

THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES  
BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY  
*Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 85*

---

# The IDF and the Lessons of the Second Lebanon War

Amir Rapaport

© The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies  
Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, 52900, Israel  
<http://www.besacenter.org>  
ISSN 0793-1042  
December 2010

### **The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies**

The BESA Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University was founded by Dr. Thomas O. Hecht, a Canadian Jewish community leader. The Center is dedicated to the memory of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who concluded the first Arab-Israeli peace agreement. The Center, a non-partisan and independent institute, seeks to contribute to the advancement of Middle East peace and security by conducting policy-relevant research on strategic subjects, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel.

*Mideast Security and Policy Studies* serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of research conducted by BESA associates. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author's views or conclusions. *BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy* summarizes the papers delivered at conferences and seminars held by the Center, for the academic, military, official and general publics. In sponsoring these discussions, the BESA Center aims to stimulate public debate on, and consideration of, contending approaches to problems of peace and war in the Middle East. The BESA *Memorandum* series consist of policy-oriented papers. The content of the publications reflects the views of the authors only. *A listing of recent BESA publications can be found at the end of this booklet.*

### **International Advisory Board**

Founder of the Center and Chairman of the Advisory Board: Dr. Thomas O. Hecht

Vice Chairman: Mr. Saul Koschitzky

Members: Prof. Moshe Arens, Mrs. Madeleine Feher, Ms. Judy Ann Hecht, Ms. Marion Hecht, Mr. Robert Hecht, Prof. Riva Heft-Hecht, Hon. Shlomo Hillel, Mr. Isi Leibler, Amb. Yitzhak Levanon, Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Mr. Robert K. Lifton, Maj. Gen. (res.) Daniel Matt, Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, Maj. Gen. (res.) Ori Orr, Mr. Seymour D. Reich, Amb. Meir Rosenne, Hon. Yitzhak Shamir, Amb. Zalman Shoval, Amb. Norman Spector, Mr. Muzi Wertheim

### **International Academic Advisory Board**

Desmond Ball *Australian National University*, Ian Beckett *University of Northampton*, Eliot A. Cohen *Johns Hopkins University*, Irwin Cotler *McGill University*, Steven R. David *Johns Hopkins University*, Yehezkel Dror *Hebrew University*, Lawrence Freedman *King's College*, Patrick James *University of Southern California*, Efraim Karsh *King's College*, Robert J. Lieber *Georgetown University*, Barry Posen *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*, Jasjit Singh *Centre for Strategic and International Studies*

### **Research Staff**

*BESA Center Director:* Prof. Efraim Inbar

*Research Associates:* Dr. Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, Prof. Stuart A. Cohen, Dr. Gil Feiler, Prof. Hillel Frisch, Prof. Eytan Gilboa, Eng. Aby Har-Even, Dr. Tsilla Hershco, Dr. Mordechai Kedar, Prof. Avi Kober, Dr. Yaakov Lifshitz, Prof. Ze'ev Maghen, Prof. Amikam Nachmani, Dr. Jonathan Rynhold, Maj. Gen. (res.) Emanuel Sakal, Prof. Shmuel Sandler, Dr. Danny Shoham, Dr. Max Singer, Prof. Gerald Steinberg

*Director of Public Affairs:* David Weinberg

*Program Coordinator:* Hava Waxman Koen

*Publication Editor (English):* Ilana Hart

*Publication Editor (Hebrew):* Alona Briner Rozenman

# **THE IDF AND THE LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR**

## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

<b>INTRODUCTION .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: THE GENERAL STAFF'S OPERATIONAL APPROACH FOR THE IDF .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>The Situation Today .....</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>CHAPTER 2: FORCE-BUILDING AND PREPAREDNESS .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Ground Forces .....</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Air Force .....</b>	<b>21</b>
<b>The Navy .....</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>Supplies .....</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Intelligence .....</b>	<b>28</b>
<b>Home Front .....</b>	<b>30</b>
<b>Logistics .....</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>CHAPTER 3: THE IDF – ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE .....</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>The General Staff .....</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>Additional Organizational Aspects .....</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Values .....</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Discipline .....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>CONCLUSIONS .....</b>	<b>54</b>

**This research was supported by  
The B.L. Manger Foundation**

The B.L. Manger Foundation Inc. is a charitable foundation established by Bernard L. Manger z"l for Jewish charitable, philanthropic, religious and educational purposes. Longtime residents of Stamford, Ct., USA, Ben Manger, together with his wife, Faye, support numerous worthwhile Jewish causes and the growth and development of the State of Israel.

# The IDF and the Lessons of the Second Lebanon War

*Amir Rapaport* \*

## INTRODUCTION

The quiet prevailing on the northern border since August 2006 cannot change the fact that the Second Lebanon War was an abject failure. The sense of failure stems from the fact that Israel, with all its military and economic power, did not defeat Hizballah in the military confrontation nor did it score even partial achievements against the organization, like those that eventually were attained in Operation Cast Lead, but in a shorter time than the thirty-three days of the campaign and with much lesser casualties and damage. The sense of failure also comes from the fact that Israel did not achieve its publicly stated goals at the outset of the war, particularly the return of the kidnapped soldiers and the disarming of Hizballah in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1559.<sup>1</sup>

A considerable portion of the failure should be accredited to the Israel Defense Force (IDF). The war was fraught with major errors of the senior military echelon, and during it, severe logistical foul-ups, grave shortcomings in preparedness, and serious attitudinal problems also emerged. As a test of truth, the campaign in the summer of 2006 exposed some of the army's pervasive organizational problems, which escaped the scrutiny of the public and sometimes even the senior command in ordinary times. Suddenly the low professional level of the ground forces and the degree of neglect in the reserve forces emerged starkly. In particular, it was revealed that the IDF was captive to a problematic operational approach and to a professional language that was unfamiliar to most of the forces in the field.<sup>2</sup>

---

\*The author thanks those who contributed their time, as well as the IDF for the openness it demonstrated on some of the issues. Special gratitude is also due to his research assistant, Liran Ofek.

The process of drawing lessons from the war was the most comprehensive and thorough in Israel's history.<sup>3</sup> A series of investigative committees, headed by reserve officers and senior academics, were established a few weeks after the war. Their work formed the basis for an official document that presents the lessons of the war and main recommendations for changes in the IDF.<sup>4</sup> The Operations Division of the General Staff supervised the implementation of the recommendations according to time schedules that were set in advance, and once every few months the deputy chief of staff held special discussions on how the work was progressing.

The commission to investigate the 2006 Lebanon Campaign, known as the Winograd Commission, acted in parallel to the military process and relied on the conclusions of the military investigations, particularly with regard to the IDF's functioning. Hence there is great overlap between its recommendations for the IDF and those made by the military commissions.<sup>5</sup> With the publication of the final report in January 2008, the Operations Division identified six main disparities between the Winograd Commission's recommendations and those of the military commissions. Thus, two additional internal commissions were set up in the IDF for the purpose of updating the document on the military lessons. After the update, the document contained 31 principal recommendations for major changes in the IDF.

Since the Second Lebanon War the IDF has undergone significant change. Some of the approaches that were practiced until the summer of 2006 have been completely eliminated. The language and terminology have also changed. In December 2008-January 2009, the IDF waged Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, and there some of the changes were evident. The operation's success, however, is only a partial indication of the changes that have occurred. The territory of Gaza is, of course, relatively narrow and clear-cut. The capabilities of the enemy there, Hamas, are inferior to those of Hizballah.<sup>6</sup>

The aim of this study is to examine the lessons the IDF drew from the Second Lebanon War and how they have been implemented, as well as to clarify the extent to which the IDF is prepared for the challenges that await it. The study analyzes the lessons of the war and examines the principal changes that have occurred in the IDF since 2006, in line

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

with the lessons that have been drawn. The first chapter discusses the General Staff's operational approach. It presents the main factors that influenced the formulation of the approach in the years before the Second Lebanon War. Subsequently it shows how these factors were translated militarily into working assumptions, which were manifested in the war. The second chapter focuses on the building of the IDF and its preparedness according to the different operational principles. It deals with the changes and the different directions that have emerged since the war in three main branches – air, sea, and ground – and also in other military bodies such as logistics, intelligence, and the home front. The third chapter explores the strengths and weaknesses of the IDF as a large organization and the issue of its behavioral norms, which were manifest in the summer of 2006, while examining the changes that have occurred consequently. The conclusions present the main findings and possible topics for future research.

The study focuses on the military rather than the political echelon. Materials were collected under limitations of information security.<sup>7</sup> Over 100 in-depth conversations were held with the decision makers, especially in the defense establishment, including military officials in key positions. The study also relies on books, articles, official military investigations, official reports of the state of Israel, media publications, and official publications of the IDF.

## **CHAPTER 1: THE GENERAL STAFF'S OPERATIONAL APPROACH FOR THE IDF**

Operational Art constitutes the operational principles of a military campaign. This concept reflects and incorporates fundamental tenets of the use of force and provides a common basis for commanders and soldiers for the better functioning of the complex army institution.<sup>8</sup> It reflects the IDF's view of the positioning of the state of Israel within the regional and global environment, and of the influences of processes occurring in Israeli society.<sup>9</sup> Primarily, Operational Art is a framework of guiding ideas, principles, and procedures. It can be seen as a layer between the conceptual framework for achieving the main aspects of the policy and the military battle doctrine and its operative planning, which are based on clear criteria.

The need to reformulate the Operational Art was the first lesson in the IDF document on lessons of the Second Lebanon War. Many in the army were inclined to see the Operational Art that came into force only three months before the war, under the headings "The General Staff's Operational Art for the IDF"<sup>10</sup> and "Effects-Based Operations," as a significant reason for the failures in Lebanon. The Winograd Commission pointed to the fact that this Operational Art had been officially approved in the IDF without undergoing proper assimilation processes within the organization beforehand.<sup>11</sup>

For example, the Operational Art made a distinction between a "general theater" under the responsibility of the General Staff, a "battle theater" under the responsibility of one of the regional commands, and an "operational theater." Yet the regional commands were not given appropriate means to independently implement their responsibility in the "battle theater," such as intelligence gathering in enemy territory. All such capabilities remained – despite the new Operational Art – under the aegis of the General Staff.

The limited assimilation process led to the fact that during the war the Northern Command, which was supposed to have been responsible for all the forces that fought in Lebanon, directed and coordinated only the ground combat force. Meanwhile the General Staff, which

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

was supposed to supervise all the different theaters, dealt with coordinating and directing the overall military effort in Lebanon.<sup>12</sup>

The essential problem, however, did not lie either in the chain of command or in the operational document itself (in any case, few in the IDF were fully familiar with it), but rather in ideas that had developed in the army in the years preceding the war and created the framework for the Operational Art. Three central ideas with far-reaching implications for the IDF's performance, both in the period before the war and during it, require attention.

The first concept, which held an important place in the IDF before the war, was that the importance of the air force was growing dramatically while that of the ground forces was becoming negligible. Some even believed that the next war could be won using air power alone, despite the fact that there was no clear historical precedent for an "aerial victory."<sup>13</sup>

Excessive belief in the air force did not begin with the appointment of an air force man, Dan Haloutz, as IDF chief of staff. Haloutz himself had already given voice to the idea years earlier. In January 2001, as part of a lecture at the National Security College, he said that "a ground force should not be used so long as there is an aerial alternative...this requires us to abandon some anachronistic assumptions: first of all, that victory equals territory. Victory means achieving the strategic objective and not necessarily territory...victory is a matter of consciousness. Air power significantly influences the consciousness of the enemy."<sup>14</sup>

The preference for the air force stemmed from the combination of its traditional characteristics – free movement in space and rapid concentration of firepower – and innovative technological developments in the areas of command and firepower.<sup>15</sup> This combination, considered a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), caused the air force to undergo operational and organizational changes that profoundly influenced the capability for air power and the manner of conducting war in general.<sup>16</sup> This development, claimed the proponents, enables the air force to rapidly concentrate accurate firepower and direct it at the critical mass of the enemy force

so as to paralyze it. Such an approach puts the enemy in a situation where he is denied any ability to meet the challenge. The physical paralysis together with the psychological effect of being unable to respond will cause the enemy to lose his balance and collapse.<sup>17</sup>

The assumption that the air force was capable of causing strategic paralysis went hand in hand with certain other notions that influenced the IDF. One was to regard a ground maneuver as the last resort in the repertoire of IDF responses.<sup>18</sup> Such a perspective fits the “post-heroic” concept of warfare, according to which a war is considered legitimate by the public and its leaders as long as it achieves its objectives with a minimum of casualties among the fighting forces and among the other side’s civilians.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, the preference is for whatever force is capable of inflicting numerous and accurate strikes on the enemy while creating minimal risk for the troops.<sup>20</sup>

Haloutz was not the only senior officer who viewed the air force as the main military force. During the tenure of his predecessor, Lt. Gen. Moshe Yaalon, the budgets of the air force and intelligence were increased despite the substantial cut in the IDF’s overall budget from 2002 to 2005. In contrast, the budget for the ground forces was cut no less than 25 percent in this period.<sup>21</sup> That reduction, to a great extent, reflected the new approach, whereby the “traditional” ground maneuver, which placed emphasis on a large and balanced order of battle for the ground forces, became at most a supporting element to the use of massive firepower from the air.<sup>22</sup>

The total preference for the use of precision power over a ground maneuver had many repercussions. For example, in 2006 the IDF refrained for a considerable time from mobilizing the reserves out of a belief that an air campaign alone would achieve the desired results. This preference also had institutional repercussions, such as the decision to appoint the air force commander, Dan Haloutz, as chief of staff – despite the fact that, according to the IDF’s structure, the chief of staff is directly responsible for the operation of the ground forces. Haloutz had no experience in that area.

Another problem in the 15 years preceding the 2006 Lebanon War was connected to the IDF emphasis on building its power to provide a

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

suitable answer for a limited confrontation – what is called asymmetrical, low-intensity conflict – very similar to the fighting in the territories against the Palestinian terror of the Second Intifada that began in 2000. Preparedness for such limited wars was put high on the IDF's list of priorities, just under the need to prepare for a nuclear threat such as Iran. "Traditional," symmetrical large-scale war, in contrast, was relegated to the bottom of the list. As a result, the main facets of the Operational Art for a regular confrontation, or even a limited one, with Hizballah, even though it would differ from the conflict in the Palestinian arena, were neglected.<sup>23</sup> Particularly neglected were preparations for an offensive ground maneuver aimed at destroying the enemy's forces and conquering parts of his territory.<sup>24</sup>

Beyond all these issues, the most important conceptual development in the years preceding the Second Lebanon War, whose implications are far-reaching, involved applying the principles of Operational Combat theory. Operational combat is defined as the "total of all military actions and the operations that accompany them, which are subordinate to a single idea and are directed at achieving that goal."<sup>25</sup> The "father of Operational Combat theory" is Brig. Gen. (res.) Shimon Naveh, who in 1994 founded, within the framework of the National Security College in Gilot, the Institute for Research on Operational Combat Theory. The theory Naveh dealt with constitutes a theoretical domain between strategy, the highest level of definition of objectives by the political echelon and the supreme command of the army, and tactics, how the objectives of war are achieved on the ground. The concepts of this theory are also derived from systems analysis, an interdisciplinary theory that is used, among other fields, in the social sciences, biology, and computer science. This theory seeks to examine the operational principles of a particular unit (an organism, a community, or a computer network) as part of an array of other units, the interrelations between it and other units, and its influence on these units and on the system as a whole.<sup>26</sup>

The IDF, according to this concept, acts first and foremost against enemy systems and not only against the enemy's army. To defeat these systems, the IDF must identify points of strength and weakness and disrupt their equilibrium. Any military move inevitably affects

not only the events in the battlefield but also one's own society and the enemy's society. Hence, a campaign can be won by using limited but accurate force. The most important thing is to identify the coordinates of the enemy's equilibrium and attack there.

Over the years, Naveh's Institute for Research on Operational Combat Theory (Brig. Gen. (res.) Dov Tamari co-directed the institute) inculcated the systems approach in generations of commanders, who took an advanced systems course until it was terminated in 2002. From some of his students, Naveh acquired an exalted status almost of a "guru."

The ideas underlying the systems approach were not refuted. Military theoreticians in various countries had already thought about them before Naveh. In the IDF, however, the approach became almost definitive at the expense of tactics and strategy. This had destructive consequences.

The operational approach that the IDF adopted under the influence of the Institute for Research on Operational Combat Theory includes three stages of deliberation and staff work: (a) design – developing logical and feasible military objectives in line with political objectives, and the constraints on them; (b) planning – deciding on the operational goal and defining the missions for the different forces; and (c) implementation – carrying out missions based on the tension between clear-cut practices and criteria and the existing situation on the ground.<sup>27</sup> These are distinct stages, carried out by different actors while using new concepts, such as "searing the consciousness" of the enemy, which has become an all-purpose objective from the IDF's standpoint – for example, in the conflict with the Palestinians.

The academic ideas were for the most part applied in the IDF to create an innovative organizational structure. Thus, the IDF established a Design Department headed by an officer at the rank of colonel in the Operations Branch, and even the objectives of the IDF Spokesperson's Unit were adjusted to the new thinking: no more dealing with spokespersonship and public relations (*hasbara*), as had been done for decades, but instead the "formulation of a perception of reality in the public discourse." It was decided that the IDF should in

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

wartime use an “awareness set,” much like the traditional sets in the commands that were responsible for activating fire or coordinating logistical assistance. The absurdity did not stop in the General Staff. An awareness set was established even in the Galil formation (Division 91), which is responsible for the Lebanese front, as if this were a matter of a war-fighting foundation in every regard.

The new outlook changed the language used in the IDF and the definition of objectives. Officers began to talk about an effects-based approach – that is, the ability to affect the enemy’s behavior and capabilities by using different means, in line with the targets set and the specific missions of the different forces,<sup>28</sup> so as to induce a desirable behavioral change in the enemy.<sup>29</sup>

Examples of the “effects” discussed were decapitation – attacking the enemy’s leadership – since it alone sets the goals of the system and is authorized to alter them,<sup>30</sup> and blinding – attacking the enemy’s communication lines and senses – with the aim of denying him the knowledge of what is happening on the battlefield. In addition to “effects,” new concepts developed in the IDF that were derived from systems analysis, such as “system idea,” “levers,” “consciousness,” “breaking the enemy’s logic,” “designers,” and so on.

Most of these concepts were elusive slogans and academic notions, generally of a political-strategic nature. It was very difficult to derive from them substantial and practical insights that would enable the definition of a clear objective that could be implemented on the ground. Even Naveh himself asserted, in retrospect, that the IDF went too far in trying to apply concepts connected to system theory on the ground.<sup>31</sup>

### **The Situation Today**

Four years after the Second Lebanon War, nothing remains of the approach and the terminology that prevailed in the IDF before and during the war. Terms such as “effect” and “decapitation” have disappeared from the military discourse. They have once again been replaced by the basic concepts – deterrence, warning, and victory – for describing a symmetrical war in which the air force aids the

ground forces in striking the force concentrations of the enemy army.<sup>32</sup> The operational approach that came into use three months before the war has been abandoned.

The IDF, however, has had a hard time formulating a new operational approach. One reason for this is that a military operational approach stems from a national-security doctrine, which is approved by the political echelon, and mediates between it and the operational planning and building of the military force. Yet, since its establishment, Israel has never had an official document that presents the political principles by which existing resources are to be allocated. It is worth recalling the Ben-Gurion Document of 1953, which discussed the need to develop quality ground and air forces as an answer to the Arab armies' quantitative advantage. Another document that the General Staff produced in the 1970s discussed the Israeli need to achieve a decisive victory as a condition for deterring enemy armies and fostering the recognition of Israel's existence and peace agreements with it. These two documents never became binding. A team led by Dan Meridor formulated a new national-security doctrine before the Second Lebanon War, but due to the war's outcome, this document too was frozen before it attained any binding status. After the war the National Security Council was assigned the task of formulating updated principles, but its work has not been completed.

In the absence of an official doctrine, the IDF relies on "basic concepts" that have been formulated in the different military branches and on principles that have been formulated by the chief of staff and his team on a number of occasions, such as the five-year Tefen 2012 plan. This plan gives high priority to the use of air forces and ground fire. At the same time, it revives the status of the ground maneuver as an inseparable and substantial part of any operational plan. The importance of the maneuver was already validated in Operation Cast Lead in the Gaza Strip, in a move aimed at cutting off Gaza so as to prevent the transfer of weapons and fighters from theater to theater, and particularly to provoke an enemy response, causing the target to stand out in his surroundings and expose himself to IDF fire.<sup>33</sup>

With the freezing of the "effects-based" operational approach, the Department for System Design in the Operations Branch was

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

eliminated, and the IDF's operational approach has returned to balancing components of firepower and maneuver in battle. At the same time, the extreme shift, which led to the almost total negation of the ideas that had developed during 1994-2006 in the context of the activity of the Institute for Research on Operational Combat Theory, would become problematic.

Today, there is an ongoing internal IDF debate on whether the "effects-based" approach failed because it was fundamentally erroneous and/or was not properly assimilated and "went too far." No one has any doubt that old terms such as "victory" need to be updated since, in the present day, the enemy can consist of entities with no state accountability.<sup>34</sup>

The Winograd Commission warned from the start of the danger of the sweeping invalidation – prompted by the war – of all these ideas in the name of a "return to basics." The commission's report states:

"Being strongly critical of the new operational approach, some forgot that the development of the approach was a genuine attempt, important and necessary, to bridge a deep conceptual gap in the IDF. The army deserves praise for dealing with this issue so much and devoting great attention to it. The IDF had no choice but to update or formulate operational approaches for various basic scenarios that would suit the challenges it faces. True, it was also necessary to identify, and essential to oppose, an unfortunate tendency to anti-intellectualism in the IDF, and also to acquaint the commanders with a wider, more abstract conception. It is also important to stress that not in every war or other use of force is it necessary or possible or desirable to conquer territories."<sup>35</sup>

It is important to emphasize that the designers of the operational plans in the high IDF echelons are also aware today of the changes in the nature of war. The IDF did not completely reject Operational Combat theory after the Second Lebanon War, and in recent years two groups of senior officers at the colonel and brigadier-general levels have indeed taken a course in operational combat art. Nevertheless, the situation is deplored by most of the senior officers, with some even

## MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES

saying that since the end of the war “it’s as if an order was given from above to stop thinking.”<sup>36</sup> This may be exaggerated, but there is no doubt that the IDF today is very far from the intellectual storms that characterized it in the time of Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon. In those days the Chief of Staff’s bureau even organized brainstorming groups to develop new ideas. Today as well, the Institute for Operational Combat Theory serves as a basis for the IDF’s intellectual framework, but its importance is incomparably lower than in the period when Brig. Gen. (res.) Naveh headed it.<sup>37</sup>

Although the process of restoring the traditional ideas to the operational approach and creating a reasonable proportion among its components appears to be a step in the right direction, the anti-intellectual atmosphere might cause damage in the long term.

## CHAPTER 2: FORCE-BUILDING AND PREPAREDNESS

### Ground Forces

The Winograd Commission wrote that “in most of the cases and the areas, the army displayed impotence vis-à-vis Hizballah in its ground operations.”<sup>38</sup> Grave mistakes, indicating a basic lack of professionalism, even occurred in two of the IDF’s best regular-army formations – Infantry Brigade 933 (the Nahal Brigade) and Armored Brigade 401, which uses *Merkava* 4 tanks. The two brigades took part, among other things, in the battle over the crossing of the Saluki River on the 32nd day of the war.

The deplorable lack of coordination between the two brigades, whose headquarters were located in the same Lebanese house during the battle, is well known. Particularly vexing, however, was the fact that most of the sophisticated *Merkava* 4 tanks were not equipped at all with basic protection against anti-tank missiles – from smoke canisters to camouflage. Because of cuts in the training budget in the years preceding the war, the tank corps did not train the soldiers in the use of canisters. Subsequently, the corps decided that, since the soldiers in any case did not know how to operate the canisters, there was no reason to install them on the newly produced tanks. Of course, the root of the neglect lay in the concept that the ground maneuver belonged to wars of the past.<sup>39</sup>

Immediately after the war, smoke canisters were installed on all tanks that had not been equipped with the basic system. Soldiers have gone back to learning how to operate the old-style protective mechanisms and are drilled on this occasionally. This is not the only basic shortcoming that has been repaired in the tank corps: the tank crews have learned common military practices anew, such as the need to be in motion most of the time, and even the basic rules for constructing earthworks in the field as defense against enemy fire. Other parts of the ground forces, too, have seen a return to the basics of the military professions – from the level of the individual soldier and squad to that of the company.<sup>40</sup>

It is important to understand that the return to basics in the building of the IDF force after 2006 focused first and foremost on implementing old-new concepts. According to these concepts, ground fighting again has a significant role to play in the IDF's war plans. A few months after the Second Lebanon War, the new Chief of Staff, Gabi Ashkenazi, (after Haloutz resigned) instructed the Ground Forces Command to formulate a basic concept that would describe the anticipated challenges for the ground forces over the next ten years; in line with this, the basis for the building of the force would be determined.

The return of old concepts was evident in the new plan for building the ground forces, which was officially signed at the beginning of 2009.<sup>41</sup> This time the operational needs of the ground forces and the operational planning in line with different reference outlines – not budgetary constraints – formed the central consideration for resource allocation. These constraints had caused, according to then Deputy Chief of Staff Gen. Moshe Kaplinsky, the reduction in training of the regular forces and the almost complete elimination of training for reserve units.<sup>42</sup> And, despite the reduced pre-war budget (75 percent of the budget in the early 2000s), the ground forces could still have allocated a higher sum to training instead of spending it on a controversial force-building project, the Digital Land Army (DLA) project.

The purpose of this project is to connect the ground units, and subsequently all the IDF forces, to information and data networks so as to enable optimal decision-making by all levels of command in real time.<sup>43</sup> The multitude of plasma screens in the war rooms of the Second Lebanon War was a first harbinger of the DLA project's implementation. Since the war millions of dollars have been invested in advancing it.<sup>44</sup> Despite its being one of the IDF's largest force-building projects in the first decade of the third millennium, and despite the fact that the investment in it comes at the expense of other aspects of force-building, no serious discussion of the project has been held outside of the IDF. The political-security cabinet, which approved the budget for the project, devoted only fifteen minutes to discuss the matter, and this was during another discussion focused on a completely different issue.<sup>45</sup> In any case, since the Second Lebanon

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

War, in the framework of the five-year Tefen plan, all large IDF projects, including the DLA project, are included in the central force-building budget and not in the separate budgets of the different forces. The basic stage of the DLA project, according to whose framework a number of divisions have adopted the DLA systems, has almost ended, and at present the IDF is awaiting the decision on whether to allocate additional resources for further stages.

Another significant post-war improvement in the ground forces included the setting of fitness standards for all the units – both in the regular units and the reserves – as already practiced for decades in the air force. This means regularly monitoring the level of training of soldiers and commanders, the equipment and resources that each unit possesses, the condition of the vehicles, and so on. The required level of fitness for each battalion or brigade is determined in line with the plans designated for it in case of war. The units that are supposed to enter into combat immediately must be at the highest level of fitness. Reserve units, however, which can train for a few days in an accelerated emergency program called “Precious Time,” can be at a lower level of fitness according to the numerical standards that have been set. Most important is that the General Staff now monitors the fitness of every unit, and in case of an emergency there will not likely be “surprises” as in 2006.

The following parameters reflect the changes that have occurred in the ground units since 2006:

**Training:** In line with the “fitness standards,” the scope of training of the IDF ground forces has vastly increased. It emerged during the 2006 war that infantry soldiers did not know how to climb in orderly fashion into a helicopter during an operation. Brigade and division commanders completed tenures without undergoing extensive training drills.

Today, the situation has improved dramatically. The IDF’s training program has been fully implemented since 2007, in contrast with the years 2001-2005, during which 25 percent of training sessions were canceled at the last minute. Every battalion is now required to train at least 13 weeks out of every two years, and only the highest levels of

the General Staff is authorized to approve a postponement or cancellation of these training sessions. Regular units have gone back to training with “live fire,” which wasn't done in the years before the 2006 War. The reserve units, too, have gone back to training, though, unlike the regular forces, they mostly do “dry” training.

Due to the high probability of combat in urban areas, great emphasis is placed on training for such scenarios. To this end, a training city that replicates Arab villages has been set up at the National Center for Training in Tze'elim. Another facility for training in urban areas has been created at the Combat Engineering School near Eilat. The IDF today devotes 30 percent of training to basic defense scenarios.<sup>46</sup>

There has also been a substantial improvement in the physical fitness of the regular forces and to a certain extent the reserve units. A comprehensive program was initiated by the School for Combat Fitness, which is located at the Wingate Institute.<sup>47</sup>

**Equipment and armored combat vehicles (ACVs):** In the week in which the Second Lebanon War broke out, a dramatic decision was supposed to be taken in the IDF that would have reduced by tens of percentage points the arsenal of tanks, in line with the five-year Kela plan for the years 2007-2011. This plan was canceled. In accordance with the current five-year plan, Tefen, the plan to close tank formations was canceled, and production of the Merkava 4 tank is continuing at a rate of 30 per year. Likewise it was decided to improve older-model tanks and to add active protection systems (such as the "Trophy," manufactured by Rafael and other systems).

The process of the shrinking of the ground units, which characterized the IDF since the end of the previous decade, has ended. Several units that were disbanded before the Second Lebanon War, such as the Corps Headquarters for the Lebanese front and the Golan front, were reestablished in a smaller format. However, thus far no Central Command for the Special Forces has been created.

Before the war and particularly after it, much was said about the need for such a framework; however, the different branches of the IDF are not prepared to hand over exclusive control of their prestigious

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

commando units to a new command body. *Sayeret Matkal* (the General Staff reconnaissance unit) belongs to the Intelligence Directorate, the Naval Commandos to the navy, and the Shaldag units and 669 to the air force. During the Second Lebanon War an improvised coordination and liaison headquarters was activated for the Special Forces; however, the direct command over these units remains in the hands of the army, navy, and air force – which has caused a “defect in the ability to liaise between the Special Forces and the general strategic idea.”<sup>48</sup> Despite the fact that a unified command still does not exist, the coordination between the special units was drastically improved as a lesson from the Second Lebanon War, even without a single, regularly functioning central headquarters.

Another grave problem that emerged in the war concerns the mobility of the infantry forces in the combat theater. The IDF has long neglected the acquisition of armored personnel carriers (APCs), which are based on the American M-133 APCs. These were originally produced in 1960 and came into massive use in the IDF after the Yom Kippur War. They are not able to protect against machinegun fire let alone antitank missiles. Thus, they do not enable the deployment of infantry to an area under heavy fire.

The new approach for the ground forces promotes the principle of “balance” between armored vehicles, tanks, and protected APCs, thereby enabling infantry and armored units to advance quickly into the combat theater, allowing a rate of advance faster than human walking. Accordingly, it was decided to manufacture the *Namer*, Merkava APCs, which offer the same protection as the Merkava tank. The Golani brigade used the first two *Namers* in Operation Cast Lead. However, the process of equipping the *Namer* has just begun and will continue for a number of years. Building the force is a lengthy process and the gaps of decades that exist in certain areas cannot be closed in two or three years. Today the infantry forces still suffer from a significant lack of protected APCs. This shortage delayed and sometimes limited the activity of the IDF forces in the Second Lebanon War.

The utility helicopter fleet, composed of Yasur (CH-53) and Black Hawk (UH-60) helicopters, is not a suitable substitute for the APC

contingent. This is evidenced by the fact that the helicopter fleet needed two nights to transfer the regular-army paratroopers brigade (Brigade 35) and the reserve Hod Hahanit brigade deep into the Lebanese front with their full equipment in Operation Change of Direction 11 during the Second Lebanon War. The helicopter fleet is limited in scope and cannot transport masses of forces and equipment that are required for a significant ground maneuver in a war.<sup>49</sup>

Gaps caused by longstanding neglect also exist in the area of active defense. After the war, the IDF decided to develop an active protection system (APS) against antitank missiles. This does not involve damage-absorbing protection, such as the classic tank layer, or protection that deflects the damages of the explosion by means of “reactive” protection (tiny explosive nodes), but instead interceptors that are fired at the attacking missile to prevent it from reaching the tank or APC altogether. Currently the defense establishment is investing in the development of APS of this kind, such as Rafael’s Trophy system, Israel Military Industries’ Iron Fist system, and others.

In August 2008 the IDF decided to acquire 100 APS for installation on armored combat vehicles, and the prototype was utilized by one the forces during Cast Lead. Massive production and deployment with this system, however, has not yet begun.

**The reserves:** Before the Second Lebanon War, the reserve force was viewed as superfluous. This attitude, however, has changed completely. The considerable improvement in the reserve units has focused on equipment and training. In addition to renewed training, after the war the General Staff adopted the "Shalhevet" program, whereby NIS 2.5 billion were invested in improving soldiers’ personal equipment, with priority given to those designated to fight on the northern front – that is, Lebanon and Syria.

The IDF has also tried to improve the reservists’ attitude toward the senior command. Surveys performed after the Second Lebanon War showed that less than 30 percent of the reserve soldiers trusted the senior command.<sup>50</sup> Throughout the war, orders were changed frequently, most of which did not reach the stage of implementation.

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

This caused soldiers and field commanders to wonder out loud whether the commanders in the high levels “know what’s going on.”<sup>51</sup> As a lesson from the war, the IDF understood that the frequent changing of orders must be avoided so as not to disconcert the fighting forces. The improvement in equipment and in training has helped the reserve force recover from the profound crisis it had been in.

**Artillery:** During the Second Lebanon War, artillery was used against Hizballah rockets; however, the artillery fire did not succeed in slowing the pace of the rocket launches. Indeed, the average number of launches, which in the first two weeks of the war came to 75 per day, doubled in the subsequent week, and on the last day of the war 253 launches were counted.<sup>52</sup> “The artillery fire,” wrote Brig. Gen (res.) Yaakov Zigdon, “achieved meager results in the stationary war against an enemy that was quantitatively tiny.”<sup>53</sup> Indeed, the findings of the military investigations substantiate this criticism. During the 33 days of the war, no fewer than 174,000 Israeli shells (84 percent of them explosive shells) were fired. Most of them were intended to hit Katyusha launchers or to disrupt their fire. In actuality, the combined firing effort of the artillery and the air force succeeded in destroying only about 100 out of 12,000 Katyusha launchers – less than one percent.

This wasteful fire led to a severe shortage of shells toward the end of the war. Thus, smokescreen shells were not fired to obscure the advance of the forces, which crossed Wadi Saluki and were exposed to fire from two sides.<sup>54</sup> Neither did the firing of hundreds of MLRS rockets bring significant results.

The important lesson from the failure of artillery in the summer of 2006 was to carry out selective artillery firing, as was done in Operation Cast Lead. In the course of that operation, only about 7,500 shells were fired.<sup>55</sup> Massive use was also made of 120-mm precision-guided mortar fire, which better suits the urban environment. The IDF intends to widely equip the units with such mortars, called Kardom,<sup>56</sup> but the planned acquisitions have not yet been budgeted.

An additional lesson is to set up a central headquarters in the Northern Command that will concentrate and coordinating the firing effort, as has already been practiced for decades at the division level.<sup>57</sup>

**Engineering:** As part of the lessons of the Second Lebanon War, the Ground Forces Command emphasized developing means to provide an effective answer to minefields in different environments, urban and other. Thus, during Cast Lead, the IDF used of "Viper Armor" for detonating mines so as to enable safe movement for tanks and APCs in the streets of Gaza. In addition, a breaching instrument called Matador was developed for blowing up the walls of houses. This device was designed to facilitate soldiers' entry into buildings, not through doors and windows, which are likely to be booby-trapped. In previous operations, entry through the walls required shattering them with a hammer, which entails great effort.

**Infantry-Tank Teams:** In recent years, the IDF has bolstered the operational approach of joint infantry and tank (and, on a smaller scale, engineering) teams. With the purpose of improving coordination between combat forces in the same zone, this approach has been used in joint training sessions in order to acquaint each unit with the others' attributes. These sessions are conducted on the basis of clear and defined operational plans for the combined forces, and their commanders know from the start which missions they will have to carry out together in time of battle.

The Second Lebanon War led the IDF to give up the notion that the troops must be deployed in the battlefield as small, simultaneously activated units, deep in enemy territory. This operational concept was influenced by American theories, which asserted: The ground forces should be reorganized, shifting from the divisional structure of the Cold War era to independent combat units with fighting strength that is separate and operationally focused.<sup>58</sup> The IDF went even further with this idea and adopted approaches that viewed the minuscule forces within enemy territory as "dynamic molecules."<sup>59</sup> Within this trend, making the brigade the basic IDF formation instead of the division was deliberated. This echoed Richard Simpkin, who said: We must give up the sacred cow known as a division – the previous evolutionary stage in the path that was outlined by technological

progress.<sup>60</sup> After the Second Lebanon War, the IDF concluded that the status of the division as the basic formation would also be preserved in the next decade.<sup>61</sup>

### **Air Force**

The assumption that aerial bombings weakened people's fighting spirit is not necessarily right, claimed British Prime Minister Winston Churchill during World War II, adding: What we learned about the ability of the enemy population to endure suffering does not justify our assumption that it is possible to subjugate them with such methods or that they will not be made more resolute by despair.<sup>62</sup> His words, which point to the limitations of air power in defeating the will of the enemy, were also valid in the summer of 2006.

The exaggerated expectations placed on air force capabilities in the Second Lebanon War – by the decision-makers, commanders, and the general public – were flawed. The air force did not achieve a rapid victory. The destruction of most of Hizballah's long-range rocket launchers on the night of July 13, and even the harsh blow to the Dahiya quarter of South Beirut, the stronghold of Hizballah, did not lead the organization to raise a white flag.

The air force contribution was also marginal in attacking Hizballah's short-range Katyushas,<sup>63</sup> exactly like the artillery's limited effectiveness in this regard. The air force was not surprised. In any case it did not see itself as responsible for "taking care" of the 122-mm-diameter Katyushas with their range of only 10 kilometers, these being almost completely impossible to locate from a high altitude.<sup>64</sup> Conversely, against heavier rockets with their launch vehicles and clear, easy-to-identify signature, the air force was highly effective in a way that evoked amazement among air forces all over the world. Unlike the ground forces, the air force functioned very well during the war, and were it not for the excessive expectations placed on it from the beginning, its achievements could be considered a great success.

One of the main lessons the air force drew from the war, related to the issue of coordination with the ground forces, relates to the concept of "jointness." A lack of coordination between the forces was not a

problem that popped up for the first time in the summer of 2006, and it is not unique to the IDF. Lamentable instances of “friendly” aerial fire against IDF ground forces occurred in the First Lebanon War, and such cases also occur in the US army. For example, during the Anaconda Operation in Afghanistan in 2002, an American ground convoy was bombed by mistake.<sup>65</sup> In general, a ground operation’s proximity to the foci of an aerial action in the battle theater is a factor that limits, and sometimes cancels, aerial activity.<sup>66</sup>

After the war the IDF decided to examine the traditional division between the ground forces and the air force,<sup>67</sup> in the spirit of the IDF document “Blue-Brown,” which had already determined in the 1990s that all aerial forces and all ground forces should belong to separate branches (as opposed to what is practiced in other armies, most notably the US army, where the Army [ground division] maintains its own airplanes and helicopters).

The Second Lebanon War did not prompt the invalidation of the “Blue-Brown” document. However, it did give rise to the establishment of joint committees for the air force and the Northern Command, aimed at strengthening their cooperation. It was agreed that the air force would give higher priority to its participation in ground fighting<sup>68</sup> than in the past. Consequently, the practice of marking a “yellow line” on maps, creating an artificial but complete separation between the offensive activities of the air and ground forces in the Lebanese theater, was terminated. (The line was originally created for security reasons, to quell fears that air force planes would mistakenly hit IDF forces).<sup>69</sup>

The IDF took a series of additional steps aimed at breaking the psychological barriers between the sides. Army commanders were invited for flights in combat planes to see how the battle appears from a high altitude, and pilots went down to the ground. Moreover, different squadrons have “adopted” ground brigades and divisions and strengthened their mutual ties. Likewise, in every urban warfare training exercise for regular and reserve units, attack helicopters also participate.

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

Another important modification after the war was the appointment of an air support officer to every combat brigade. Implementing this decision, however, has encountered great difficulty because most of the pilots are not prepared to serve in ground commands in time of emergency. The air force was indeed able to “lend” five such officers to the different forces that participated in Cast Lead, but there is no way of knowing what would happen if dozens of them were needed at once in case of a wider scale war. Meanwhile, the manning of this position in the ground forces is proceeding slowly.

Improving cooperation with the ground forces is an important and vital process, but the air force still has a problem when it comes to building up the force. At the start of the decade, the force began a process of obtaining no fewer than 102 F-16I (Sufa) planes. According to an agreement with the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, the receipt of the planes continued until 2009; the next-generation plane, the F-35, will not be available until at least 2014.<sup>70</sup>

In the past, the IDF made certain to acquire state-of-the-art warplanes every five to six years, significantly raising the level of both weaponry and flight range. The decision at the outset of the decade, however, to purchase F-16Is at a sum of \$4.5 billion (from US aid money) means that at least 12 years will have passed from the beginning of the acquisition of the F-16I until the receipt of a plane with new capabilities, the F-35.

The great advantage of the F-35 is its stealth, which reduces the chance of detection by enemy radar, and its ability to autonomously generate, process, and distribute data from multiple sources at long ranges. At the current stage, the IDF is planning to purchase a single F-35 squadron (20 planes), but a larger potential exists (for around 75 planes).<sup>71</sup>

The air force has the responsibility to deploy a multilayered antimissile protection system – from the Iron Dome project for intercepting short-range Kassam and Katyusha rockets to the Arrow, and Arrow-3, missiles for intercepting Scud and Shihab-type missiles with the potential to carry nuclear warheads.

The Iron Dome system, the investment in which was decided upon after the Second Lebanon War, became operational in the IDF in the second half of 2010. Reportedly, experiments conducted in the course of developing Iron Dome were crowned a success.<sup>72</sup> At the same time, some disagree that the system will be able to effectively intercept Kassams at a range of 6-10 kilometers because of the short flight time, though all agree that the system will be able to effectively intercept Grad rockets fired from ranges of 30-40 kilometers with their relatively longer flight time.<sup>73</sup>

Rafael, which is developing Iron Dome, is also working on the "David's Sling" system, which is designed to intercept medium-range rockets such as the Fajr, as well as boat-launched missiles, air-launched cruise missiles, and other air-breathing targets.<sup>74</sup>

The Arrow 2 missile (operational for about a decade) is designed to intercept surface-to-surface missiles high in the atmosphere, and the Arrow 3 (which is still in very early stages of development), outside of the atmosphere. Unlike for surface-to-surface missiles, there is at this point no defensive system available against low-flying cruise missiles. It is important to recall that Iran is making an enormous effort to equip itself with such missiles.<sup>75</sup>

Likewise, no budget has yet been approved for substantial deployment of Iron Dome systems that could provide protection against rockets along the Lebanese border. The budget for the project so far (about NIS one billion) is designated for the costs of development and for the deployment of some of the initial Iron Dome systems only. Even if many Iron Dome batteries are produced, should these missiles be used extensively to intercept thousands of Katyushas fired by Hizballah at the northern settlements, the huge gap between the cost of each Iron Dome interception (tens of thousands of dollars) and the cost of a Katyusha (hundreds of dollars at most) will attract all the more controversy. If the IDF tries to intercept thousands of Katyushas, it will likely be hugely expensive even though Iron Dome can distinguish between missiles that fall in open and in built-up areas.

## **The Navy**

The navy's status was hard hit during the 2006 War. The long series of defects that emerged raised many questions about its professional level and organizational culture.<sup>76</sup> After the war the force underwent a major shakeup. Admiral (res.) Dudu Ben-Bashat, commander of the navy in the summer of 2006, left his post in October 2007. Along with him went a group of senior officers from the top leadership. The current navy chief, Gen. Eli Marom, was brought back for service by Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi. Returning along with him was Brig. Gen. Rani Ben-Yehuda, who was appointed the force's deputy commander and chief of staff (the differentiation between the deputy commander and the chief of staff, which existed during the war, was eliminated when these two returned to service).

The significant change that Marom and Ben-Yehuda brought about has influenced the daily routine: Battleship crews now maintain high preparedness in every operational cruise and activate all the defensive systems on the ships. This practice was not done during the war. Then, a missile boat of the Sa'ar 5 Corvette-class (Hanit) was hit by a shore-to-sea missile of the C-802 model, an Iranian version of a Chinese missile. Most of the defensive systems on the missile boat, including the Barak interception system, had not been activated at that moment, and in any case the data of the missile in question were not fed beforehand to the ship's computers. The navy did not have clear-cut evidence that Hizballah possessed such a missile. As a lesson from this foul-up, any and all information on the possibility that any missile could be possessed by the enemy in the theater is entered immediately into the defensive systems of the navy's boats, even if there is no proof that the enemy indeed has the missile.

An additional change is the improvement of interoperability with the ground forces. In Cast Lead the naval forces played a significant part in attacking enemy targets, though it is doubtful whether this will still be possible against an enemy equipped with sophisticated shore-to-sea missiles.

Since the summer of 2006, the navy has invested in improving the survivability of its vessels, but its main problem still lies in its order

of battle. Gen. (res.) Ze'ev Almog, former navy commander, noted that the navy is still far from the order of battle that was planned for it many years ago. He pointed out that the navy currently has only three boats of the Sa'ar 5 class instead of the eight that had been planned.<sup>77</sup>

The navy's budget, which comes to only a few percent of the total IDF budget, did not change after the war; however, as a force with strategic capabilities meant to enable hitting distant targets, acquiring missile boats and submarines for the navy is part of the force-building budget that is designated for the IDF by the five-year Tefen plan. The navy is expected to be bolstered particularly with respect to submarines. In 2013 and 2014 another two submarines of the Dolphin class, currently being built in Germany<sup>78</sup> at a cost of over €1 billion, are supposed to arrive in Israel.

The navy received three Dolphins about a decade ago, with Germany paying most of the cost of their construction as a gesture in light of the missile attacks Israel endured during the First Gulf War in 1991.<sup>79</sup> The new submarines, however, are being purchased primarily by Israel with Germany subsidizing one-third of the cost. The decision to build two additional submarines was taken in 2005 by then prime minister Ariel Sharon. He opposed the IDF chief of staff at the time, Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, who thought the money should be invested instead in other areas of force-building. When the two submarines, currently being built in Germany, arrive, the navy's fleet will number five modern submarines. Apparently the IDF position on the need for submarines has changed; Israel had hoped to purchase from Germany a sixth submarine.<sup>80</sup>

According to the foreign media, the immense importance of the Dolphin submarines is in the possibility of launching seaborne missiles with nuclear warheads, that is, a "second strike" capability from the sea in the event of a nuclear attack on Israeli territory. Such a capability is thought to be necessary for deterrence against a nuclear threat.

Meanwhile the navy has not succeeded in procuring new missile boats. The most state-of-the-art missile boats in its arsenal are of the Sa'ar 5 class, purchased from the United States in the 1990s. The

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

navy is interested in modern missile boats weighing 2,500-3,000 tons (slightly larger than the 2,000-ton Sa'ar 5). The goal is to equip the boats with a state-of-the-art defensive system against enemy planes, called Barak Adir, which requires a larger platform than the Sa'ar 5. The navy is also interested in emplacing mid-size helicopters on the larger boats in contrast to the small helicopters that are on the Sa'ar 5.

The Tefen plan allocated \$200 million to jumpstart the process of acquiring the new boats for the current five years. However, negotiations with Lockheed Martin on purchasing a new boat that was developed for the American fleet in the framework of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) project have faltered because of an increase in cost stemming from a decreased demand for ships on the part of the US navy. The project was greatly cut back and the price of each individual ship rose, among other things, because of a decrease in the US defense budget under President Barack Obama. What could lower the price is, in fact, a decision by Saudi Arabia to obtain a large number of ships of this model and deploy them against Iran in the Persian Gulf.

With the freeze in talks over the purchase of LCS ships, the navy began examining the possibility of manufacturing ships in Israel on the basis of construction plans to be acquired from the German corporation TKMS, which also manufactures the Dolphin submarines. The navy is considering purchasing plans for at least two ships of a stretched MEKO A-100 model, but there is doubt whether this is realistic. If the navy does decide to go through with it, or to buy the ships after they are built in Germany itself, it will be necessary to allocate an Israeli currency budget for new missile boats, which currently does not exist. It is hard to see at this stage how the navy will manage to meet its target date of 2014 for obtaining new missile boats.<sup>81</sup>

### **Supplies**

One of the important lessons from the Second Lebanon War, which pertains to all the combat forces, surrounds the need to increase supplies of ammunition and replacement parts. Due to budget cuts and the decision to put preparations for an all-out conventional war at

the lowest priority, on the eve of the 2006 War the level of supplies was very low. Thus, despite the fact that the battle was fought in only one theater and, moreover, against a paramilitary guerrilla organization, in the course of the war the IDF needed ammunition airlifted from the United States.

A number of months after the conflict, a comprehensive process of filling the IDF depots was launched. In this framework the port of Ashdod was closed for a full month for the purpose of unloading giant weapons shipments. These shipments raised the level of supplies beyond what existed before the war. The new levels of supplies accorded with the reference scenarios prepared in the Planning Branch regarding each of the theaters and the expected duration of fighting within them.

### **Intelligence**

Like the IDF combat forces, Intelligence has also undergone a shakeup since the Second Lebanon War. The war revealed that the intelligence corps apparently prepared well for a war with Hizballah in terms of understanding the organization, its deployment on the ground, and its mode of activity.<sup>82</sup> There was, however, an exaggerated tendency to engage in “political” intelligence in an attempt to analyze the intentions of leaders,<sup>83</sup> a task largely doomed to failure. To actually enter a leader’s mind is very difficult even if one performs the most professional psychological analyses.

Compared to political intelligence, field intelligence was largely neglected. The IDF knew nothing about some of the “nature reserves,” the underground sites that Hizballah built basically under the nose of the Galil division along the northern border. Information about the “reserves” that was known was kept in sealed boxes and withheld from combat forces.<sup>84</sup>

Chance discoveries of trench networks and camouflaged fortifications showed that the ground units were operating in insufficiently familiar surroundings.<sup>85</sup> If this were not enough, the forces in the field issued maps that sometimes had not been updated for five to eight years. Certain battalions in Lebanon were surprised to find numerous houses

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

in areas that, according to the maps they had, were supposed to be completely empty.

As a lesson from the war, the intelligence corps has undergone structural changes (involving some friction within the branch, as occurs not infrequently under such circumstances). The goal of some of the changes was the strengthening of intelligence efforts aimed at acquiring military objectives and targets.

Since the war, all maps have been updated more than once and new procedures have been instated to ensure the flow of information to the field level with appropriate information-security arrangements. The field-intelligence force that was established at the beginning of the decade as part of the ground forces, and which was responsible for both the intelligence of the battlefield that was needed by the field commanders and the collection of combat intelligence, has since been dismantled. This force was considered a total failure. It was decided to restore the responsibility for “heavy” intelligence matters and for the development of all the intelligence officers to the Intelligence Corps Authority, which is subordinate to the Military Intelligence Directorate. The field-intelligence force of the ground forces remains, in reality, solely a force for collecting battle intelligence. Within the new structure, the surveillance capabilities have been greatly improved.

After years of joint work with the Israeli Security Agency (Shabak), the IDF has become greatly dependent on intelligence that the Shabak provides. Operation Cast Lead in Gaza was based to a great extent on information transferred by Shabak coordinators, who were integrated into every combat force. Without such coordinators, as was the case in the 2006 War, the IDF has difficulty collecting quality intelligence on heavily populated enemy areas and within organizations that are difficult for intelligence to penetrate (though sometimes the IDF succeeds in obtaining such precious information).<sup>86</sup>

The intelligence of the IDF and the Shabak is well integrated in war rooms in which quality targets are dealt with and targeted killings of terrorists from the air are also directed. However, a basic problem still remains: There is no clear division of boundaries between the intelligence bodies – Aman (Military Intelligence), the Mossad, and

the Shabak – and no joint “national assessor” for them has been instituted despite the fact that clear recommendations to do so were already presented in the Agranat Report on the Yom Kippur War almost 40 years ago.

The nature of the threats today – asymmetrical enemies who are mixed into a civilian population, political entities lacking a stable regime, and the danger of the development of non-conventional capabilities – makes the issue of setting boundaries more complex and difficult.<sup>87</sup> What is clear, though, is that the complexity of the threats requires a thorough examination of the old division between the Shabak, which operates within Israel and the territories, the Aman military intelligence, which operates against states of the first circle around Israel, and the Mossad, which operates against states in distant circles.<sup>88</sup> This complexity necessitates instating a clearly defined head of intelligence to direct its activities and strengthen the cooperation between its different branches.

### **Home Front**

Since the Second Lebanon War, the strategy for the home front has undergone a transformation, beginning with a transition from a “narrow” approach to a “broad” approach. Today, the IDF Home Front Command sees itself as responsible not only for evacuating civilians from the ruins of buildings, if necessary, and providing a warning siren and guidance to residents on how to protect themselves against conventional and non-conventional harm (including with the help of gas mask kits), but also as responsible for social resilience, even if this entails tasks that are commonly performed by civilian bodies. For example, one of its duties is to ensure the distribution of mail and medicines to sick people who will be inside shelters.

The IDF culture, whereby each commander overturns his predecessor’s policy in many regards, has already occurred several times in the history of the Home Front Command. Unfortunately, in the Second Lebanon War, while the approach of the Home Front Command was defined as “integrated” – the full performance of civilian tasks by civilian bodies was under the Home Front Command’s responsibility – in actuality the approach was one of

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

“minimizing,” since it was not backed up by appropriate legislation that would have granted the military command authority over any of the civilian actors. The state comptroller’s report on how all the authorities dealt with the home front, which was published after the Second Lebanon War, directed harsh criticism at this defect.<sup>89</sup>

In any case, the understanding that the home front is an important part of any conflict was not born in the Second Lebanon War. Beginning with the 1991 Gulf War, in which Israeli society’s resilience was identified as a weak point, the home front has been an integral part of every conflict, and even a “preferred target” from our enemies’ standpoint. The establishment of the Home Front Command itself was, indeed, a lesson from the 1991 War. Previously only civil defense bodies had dealt with the home front.

As a lesson from the Second Lebanon War, a dramatic change was implemented in the approach to the home front - the National Emergency Authority was set up. Initially the authority was to be subordinate to the Defense Ministry, under the direct responsibility of Deputy Defense Minister Matan Vilnai. The authority was supposed to “integrate” the activity of different bodies that are responsible for dealing with the home front, such as the Home Front Command, the Israel Police, Magen David Adom (Israeli Red Cross), the Firefighters, the Interior Ministry, local authorities, and so on. In 2008-2009, the coordination between the different bodies was tested in a series of national emergency drills; it was also tested in Operation Cast Lead.

The data from Operation Cast Lead testify to its success: Before the operation, only 50-60 percent of the residents of southern Israel said they felt “to a great extent” or “to a very great extent” that they had the fortitude to withstand a missile attack from the Gaza Strip (on a scale with five possibilities for determining the level of fortitude). This figure climbed in the course of the operation to 80, 90, 95, and even 96 percent in the war’s last days. In contrast, in the Second Lebanon War the fortitude of the population in the north declined from 85 percent in the first days to only 30 percent toward the end.<sup>90</sup> Despite such unequivocal data, it is hard to draw sweeping conclusions from Operation Cast Lead since, in its course, some 813

mortars and Qassam rockets, carrying a total weight of three tons of explosives, were fired at the Israeli home front. The heaviest rockets that exploded in Israeli territory during the operation, of the Grad class, each carried only seven kilograms of explosives. Statistically speaking, only four percent of the missiles fired at the home front scored a direct hit on any structure; 75 percent landed in unpopulated areas. This data is similar to the Second Lebanon War, except that some 4,000 rockets carrying a total weight of 30 tons of explosives were fired at the northern settlements. And that too is likely to be a drop in the ocean compared to Hizballah's ability in a renewed confrontation, or those of Iran or Syria, to hit the Israeli home front with surface-to-surface missiles carrying warheads weighing hundreds of kilograms each.

The main contingent of the Home Front Command currently numbers 24 regiments for search and rescue, 12 non-conventional warfare regiments that specialize in dealing with chemical and biological weapons, 14 hospitals, and 10 regiments for maintaining public order. This force is divided into 18 districts, constituting regional brigades of a sort.

The lessons of the Second Lebanon War included the reestablishment of three of these districts. The Home Front Command has reestablished a sort of Civil Defense corps; however, instead of the historic Civil Defense, which was based on relatively old reservists, a corps that was eliminated in the 1990s, the new corps, which is being constructed, is based on volunteers who are 11<sup>th</sup>- and 12<sup>th</sup>-grade students.

An operational research study dealing with attacks on the home front (in Israel and also in European cities in World War II) shows that proper wartime behavior by a population prevents considerable percentages of casualties. After the Second Lebanon War, it was decided that the population should be continuously informed on how to behave in emergency situations. At present, instructions have been issued to take refuge in a protected room, which should be chosen beforehand in every home in case there is no shelter within the building or not enough time to reach a shelter outside of it. (Warning times depend on the source of the threat and the distance from it, and

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

comes up to one minute in Haifa, two minutes in Tel Aviv, three minutes in Jerusalem, and only 45 seconds in Ashdod because of the proximity to the Gaza Strip).

The IDF Home Front Command has divided the large cities into “quarters” and appointed hundreds of officers as emergency liaisons for the different communities. In a state of emergency there will also be a representative of the Command in each municipal center (telephone line 106). One role of the liaison officers will be to verify the functioning of the essential services of each municipality and to assist the municipalities in case of need so that there will not be a situation such as that in Safed during the Second Lebanon War, when only 20 out of 300 municipal workers remained in the city. In the Second Lebanon War it was the weak population, which could not evacuate itself, that was “stuck” in the shelters for long weeks. It was only on the last day of the war that the Defense Ministry began implementing a program for the rapid evacuation of this population to better conditions in the center of the country.

The National Emergency Authority recently prepared a plan whereby 300,000 residents of the areas likely to be attacked will be “adopted” by families in other areas of the country. Furthermore, the Home Front Command is working diligently on a plan for the rapid evacuation of up to 200,000 citizens to hotels and hostels, which will sign agreements with the state beforehand.

In addition to these measures, the whole country has been divided into 27 siren districts, compared to the 10 that existed in 2006. With this new distribution it is expected that a siren will be heard in only 50 percent of the communities in the country, even in the case of an all-out war. Yet, even after all the steps that have been taken since the Second Lebanon War, the home front still faces two fundamental problems.

First, there is still a shortage of millions of properly functioning gas mask kits for the population’s use in case of need. Report 58A of the state comptroller, published in February 2009, revealed that the situation is pressing regarding the number of kits, the pace of distribution, the quality of the kits, and the extent to which they are

customized for civilians.<sup>91</sup> Second, and even graver, should a day come, God forbid, when Iran announces it has nuclear bombs, everything will go awry. In line with a deliberate and basic decision, Israel is not preparing the home front to cope with a nuclear threat and is not building nuclear shelters with the exception of a few, such as a new bunker designated for the IDF senior command in the Defense Ministry compound in Tel Aviv, a bunker for the leadership of the country under the government complex in Jerusalem, and some “improvised” bunkers – for example, the digging of the Carmel tunnel, for the purpose of building a new road, was exploited to construct a new shelter deep inside the mountain, but its size will enable it to hold hundreds of people at most.

### **Logistics**

There has been substantial improvement in the area of logistics since the Second Lebanon War. Organizational changes include the reestablishment of the Logistics Brigade in the framework of the Technology and Logistics Branch of the General Staff – a return to previous practices. In addition, the traditional logistics contingents – the Ordnance Corps and the Logistics Corps (or Maintenance Corps as it was known historically) have been restored. The Technology and Logistics Division, which in the era of Dan Haloutz as chief of staff was given the name Logistics, Medicine and Centers, has been dismantled. These changes, however, more than organizational or semantic, are conceptual: commanders, even those most involved with the battlefield, have internalized that an important part of their role is to ensure an ongoing logistical supply to their units.

During the Second Lebanon War, a newly formulated approach was tested for the first time: It entailed dismantling the maintenance support units (logistical brigades of a kind), which were responsible for the ongoing supply, in all the combat divisions. These maintenance support units were cumbersome and often took wrong turns in the field. The IDF reached the conclusion that when only a small area separates the different combat theaters, it is possible to set up regional logistical support units, which can be responsible for logistical supply to a number of units that are active in a particular zone and not only to a specific unit. In 2006 the logistical support

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

units hurriedly brought enormous quantities of food and drink, along with personal equipment and diesel oil, to the forces' entry points into Lebanon. Yet a serious hitch occurred: the "combat logistics" approach, in which commanders were supposed to be responsible for transferring the equipment from the border to the forces deep in the field, failed completely. In light of intelligence information that the known arteries in southern Lebanon had been mined by Hizballah, the engineering corps paved logistical routes through which provisions were supposed to reach the troops; however, the rate of progress on these routes almost never fit the rate of progress of the forces on foot. Thus, the food and water that the soldiers lugged in backpacks often ran out well before the gap was closed.

Attempts to bring in provisions on ATVs, and even on lamas, did not succeed. The logistical issue was far down on the commanders' order of priorities; the outcome was grim reports on hungry and thirsty soldiers deep in the field. The air force had to then parachute provisions to the forces under a huge risk to unprotected Hercules planes that hovered over missile-studded territory at a height of only 400 feet, a practice that did not always succeed in accurately dispensing provisions to the units below. Some of the materials that landed from the skies fell into the hands of Hizballah.

After the 2006 War the activity of the divisional logistical units was resumed, though in a limited format, as a replacement of sorts for the maintenance support units. The term "combat logistics" has been discontinued. In Operation Cast Lead no logistical difficulties emerged as in Lebanon, but it is known that commanders ascribed great importance to this issue and did not only deal with operational combat matters in the field.

The IDF has also reestablished battalion-level medical stations for treating the wounded. After the war it was found that in-field treatment of the wounded and their evacuations from the field without first aid to battalion-level help stations was extremely problematic.

Since the war, the Logistics Division has developed various means for assisting troops who need food and water within enemy territory, in preparation for the next confrontation. For example, a facility for

water purification that makes even seawater drinkable was acquired, and a GPS-guided parachute has been developed to transfer provisions from a plane to forces in the field with great precision. The IDF is also currently developing a remote-controlled unmanned vehicle that will provide food, fuel, and weapons to forces in enemy territory without the need to risk lives.<sup>92</sup>

Logistical improvements have also taken place in the ongoing maintenance of the IDF reserve brigades, as described earlier; this can be ascribed to the fact that it was decided to include two contingents of career soldiers in every reserve brigade. The role of the career soldiers in the reserve units is to ensure that the level of fitness is much higher than previously. The readiness level of the IDF combat vehicles in the emergency depots was already good in the Second Lebanon War (only 15 percent of the vehicles were found unfit when they were started in the storerooms, and of these, 75 percent were repaired in less than 12 hours).<sup>93</sup> In the next test the vehicles' readiness level is expected to be even higher.

### CHAPTER 3: THE IDF – ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

#### The General Staff

The General Staff, the supreme command of the IDF, is regarded more than three years after the Second Lebanon War as one of the organization's weak links – at least in terms of its composition. Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, appointed chief of staff in February 2007 after Haloutz resigned, would prefer to see other officers in the key posts of the General Staff. Nine months after Ashkenazi's appointment, Gen. (res.) Avigdor (Yanush) Ben-Gal revealed statements Ashkenazi had made to him in private, including: "I have no one to work with in the army. They're all politicians."<sup>94</sup> In a lecture, Ben-Gal noted the fact that three chiefs of regional commands – Gadi Eisenkot in the north, Gadi Shamni in the center, and Yoav Gallant in the south – had been military secretaries of prime ministers and cited this as proof of political involvement in the IDF.<sup>95</sup>

In his book, the former chief of staff, Moshe Yaalon, characterized the political-military connection as an "ethical flaw." "Haloutz and his deputy, Moshe Kaplinsky, were close associates of the ranch forum of Arik Sharon," he wrote. Yaalon added that "the report in the media about special relations between the army commanders and the ranch forum caused confusion and the blurring of boundaries particularly among the senior officers corps. The public relations experts who served Sharon served them as well. The same environment of wealthy people and newspaper magnates that surrounded the government – especially since the disengagement – surrounded them as well."<sup>96</sup>

Politics was inseparable from the IDF top brass for decades, and criticism like Yaalon's is not devoid of a personal grudge. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that the lack of a clear separation between the political and military echelons, and the engagement with political issues by most of the IDF departments, is likely to intensify the army's politicization to the point that senior officers will seek to meet the political leadership's expectations.<sup>97</sup>

During his tenure, Ashkenazi has demarcated red lines between the political and military echelons, and he makes sure they are not crossed by his subordinates. And yet, it appears that he would prefer to see different officers in almost every major post.

The round of General Staff appointments that were made in the summer of 2009 testifies to the problem. To replace Gen. Dan Harel, the retiring deputy chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Benny Gantz was chosen even though Ashkenazi's candidate for the post was head of the Northern Command, Maj. Gen. Gadi Eisenkot. Defense Minister Ehud Barak, for his part, would have preferred to grant the post to Maj. Gen. Yoav Gallant, head of the Southern Command. The disagreement between the two paved the way for the appointment of Gantz, who was seen essentially as a compromise candidate.

An additional problem is the service path and the training of the senior officer corps. For example, it was decided to appoint as head of the Central Command Maj. Gen. Avi Mizrachi, formerly commander of the ground forces – despite the fact that his background was in the Northern Command and he had no experience with the central region or in dealing with terror. Maj. Gen. Sami Turgeman was appointed as Mizrachi's replacement. This is his first post as major general – notwithstanding the fact that several chiefs of staff have warned in the past that the position of commander of the ground forces should not be the first post of an officer at the level of general.

The reason Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi was unable to put together a General Staff more to his taste lies partly in the command vacuum among the army's top leadership. This void was created by the retirement or delay in promotion of senior officers, whose careers were stymied by the results of the Second Lebanon War or by grave ethical problems. The list of officers whose careers were hit hard includes Dan Haloutz, Moshe Kaplinsky, Udi Adam, Shmuel Zakkai, Gal Hirsch, Erez Zukerman, Moshe Tamir, and Imad Faris. The latter five were supposed to be on the General Staff today or appointed to it soon.

During Ashkenazi's tenure as chief of staff, a change has occurred in the General Staff's structure and distribution of authority. Immediately after his appointment in June 2005, previous Chief of

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

Staff Dan Haloutz presented to the General Staff Forum his vision of the direction the IDF needed to take in order to adjust its structure and organization to its future missions. His instructions were foisted on the General Staff without first undergoing comprehensive administrative procedures. Haloutz set extremely short timelines for far-reaching changes and clarified that if some of the changes did not prove themselves “we’ll backtrack as much as we need to.”<sup>98</sup> None of the generals on the General Staff questioned the changes he dictated.

The main idea behind the changes was to divide the responsibility between long-term “force-building” and the immediate “use of force” as practiced in the air force.<sup>99</sup> Haloutz’s program gave the deputy chief of staff the responsibility for building the force, and the Operations Branch the responsibility for employing it. Concomitantly, the post of the head of the Staff Branch was abolished; in its framework the deputy chief of staff had been responsible for coordinating the work of all the divisions of the General Staff. A further modification was the beefing up of the Ground Forces Command with complete forces and with subunits that were transferred to it from the other divisions of the General Staff, with the Logistics and Technology Branch leading the way.<sup>100</sup> It was then decided, in an anomalous step, to put two generals in charge of the ground forces.

The new plan identified the General Staff as the “All-Forces Staff,” responsible for the activity of all three branches: ground, sea, and air. In addition, it was announced that nine commands would be responsible for activating the IDF forces: the Operations Branch, the three commands for each of the branches, the three regional commands, the Intelligence Directorate, and the logistical coordinators in the Logistics, Medicine and Center Branch (previously known as the Logistics Brigade).

Haloutz, in fact, put together a General Staff in the following fashion. At the staff level were two functions equal in value: (1) the function of building the force, headed by the deputy chief of staff, and (2) the function of activating the force, headed by the chief of the Operations Branch. At the command level, the direct responsibility for activating and directing the different units was given to the heads of the

commands. This division of labor reflected the mood in the IDF during that period; as Kaplinsky put it: “A General Staff that is all-forces and not 80 percent ground forces. Based on effects and not on tanks.”<sup>101</sup> Also terminated in this framework was, among other things, the activity of the Logistics Brigade, despite its huge contribution to the logistical supply of the forces in Operation Defensive Shield (April-May 2002) and in the disengagement (July-August 2005).

Almost all of the changes of the Haloutz era were overturned by Ashkenazi. The General Staff went back to the structure and the distribution of authority that had prevailed during Moshe Yaalon’s tenure. In the context of this reorganization, the Logistics Branch was reestablished. Thousands of soldiers and career soldiers again moved with their fellows from department to department. The deputy chief of staff went back to heading the Staff Branch, and the Operations Branch was no longer responsible for activating the forces. Even the divisions whose names changed under Haloutz, such as the Logistics, Medicine and Centers Branch and the Human Resources Branch, returned to their original names – the Logistics Brigade and the Manpower Branch, respectively.

Beyond the semantic changes, graver shortcomings were repaired, such as the avoidance of activating the Supreme Command Post as occurred during the Second Lebanon War.<sup>102</sup> Kaplinsky asserted that the issue of utilizing the post, through which it is possible to direct the fighting and monitor the achievement of missions and targets in keeping with a “war clock” and various other means, was irrelevant. This, however, gave the commanders and troops a problematic, misleading message that what occurred in Lebanon was not war but at most a complex military operation.<sup>103</sup> This failure was fully remedied after the war. In Operation Cast Lead the Supreme Command Post was already being fully activated, and presumably this will be done as well in the future. An additional shortcoming that was amended after 2006 concerns the practice of conducting an “operations and sorties” discussion with the defense minister over each border-crossing operation, as was routinely done, but which greatly encumbers the IDF’s activity during war. In Operation Cast Lead, this practice was discarded.

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

An additional problem that the Winograd Commission warned about was the lack of training sessions and drills among most of the generals of the General Staff. This defect was repaired thanks to a series of commander training sessions for senior levels of the IDF. Almost all the generals of the staff, including the Chief of Staff, have in recent years participated in a number of exercises, addressing potential war scenarios on a number of fronts.

Another important issue is the size of the General Staff. Compared to the General Staff 15 to 25 years ago, it is currently larger by several branches, divisions, and departments and in the number of officers who serve in it. It does not seem likely that its functions, areas of responsibility, and quantity of tasks are greater than in the period after the Six Day War, or the period of the IDF rehabilitation after the Yom Kippur War. The question arises, then, whether the size of the General Staff today – 21 generals, five colonels, and hundreds of other senior officers serving under them – is optimal.

There is also a need for special examination of the Ground Force Command's contribution in light of its huge size. The ground forces, which amalgamate all the combat ground units (infantry, paratroopers, armor, artillery, combat engineering, and field intelligence) and the Technological Brigade are responsible for building the force from the level of the individual soldier to that of the corps in areas of training and exercises, combat doctrine, weapons, manpower, planning, and organization.<sup>104</sup> It is important to emphasize that the responsibility for building the force beyond the corps level falls on the regional commands and the General Staff.

The Ground Forces Command was set up in 1999 in the framework of the IDF 2000 program, which was aimed at enabling the IDF to cope with the challenges of the future: logistics, teleprocessing, armament, and adjutancy. Along with these, the Technological Ground Brigade was subordinated to the Ground Forces Staff. In February 2008, as part of the implementation of lessons from the war, the supportive units were returned to the different divisions of the General Staff. Today, after reorganization, the ground forces are composed of four staff brigades: the Planning and Force-Building Brigade, the Ground Brigade, the Manpower Brigade, and the Technological Brigade,

which remains within the ground forces. Under the command of the ground forces, there are three command schools: The Lt. Gen. Haim Laskov School for Officers (Training Base 1), The School for Training Commanders of Companies and Battalions, and The College for Tactical Command. The ground forces are responsible for all the IDF basic training bases, all the training bases for the ground forces, and for the National Center for Training – the largest center for ground forces training in Israel.<sup>105</sup>

The Ground Forces Command has undergone continuous changes since being established a decade ago. Due to the implementation of lessons from the 2006 War, it is now hard to find significant differences between it and its predecessor, the Field Forces Command. There would appear to be no substantial differences to justify the vast manpower that serves in the branch, even though it is currently headed by “only” one officer at the rank of general. Generally the addition of positions appears to be unjustified, especially given the fact that while the Ground Forces Command has grown within a decade by tens of percentage points compared to the Field Forces Command, the magnitude of the ground forces has in fact diminished in this period as part of structural changes in the IDF, such as the elimination of entire ground formations.

A sensitive issue regarding the conduct of the General Staff in the period preceding and during the Second Lebanon War is that of conformism – the “swimming with the current” – of most of the generals. The changes instituted by Haloutz were accepted by the members of the staff almost without opposition, and only few came out against the way in which he ran the war. The staff of Lt. Gen. Ashkenazi is considered quite conformist as well. Thus, the changes that completely erased the Haloutz revolution were also received almost without opposition in the General Staff, just as two years earlier the General Staff had adopted Haloutz’s changes without hesitation.

### **Additional Organizational Aspects**

The IDF emerged from the war of 2006 as an organization in crisis. The gravest problems were in the reserves and career army.<sup>106</sup>

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

Surveys among career soldiers, which were held a number of months after the war, revealed a severe crisis particularly among junior-level officers, captains, and majors, and also among noncommissioned officers (NCOs), who had not yet tied their fate to military service. Internal army questionnaires showed that over 50 percent of these officers and NCOs were looking for work in the civilian sector while serving in the military and were seriously considering the possibility of leaving the IDF.<sup>107</sup> The situation was similar even among veteran career soldiers who complained of frustration over their workload and about the IDF's image in Israeli society having sunk to its lowest point after the war. Many of them felt that their friends, relatives, and the public in general did not show respect for their huge investment or readiness to risk their lives.

The unwritten contract between the general public and career soldiers, according to which the latter are prepared to risk their lives in return for great honor and material compensations, appeared to have been breached. Career soldiers even reported feelings of shame over serving in the IDF, with its many critics seeing them as “freeloaders” and “hedonists.”<sup>108</sup> If that was not bad enough, many career soldiers also felt a lack of occupational security because of the ongoing organizational shakeups that involved dismissals of thousands of soldiers as part of the structural changes and defense budget cuts.

Precisely at the height of the crisis, the IDF also lacked the adjutancy force, one of whose main roles is to deal with career soldiers. The adjutancy corps was closed as part of the changes in the structure of the General Staff, which were decided during Haloutz's tenure. Subsequently, the corps was reestablished as part of the process, guided by Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, of returning to an earlier state of affairs. In the years since the war, the situation of the career army has stabilized, and the satisfaction of those serving in it has improved.<sup>109</sup>

However, the issue of the career soldiers is only one many problems that plagued the IDF's functioning as an organization. The Winograd Commission asserted that a substandard organizational culture, characterized by contempt for orders, lack of trust between the different command levels, moral problems in the operational sphere,

and a deterioration of values and norms, all contributed to the 2006 War's failures.<sup>110</sup>

This organizational culture, adduced by the commission, testifies more than anything to the difficulty of the military profession. One can identify at least three components of the military command as a profession. The first is a practical component (expertise) – the degree of experience, specialized knowledge, and capabilities within a combat framework, which are necessary for the proper use of its means and resources to achieve clear goals.<sup>111</sup> The second is an institutional/systemic component – the degree of ability of any command level to translate into clear orders and practices the requirements of higher levels, and to demand obedience and implementation from subordinate levels. And the third component is that of quality – the ability of each soldier and commander to think in original ways, in line with the orders and requirements to which he is obligated, and to exercise judgment in accordance with values and norms.<sup>112</sup>

These three components enable those working in the military profession to operate optimally in situations where the lives of young soldiers are in the hands of relatively junior officers. Thus, the IDF needs to cultivate “the best officers that the state of Israel can produce,” and to instill in them “the proper values of the state of Israel and its army, and to train its soldiers and commanders in the best possible way to carry out its tasks and fulfill their duty.”<sup>113</sup>

The military command as a profession obligates all those who serve, but it is particularly important with respect to the appointment and training of IDF commanders. The army maintains a set procedure for promotions: Officers who are designated for the ranks of lieutenant-colonel and colonel undergo tests at special evaluation centers, and the different branches hold discussions on their assignments. The chief of staff and the defense minister must approve decisions on the assignment of officers at the level of colonel and higher.

This complicated process is aimed at ensuring that selection is rigorous, with only the best and most suitable individuals being promoted in the ranks. Yet, according to testimonies of commanders,

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

the reality is different. Informal “agreements” are reached, when a senior officer supports the appointment to a certain post of a candidate who is identified with another senior officer, and in return the latter supports “his” candidates for other posts that are open. Often discussions of appointments in the General Staff are for protocol only, and the agreements and decisions regarding the appointments are made well beforehand, behind the scenes.<sup>114</sup>

As a result of this "system," promoted officers are not necessarily independently minded, or the sorts who tend to draw attention to defects, but instead the sorts who tend to fulfill the wishes of the commanders who will decide their future. Thus, the IDF, through an informal organizational culture, encourages mediocrity, though that does not necessarily mean the officers who have progressed up the ladder lack talent (there are also talented officers who are promoted, notwithstanding the system). The encouragement of mediocrity also stems from the fact that

“commanders of field formations...know well that those of them who will have to deal with problems of doctrine, training, equipment and organization, and who deviate from behavioral norms of the ‘low profile’ are likely, God forbid, to be seen as ‘troublemakers’ and hence endanger their advancement. Therefore many of the commanders sweep problems under the rug and hope to get through their command without complications.”<sup>115</sup>

These words were written almost 30 years ago, following the First Lebanon War, by Col. Dr. Emanuel Wald, who was discharged from the IDF because of the damning document that he authored. His words, however, reflect the fact that some of the IDF’s organizational maladies are chronic and indeed have continued even after the Second Lebanon War.

At the same time, the IDF is making an effort to address a number of afflictions that were identified in the wake of the war (and would have remained hidden from view if the war had not occurred). For instance, the IDF has managed over the past two years to lengthen, to some extent, the tenure of officers in different command positions. In

combat units some commanders now stay in their posts for two to three years, rather than one or two years, as was typical in the past. In non-combat posts some officers now serve for four years or more, compared to shorter periods in the past.

Even with this prolongation, however, the service in each military post is considerably shorter than what is practiced in the civilian sector. Keeping tenures short is important to commanders because it hastens promotion; but it comes at the expense of professionalization. Short tenures also mean that at the initial stage the commander is occupied by familiarizing himself with his unit; yet, within a year or two, he is already busy “self-marketing” for promotion to the next post. No commander has an interest in upsetting the applecart or “doing dirty laundry” outside of the unit, even if this is called for (still, there are some who deal courageously with problematic phenomena in the organization, notwithstanding the “basic instinct” of personal advancement).

Since the war, a partial improvement has also occurred in the training of senior commanders. An order was issued that no officer can be promoted to the rank of lieutenant-colonel unless he takes a course in the Command and Staff College. Although this requirement also existed in the past, care is now being taken to enforce it. At the more senior levels, however, the IDF is still not succeeding in mandating that those designated to be generals study at the National Security College.<sup>116</sup> According to the state comptroller’s report for 2006, only 18 percent of officers at the rank of general, 32 percent at the rank of brigadier general, and 24 percent at the rank of colonel are graduates of the National Security College.<sup>117</sup> It appears that this lamentable situation will continue in the future.

The report also shows that the IDF failed to implement the “Distant Horizon” program, in whose framework 71 officers at the lieutenant-colonel level were designated toward the middle of the past decade as having potential for promotion to the rank of brigadier general. The program required these officers to undergo an orderly sequence of training that included: studies at the National Security College, participation in the “Turning Point” program for acquiring knowledge and administrative tools, and in an advanced systems course.<sup>118</sup> Yet,

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

due to minimal supervision of the contents of the studies and the lack of orderly training on the part of the institutions, the number of officers in the program who studied at the National Security College from 2003 to 2006 came to only 28-50 percent, and the rate of participation in the Turning Point program was even lower at only 22-44 percent.<sup>119</sup> Thus, the Distant Horizon program sputtered until it was finally discontinued.

Another improvement in officer corps training relates to the halting of the malpractice, whereby officers from the infantry corps were appointed to command armored divisions without undergoing a retraining process.<sup>120</sup> In recent years, all officers in the infantry corps who have been appointed to posts in the armored corps have undergone the necessary retraining. It appears that with the passage of time, the phenomenon of conformism that characterized the Second Lebanon War has lessened; moreover, the good news is that in Operation Cast Lead commanders showed more initiative and offensive spirit than was typical in the summer of 2006.<sup>121</sup>

One issue that has not, however, improved is the phenomenon of cover-ups. Situations where senior officers have lied during an investigation of trivial road accidents, as in the testimonies of Gaza Division Commander Brig. Gen. Moshe Tamir,<sup>122</sup> and the commander of the Galil formation, Brig. Gen. Imad Faris,<sup>123</sup> reveals a profound problem with truth-telling in inquiries conducted within the IDF. The problem has been known for years and has particularly grave consequences in operational investigations, where a mendacious inquiry could well cost human lives in the future. The reliability of IDF investigations has more than once been criticized as very low, particularly when numerous commanders, from the entire chain of command, are involved. Even if everyone makes a maximal effort to arrive at the truth, all it takes is for each person to slightly “renovate” the truth, causing the end result to be a total distortion of what actually occurred.

The way to deal with such cover-ups is to transfer sensitive IDF investigations to an external body comprised of former senior officers whose professional futures do not depend on the results of these inquiries. However, the likelihood of the IDF agreeing to the

establishment of an external body for special investigations is nil. The IDF will seek to continue being one of the only bodies in Israel that investigates itself.

Along with the issue of investigations, a solution to the lack of an IDF internal monitor is still needed. The monitor of the defense establishment currently serves as the internal ombudsman of the IDF. As a result, there is no clear distinction between monitoring (which falls under the responsibility of the Defense Ministry) and supervision (which falls under the responsibility of the Supervision and Monitoring Division of the IDF). There is no definition of the duties and functions of those dealing with internal monitoring nor is there any overall concept of internal monitoring and its purpose in the IDF. During 2010 the issue of the internal ombudsman has become a point of dispute between Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi.<sup>124</sup>

A further influence of the Second Lebanon War was on the aim to shorten compulsory service to 32 months and to have a differential service where soldiers from Home Front units would be discharged after only 28 months – this plan was jettisoned. Such a program was intended to save the IDF the costs of excessive manpower in bloated commands. In addition, it could save the economy the concomitant costs incurred by employing these soldiers, who mostly serve in administrative functions, whereas soldiers who are really needed – fighters and technological personnel – would receive a salary payment in the last months of their service.<sup>125</sup>

Some of the decisions regarding the shortening of service were imposed on the IDF by a committee headed by economist Avi Ben-Bassat. The committee was appointed under the aegis of then-defense minister Shaul Mofaz, and its conclusions were published before the 2006 elections.<sup>126</sup> The IDF supported the plan for differential service because it made sense. It is a pity that because of the “traumas of Lebanon” along with the shortage of combat and “technological” soldiers, the IDF turned to the political echelon with the demand to cancel the program entirely, and the political echelon complied. This is likely to cast doubt on the government’s ability to impose other vital reforms in the IDF.

## Values

The Winograd Commission asserted that most of the failures stemmed from the fact that “norms that the army itself was supposed to assimilate and act in accordance with, were not upheld.”<sup>127</sup> This criticism led the IDF, in 2008, to set up a special inquiry commission for adherence to values.

The commission pointed to problems in implementation of the following values: commitment to the mission and striving for victory; responsibility; and human life.<sup>128</sup> From an analysis of representative battles and interviews with dozens of commanders, the commission determined that, compared to the supreme priority that was given to human life – that is, preserving the lives of the soldiers – the importance given to the value of commitment to the mission and striving for victory was meager. As for the value of responsibility, the commission asserted that many commanders had acted against the spirit of Ben-Gurion’s words, whereby every commander and every soldier must adopt the mindset that the fate of the battle depends on him. In Lebanon, commanders largely focused only on what occurred in their own zone. The value of responsibility was often translated into demands on the commanders and the higher ranks, and not on the lower levels.

The commission found no problems, however, in implementing the value of setting a personal example and upholding the IDF norm of “leading into battle.” It reached this conclusion despite the phenomenon of the “plasma commanders,” those who preferred to manage the fighting from within war rooms and not to command their forces in the field. The commission asserted that the practice of sitting in war rooms that were accessorized with state-of-the-art equipment stemmed from a mistaken notion that a technological war room is an appropriate place to effectively manage the fighting. The “purity of arms” also was not seen as a normative problem. Nor did the military commission find cases of intentional harm to the innocent Lebanese civilian population, and cases of looting were very few.

The IDF sought reasons for the erosion that occurred in the implementation of values. Among the explanations given for a large

number of incidents of lack of “adherence to the mission and striving for victory,” prominent ones were that many orders were given to forces in the field in unclear language, or were frequently changed, or were perceived as “unimportant,” leading commanders in field ranks to not enact them. If in any case they did not regard the mission as important, commanders preferred not to endanger soldiers in order to carry it out. Additionally, in several instances where the mission did in fact appear important, commanders preferred to discontinue battles and concentrate on rescuing wounded soldiers from the battlefield instead of completing the mission and only subsequently devoting all efforts to rescue.

Col. Roni Sulimani of the Education corps, who coordinated the commission’s work, published an article in the bulletin of the education corps, *Education Now*, in which he noted several additional reasons for normative problems that emerged in the IDF during the Second Lebanon War. He cited “the sensitivity to the lives of soldiers in Israeli society” as a reason for the behavior of the commanders during the fighting.

“A change has occurred in all of Western society regarding human life, and within Israeli society as well.... In an ongoing process, whose sources need to be examined, the IDF has become a very sensitive matter in Israeli society.... The IDF, whose purpose is to defend its citizens to the point of ultimate sacrifice, has become the ‘soft underbelly’ of the society.... The sensitivity that percolates from the society to IDF commanders hampers the fulfillment of the organization’s objectives in wartime and of our basic duty to defend the state of Israel.”<sup>129</sup>

Global processes that undermine the importance of the nation as a whole, and the fact that individuals in modern society put themselves at the center, before the state, are also mentioned among the external influences on the IDF that have harmed the implementation of the values in question. Blame is also pointed at governmental instability, including the frequently heard claim that leaders who are replaced often in their positions are motivated in their decision making by political survival and not by the good of the country, with such

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

conditions also affecting the army. Also mentioned are deficiencies in the education system:

“Over the years streams have been created that are budgeted by the state, yet supervision and control over them are limited or do not exist at all.... The products [i.e., the army recruits] lack good answers to the questions: ‘For what and why are we fighting here?’ Yet, at the same time, they are forced to contribute a substantial span of their lives.”<sup>130</sup>

Based on the assertions made in Sulimani’s article, which reflect the findings of the IDF Values Commission, the IDF is conducting a series of activities in tandem with the Education Ministry to strengthen the motivation for service and to increase the spiritual and moral attitude that the recruits bring with them. However, most of the effort to repair the flaws in implementing IDF values has been directed at the military command. “Value” lessons have been enhanced in the course curriculum offered in the IDF at all the levels. Furthermore, in the framework of a new IDF course called “Origins,” each week 25 officers at the ranks of lieutenant-colonel and colonel gather for discussions on values. The aim is to “strengthen” these officers so that they will subsequently disseminate these values to their subordinates.

Chief of Staff Ashkenazi conversed with all IDF company commanders and with higher level commanders about the importance of “commitment to the mission” and “responsibility.” However, clarifying what norms the senior command expects of them always requires the use of punishment. Ashkenazi has indeed dismissed a number of commanders who failed to attack terrorists during the fighting in the Gaza Strip. In the best-known case, the commander of Battalion 9 of the armored corps was dismissed because he failed to counter-attack during an attack on the Nahal Oz checkpoint.<sup>131</sup>

The importance of values was also reiterated in the course of all IDF exercise drills. But does this produce results in the field? Inquiries conducted after Operation Cast Lead found that, compared to the Second Lebanon War, an improvement had indeed occurred in the implementation of values presented in “The IDF Spirit.” This

operation, however, raises a different question: Did the “commitment to the mission” coupled with the desire to preserve the soldiers’ lives, which remains a supreme value in the IDF, come at the expense of a light hand on the trigger and the use of exaggerated fire in the most populated areas of the Gaza Strip, thereby compromising the “purity of arms”? So far no significant public discussion has been held in Israel regarding the validity of the opening strike of Cast Lead, in which 60 combat helicopters attacked targets in heavily populated areas. A member of the Winograd Commission, Maj. Gen. (res.) Menachem Einan, addressed the issue of the heavy use of fire when he said, after Operation Cast Lead, that “I think this is a campaign in which the use of fire to help our forces advance, while hitting civilians, involved maneuver margins of security that did not exist in the past.”<sup>132</sup>

Beyond moral considerations, the policy of aggressive fire had problematic repercussions: it strengthened both the international criticism of Israel and the legal measures against IDF officers in foreign courts, part of a growing trend. Because of harsh international criticism after the Second Lebanon War, in Cast Lead the IDF avoided using the MLRS artillery-rockets system. In a future conflict it will have a hard time using even smoke shells because of grave accusations that they contain white phosphorus ingredients. The Goldstone Report, which was submitted to the United Nations in September 2009, and condemned the IDF’s use of fire in Operation Cast Lead, may greatly limit the IDF’s ability to use aggressive fire in an additional confrontation in the Gaza or Lebanon arena.<sup>133</sup> In light of the international criticism, it is doubtful whether the IDF will be able to implement a policy of aggressive fire even though Northern Command head Gadi Eisenkot stated that the IDF intended to do so in case of another war.<sup>134</sup>

### **Discipline**

Although discipline is one of the 10 basic values of the IDF, it is worth addressing separately because the IDF is an exceptionally undisciplined force compared to Western armies. At the same time, regarding operational discipline, a great improvement has occurred since the 2006 War. A number of examples illustrate this: (1) The use

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

of cellular phones during operational missions has been forbidden completely, and this is enforced. Cellular phones are not even brought into some routine meetings. (2) Leaks to the media have been reduced significantly. Checks of telephone conversation emissions that were conducted after the Second Lebanon War revealed that dozens of senior officers had been in contact with journalists. The scope of this phenomenon began to decline from the moment that Ashkenazi decided to instate heavy penalties for media leaks. It appears that the Chief of Staff's threats, along with other factors, have been effective, as a check that was conducted of 550 officers during Cast Lead found that none of them leaked information or conversed with journalists without the mediation of the IDF spokesperson. With regard to the protection of information, Judge Winograd praised the IDF stating that "the Department for Information Security and the censor complemented each other [in Operation Cast Lead], so that the information important for combat was properly safeguarded."<sup>135</sup>

## CONCLUSIONS

The situation on the northern border seems to indicate an improvement from the situation leading up to July 2006. On the Lebanese side, Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces are active, and Hizballah has no overt presence. On the Israeli side, the IDF is applying Israeli sovereignty up to the border. Yet, this improved picture is mainly symbolic, with Hizballah now holding a quantity of rockets four times larger than what it had in the summer of 2006. The range of these rockets includes Tel Aviv and reaches as far as Dimona. The rockets have much larger warheads than in the past and great accuracy.<sup>136</sup> The northern front, then, is explosive.

The IDF has corrected many of the flaws that came to light in the Second Lebanon War. At the same time, certain organizational maladies from which it suffers have not been cured; nor, today, does the IDF have an effective answer to Katyushas and other short-range rockets (as opposed to medium- and long-range rockets, such as those of the Fajir, Ra'ad, Haiber, and Zilzal types, which the air force dealt with very effectively in the war).<sup>137</sup>

In addition, fire from camouflaged underground bunkers situated in open areas, such as Hizballah's "nature reserves," is likely to challenge the IDF in the future as well.<sup>138</sup> The IDF still needs to develop a method of protection against antitank missiles; the development process is not yet complete. A large number of these munitions (including tandem-warhead missiles) hampered and curtailed the forces' movement on the Lebanese front. Since the summer of 2006, Hizballah and Syria have armed themselves with many more such missiles.

Since the Second Lebanon War the IDF has greatly improved its functioning in five areas of battle: intelligence, warning, passive defense, active defense, and offense. It has also considerably addressed the five foundations of force-building: battle doctrine, weapons, commands, organization, and training.

At the same time, the IDF is not the only one in the arena that has drawn lessons. A future conflict against Iran or Syria, or perhaps

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

“only” against Hizballah, is likely to be much more difficult than the challenge that confronted the IDF in the summer of 2006.

This study focused on changes that the IDF has undergone conceptually, professionally, and organizationally, with the aim of providing an up-to-date picture of the situation. To answer the question of whether the IDF will be able to cope with the next challenge that awaits it, this study must be complemented with a thorough examination of the lessons that have been drawn by Hizballah, Syria, and Iran. Also required is a professional public discussion of the objectives, structure, and budget of the IDF, taking into account the existing threats in the region and those likely to arise in the coming years. It is likewise necessary to examine courageously how Israeli society and also the international system relate to the IDF in an era of “postmodern” attitudes. The IDF, the political echelon, and society as a whole must continue to address the basic problems without letup. Merely waiting for the next test is not an option.

### Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Article three of the resolution calls for the dismantlement of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon. Article four calls for applying Lebanese sovereignty to all parts of the country.  
United Nations, Security Council, *Resolution 1559*, 2 September 2004, p. 1, Available at: <<http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/498/92/PDF/N0449892.pdf?OpenElement>>
- <sup>2</sup> On July 11, 2006, then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert heard severe warnings from the head of the Planning Division, Gen. (res.) Yitzhak (Haki) Harel, who said, "We are a hollow army." The president of the Military Court of Appeals, Gen. Yishai Bar, added that "the IDF is a mediocre army" with "a few islands of excellence" and warned that in the moment of truth, parts of it would be revealed as "a check with insufficient funds." But the chief of staff, Lt. Gen. (res.) Dan Haloutz, said soothingly, "We can count on it", and added that "the tasks facing us will be carried out perfectly."  
A. Rapaport, *Friendly Fire: How We Undid Ourselves in the Second Lebanon War*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Sifriat Maariv, 2007, pp. 106-107.
- <sup>3</sup> For purposes of comparison: because of the overwhelming victory, several failures during the Six Day War (1967) were never investigated. The Agranat Commission, which investigated the Yom Kippur War (1973), focused on certain aspects of the war and only on its first days. Following the First Lebanon War (1982) 14 symposiums were held in the IDF, which turned into a mud-slinging match between commanders who were involved in the conflict.
- <sup>4</sup> The document was published in February 2007 with an information-security classification, which means it cannot be fully published in the public domain.
- <sup>5</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *Recommendations for the Section on the Army*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, pp. 417-427.
- <sup>6</sup> P.L. Mellies, " Hamas and Hezbollah: A Comparison of Tactics," in LTC S.C. Farquhar (ed.) *Back to Basics: A Study of Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009, pp. 51-52, 58-59, Available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498599&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>>
- <sup>7</sup> The research was approved by the military censor, as is commonly practiced, and does not reveal classified information, whose publication is prohibited by the Defense Regulations for Times of Emergency.
- <sup>8</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *The Operational Approach, Plans and Preparedness before the War*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, p. 268.
- <sup>9</sup> S. Naveh, *Systems Art/ the Art of Battle and General Systems Theory: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding a Modern Campaign*, [in Hebrew], 1996, p. 6.

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

- <sup>10</sup> Eked, *A General Staff Operational approach for the IDF*, [in Hebrew], April 2006. The document is classified for reasons of information security.
- <sup>11</sup> Winograd, Gavison, Dror, Nadel and Einan, op. cit., p. 271.
- <sup>12</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *Military Aspects of the Conduct of the War*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, p. 321.
- <sup>13</sup> This is so if one does not regard the dropping of the atom bombs on Nagasaki and Hiroshima at the end of World War II as a victory that was achieved from the air. Even the 1999 campaign in Kosovo, which was mainly aerial, was decided only at the end of an extensive ground maneuver by NATO forces. A senior IDF officer, who was asked how he would assess the situation on the third day of the Second Lebanon War, replied to the editor of this study that he believed it was indeed possible to win the war that had just begun and to achieve the goals that had been set out for it through the use of accurate fire from afar, that is, mainly by relying on the power of the air force with no need for a ground maneuver. On this issue, see:  
F.G. Hoffman, *Decisive Force: The New American Way of War?*, Newport: Naval War College, 1994, pp. 158-159, Available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA283762&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>>  
T. Garden, "Iraq: The Military Campaign", *International Affairs*, Vol. 79, No. 4, 2003, 702.  
D.L. Byman and M.C. Waxman, "Kosovo and the Great Air Power Debate," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 2000, 5-6.  
C.A. Hughes, *Achieving and Ensuring Air Dominance*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air Command and Staff College, Air University, 1998, p. 3, Available at: <<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/98-128.pdf>>  
P.S. Meilinger, *10 Propositions Regarding Air Power*, Washington: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1995, pp. 3-4, Available at: <[http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/10\\_propositions\\_regarding\\_air\\_power.pdf](http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/fulltext/10_propositions_regarding_air_power.pdf)>  
"Conclusion," *United States Strategic Bombing Survey: Summary Report (Pacific War)*, Washington, 1946, pp. 27-29, Available at: <<http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm>>
- <sup>14</sup> A. Rapaport, *Friendly Fire: How We Undid Ourselves in the Second Lebanon War*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Sifriat Maariv, 2007, p. 53.
- <sup>15</sup> E. Inbar, "How Israel Failed in Lebanon in the summer of 2006," [in Hebrew], *BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy* 73, 2007, 7, Available at: <<http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS73.pdf>>
- <sup>16</sup> S. Mets and J. Kievit, *Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to Policy*, Carlisle: Strategy Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 1995, pp. 3-4, Available at: <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/stratma.pdf>>
- <sup>17</sup> D.S. Fadok, *John Boyd and John Warden: Air Power's Quest for Strategic Paralysis*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1995. p.14,

- Available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA291621&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>>
- <sup>18</sup> E. Inbar, "The Failures of Strategic Thought," [in Hebrew], BESA Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy 22, 2007, 4, Available at: <<http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/coll22.pdf>>
- <sup>19</sup> A. Kober, "The Second Lebanon War," *Perspectives Paper* 22, 2006, 1, Available at: <<http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives22.pdf>>
- <sup>20</sup> E.N. Luttwak, *Strategy of War and Peace*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: IDF-Ma'archot/Defense Ministry Publishers, 2002, pp. 100-101.
- <sup>21</sup> On June 29, 2003, the then ground forces commander, Gen. (res.) Yiftach Ron-Tal, warned in a letter addressed to Chief of Staff Moshe Yaalon that: "The main force for achieving victory is the ground force, and the mechanized maneuver is central to it. There is not, never was, and never will be an alternative solution to this. There is no fire, however accurate, and there is no aerial power, however sophisticated and lethal, that is capable of capturing territory, holding it and defending it over time. The sharpness of this diagnosis is getting dulled in the IDF. This is a 'trend' and even a snowball effect, and I am fearful of it and warn from it." Nothing changed the "*conceptzia*" (conception).  
Rapaport, op. cit., p. 287.
- <sup>22</sup> A. Bron, "The Ground Maneuver and Its Place in the Systems Approach," [in Hebrew], in *Conclusions of the 2nd Latrun Conference- The Ground Maneuver in the Twenty-First Century*, Latrun: Institute for the Study of Ground Warfare, 2008, pp. 37-39, Available at: <<http://www.ilws.org.il/UserFiles/File/2nd%20latrun%20con.%202008.pdf>>
- <sup>23</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *The Operational Approach, Plans and Preparedness before the War*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, pp. 272-273.
- <sup>24</sup> R. Tirah, *The Struggle over the Nature of War: From Clausewitz to Scipio Africanus and Anwar Sadat, and up to the Political Enemy that Adapted to the War against the RMA*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2008, p. 23, Available at: <[http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1223279897.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1223279897.pdf)>
- <sup>25</sup> S. Naveh, *The Art of Battle: The Emergence of Military Excellence*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: IDF-Hotza'at Ma'archot/Defense Ministry Publishers, 2003, p. 29.
- <sup>26</sup> Y. Feldman, "Warhead," *Haaretz* 24 October 2007, [in Hebrew], Available at: <<http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=916560>>
- <sup>27</sup> Naveh, op. cit., pp. 34-35.
- <sup>28</sup> D.J. McCauley, "Israeli-Hezbollah Conflict of 2006: EBA in Joint Ops," *Fires Bulletin* (September-December), 2007, 50-51, Available at: [http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2007/Sep\\_Dec\\_2007/Sep\\_Dec\\_2007\\_pages\\_50\\_55.pdf](http://sill-www.army.mil/firesbulletin/2007/Sep_Dec_2007/Sep_Dec_2007_pages_50_55.pdf)
- <sup>29</sup> J.G. Lofgren, *21<sup>st</sup> Century Air Power Theorists: Who Has It Right John Warden or Robert Pape?* Washington: National War College, National Defense

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

- University, 2002, pp. 2-3, Available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA442423&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>>
- <sup>30</sup> S.D. West, *Warden and the Air Corps Tactical School: Déjà vu?*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1999, pp. 10-11, Available at: <<http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/saas/west.pdf>>
- <sup>31</sup> A. Rapaport, "Interview with Shimon Naveh," *Maariv*, 1 October 2006, [in Hebrew].
- <sup>32</sup> Winograd, Gavison, Dror, Nadel and Einan, op. cit., p. 269.
- <sup>33</sup> A.F. Marrero, "The Tactics of Operation CAST LEAD," in LTC S.C. Farquhar (ed.) *Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Combined Arms Center, 2009, pp. 91-92, Available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498599&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>>
- <sup>34</sup> S. Brom, "Political and Military Objectives in a Limited War against Guerilla Organization," in M. Elram and S. Brom (eds) *The Second Lebanon War: Strategic Perspectives*, Tel-Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007, pp. 14-16, Available at: <[http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1196773316.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1196773316.pdf)>
- <sup>35</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *Military Aspects of the Conduct of the War*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, p. 323.
- <sup>36</sup> This quotation is based on statements made to the editor of the study by a senior IDF officer, in an informal fashion, and not for quotation (so as not to "get in trouble" with his commanders).
- <sup>37</sup> The Institute for Research on System Theory is today headed by Brig. Gen. Itai Bron, originally an air force man, who served as a senior officer in the Intelligence Directorate during the Second Lebanon War.
- <sup>38</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report*, [in Hebrew], Jerusalem, January 2008, p. 255.
- <sup>39</sup> A. Rapaport, *Friendly Fire: How We Undid Ourselves in the Second Lebanon War*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Sifriat Maariv, 2007, pp. 303-319.
- <sup>40</sup> M. M. Matthew, "Hard Lessons Learned," in LTC S.C. Farquhar (ed.) *Back to Basic: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD*, Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, 2009, p. 23, Available at: <<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA498599&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>>
- <sup>41</sup> Based on statements made by a senior military figure to the editor of this study.
- <sup>42</sup> M. Kaplinsky, "The IDF in the Years before the War," [in Hebrew], *Army and Strategy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2009, 21-22, Available at: <[http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1257335411.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1257335411.pdf)>
- <sup>43</sup> The Digital Ground Force system combines within it the following functions: command, control, computer, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR).

Y. Katz, "IDF Takes Plasma Screens to Battlefield", *The Jerusalem Post*, 18 September 2009, Available at:

<<http://fr.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1253198148739&pagename=JPost/JP/Article/ShowFull>>

<sup>44</sup> The contractor carrying out the project is the Elbit Corporation.

<sup>45</sup> During the tenure of Shaul Mofaz as the Defense minister.

<sup>46</sup> The information was provided to the author of the study by a senior source.

<sup>47</sup> Physical-fitness data of IDF units show a consistent improvement since the Second Lebanon War, according to inquiries conducted by the Battle Fitness Division of the Wingate Institute.

<sup>48</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan *Branches, Combat Support and Special Operations*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, p. 358.

<sup>49</sup> A. Rapaport, op. cit., p. 306.

<sup>50</sup> To a "great" or "very great" extent, according to internal surveys of the Manpower Division.

<sup>51</sup> Statements made in the course of the war by Col. Amnon Eshel. See Rapaport, op. cit., pp. 231-232.

<sup>52</sup> U. Rubin, *The Rocket Campaign against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War*, Ramat-Gan: The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Bar-Ilan University, 2007, p.13, Available at: <<http://www.biu.ac.il/Besa/MSPS71.pdf>>

<sup>53</sup> Y. Zigdon, "Much Fire, Little Wisdom", [in Hebrew], *Ma'archot* 421, 2008, 48.

<sup>54</sup> Y. Katz, "Wadi Saluki Battle - Microcosm of War's Mistakes," *The Jerusalem Post*, 29 August 2006, Available at: <<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1154525969154&pagename=JP/Article/ShowFull>>

<sup>55</sup> The figure was provided by a senior military source.

<sup>56</sup> The Kardom system, manufactured by Soltam, enables rapid fire from armored vehicles, and achieves high percentages of accuracy by means of a computer system for firing as with artillery cannons.

<sup>57</sup> The new "firing center" of the Northern Command will be headed by Brig. Gen. Dani Kasif, formerly the chief artillery officer.

<sup>58</sup> D.A. McGregor, *Transformation Under Fire: Revolutionizing How America Fights*, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2003, p. 26.

<sup>59</sup> H. Asa and Y. Yaari, *Decentralized Warfare: War in the Twenty-First Century*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot, 2005.

<sup>60</sup> R. Simpkin, *Race to the Future: Thoughts on War in the Twenty-First Century*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Ma'archot, 1999, p. 349.

<sup>61</sup> A basic formation is the smallest force framework that independently possesses all the necessary means for conducting warfare, such as a capability for distant fire, and engineering and logistics forces.

<sup>62</sup> P. Taylor, *Dresden*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Hotza'at Matar, 2004, p. 96.

<sup>63</sup> U. Rubin, "Active Defense against Rockets and Missiles: Lessons of Cast Lead and the Second Lebanon War," [in Hebrew], *Perspectives Papers* 69, 2009, 2, Available at:

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

- <<http://www.besacenter.org/docs/perspectives69He.pdf>>
- <sup>64</sup> Y. Ben-Israel, *The First Missile War: Israel-Hizbullah (Summer 2006)*, Tel Aviv: School for Government and Policy, Tel Aviv University, 2007, p. 11.
- <sup>65</sup> R. Kugler, "Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan: A Case Study for Adaptation in Battle," *Case Studies in National Security Transformation* 5, 2007, 15, Available at: <<http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA463075&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>>  
See also: S. Naylor, *A Day that's Not Good to Die On: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Defense Ministry Publishers, 2007.
- <sup>66</sup> S. L. Gordon, "The Vulture and the Snake: Counter-Guerilla Air Warfare in Southern Lebanon," *Mideast Security and Policy Studies* 39, 1998, 26, Available at: <<http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/publications/39pub.html#Chapter 3>>
- <sup>67</sup> A. Rotem, "Approach to the Combined Battlefield: Participation of the Air Force in the Ground Warfare," in A. Rotem (ed.) *An Overhaul in the Castle*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Ma'archot and Defense Ministry Publishers, 2007, pp. 66-67.
- <sup>68</sup> An aerial attack, with close aerial support, which involves hitting the other side's resources and supply lines. The aim is to hamper the enemy forces' ability to counter the ground effort effectively. On the air force's missions, see: J.B. Egginton, *Ground Maneuver and Air Interdiction: A Matter of Mutual Support at the Operational Level of War*, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, 1993, pp. 5-6, Available at: [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/research\\_pubs/p183.pdf](http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/research_pubs/p183.pdf)
- <sup>69</sup> Out of safety considerations, instead of a "yellow line" that would create a total separation, it was decided to maintain a "coordination line" between Northern Command and the air force.
- <sup>70</sup> The plane is manufactured by "Lockheed Martin" in the framework of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, which combines two older projects of the corporation. One is the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter (CALF), which was designed to develop a vertical-takeoff plane, which will be an F-16 plane. The other is the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) project, which was designed to develop planes according to recommendations of the US Defense Department. The development is financed by a number of countries: the United States, Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Turkey, Australia, Denmark and Norway. Israel and Singapore are junior partners.
- <sup>71</sup> Y. Katz, "US Denies Israel Access to F-35 Computer," *The Jerusalem Post*, 7 May 2009, Available at: <<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1241719495058&pagename=JPArticle/ShowFull>>
- <sup>72</sup> H. Greenberg, "A Perfect Iron Dome: To Be Stationed in the Field as Soon as This Year," *YNET*, 6 January 2010, [in Hebrew], Available at: <<http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3830717,00.html>>
- <sup>73</sup> Rubin, op. cit., p. 2.

- <sup>74</sup> Based on statements by the chairman of Rafael, Gen. (res.) Ilan Biran, in an interview with Amir Rapaport, *Security Zone program*, Radio Program, Galei Tzahal, 5 January 2010, [in Hebrew].
- <sup>75</sup> In the past it was revealed that Iran had acquired from Ukraine about 20 maritime missiles, apparently to enable its engineers to learn about their mechanisms for the purpose of developing additional maritime missiles.
- <sup>76</sup> Winograd, Gavison, Dror, Nadel and Einan, op. cit., p. 335.
- <sup>77</sup> A conference on the subject was held at Tel Aviv University on 17 March 2009.
- <sup>78</sup> According to information provided to the author by a senior military figure.
- <sup>79</sup> Two submarines were built by Germany and provided as a gift to Israel. The third submarine is being financed half by the German government and half by the IDF.
- <sup>80</sup> A. Ben-David, "Israel seeks sixth Dolphin in light of Iranian threat," *Jane's*, Available at:  
<[http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw091001\\_1\\_n.shtml](http://www.janes.com/news/defence/jdw/jdw091001_1_n.shtml)>
- <sup>81</sup> According to information provided to the author by senior military figures.
- <sup>82</sup> A. Ze'evi Farkash, "Intelligence in the War: Observations and Insights," in M. Elram and S. Brom (eds) *The Second Lebanon: Strategic Perspectives*, Tel-Aviv: The Institute for National Security Studies, 2007, p. 79, Available at:  
<[http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1196773316.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1196773316.pdf)>
- <sup>83</sup> S. Even and A. Granit, *The Israeli Intelligence Community – Whither?: Analysis, Trends and Recommendations*, [in Hebrew], Tel-Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2009, p. 19, Available at:  
<[http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1237362207.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1237362207.pdf)>
- <sup>84</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *Military Intelligence in the War*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, p. 257.
- <sup>85</sup> Y. Hendel, "The Failures of Tactical Intelligence in the Lebanon War," [in Hebrew], *Strategic Update*, Vol. 9, No. 3, 2006, 35, Available at:  
[http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1193638753.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1193638753.pdf)
- <sup>86</sup> The great contribution of agents is evident in Israel's conflict with Hizballah. The number of quality agents, who were activated against Hizballah from 1982 to 2006, was no more than a few dozen.  
R. Bergman, *The State of Israel Will Do Its Utmost: The Secret War over the Prisoners and the Missing*, [in Hebrew], Ohr Yehuda: Kinneret, Zmora-Bitan, 2009, p. 269.
- <sup>87</sup> Even and Granit, op. cit., p. 55.
- <sup>88</sup> A. Ze'evi, "Intelligence under Scrutiny: Lessons and Conclusions," [in Hebrew], *Strategic Update*, Vol. 4, No. 9, 2007, 44, Available at:  
<[http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1193580802.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1193580802.pdf)>
- <sup>89</sup> State Comptroller's Office, *The Preparation of the Home Front and Its Functioning in the Second Lebanon War*, [in Hebrew], Jerusalem: State Comptroller's Office, 2007, Available at:  
<<http://www.mevaker.gov.il/serve/contentTree.asp?bookid=493&id=188&contentid=&parentid=undefined&sw=1344&hw=770>>

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

- <sup>90</sup> Based on surveys conducted by the Home Front Command. The source of the data regarding both the Second Lebanon War and Cast Lead is the Home Front Command of the IDF.
- <sup>91</sup> I. Harel, *Haaretz*, 2 March 2009, [in Hebrew].
- <sup>92</sup> A. Buhbut, *Maariv*, 30 August 2009, [in Hebrew].
- <sup>93</sup> According to data of the Technology and Logistics Division.
- <sup>94</sup> H. Greenberg, "The Chief of Staff Told Me that the Army Is Full of Politicians", *YNET*, 14 November 2007, [in Hebrew], Available at: <[www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3471340,00.html](http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3471340,00.html)>
- <sup>95</sup> Bin-Gal's words stirred up quite a storm; an announcement was coordinated between him and the IDF spokesperson that softened the harsh impression of his words. In private conversations, however, Bin-Gal said that Ashkenazi definitely meant he had no one to work with.
- <sup>96</sup> M. Yaalon, *The Long Short Way*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharanot, 2008, p. 199.
- <sup>97</sup> U. Dayan, *Relations between the Civilian Echelon and the Military Echelon in Israel: Interactions and Forms of Supervision*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, 2003, p. 26.
- <sup>98</sup> A. Rapaport, *Friendly Fire: How We Undid Ourselves in the Second Lebanon War*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Sifriat Maariv, 2007, p. 51.
- <sup>99</sup> The air force chief of staff is responsible for building the force, while the head of the air force group is responsible for operating it.
- <sup>100</sup> From the Human Resources Division was transferred a chief adjutancy officer; out of 47 departments/subdivisions, 18 were transferred. From the Teleprocessing Division were transferred: a chief teleprocessing officer, Training Base 7, analysts from the teleprocessing and weapons services; out of 81 departments/subdivisions, 61 were fully transferred and another 18 partially. From the Logistics, Medicine and Logistical Coordinators Division were transferred: a chief logistics officer, a chief ordinance officer, a logistical-technical unit, a maintenance division, the Special Weapons Development Unit, (*Yiftach*) Training Base 6, Training Base 20. From the Operational Division – the operational employment issue; a subdivision was set up in the Branch Command (*Mazi*) for managing Resources (*Ta'am*).
- <sup>101</sup> Advanced course for military reporters, 15 January 2006.
- <sup>102</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *Conclusions and Summary for the Section on the Army*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, p. 408.
- <sup>103</sup> M. Kaplinsky, "The IDF in the Years before the War," [in Hebrew], *Army and Strategy*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2009, 24, Available at: [http://www.inss.org.il/upload/\(FILE\)1257335411.pdf](http://www.inss.org.il/upload/(FILE)1257335411.pdf)<<
- <sup>104</sup> From the Branch Command site: <<http://mazi.idf.il/14-he/IGF.aspx>>
- <sup>105</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>106</sup> According to data of the Manpower Division. First published by the editor of the study in *Maariv*, 12 October 2007, [in Hebrew].
- <sup>107</sup> Ibid.

- <sup>108</sup> The “hedonists” image was cultivated by senior officials in the Finance Ministry, who initiated media articles criticizing the service conditions of the career soldiers.
- <sup>109</sup> According to data of the Manpower Division.
- <sup>110</sup> Winograd, Gavison, Dror, Nadel and Einan, op. cit., p. 254.
- <sup>111</sup> S.P. Huntington, *The Solider and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, New York: Random House, 1957, p. 8.
- <sup>112</sup> D.M. Snider, J.A. Nagl and T. Pfaff, *Army Professionalism, the Military Ethics and Officership in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, Army War College, 1999, pp. 3-7, Available at:  
<<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB282.pdf>>
- <sup>113</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *Recommendations for the Section on the Army*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, p. 425.
- <sup>114</sup> According to testimonies heard by the author.
- <sup>115</sup> E. Wald, *Curse of the Broken Vessels: The Decline of Israeli Military and Political Power (1967-1982)*, [in Hebrew], Jerusalem: Schocken, 1987, p. 158.
- <sup>116</sup> Studies at the National Security College last about a year and are designed for IDF officers at the lieutenant-colonel and colonel ranks, and also for senior officials from other security organizations and from the Foreign Service.
- <sup>117</sup> A. Mandi, "The Training of the IDF Senior Officer Corps," [in Hebrew], *Annual Report 57A*, 2006, 44.
- <sup>118</sup> I. Harel, "Who's Surprised that the Fighting in Lebanon Turned Out as It Did?" *Haaretz*, 4 December 2006, [in Hebrew], Available at:  
<<http://www.haaretz.com/hasite/spages/796814.html>>
- <sup>119</sup> Mandi, op. cit., p. 44.
- <sup>120</sup> Particularly publicized was the case of Brig. Gen. Erez Zukerman, who rose through the Naval Commandos and the Golani Brigade before being appointed commander of Division 366. The division's failure in the war led Zukerman to resign from the IDF. It is important to note that the Winograd Commission concluded that the issue of career training for the tank corps was not critical. Page 388 of the commission's final report states: "No substantial difference emerges between the functioning of commanders who have not undergone full training and reorientation and those who have had such training. Hence it appears that the systemic aspects are more significant than the personal ones."
- <sup>121</sup> In the Second Lebanon War the head of the Northern Command dealt constantly even with tactical matters such as the location of a bulldozer in the field.  
A. Rapaport, *Friendly Fire: How We Undid Ourselves in the Second Lebanon War*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Sifriat Maariv, 2007, pp. 154-159.
- <sup>122</sup> A. Buhbut, "Former Gaza Division Commander, Moshe Tamir, Goes Down in Rank," *Maariv*, 11 June 2009, [in Hebrew], Available at:  
<<http://www.nrg.co.il/online/1/ART1/902/327.html>>
- <sup>123</sup> H. Greenberg, "Brig.-Gen. Imad Fares Lied – and Retired from the IDF," *YNET*, 10 August 2009, [in Hebrew], Available at:  
<<http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/1,7340,L-3760039,00.html>>

## LESSONS OF THE SECOND LEBANON WAR

- <sup>124</sup> A. Oren, "Why Doesn't the IDF Have a Chief Military Inspector," *Haaretz*, 15 January 2010, [in Hebrew], Available at: <http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/spages/1142681.html>
- <sup>125</sup> The real cost of an IDF soldier is not just the required, symbolic soldier's wage, but is composed of indirect costs such as the fact that these soldiers do not participate in the manpower of the economy. According to the report of the Ben-Bassat Commission on compulsory IDF service, the loss to the economy from a soldier's compulsory service for one month is NIS 3,360.
- <sup>126</sup> The recommendations of the Ben-Bassat Commission were published on 13 February 2006, and were soon adopted by Shaul Mofaz, then the defense minister, Available at: <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3215586,00.html>
- <sup>127</sup> E. Winograd, R. Gavison, Y. Dror, C. Nadel and M. Einan, *Conclusions and Summary for the Section on the Army*, [in Hebrew], The Commission of Inquiry into the Events of Military Engagement in Lebanon 2006: Final Report, Jerusalem, January 2008, p. 399.
- <sup>128</sup> The "IDF Spirit" document constitutes the IDF's ethical code and contains ten values. The first value is "adherence to the mission and striving for victory".
- <sup>129</sup> R. Solimni, *Education Now*, [in Hebrew], 2008, pp. 26-28.
- <sup>130</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>131</sup> H. Greenberg, "Tank Corps Battalion Commander Dismissed after Attack on Nahal Oz Terminal," *YNET*, 22 April 2008, [in Hebrew], Available at: <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3534347,00.html>
- <sup>132</sup> M. Einan, *The Winograd Report in the Perspective of a Year: Main Lessons from the Test of Implementation*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2009, Available at: [http://video.tau.ac.il/Lectures/INSS/2009/28\\_01/](http://video.tau.ac.il/Lectures/INSS/2009/28_01/)
- <sup>133</sup> The full Goldstone Report, Available at: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasite/spages/1115030.html>
- <sup>134</sup> A. Fishman and A. Ringel-Hoffman, "I Have Enormous Power, There Will Be No Excuses," interview with the head of Northern Command, Gadi Eisenkot, *Yediot Aharonot*, 3 November 2008, [in Hebrew].
- <sup>135</sup> E. Winograd, *The Winograd Report in the Perspective of a Year: Main Lessons from the Test of Implementation*, [in Hebrew], Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2009, Available at: [http://video.tau.ac.il/Lectures/INSS/2009/28\\_01/](http://video.tau.ac.il/Lectures/INSS/2009/28_01/)
- <sup>136</sup> A. Fishman, "A Focused Threat," *Yediot Aharonot* - Shabbat supplement, 14 April 2010, pp. 6-7, [in Hebrew].  
B. Ravid, "Weapons from Iran to Hizbullah Pass through Turkey," *Haaretz*, [in Hebrew], Available at: <http://www.haaretz.com/hasite/spages/961122.html?more=1>
- <sup>137</sup> David Ivri, who was in the past the commander of the air force, deputy chief of staff and director-general of the Defense Ministry, wrote on 9 March 1998 a letter to the defense minister, the commander of the air force, the head of the Administration for Research and Development of Weapons and Technological Infrastructure and the head of the Planning Division. In this letter he stated that

## MIDEAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES

the IDF was minimizing the importance of the missile threat. This was in the context of the army's opposition, at that time, to invest money in developing a capability to intercept missiles of whatever kind. Today it is understood in the IDF that the rocket threat is not just a "nuisance," but there still is no practical solution in terms of interception.

<sup>138</sup> Presumably, weapons designed for this threat have been developed; these include bombs with a hugely improved capability for bunkers and for deep underground.