THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
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Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Whereto?

Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies research associates discuss Israel's options after the failure of the Kerry process and subsequent hostilities.



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General Amidror joins the BESA Center

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Bar-Ilan University

Prime Minister Netanyahu Headlines the Center's International Conference

Also IDF Chief-of-Staff Gantz, Ministers Steinitz and Erdan, and former security chiefs Arad, Arens, Ben-Israel, Dayan, Dichter and Eiland.



Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu

Netanyahu: "Palestinians must recognize the right of the Jewish People to a state, and abandon their demand for refugee return."

Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu made his eighth major appearance at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies last fall, opening the center's 20th anniversary international conference with an address on "The State of Israel's Challenges."

Netanyahu had delivered seven previous addresses at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, beginning in 1994 through his famous "two-state solution" address in June 2009. He also spoke at the center in 1995, as Prime Minister in 1999, as Finance Minister in 2005, and as Opposition Leader in 2007 and 2008.

In his latest BESA Center address, Netanyahu voiced doubt over the possibility of a two-state solution, citing the Palestinian leadership's refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state. "In order for the process in which we find ourselves to be significant… in order for it to have a real chance of success, it's necessary to hear the Palestinian leadership finally say that it recognizes the right of the Jewish people to a state of its own, which is the state of Israel. I hope that it shall be so, so that we can advance a real solution to the conflict," concluded Netanyahu.

He also called for Palestinians to give up on their demand for Palestinian refugees and their descendants to return to areas now inside Israel. "The Palestinians must abandon their [demand for a] right of return," he said.

Netanyahu dwelt on the links of the head of the Palestinian national movement in the pre-state days – Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini – with the Nazis. He reminded his listeners that the



Minister of Intelligence Dr. Yuval Steinitz



IDF Chief-of-Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz

mufti visited Adolf Hitler in 1941 and promised his aid in getting Muslims to enlist in the SS in the Balkan states, and in the Nazi propaganda efforts. Husseini, he said, is still an admired figure among Palestinians. "That is what needs to be uprooted," he said.

Netanyahu also addressed the Iranian nuclear issue, reiterating his distrust of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani's peace overtures to the West and saying Iran aspires "to rule the entire Middle East" and destroy the state of Israel. He repeated his insistence that Iran abandon its uranium enrichment capacity and plutonium production route, saying those apparatuses are "not necessary at all for [civilian] nuclear energy," and that only a state seeking a bomb would refuse to give them up. "Iran claims that it wants this capability for nuclear energy for peaceful needs," he said. "But seventeen countries in the world produce nuclear energy for peaceful needs without one centrifuge for enriching uranium."

Steinitz: "Iranian economy 18 months away from collapse."

Minister of Intelligence Dr. Yuval Steinitz reinforced Netanyahu's address by arguing that the West ought to ramp-up its economic pressure on Teheran, not weaken them. "Sanctions have cost about $100 billion damage to Tehran's economy over the past 18-24 months, inflation in Iran is currently running at 40 percent a year, and the unemployment rate is between 25%-30%, with the rate among youth at about 40%," he said.

"Sanctions have effectively cut Iran off from the world's financial system, making it very difficult to do business. At this rate, the Iranian economy will collapse in another year-and-a-half. Now is the time to capitalize on this pressure by forcing an end to the nuclear program. It is not the time to let-up on sanctions. The pressure works, it is effective! If we add to this pressure a credible military threat, the chances of stopping the Iranian nuclear program will be greatly improved."

Steinitz said the combination of a credible military threat and diplomacy that succeeded in getting Syria to begin dismantling its chemical weapons stockpiles will work against Iran as well. Syria, he said, showed that there was truth in the slogan "the greater the pressure, the greater the chances for diplomacy to succeed."

Gantz: "Israel's next war will involve precise missiles, cyber-attacks, mass border invasions."

IDF Chief-of-Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz delivered a major address to the conference with his vision of what Israel's next wars could look like. He referred to the outbreak of war almost as a forgone conclusion, with only the timing still to be determined.

General Gantz speculated that stateless enemies may launch attacks on several fronts, including cyber warfare and kidnappings. This could include an al-Qaeda attack on the Golan Heights, rockets on Eilat and a Hamas assault on the Erez crossing with Gaza, he said. "The morning of the war could open with a missile on the Kirya building [the Defense Ministry's HQ in Tel Aviv], with a cyber-computer attack on banks, with a mass charge on a border town, or a tunnel packed with explosives that reaches a kindergarten."

Gantz stressed the element of uncertainty in Israel's strategic and tactical environment. "Unpredictability is a part of the daily routine of every commander in every sector today. On any given day, strategic weapons could fall into the wrong hands, a bomb

tunnel leading to the entrance of an Israeli community can be exposed, or a border patrol can come under a bomb attack."

In the next war, Gantz said the IDF will confront an enemy possessing advanced capability, decentralized and camouflaged, and operating from within a civilian population. In response, he warned that "Israel will have to use firepower that does not permit full distinction to be made between civilians and terrorists; and that blurring will be expressed operationally in undesirable results, which, regrettably, constitute an integral element of war."

Gantz underscored the need to preserve the IDF's ground-maneuver ability. At the same time, he placed a special emphasis on the use of technology-intensive means – above all those employed by the air force, as well as upgraded combat intelligence for the commanders of frontline units. "In the future, the IDF's diversity of combat platforms will be bolstered by quantities of autonomous, robot-like weapons in the air and at sea, and maybe even on the ground."

Erdan: "Enemies have 200,000 rockets and missiles pointed at Israel."

Gilad Erdan, who at the time was Minister of Homeland Defense (and remains also the Minister of Communications), told the conference that Israel's enemies, including Hezbollah, have 200,000 rockets and missiles pointed at Israel, and that around 30 percent of Israel's population is vulnerable to these attacks.



Then-Minister of Homeland Defense Gilad Erdan

"In fact, one out of every 10 homes in south Lebanon has a rocket launcher or weapons stored in it. Thus in any scenario of a full-scale war, the Israeli home front will be pounded by thousands of rockets for up to three weeks," Erdan said. "Hezbollah's accurate missile stockpile is growing, and the terror organization will seek to target the most painful places for Israel, such as national infrastructure sites, natural gas facilities, electricity production centers, and other installations. Our enemies want to break the spirit of Israelis, and get them to stop believing that we can have a normal life here."

An inter-ministerial committee is working on a plan, he said, to ensure that basic commodities reach civilians in wartime, and that safe zones for people living in 650,000 unprotected homes are created.

Eiland: "Fight Hamas and Hezbollah as if fighting enemy states."

Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, former head of the National Security Council, said that Israel should reject the idea that it must fight against terrorist guerrilla organizations embedded in civilian areas, and return to the idea that it is fighting enemy states. This, he said, would add to Israeli deterrence and cut short any future conflicts.

"Neither Hezbollah, Syria, Iran or the Americans want to see the destruction of Lebanon. If war does break out, treating Lebanon as an enemy would end the conflict in three days, not three weeks," he said. This entails bombing bridges and other state-affiliated targets, though staying clear of civilian sites like schools and hospitals, he stressed.

"It's not right for us to accept the idea of fighting low-intensity counter-terrorism conflicts. We should move to an interstate conflict system," Eiland argued. "This model also applies to Gaza, which, since Hamas seized power there, has become a state in every way."



Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland



Ambassador Zalman Shoval, Prof. Zeev Maghen, Prof. Efraim Karsh, Dr. Daniel Pipes, Prof. Gabi Ben-Dor, and MK Zeev Elkin (from l. to r.)

The twentieth anniversary conference was packed throughout its two-day run, and was addressed by a star-studded lineup including:

- Zeev Elkin, Deputy Foreign Minister
- Ambassadors Yitzhak Levanon and Zalman Shoval
- Avi Dichter, former Director, Israeli Security Agency and Minister of Internal Security
- Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, Ministry of International Affairs
- Col. (ret.) Dr. Douglas Macgregor, Burke-Macgregor Group LLC
- Dr. Daniel Pipes, Director of the Middle East Forum
- Dr. Fiamma Nirenstein
- Maj. Gen. (res.) Prof. Yitzhak Ben-Israel, Chairman, the Israel Space Agency
- Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan and Prof. Uzi Arad, former NSC heads
- Mr. John Birkler, RAND Corporation
- Mr. Uzi Rubin, BESA Center
- Ms. Tali Lipkin-Shahak, Israel TV
- Prof. Avi Bell, Bar-Ilan University
- Prof. Gabriel Ben-Dor, Haifa University
- Prof. Leo Leiderman, Tel Aviv U.
- Prof. Minxin Pei, Claremont McKenna College
- Prof. Moshe Arens, former Minister of Defense
- Prof. Robert J. Lieber, Georgetown U.
- Prof. Sarit Kraus, Bar-Ilan University
- Prof. Yehezkel Dror, the Hebrew University
- Prof. Eytan Gilboa, Prof. Efraim Karsh, Dr. Yaacov Lifshitz, Prof. Zeev Maghen, Prof. Shmuel Sandler, and Dr. Eitan Shamir, BESA Center



Professors Efraim Inbar, Uzi Arad, Robert Lieber, Minxin Pei and Leo Leiderman (l. to r.)

MARKING THE BESA CENTER'S 20th ANNIVERSARY



Ms. Tali Lipkin-Shahak, Prof. Yehezkel Dror, Avi Dichter, Prof. Moshe Arens, and Prof. Inbar (l. to r.)



Professors Eytan Gilboa and Avi Bell, Brig. Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, and Dr. Fiamma Nirenstein (l. to r.)



Prof. Shmuel Sandler, Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan and Prof. Yaacov Lifshitz (l. to r.)

Awarding BESA Center Supporters

In the presence of Prime Minister Netanyahu, Bar-Ilan University President Prof. Daniel Hershkowitz and BESA Center Director Prof. Efraim Inbar awarded certificates of distinction to the center's three key supporters: Dr. Thomas O. Hecht, Mr. Saul Koschitzky and Mr. Muzi Wertheim. In presenting the awards at the opening night of the twentieth anniversary conference, Prof. Hershkowitz said that "The BESA Center has become a world-leading think tank of distinction, thanks to your generosity and vision."



Mr. Saul Koschitzky (r.) being awarded by BIU President Prof. Daniel Hershkowitz (c.) and Prof. Efraim Inbar.



Mr. and Mrs. Muzi Wertheim with Prof. Inbar.



Ms. Marion Hecht receiving an award on behalf of her father, Dr. Thomas O. Hecht, from Prof. Hershkowitz.

BESA CENTER ASSOCIATES IN ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION

Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Whereto?

In April, the nine-month-long US-led diplomatic talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority collapsed.
Here, the research associates of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies discuss why the talks failed and what Israel's diplomatic options are for the long term: managing the conflict, making unilateral moves, seeking interim agreements, or driving once again towards a full-fledged two-state arrangement? *(This discussion was held prior to Israel's most recent war against the Hamas, 'Operation Protective Edge').*

Prof. Shmuel Sandler:
The talks failed because both sides prefer the status quo. For Mahmoud Abbas, a curtailed, constricted and poor Palestinian state squeezed between Jordan and Israel would be worse than the current situation – in which the PA benefits from lavish attention and financial assistance from the world community. For Israel, the prospect of a Palestinian state, that would very likely develop into a Hamas-led entity, controlling the strategic highlands and the Jordan border – is equally unappetizing. The current instability in the Arab world and uncertain American global leadership also makes Israel very reluctant to take significant security risks.



Prof. Shmuel Sandler



Dr. Jonathan Rynhold

Dr. Jonathan Rynhold:
The fundamental underlying reason the talks failed is that the Palestinians are not prepared to make the required compromises on refugees and security; whereas Prime Minister Netanyahu sincerely wanted the talks to continue. In fact, he took major strides towards compromise on the territorial front. Had the Palestinians agreed to continue the talks, Israel would have released more prisoners and agreed to a partial settlement freeze.

Israel made one tactical blunder. By announcing the expansion of settlements during the crisis over the collapse of the talks it handed the Palestinians a significant advantage in the 'blame game' which is now underway and which will impact on Israel's international standing. This affects the approach of many countries towards the Palestinian drive to join international organizations and isolate Israel.

Prof. Eytan Gilboa:
Abbas refused to even discuss the 'Kerry principles' for extending the talks, in line with years of Palestinian recalcitrance. But a great deal of responsibility for the failed process lies with the Americans. The open and ongoing US criticism of Israel, the



Prof. Eytan Gilboa



warnings of Kerry and Obama about Israel becoming an "apartheid" or isolated state, the relentless focus on settlements including housing starts in Jewish Jerusalem, and the constant praising of Mahmoud Abbas as the "most moderate" Palestinian leader Israel could ever hope for, backfired. This only hardened Palestinian positions. In short, the narrative that blames the collapse of the talks on Israel ignores American mistakes and remains wrongly fixated on settlement construction.



Uzi Rubin

Uzi Rubin:
The talks were destined to fail. There is no middle ground that can serve as a basis for a mutually acceptable, permanent and comprehensive peace agreement between Israel and the Palestinians. Until such time that one of the sides gives up on its basic tenets – Israel on Zionism and the Palestinians on their so-called right of return – no peace agreement is feasible. Interim agreements or rather arrangements to manage the conflict are what we are left with.

In any case, it would be a mistake for Israel to "punish" the Palestinian Authority for its intransigence and to undermine the sustainability of the PA. It is rather in Israel's interest that life in the PA continues apace.



Prof. Efraim Inbar

Prof. Efraim Inbar:
We ended this latest round in the Israel-Palestinian conflict with little damage and should not be tempted to take punitive actions against the PA. We should not forget that hungry neighbors make bad neighbors. Israel has no interest in seeing the collapse of the PA or causing a civilian services crisis in the PA.

Gilboa: That's true, but Israel still could and ought to respond to Abbas' decision to pursue coalition with the genocidal Hamas, through carefully-calculated financial and political pressures. The PA should be forced to pay its enormous debts to Israeli companies such as the Israel Electric Company, and Western nations should reduce their contributions to the PA in correlation to the amounts of money that the PA pays to Palestinian terrorists. Senior PA officials should also lose some of their VIP privileges granted by Israel.



Prof. Shlomo Shpiro

Prof. Shlomo Shpiro:
Indeed, if Abbas is serious about coexistence with Israel he cannot share power and embrace those seeking to wipe Israel off the map and those who continue to attack Israeli towns with missiles.

Ironically, the political stalemate makes security dialogue and cooperation between the IDF and PA police even more necessary – for routine daily issues affecting security operations, road closures, PA training programs, movement of Palestinians, and more.

Prof. Efraim Karsh:
Abbas's decision to strike an agreement with Hamas casts a serious doubt not only on the Palestinian leadership's commitment to a two-state solution, but also on its interest in the attaining of statehood at all. Not that this should have come as a surprise to anyone. For nearly a century, Palestinian leaders never have missed an opportunity to impede the development of Palestinian civil society and the attainment of Palestinian statehood. This is true about Abbas, as it was about Jerusalem Mufti Hajj Amin Husseini and PLO leader Yasser Arafat.



Prof. Efraim Karsh

Israeli-Palestinian Relations: Whereto? *(continued)*

Inbar: I accept this analysis of the chronic Palestinian unwillingness to settle with Israel, and do not expect the situation to change anytime soon. The question then becomes: What are Israel's options going forward? I say that time is on Israel's side, and therefore conflict management is neither a nefarious nor a bad option. All the talk of Israel's growing isolation is exaggerated.

Shpiro: I agree. Events all over the world effectively have pushed the Israeli-Palestinian issue to the back burner. The crisis in the Ukraine renews dormant Western fears over the re-emergence of Russia as a world power. The savage civil war in Syria, coupled with political events in Egypt, Libya, Iraq and Yemen, exploded the old myth that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict alone is the source of instability in the Middle East. Most Western decision-makers are tired of the Middle East and are tied up with their own economic problems.

At the same time, Israel's success in emerging from the global economic crisis of the past five years relatively unscathed serves as a role model for many Europeans, especially Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Greece and Italy. Israeli entrepreneurship, technology and creativity challenge some of the world's biggest corporations.

Perhaps the time of big diplomatic moves is over for the foreseeable future. Thus, Israel should concentrate on conflict management and containment of terrorism, while further developing its economy and its ties with old friends and emerging major global players.

Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum:
Israel should still actively promote the two-state solution as the final goal. But since that is not attainable now, it should work on economic cooperation



Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum

and help as much as possible with institution building in the PA. It should strive for a long-term interim agreement. It should explore a model of cooperation such as that shared by the People's Republic of China and Taiwan, which have territorial disputes and do not recognize each other, but still cooperate economically.

Israel might also telegraph its final border aspirations by passing a bill that would incentivize settlers living on the other side of the separation fence or outside of settlement blocs to return to Israel proper. In fact, perhaps we should declare an "Israeli Peace Initiative" – our vision of a future settlement.

Rynhold: The collapse of the talks could provide Israel with an opportunity to shape significant outcomes with international backing. For reasons of demography and international legitimacy, Israel should take the opportunity to present a plan for an interim solution that advances partition, including a significant further withdrawal in the West Bank.

Gilboa: The two-state solution is fine as a long-term vision, but in practice Israel should initiate a plan for an interim agreement based on the issues the sides have already agreed on. The other alternative is to seek with Jordan a permanent solution; one that establishes something short of a Palestinian state.

Dr. Max Singer:
There is some childishness to the idea that the problem of Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be solved now. It is more likely to be solved by people who are prepared to wait.

A key challenge for leadership is bringing about a wider recognition and acceptance in Israel of the unfortunate reality that the Palestinians are forcing us to continue the occupation. The Palestinians have not given us any better alternative to the occupation – sinful as it is in principle. Therefore Israel has to bear the burden of being an "occupier" (especially the moral burden). We need the Israeli center to join the acceptance and defense of the occupation, and to devote efforts to improve the way the occupation is implemented.

The response everyone should have to negative features of the occupation is not that "we have to end the occupation" – because that has been made impossible by the Palestinians, but that "we have to try to find ways to make the occupation less objectionable." Our obligation to the Palestinians is not to end the



Dr. Max Singer



occupation that they have forced upon us. Rather our obligation is to make the occupation as least harmful to the Palestinians as possible, consistent with our security requirements.

Israel must pursue peace, but it must do so patiently. The present situation is undesirable and even dangerous – although less so than in any previous decade. In any case, it may be the best that can be achieved now and for some years hence.



Dr. Mordechai Kedar

Dr. Mordechai Kedar:
I think it is time for Israel and the world to change directions all-together. We must take Arab sociology into account, rather than Western concepts and considerations – which do not apply in the Middle East. Consider the breakup of Syria, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and Yemen. Similarly, there are deep tribal rifts among the Palestinians, and thus there will never be a successful unity government that incorporates all Palestinian Arab population centers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Consequently, we should recognize and support local leadership in Arab Palestinian population centers that desire lasting peaceful relations with Israel – as independent city-states.

The eight city-states (which might be called the Palestinian Emirates), would comprise the areas of Jenin, Nablus, Ramallah, Jericho, Tulkarem, Kalkilya, the Arab part of Hebron, and the Gaza strip. This approach will most closely map the true loyalties of Palestinians, and free 85 percent of them from Israeli control; while maintaining Israeli security in the overall area.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror:
The most important thing is not to rush off in any direction without careful consideration, consultation with our allies, and preparation of the Israeli public. Paradigmatic change can be brought about only slowly, and is best implemented when all the relevant regional and international parameters have gelled. Again, this takes time; and indeed, Israel has the time to move cautiously. Eventually, Israel may have to strike out in new directions, but then we will be well-placed to act with determination and efficiency.

In the meantime, Israel must act to buttress a united Western stand against the inclusion of Hamas in any Palestinian coalition, even in a so-called "technocratic" unity government.



Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror



Prof. Uzi Arad:

"There is no Palestinian leader who is truly willing to end the conflict with Israel."

Prof. Uzi Arad, former director of intelligence for the Mossad and National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Netanyahu, says that "no end-of-conflict accord with the Palestinians is on the horizon, because neither Mahmoud Abbas nor any other Palestinian leader is prepared to declare an end to all claims against Israel. Even when the Palestinians say that they seek an 'endgame' deal with Israel, they don't mean it. Rather, their refugee claims against Israel are permanent and unending. Their strategy is to chip away at Israel, while leaving key issues open and festering, and to pass the conflict on to the next generation for continuation."

Arad spoke at a Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies conference in March, co-sponsored by the Security Council for Israel, prior to the collapse of the Kerry process. Other speakers were Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan, Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror, Prof. Efraim Inbar, and Dr. Jonathan Rynhold.

Arad: "Israeli leaders such as Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert sought to bring finality and closure to Israel's conflict with the Palestinians, but the other side is just not willing to agree on this. Consequently, Prime Minister Netanyahu's approach has been to advance partial agreements and stage-by-stage accords, which have some realistic chance of holding. Interim agreements are pragmatic and functional; the search for grand and comprehensive peace deals is not."

Prof. Arad also argued strenuously against Israel making any unilateral withdrawals from Judea and Samaria. "Unilateral moves will bring neither peace nor security to Israel. It would be both dangerous and foolhardy to do so."

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror devoted his remarks at the conference to explaining Prime Minister Netanyahu's demand that Palestinian leaders recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jews. Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan spoke of the need to retain the Jordan Valley as Israel's eastern security border.



BESA CENTER STUDY

The Myth of Palestinian Centrality





Prof. Efraim Karsh

In a new BESA Center study, Prof. Efraim Karsh deconstructs the myth of linkage between the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the attainment of regional peace and stability. He shows that neither the Arab states nor Palestinian leaders have truly wanted the "liberation of Palestine."

No cliché has dominated the discourse on Middle Eastern affairs more than the supposed "linkage" between the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the attainment of regional peace and stability.

According to this argument, since Arabs and Muslims are so passionate about Palestinian statehood, the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate feeds regional anger and despair, gives a larger rationale to terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and to the insurgency in Iraq, and obstructs the formation of a regional coalition that will help block Iran's quest for nuclear weapons. As President Obama asserted after his first meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu in May 2009: "[Making] peace with the Palestinians…. actually strengthens our hand in the international community in dealing with the potential Iranian threat."

In a new study released in July, BESA Center senior research associate Prof. Efraim Karsh demonstrates that this argument is not only completely unfounded, but the inverse of the truth. For even though the "Palestine question" has long formed the main common denominator of pan-Arab solidarity and its most effective rallying cry, neither the Arab states nor Palestinian leaders have truly wanted the "liberation of Palestine."

Karsh: "The former have manipulated the 'Palestine' cause to their own ends while blocking the Palestinians' road to statehood, perpetuating the refugee problem, and abusing their guest Palestinian populations. The latter have immersed their hapless constituents in disastrous and wholly unnecessary conflicts, while lining their pockets from the proceeds of this ongoing tragedy."




"Nor have ordinary Arabs evinced any interest in the Palestinian cause. Quite the reverse in fact; from their arrival in the Arab states during the 1948 war the Palestinians were deeply resented and despised by the host societies and this sentiment has changed little over the years. Not once has the proverbial 'Arab street' driven the Arab regimes to war with Israel; it was rather the Arab masses, indoctrinated for decades with vile anti-Jewish and anti-Israel hatred, who have been repeatedly goaded into violence by their unelected rulers so as to divert attention from their own marginalization and repression."

As for Palestinian leaders, Karsh shows that for nearly a century they "have missed no opportunity to impede the development of Palestinian civil society and the attainment of Palestinian statehood."

"Had the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin Husseini, chosen to lead his constituents to peace and reconciliation with their Jewish neighbors, as he promised the British officials who appointed him to his high rank in 1921, the Palestinians would have had their independent state over a





substantial part of mandate Palestine by 1948, if not a decade earlier, and would have been spared the traumatic experience of dispersal and exile. Had Arafat set the PLO from the start on the path to peace and reconciliation instead of turning it into one of the most murderous and corrupt terrorist organizations in modern times, a Palestinian state could have been established in the late 1960s or the early 1970s; in 1979 as a corollary to the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty; by May 1999 as part of the Oslo process; or at the very latest with the Camp David summit of July 2000."


"Had Abbas abandoned his predecessors' rejectionist path, a Palestinian state could have been established after the Annapolis summit of November 2007, or during President Obama's first term, after Netanyahu broke with the longstanding Likud precept by publicly accepting the two-state solution and agreeing to the establishment of a Palestinian state."

"But why should they engage in the daunting tasks of nation-building and state creation," asks Karsh, "if they could drive their hapless constituents to lasting dispersal and statelessness while basking in international sympathy for the Palestinian plight and lining their pockets from the proceeds of this self-inflicted tragedy? The attainment of statehood would have shattered Palestinian leaders' pan-Arab and Islamist delusions, not to mention the kleptocratic paradise established on the backs of their long suffering subjects. It would have transformed the Palestinians in one fell swoop from the world's ultimate victim into an ordinary (and most likely failing) nation-state thus terminating decades of unprecedented international indulgence."

"It would have also driven the final nail in the PLO's false pretense to be 'the sole representative of the Palestinian people' (already dealt a devastating blow by Hamas's 2006 electoral rout) and would have forced any governing authority to abide, for the first time in Palestinian history, by the principles of accountability and transparency. Small wonder, therefore, that whenever confronted with an international or Israeli offer of statehood, Palestinian leaders will never take 'yes' for an answer."




MIDDLE EAST SECURITY AND POLICY STUDIES



Israel and Kazakhstan: Assessing the State of Bilateral Relations

Dr. Gil Feiler and Kevjn Lim

Economic, cultural, political, military and strategic interests (including the confronting of Iran) undergird the three-decade-old and growing relationship between Israel and Kazakhstan.



South Korea's Middle East Policy

Dr. Alon Levkowitz

South Korea's Middle East policy balances political neutrality with a cautious policy towards Israel, as Seoul is concerned that political support for Israel will jeopardize its positive standing in the Middle East.

BESA CENTER STUDY

Securing the Jordan Valley and Protecting Israel

On a series of field tours, the Begin-Sadat Center studies Israel's security and settlement needs in the Jerusalem hills and Jordan Valley.

Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan:

"No warning system can replace the defensive space of the Jordan Valley, and Israel must never rely on foreign forces."



Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan leads a BESA Center tour at the Sartava lookout in the Jordan Valley.

This spring, research associates of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies conducted a series of field tours in the Jerusalem hills and Jordan River valley, seeking to evaluate Israel's long-term security and settlement needs in these areas, both in the context of the US-led diplomatic process and beyond.

In addition, the center conducted a strategic tour of the Jordan Valley for foreign military attaches, led by Maj. Gen. (res.) Uzi Dayan, who was head of the IDF Central Command, IDF Deputy Chief of Staff, and National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister.

Some of the study missions were hosted and guided by municipal leaders, including Jordan Valley Regional Council head David Elhayani and Megilot Dead Sea Regional Council head Motzi (Mordechai) Dehaman.

General Dayan cogently and clearly laid out the argument for defensible borders that necessarily include the Jordan Valley. Only the Jordan Rift Valley (which ranges between 6 and 14 km wide), he says, provides Israel with the needed room to wage war against the threat of conventional attack from the outside; and room that allows for effectively combating terrorism.

The mountains on the valley's western edge (which range from 900 to 1,400 meters edge high) create a physical defensive barrier that is traversable only through five mountain passes. Thus, even a limited IDF force deployed in the valley should be able defend Israel against an attack from the east. Furthermore, the Jordan Valley is the eastern buffer zone that prevents the West Bank mountain region from becoming a full-blown terrorist entity, Dayan told the military attaches on his tour.



Reproduction of map courtesy *Israel's Critical Security Requirements for Defensible Borders: The Foundation for a Viable Peace*, © 2011 Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

Dayan rejected the plans of some American and Israeli officials to replace Israeli forces in the Jordan Valley with electronic early detection and warning systems and with foreign forces, which was the essence of the security plan proposed by US General John R. Allen on behalf of Secretary of State John Kerry. "No warning system can replace the defensive space of the Jordan Valley, and Israel must never rely on foreign forces. Foreign troops will not risk their lives in the war on terror and they will be the first to flee the region should a crisis develop," Dayan says.

Dayan also tackled the strategic situation. "It's true that the conventional military threat to Israel from the east has currently diminished – with the end of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, the weakening of war-torn Syria, and the impressive stability of Jordan despite the turmoil in the Arab world. Yet this is a very short-term perspective, motivated by the desire to convince the Israeli public that the Jordan Valley is militarily dispensable. This perspective ignores the immense potential for escalated political upheaval



in the region, including possible Jihadist destabilization of Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Jordan."

Dayan argues that Israeli negotiators of the past twenty years have approached security and diplomacy "with their heads screwed on backwards." Israel, he says, "must move from a policy of security based on international agreements and diplomatic guarantees to a policy of agreements based on security provided by Israeli forces deployed in defensible spaces. We have to think of defensible borders not only as markers that ensure Israel's security needs, but as key building blocks which guarantee that peace treaties will be sustainable."

Prof. Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, goes one step further. "If Israel wants to maintain a defensible border along the Jordan Valley it needs to secure the road from the coast to the valley, via an undivided Jerusalem and via the West Bank city of Maaleh Adumim. This is the only west-east axis with a Jewish majority, and the only safe route via which Israel can mobilize troops from the coast to the Jordan Valley in a case of military emergency."

"Thus Maaleh Adumim is the linchpin in establishing an effective line of defence along the valley against aggression from the east. Bolstering the populated Jewish corridor from Jerusalem to Maaleh Adumim, including the five kilometre connecting strip of land known as E-1, is necessary to secure the road to the Jordan Valley and prevent the division of Jerusalem," adds Inbar. "Now that the Kerry process has dead-ended, Israel should move to reinforce its civilian presence in areas well within national consensus – such as the Jordan Valley and the E-1 corridor."

Former National Security Advisor Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror, the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the BESA Center, points out that in recent talks with the Palestinians Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu insisted upon maintaining "Israeli military forces along the Jordan River" – which is a cautious formulation that does necessarily encompass Israeli sovereignty or settlement in the area. By contrast, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin spoke of retaining control over the Jordan Valley "in the broadest meaning of that term."

Major General (res.) Yaacov Amidror Joins the BESA Center



Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror, the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow at the BESA Center

Amidror:

"If the Palestinians do not recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jews – any accord will not be worth the paper it is written on."

"Israel cannot accept the accord apparently emerging between the US and Iran."

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror, who recently retired as National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister of Israel and the Head of the National Security Council, has joined the BESA Center as the Anne and Greg Rosshandler Senior Fellow.

Amidror (66) served with the Israel Defense Forces for 36 years (1966-2002). During his long military career, General Amidror was commander of the IDF Military Colleges, military secretary to the Minister of Defense, director of the Intelligence Analysis Division (responsible for annual National Intelligence Assessment) in IDF Military Intelligence, head of a large scale technology project, intelligence chief of the Northern Command, and head of the "Devil's Advocate" unit in Military Intelligence.

"I am honored to be joining the BESA Center, which is widely-respected as one of the most thought-provoking and important think-tanks in Israel," says Amidror. "I hope to be able to contribute to the development of new thinking on the major security-diplomatic issues of the day."

In his first two policy papers published at the BESA Center, General Amidror has tackled the Palestinian and Iranian issues.

"Since the signing of the Oslo accords twenty years ago, Israel has adjusted its diplomatic positions significantly towards the Palestinians, while the Palestinians have not moved one millimeter towards Israel on any issue," Amidror wrote in April before the American-brokered peace talks collapsed. "A consistent pattern of Palestinian inflexibility explains Prime Minister Netanyahu's critical demand that Palestinian negotiators state clearly that they understand that the endgame of talks is to create a Jewish state of Israel alongside the Arab Palestinian state. If the Palestinians do not recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jews – any accord will not be worth the paper it is written on."

Amidror has also warned that Israel cannot accept the accord apparently emerging between the US and Iran, in which Iran will be allowed to maintain a full nuclear fuel cycle.

"None of assumptions behind the emerging accord are sound: Neither the assumption that a monitoring regime could guarantee identification in real time of Iranian violations; nor the assumption that the US would act with alacrity if a breach is identified; nor the assumption that in the real world Iran will truly be deterred by US threats. An agreement along these lines would be far worse than no agreement, and could force Israel to respond independently," Amidror warned.



CONFERENCE

The IDF of the Future



Dr. Eitan Shamir

Is it a mistake to downsize Israel's ground forces capabilities?

Dr. Eitan Shamir:
"There are real battles ahead against well-entrenched Hamas and Hezbollah armies."



Dr. Amir Rapaport

In December, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies held a conference to discuss the controversial cuts planned in the IDF ground forces. Senior IDF officials and military experts presented their visions for the IDF of the future.

Traditionally, the backbone of the IDF has been based on a large land army, comprised of heavy armored brigades supported by artillery and infantry. Most of the ground forces were reserve units mobilized from their homes in the event of war. A strong air force ensured air superiority of the sky and allowed the time for the reserves to deploy. This system proved highly effective in Israel's first decades of existence, when the main strategic threat was large conventional Arab armies threatening to invade Israel's territory.

Conference attendees were told, however, that three major strategic shifts occurred in the last two to three decades. First is the change in the IDF's main strategic challenge. The last time the IDF engaged in combat with a conventional army was on Lebanese soil against the Syrian army in 1982. Since then, the threat from conventional armies has diminished. Egypt and Jordan signed peace treaties with Israel (in 1979 and 1994). Iraq's army was essentially eliminated by US invasion in 2003. The Syrian army too has been devastated by the civil war in that country, with no end in sight.

Instead of conventional armies, the IDF finds itself occupied with operations against terror and guerilla organizations such as Hamas in Gaza, Islamic Jihad in Sinai, and Hezbollah in Lebanon. The threat to Israel's home front has also changed, from bombardment by hostile air forces to rocket and missile fire by terror organizations. The country that most supports and supplies these organizations is a non-Arab state actor that does not share a border with Israel – Iran. Iran also has a nuclear program that poses a threat to the entire Middle East. Under these circumstances Israel must be able to project force thousands of kilometers from home.

The second shift relates to the latest technological developments in the military (as well as civilian society) and the new possibilities they present on the battlefield. The introduction of drones and unmanned vehicles in the air, sea and land; networks of digital command and control; precision fire that can be launched from almost any platform; and cyber-warfare – all hold the potential to alter, and in some cases have already changed, the way armies fight.

The third shift in the strategic environment relates to domestic politics. The large civil protest demonstrations in Israel of 2011 reflect a change in priorities of the Israeli public: "More butter, fewer guns." The result is a growing public pressure on the IDF to become more effective and less costly.

Ideally, like every military, the IDF would like to have it all: The new F-35 jet fighter and state-of-the-art Dolphin class submarines, the new Namer APC and a new model of the Merkava tank, and additional batteries of Iron Dome, Arrow and the new David Sling missile defense systems. However, due to budget pressures, the IDF must compromise and make hard choices.

According to conference co-sponsor and speaker, military analyst Amir Rappaport (publisher and editor of *IsraelDefense* magazine, and a research associate at the BESA Center), IDF Chief-of-Staff, Lt. Gen. (res.) Benny Gantz, has clearly decided to invest primarily in air force capabilities, intelligence, special operations forces, stand-off precision fire and cyber capabilities; at the expense of its more traditional units, mainly the ground forces. This implies that the IDF does not think it will need to fight a conventional army force in the



foreseeable future, nor will it have to conduct large scale ground maneuvers in enemy territory.

Two opposing schools of thought were presented in the conference. The revisionist school supports the direction that Gantz is taking, while a conservative school of thought expresses concern that these changes will weaken the IDF and make it too dependent on technology.

An enthusiastic supporter of the new IDF direction was Brig. Gen. Gal Hirsh, a division commander during the Second Lebanon War and current deputy commander of the IDF Depth Command (a command formed in 2011 to coordinate the IDF's long range operations deep in enemy territory). Hirsh argued that the use of flexible special operations forces equipped with excellent intelligence provides the best response for the current threat posed by various terror organizations. Hirsh's view was supported by Brig. Gen. (res.) Avigdor Klein, former Chief Officer of the Armored Corps, who voiced his approval for reduction in armored forces as part of necessary adaptations the IDF has to make.

A different perspective was offered by Vice Admiral (res.) Eli Marom, former Commander of the Navy. Marom stressed the need to diversify IDF precision-fire capabilities and not to concentrate it all in the hands of the air force. Today's technology, he explained, allows for precision fire to be launched from the sea as well, making the IDF a better balanced force. Another aspect Marom discussed was the importance of the human factor: motivating soldiers through the education of values. "Not everything is technology, and to put boots on the ground you need well-motivated soldiers," he said.



Vice Admiral (res.) Eli Marom



Maj. Gen. Gershon Hacohen

Probably the strongest and most original critique of the new IDF thinking was offered by Maj. Gen. Gershon Hacohen, the outgoing Corps Commander of the IDF General Staff. General Hacohen argued that the IDF has become too dependent on technological solutions, rather than developing different strategies to cope with new threats.

"Military doctrine is a function of culture; it is never universal but is rooted in time and place. For years the hallmark of the IDF was the initiative and creativity of individual soldiers. Instead of the 'art of war,' today the IDF has become obsessed with the 'science of war' – statistics and numbers of targets hit – but this does not necessarily measure effectiveness. The IDF needs to maintain its ability to adapt to changing circumstances just like some of its rivals are doing. Technology cannot solve everything!" warned Hacohen.

Hacohen also warned the IDF not to neglect its ability to deploy a mass army. "A 'smart and small army based on special forces' is a nice slogan, but sometimes the events dictate the need for large forces to operate. IDF planning in this regard needs to be reexamined."

BESA Center research associate Dr. Eitan Shamir (who organized the conference) and Dr. Eado Hecht also argued that the neglect of the IDFs ground forces poses a risk to Israel's security. "There are real battles ahead against well-entrenched Hamas and Hezbollah armies," they said.

Proceedings of the conference have now been published (in Hebrew) in the BESA Center's Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy series (no. 28).



Is Assad really giving up his chemical weapons?



Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham

Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham of the BESA Center:
"There is good reason to believe that Assad is hiding some of his chemical weapons stockpile. And even if Assad abides by his commitment, Syria's equally dangerous biological weapons stock will remain.

It was always clear that disarming Syria's chemical arsenal would be a big challenge. Syria possessed a huge chemical weapons arsenal, and the US-Russia timetable for its dismantlement was very condensed. Moreover, it was clear from the beginning that the 1,300 tons of chemical warfare agents and precursor chemicals declared by Assad when he signed the Chemical Weapons Convention underrepresented the full amount he possessed. And since then, the Syrian president has been playing games with the international inspectors.

So says Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, a microbiologist and senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Shoham is recognized as a top Israeli expert on chemical and biological warfare in the Middle East. He is a former senior intelligence analyst in the Israel Defense Forces and the Israeli Ministry of Defense.

Already last fall, Shoham warned that Syria was acting with deep ambivalence, if not subterfuge, regarding its commitment to comply with UN and OPCW demands to destroy its chemical weapons arsenal and infrastructure.

Shoham suspects that Assad is stockpiling advanced weaponry – including chemical and biological arms – in the heartland of his Alawite sect's region. He apparently believes these weapons could be useful in ensuring his and his sect's political, and perhaps physical, survival in the event that Syria eventually breaks up. "The international community must ask what portion of Syria's huge chemical weapons cache Assad intends to retain and hide even after international inspectors 'complete' the process, and where he is likely to hide them," says Shoham.

"The Syrian army also has a history of smuggling and hiding chemical stockpiles in remote, unfamiliar areas of the country. And the weapons could be transferred in secret from Syria to Iran, Russia, or Hezballah. This last scenario is particularly relevant considering that parts of the arsenal are likely to bear damning indications of Iranian and Russian involvement. Furthermore, there is a real danger that parts of these stockpiles could be seized by al-Qaeda or other terror groups currently operating in Syria."

Shoham also warns that the removal plan does apply to the country's biological weapons complex. Syria is not a party to the Biological Weapons Convention, and has no international commitments in that regard. Syria has been developing biological weapons since the 1980s; these elements include certain bacterial pathogens and toxins – and perhaps the smallpox virus – that have reached the level of deployable biological warfare agents.

"The Syrians have probably removed all components of their biological weapons program from facilities that contained both chemical and biological components and are under the international inspection regime," says Shoham. "But there are three separate facilities dedicated to the development, production, and storage of biological weapons: adjacent to the port city of Latakia, in Cerin, and within the framework of the military compounds affiliated with the General Establishment for Blood and Medical Industries (also known as DIMAS), which is directly supervised by the Syrian Ministry of Defense. These biological weapons depots must be dealt with."

THE DRY FACTS ON WEST BANK WATER

Prof. Haim Gvirtzman Rebuts Palestinian Water Libels



Prof. Haim Gvirtzman

Palestinian water shortages are the result of Palestinian policies that deliberately waste water and destroy the regional water ecology. The PA is using water as a weapon against the State of Israel.

A significant public debate was sparked recently by the assertion of European Parliament President Martin Schulz that the amount of water available to the average Israeli unfairly overwhelms the amount of water available to the average Palestinian.

According to an important BESA Center study by Prof. Haim Gvirtzman, the main issue that should be discussed – and has not been sufficiently analyzed – is: What are the causes of Palestinian water supply problems?

Gvirtzman's answer is that water shortages in the Palestinian Authority are the result of Palestinian policies that deliberately waste water and destroy the regional water ecology. The Palestinians refuse to develop their own significant underground water resources, build a seawater desalination plant, fix massive leakage from their municipal water pipes, build sewage treatment plants, irrigate land with treated sewage effluents or modern water-saving devices, or bill their own citizens for consumer water usage – leading to enormous waste.

At the same time, they drill illegally into Israel's water resources, and send their sewage flowing into the valleys and streams of central Israel. In short, the Palestinian Authority is using water as a weapon against the State of Israel. It is not interested in practical solutions to solve the Palestinian people's water shortages, but rather in perpetuation of the shortages and the besmirching of Israel.

"Here is just one little example of Palestinian policy that leads to extraordinary water waste," says Gvirtzman. "It's an open secret that most West Bank and Gaza residents and businesses do not pay the PA for the water they use, in either their homes or fields. There are simply no water meters on pumping wells and no water meters at the entry to most homes, so it is impossible for the PA to measure the amount of money owed by individual consumers. Of course, people who don't pay for their water usage have no motivation to conserve."

Gvirtzman is a professor of hydrology at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a member of the Israel Water Authority Council. He is also a long-time advisor of the Israel-PA Joint Water Committee. He authored the BESA Center's groundbreaking 2012 study on Israel-Palestinian water issues, and now the 2014 brief. The recent article details four ways in which the PA could quickly and easily double or triple its water resources without assistance or interference from Israel.

"Beyond these conclusions, it is worthwhile to consider a broader perspective on the water situation in the Middle East," says Gvirtzman. "The Palestinians live in the shadow of the State of Israel, a world superpower in terms of water technologies. Consequently, the Palestinians enjoy a relative Garden of Eden. Only in Israel, in the West Bank, and in Gulf States does sufficient, safe, drinkable tap water exist in 96 percent of households. Residents in almost every other country in the region suffer from terrible water shortages."

"In Amman, the Jordanian capital, water is supplied to private homes just once every two weeks. In Syria, agricultural fields in the Euphrates Valley are drying up due to the upstream diversion of water by the Turks. In recent years (before the Arab Spring began), about three million farmers migrated from the Euphrates Valley to the outskirts of Damascus because their lands had dried up. In Damascus, too, the water running in the river beds, which used for drinking, is mixed with sewage. In Iraq, agricultural fields are drying up because waters upstream on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers are being diverted by the Turks. There too, millions of farmers lost their lands."

"In Egypt, enormous amounts of water are lost due to flood irrigation. The Nile provides 30 times more water than Israel's annual usage and Egypt's population is just 10 times greater than Israel. Therefore, we would expect to see a water surplus. Nevertheless, Egypt suffers from severe hunger and thirst due to severe wastage of water. In North Africa too, there are insufferable water shortages."

"By contrast, the State of Israel creates artificial water (desalinated seawater and recycled sewage) and behaves frugally and effectively, and as a result there is no shortage of water, despite having experienced many years of drought. Furthermore, the State of Israel is a net exporter of water! Israel supplies 55 million cubic meters of water each year to Jordan, and sells 50 million cubic meters to the Palestinians."

Gvirtzman: "In the future, if and when peace is achieved, and cooperation is truly desired by the Palestinians – which alas they do not seek at the moment – the State of Israel will be ready and able to assist its neighbors in overcoming their water shortages."

CONFERENCES IN INDIA AND GERMANY

The Peretz and Shiendel Sherman Strategic Dialogue Program



The BESA Center's Peretz and Shiendel Sherman Strategic Dialogue Program allows center experts to advance academic ties with overseas colleagues, while also conducting local interviews and outreach to government officials.

- In November, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies associates Gilboa, Inbar, Rubin, Shpiro and Teitelbaum participated in a **Germany-Israel strategic dialogue** in Berlin, co-sponsored by the Aspen Institute. The dialogue was held on the day after the P5+1 announced its Geneva accord with the Iranians, providing the participants with fertile material for debate.
- In January, the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies associates Gilboa, Inbar, Rubin and Teitelbaum participated in an **India-Israel strategic dialogue** in New Delhi, co-sponsored by the Indian Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA). The BESA Center and IDSA have been conducted an annual strategic dialogue together for more than a decade. Talks focused on the role of the US, China's ascendance, missile and naval defense, intelligence cooperation, nuclear challenges, terrorism, the Arab upheavals and other issues of shared concern.
- In November, the center hosted a discussion on Singaporean approaches to national security and the combat of terrorism with visiting scholars Dr. Damien Cheong, Ms. Sulastri Osman, Dr. Norman Vasu and Prof. Kumar Ramakrishna – from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.
- In December, the center hosted a day-long discussion of strategic issues, including the future of NATO and social resilience, with visiting scholars from the Bundeswehr Universitat, the command college of the German military.



Singaporean scholars Dr. Damien Cheong, Ms. Sulastri Osman, Dr. Norman Vasu and Prof. Kumar Ramakrishna.

CONFERENCE

Intelligence and Security in the Middle East



Gen. André Ranson, former director of French military intelligence.

Organized by BESA Center research associates Prof. Shlomo Shpiro (chairman of the BIU political Studies department and chairman of the International Intelligence History Association) and Dr. Jonathan Rynhold (director of the Argov Center for the Study of Israel), this conference explored a wide range of topics relating to Israel's intelligence services and their operations in the Middle East.

Sessions were devoted to the interaction between intelligence services and the media, propaganda and psychological warfare, and future intelligence battlefields including cyberspace and the home front.

Gen. André Ranson, former director of French military intelligence, gave the keynote address.

Among the speakers: Mr. Amir Bohbot, Senior Military Correspondent, Walla; Mr. Menachem Navot, former Deputy Head of the Mossad; Mr. Yaacov Kedmy, former Head of "Nativ"; Mr. Eitan Glazer, former Senior Shin Bet officer; Mrs. Ariela Ringel-Hoffman, Yediot Ahronot; Dr. Ron Schleifer, Ariel University; Dr. Glen Segell, INSS; Brig. Gen. (res.) Efraim Lapid; Maj. Gen. (res.) Yiftach Ron-Tal, Chairman, Israel Electric Corp.; Dr. Yoaz Hendel, Institute for Zionist Strategies; Mr. Erez Kreiner, former Head of the National Information Security Authority; and Dr. John Nomikos, Research Institute for American and European Studies.

LECTURES



Dr. Chuck Freilich, a former Israeli Deputy National Security Advisor and author of *Zion's Dilemmas: How Israel Makes National Security Policy*, lectured in November on "Israeli National Security Decision-Making."



Prof. Steven R. David, Professor of International Relations and Vice Dean for Undergraduate Education at Johns Hopkins University, and a member of the BESA Center's International Academic Advisory Board, lectured in June on "Obama: The Reluctant Realist."



Prof. Eliot A. Cohen, the Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at SAIS Johns Hopkins University and a member of the BESA Center's International Academic Advisory Board, lectured in December on "The Big Stick: Force and American Foreign Policy in the Age of Obama and Beyond."



Nebojša Radmanović, a member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina from Republika Srpska, lectured in December on "The Balkans in International Relations."



Sung-Kyu Kwak, a senior Korean diplomat who served in Iran and is now a visiting scholar at the BESA Center, lectured in March on "The Iranian Leadership."



Prof. P.R. Kumaraswamy, director of the Gulf Studies Program at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, lectured in May on "India's Elections and Foreign Policy."



Dr. Amin Tarzi, director of the Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, lectured in May on "Iran's Nuclear Politics."



Prof. Raphael Israeli of the Hebrew University lectured in June on "Why the Recent Malaise was Neither Arab nor Spring."



Mr. Uzi Rubin, a senior research associate as the BESA Center and former director of Israel's Arrow missile program, lectured in June on "Missiles and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Syrian Civil War."

SELECTED BESA PERSPECTIVES

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FORTY YEARS TO THE YOM KIPPUR WAR

Prof. Efraim Inbar

The Israeli victory in 1973 was marred by pain over casualties and disappointment with the country's leadership. Forty years later, Israel prospers as a powerful nation with a strong, resilient society.

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WHAT DOES "GETTING THE BOMB" MEAN?

Dr. Max Singer

The West is headed towards an agreement with Iran, who will not produce nuclear weapons but further enrich uranium and plutonium. However, it is possible that Iran will be able to produce several bombs, too quickly to be stopped.

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WASHINGTON MUST STRIKE IRAN, NOT BARGAIN WITH IT

Prof. Efraim Inbar

Iran is just buying time until it has a nuclear break-out capability and the ability to threaten world security. The US must act militarily to stop Iran and restore its international credibility.

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KERRY'S ANTAGONISM UNMASKED

David M. Weinberg

John Kerry has abandoned America's honest broker stance in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, laying out the consequences for Israel of disobeying America, but doing no such thing for the Palestinians if they remain intransigent.

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THE WEST'S HUBRIS: IS THE PRICE OF THE IRAQ WAR A NUCLEAR IRAN?

Dr. Jonathan Rynhold

The West was arrogant thinking it could transform Iraq into a stable democracy in 2003. Believing that Iran can be dissuaded from its course without the credible threat of military strikes is an even greater show of hubris.

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ISRAEL VS. THE IRAN-HIZBALLAH AXIS

Yaakov Lappin

The IDF and the Iran-Hizballah axis are in the midst of a long-term military build-up, preparing for the possibility of a full-scale eruption of the ongoing covert struggle between them.

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FRANCE AND THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Dr. Tsilla Hershco

France's bold move to hold up a nuclear deal between the P5+1 and Iran reflects its broader policy and genuine concern about a nuclear Iran.

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A STRIKE ON IRAN: COMPLEX, BUT POSSIBLE

Prof. Efraim Inbar

An Israeli strike on Iran's nuclear infrastructure is a risky and militarily-complicated endeavor, but within reach. Israeli ingenuity and determination could lead to a great operational and political success.

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THE GENEVA INTERIM ACCORD: A BAD DEAL

David M. Weinberg

The interim accord reached in Geneva regarding Iran's nuclear program is a bad deal that enshrines Iran's status as a nuclear threshold state and paves Tehran's path towards a nuclear bomb.

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YEMEN UNDER ATTACK

Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Shay

Yemen is on the verge of becoming a failed state, as the interim government struggles to fight terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda, that have made Yemen a base of operations.

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SAUDI-ISRAELI RELATIONS: BALANCING LEGITIMACY AND SECURITY

Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum

Given its history and concern for the legitimacy of its rule, the Saudis are more likely to draw closer to Iran than to collaborate with Israel.

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ERDOGAN IS IN TROUBLE

Prof. Efraim Inbar

The Turkish Prime Minister is facing unprecedented political pressure that might precipitate the end of his rule.

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EGYPT AND THE THREAT OF ISLAMIC TERROR
Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Shay

Egypt's new rulers are faced with a terror problem emanating from the Sinai, led by radical jihad groups. The US and international community must support the Egyptian regime to prevent Egypt from turning into the next Syria.

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WINNING THE BDS BATTLE
Dr. Jonathan Rynhold

To defeat BDS, the government should let Israeli society and pro-Israel groups abroad take the lead, and focus the debate on Israel's legitimacy.

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INDIA ADVANCES IN NAVAL ARMS RACE WITH CHINA
Dr. Micha'el Tanchum

India regards China's efforts to enhance its naval presence in the Indian Ocean as undermining its strategic position. India has beefed up its naval capabilities in response.

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CANADA'S CONSUMMATE SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL
David M. Weinberg

Canada strongly defends Israel, consistently before any other country in the world. Prime Minister Stephen Harper is a valuable ally and trusted friend.

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THE THREAT OF THE "SALAFI CRESCENT"
Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Shay

Attempts by al-Qaeda and other radical Sunni Islamist groups to challenge the Shia Crescent (Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon) must be viewed as a serious security threat.

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INDIA-ISRAEL DEFENSE COOPERATION
Alvite Singh Ningthoujam

Defense relations between India and Israel are flourishing and will continue to be strong.

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THE BOYCOTT MIRAGE
Prof. Efraim Inbar

A collapse in Israeli-Palestinian peace talks will not lead to an international boycott of Israel. Jerusalem's robust trade relations with many countries will not freeze over an impasse in negotiations.

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IS THE GCC IN PERIL?
Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum

Tension over Qatar's support for the Muslim Brotherhood has damaged relations between Doha and its Gulf neighbors. The days of the GCC may be numbered.

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RECOGNITION OF JEWISH ISRAEL IS CRITICAL FOR PALESTINIANS
Maj. Gen. (res.) Yaacov Amidror

An agreement between Israel and the Palestinians must include Palestinian recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jews, or it is not worth the paper it is written on.

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CHINA IS THE LIKELY WINNER IN UKRAINE
David P. Goldman

After decades of negotiations between Moscow and Beijing for a long term natural gas mega-contract, it seems that Russia has finally relented to China's terms.

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LIVING WITH IRAN: ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE
Prof. Louis René Beres and General John T. Chain


Iran must never be allowed to believe that Israel's strategic forces are somehow too vulnerable to first-strike attack, or too destructive for operational military use.

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HIT HAMAS HARD TO CREATE A DIFFERENT STRATEGIC BALANCE AGAINST ISLAMIC TERRORISM
Prof. Hillel Frisch

It is time for a full-scale offensive against Hamas and the other Islamist-Jihadist groups in Gaza.

Mowing the Grass: Israel's Strategy for Protracted Intractable Conflict

Prof. Efraim Inbar and Dr. Eitan Shamir



Six months before Israel launched Operation Protective Edge to halt Hamas rocket and missile fire from the Gaza Strip, BESA Center associates Inbar and Shamir outlined Israel's need to constantly "mow the grass" in order to degrade enemy capabilities.

"Our assumption is that Israel will remain is a situation of protracted intractable conflict for the long-term," explains Prof. Inbar. "Consequently, Israel needs a strategy to manage continuous conflict against hostile non-state groups. We explain that the use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but rather is a strategy of attrition designed to temporarily deter the enemy and bring about periods of quiet along Israel's borders."

The two scholars show in their (Hebrew-language) study that this Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with non-state military challenges. Their review of Operation Defensive Shield (2002), the Second Lebanon War (2006), Operation Cast Lead (2008-2009), and Operation Pillar of Defense (2012), shows that Israel evinced great restraint for lengthy periods of time in the face of enemy attacks before striking back forcefully to destroy the capabilities of its foes.

"This is constant, hard work," says Dr. Shamir. "Keeping the enemy off balance and reducing its capabilities requires Israeli military readiness and a willingness to use force intermittingly, while maintaining a healthy and resilient Israeli home front despite repeated military offensives." "It indeed must be frustrating to all Israelis," adds Prof. Inbar, "but a war of attrition against the Hamas is probably our fate for the long term, and we will quite frequently need to strike Gaza in order keep the enemy off balance."

The Inbar/Shamir study was originally published in the prestigious *Journal of Strategic Studies*.

THE SAUL AND ESTHER BECKMAN INTERNSHIP IN MIDEAST PEACE AND SECURITY

The BESA Center was pleased this summer to award the first Saul and Esther Beckman Internship in Mideast Peace and Security. The scholarship was awarded to **Ariel Vishne**, an outstanding student in Middle East history at Bar-Ilan University, who will become a research intern at the BESA Center for eight months.

The BESA Center
The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University seeks to contribute to the advancement of Middle East peace and security by conducting policy-relevant research on strategic subjects, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel. Founded by Thomas O. Hecht, a Canadian Jewish community leader, the Center is a non-partisan and independent institute dedicated to the memory of the late Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin and the late Egyptian president Anwar Sadat.

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