Almighty ... will facilitate for the believers to penetrate the lines no matter how strong they are.

For ar-Rahman, the fight was not limited to his embattled homeland of Egypt; rather the 'fields of jihad' encompassed all lands where he believed Muslims were under the domination of non-believers: 'Bosnia, Palestine, the Philippines, Somalia, southern Sudan, and ... Afghanistan'.

Since this was a sacred struggle, fatwas were required to legitimize and ritualize the violent acts, which the combatants would carry out. Thus, ar-Rahman's followers at his Brooklyn mosque believed that his religious imprimatur was necessary whenever one did something 'basically unlawful', which would be wrong unless the 'mission [was] under the flag of God and his messenger'. This belief is true in more than one tradition: Yigal Amir's interrogators quoted him as saying that

if not for a Halakhic ruling of *din rodef*, made against Rabin by a few rabbis I knew about, it would have been very difficult for me to murder. Such a murder must be backed up. If I did not get the backing and I had not been representing many more people, I would not have acted.

Indeed, in the realm of religious warfare, fatwas of one kind or another declaring the necessity of bloodshed have come to replace *ex post facto* claims of responsibility.

Usama bin Laden's February 1998 fatwa strongly conveys the sense of total war against an irreconcilable opponent:

The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilians and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa Mosque and the holy mosque from their grip, and in order for their armies to move out of all the lands of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim ... We - with God's help - call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it.

Those who hesitate to carry out the demands of the fatwa are deemed apostates and will themselves be punished. Citing the Quran, he says:

"Unless ye go forth, [God] will punish you with a grievous penalty, and put others in your place"

Bin Laden's interview with CNN correspondent Peter Arnett also conveys the unlimited objectives of a religiously motivated campaign:

We have declared jihad against the US, because in our religion it is our duty to make jihad so that God's word is the one exalted to the heights and so that we drive the Americans away from all Muslim countries ... the driving-away jihad against the US does not stop with its withdrawal from the Arabian peninsula, but rather it must desist from aggressive intervention against Muslims in the whole world.

Bin Laden's theological politics entails warfare without end. Referring to the new generation of jihad volunteers in Afghanistan (not the generation that fought against the Soviets assisted by the US), he says that:

their number, by the grace of God, was quite big, Praise and Gratitude be to Him, and they spread in every place in which non-believers' injustice is perpetuated against Muslims. Their going to Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan and other countries is but a fulfillment of a duty, because we believe that these states are part of the Islamic World. Therefore, any act of aggression against any of this land of a span of hand measure makes it a duty for Muslims to send a sufficient number of their sons to fight off that aggression.

Jews are at the root of the problem:

...we find that Jews have the first word in the American government, which is how they use America to carry out their plans in the world and especially the Muslim world. The presence of Americans in the Holy Land supports the Jews and gives them a safe back. The American government is throwing away the lives of Americans in Saudi Arabia for the interests of

the Jews. The Jews are a people who Allah cited in his holy book the Koran as those who attacked prophets with lies and killings, and attacked Mary and accused her of a great sin. They are a people who killed Allah's prophets - would they not kill, rape and steal from humans? They believe that all humans are created for their use, and found that the Americans are the best-created beings for that use.

Within this conceptual framework, jihadists believe that the corruption of the enemy and its alienation from God render it weak and susceptible to ultimate defeat. Bin Laden reflected this view when he told Arnett that their prior victory against another infidel power, the Soviet Union, would be replicated more speedily against the US, a lesser adversary. One can already see Israel's impending withdrawal from Lebanon being viewed in precisely these terms.

Under this essentially religious banner, bin Laden has united a diverse range of groups that had not previously cooperated: Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al Gama'a al Islamiyya, Jamiat ul-Islami, Harakat ul-Mujahedin, mujahedin in Chechnya and Daghestan, Ittihad al-Islami in Somalia, Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines and, as now seems to be the case, elements associated with the Algerian Groupes Islamiques Armées (GIA), who, as I mentioned before, have infiltrated the US with plans to attack it.

Skills, Organization and Reach

Among the different groups of religious terrorists, the jihad camp has an organizational structure, combat experience, technical skills, training and capacity for mobility that give it strong operational advantages. In organizational terms, one might call these 'non-group groups'. There is little hierarchy. Operatives are known to each other personally, having met, as in the case of the so-called Afghan Arabs (responsible for the World Trade Center bombing and plot to destroy aircraft over the Pacific), in training camps in Afghanistan. These camps were established to train volunteers in the war against the Soviets, but remained in operation after the Soviet

withdrawal, and have been built up and enlarged by bin Laden. The Ramzi Yousef group appears to have coalesced almost accidentally, some members becoming acquainted in a Brooklyn mosque, others having ties from Afghanistan. Members of bin Laden's al-Qa'ida operate self-sufficiently to a degree, although it is known that they communicate with the leadership in Afghanistan and with each other, combining elements of a 'hub and spoke' structure (where nodes communicate with the center) with a 'wheel' structure (where nodes in the network communicate with each other without reference to the center). This is a structure that combines resilience with command and control, complicating efforts to root out cells and disrupt operations. The looseness of these networks, and the way in which the cells within them coalesce, make identification, penetration and disruption of the groups extremely difficult, particularly for Western intelligence agencies with expertise in recruiting foreign government officials as sources.

These terrorists are adept at exploiting the tremendous expansion of intercontinental air-carrier links and the weak customs and immigration controls of many countries in which they operate or through which they transit. This ability helps them to pursue their goals in 'fields of jihad' around the world and accounts for the apparent ubiquity of cells. In view of the informal recruitment system that cannot rely on systematic standards in selection of new members, and a training system that outside Afghanistan is haphazard at best, the operatives' tradecraft and technical skills are good. Many volunteers come with technical training, typically in computer science or engineering. They are adept at establishing plausible cover for their activities, usually in the form of legitimate businesses, occasionally with import-export interests. Such cover allows operatives to evade suspicion while using international phone, fax and e-mail communications that facilitate the movement of operatives, travel documents, funds, equipment and weapons. The terrorists have also shown skill at maintaining operational security, practicing an impressive degree of compartmentalization and, in the case of Ramzi Yousef, using commercial encryption to conceal communications.

Both the Ramzi Yousef group and the al-Qa'ida operatives responsible for the East Africa embassy attacks displayed high levels of skill in all of these

areas. The attack against the World Trade Center was well planned and, with a somewhat larger bomb, could have achieved its goal: toppling one World Trade tower into the other, killing as many as 20,000 people. The Yousef group's plan to destroy 11 US civilian passenger aircraft over the Pacific used a crude kind of computerized systems-analysis to determine where bombs had to be placed on specific flight segments, where attackers had to disembark to avoid suicide, and how the fuses were to be set to yield the desired number of simultaneous detonations. The terrorists carried out an experimental run in late 1994 to test a small charge of their own design, which killed a Japanese man on a Philippines Airlines flight via Cebu to Tokyo. Had it not been for an accidental fire in early 1995 at the Manila bomb factory that revealed the attack preparations to Philippine authorities, the plan might well have succeeded. If it had, the bombings would have killed 4,000 people more-or-less simultaneously.

Technical and organizational advantages are enhanced by access to funding: al-Qa'ida relies only in part on bin Laden's personal fortune, estimated at over \$200m, and the revenue from his investments. Affiliated groups, as well as al-Qa'ida infrastructure in Afghanistan, are sustained by proceeds from the zakat (mosque contributions) in many locations, large amounts of money diverted from established welfare organizations or funds collected specifically for the terrorists. Wealthy, like-minded donors in the Persian Gulf also contribute large sums. These groups are awash with money.

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Spectacular goals require spectacular means. The new breed of religiously motivated terrorists has repeatedly sought to achieve destruction on a grand scale. The Oklahoma City bombing was the largest in American history (although if the World Trade Center bombers had accomplished their goal, it would have been small by comparison). The almost simultaneous bombing of two US embassies in East Africa created not only thousands of casualties but also the clear impression that overwhelming carnage was intended, both for its own sake and in order to demoralize Americans. Against this backdrop, the complementarity between the maximal objectives of the new terrorists and WMD emerges clearly. These groups, unlike their

secular counterparts, want a lot of people watching and a lot of people dead. An attack using chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons would therefore seem to be a natural next step for them. Moreover, publicity about terrorism involving WMD probably generates pressure within terrorist groups to use these weapons.

Sceptics about this proposition contend, rightly, that conventional explosives are well understood and relatively easy to fabricate, with blast effect limited only by the size of available containers and a demonstrated capacity to cause massive casualties. WMD, by contrast, are difficult to obtain, handle safely and store. Whether the aim is to culture and weaponize biological agents, deliver chemical weapons in an unpredictable environment or procure or fabricate a nuclear weapon, the challenges are daunting. Nonetheless, recent events indicate that extremist religious groups have sought WMD and, US officials believe, will continue to do so. Indeed, those who argue on grounds of efficacy that terrorists will not devote the resources and energies necessary for WMD procurement may be missing the point. These terrorists seek to maximize the number of casualties, but the additional horror that attaches to WMD-use would provide a premium on their investment. Thus, after multiple failures in its effort to use biological weapons, Aum Shinrikyo still refused to use conventional weapons, switching instead to chemical weapons for its attack in the Tokyo subway. After a multi-million dollar production effort, supervised by a Ph.D. chemist, the attack claimed 12 lives, undoubtedly far fewer than the cult was seeking. But for Aum's apocalyptic aims, more reliable, conventional weapons would not have been fitting.

Aum Shinrikyo failed to precipitate the Armageddon that its literature had forecast, but it did shatter a crucial psychological barrier. While the cult may lie at the far end of the spectrum in its determination to hasten a historic cataclysm, other groups appear to be pursuing the acquisition of WMD. The US attack against the al-Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum underscored the American assessment that al-Qa'ida was trying to obtain chemical weapons.

Acquiring WMD or materials need not depend on the collaboration of a state sponsor a la Sudan. Terrorists appear increasingly eager to purchase weapons or components, possibly from the pilfered stocks of the former Soviet Union or from the broad array of dual-use materials and equipment found on the open market. A bin Laden lieutenant, Mamdouh Mahmoud Salim, was extradited to the US from Germany early in 1999 and charged with 'conspiring to use WMD'. He is believed to have been bin Laden's chief procurement officer, responsible for obtaining such weapons. Al-Qa'ida is also believed to be seeking operatives with the technological and engineering abilities necessary for WMD use, and to be recruiting more activists with the necessary expertise. Most importantly, though, the close affinity between these weapons' destructiveness and the beliefs of al-Qa'ida and other groups like it will impel terrorists to overcome technical, organizational and logistical obstacles to WMD use.

Conclusion

In this new environment and with so much at stake, countries most likely to be at risk -- the United States and Israel -- will of necessity be extremely risk averse. There is, fortunately, a budding recognition in the international community that the threat of religious terrorism, particularly the jihadist type, poses a danger to a broad range of status quo powers. The unanimous support in the UN Security Council for economic sanctions on the Taleban for sheltering Usama bin Laden in Afghanistan demonstrated this sentiment, and there has been an increase in diplomatic and intelligence cooperation in confronting this threat among countries that previously found little ground for making common cause. Nonetheless, it is impossible to foil all attacks. The emerging logic of 'maximal terrorism' suggests that, even if only one plot succeeds, the perpetrators will have created the impression that they are 'winning' and their success will sharply erode the public's sense of security.

Longer-term trends offer little hope that this new brand of terrorism will quickly disappear. Dramatic setbacks for these extremist groups, such as mass arrests or other more violent forms of repression, tend to confirm their core beliefs and strengthen their determination. They continue to attract recruits, and their beliefs resonate strongly in many communities. The

reasons are complex and reflect the profound changes overtaking many societies: the rapid, often dislocating advance of technology; economic and social upheaval; crises of legitimacy; and insurmountable barriers to political expression. The concern I raise here today is that a broad perception among these groups that the peace process signified yet another *an-naqba*, or disaster, could turn it into a lightning rod for the frustrations generated elsewhere by these trends. The practical implications for Israel, it seems to me, will resemble those for the US: renewal of a civil defense system, particularly against the threat of WMD-use and greatly expanded intelligence collection requirements. Ultimately, these are stopgaps. Eliminating the deeper causes of the new terror, however, is almost certainly beyond the ability of any single government or even of many of them acting in concert. Thus, the United States and Israel will be forced to play defense against religious terrorism for some time to come. In the meantime, we will have to hope that broader historical developments will begin to ameliorate, rather than inflame, the grievances behind the new terrorism.