



**THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES**



**Bar-Ilan
University**

Militant Islam's War Against the West

Max Singer



Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 145

**THE BEGIN-SADAT CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
BAR-ILAN UNIVERSITY**

Mideast Security and Policy Studies No. 145

Militant Islam's War Against the West

Max Singer

Militant Islam's War Against the West

Max Singer

© The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University
Ramat Gan 5290002 Israel
Tel. 972-3-5318959
Fax. 972-3-5359195

office@besacenter.org
www.besacenter.org
ISSN 0793-1042

March 2018

Cover image: Screenshot from YouTube documentary, "Obsession", about radical Islam

The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies

The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies is an independent, non-partisan think tank conducting policy-relevant research on Middle Eastern and global strategic affairs, particularly as they relate to the national security and foreign policy of Israel and regional peace and stability. It is named in memory of Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat, whose efforts in pursuing peace laid the cornerstone for conflict resolution in the Middle East.

Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of research conducted by BESA associates. Publication of a work by BESA signifies that it is deemed worthy of public consideration but does not imply endorsement of the author's views or conclusions. *Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy* summarize the papers delivered at conferences and seminars held by the Center for the academic, military, official and general publics. In sponsoring these discussions, the BESA Center aims to stimulate public debate on, and consideration of, contending approaches to problems of peace and war in the Middle East. The *Policy Memorandum* series consists of policy-oriented papers. The content of the publications reflects the views of the authors only. A list of recent BESA Center publications can be found at the end of this booklet.

International Advisory Board

Founder of the Center and Chairman of the Advisory Board: Dr. Thomas O. Hecht

Vice Chairman: Mr. Saul Koschitzky

Members: Prof. Moshe Arens, Ms. Marion Hecht, Mr. Robert Hecht, Prof. Riva Heft-Hecht, Hon. Shlomo Hillel, Mr. Joel Koschitzky, Amb. Yitzhak Levanon, Sen. Joseph I. Lieberman, Mr. Robert K. Lifton, Rt. Hon. Brian Mulroney, Mr. Seymour D. Reich, Mr. Greg Rosshandler, Amb. Zalman Shoval, Amb. Norman Spector, Ms. Drorit Wertheim

International Academic Advisory Board

Prof. Ian Beckett *University of Kent*, Dr. Eliot A. Cohen *Johns Hopkins University*, Prof. Irwin Cotler *McGill University*, Prof. Steven R. David *Johns Hopkins University*, Prof. Lawrence Freedman *King's College*, Prof. Patrick James *University of Southern California*, Prof. Robert J. Lieber *Georgetown University*, Prof. Michael Mandelbaum *Johns Hopkins University*

Research Staff

BESA Center Director: Prof. Efraim Karsh

Research Associates: Dr. Efrat Aviv, Dr. Yael Bloch-Elkon, Brig. Gen. (res.) Moni Chorev, Dr. James Dorsey, Dr. Gil Feiler, Prof. Jonathan Fox, Prof. Hillel Frisch, Dr. Manfred Gerstenfeld, Prof. Eytan Gilboa, Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen, Col. (res.) Aby Har-Even, Eado Hecht, Dr. Tsilla Hershco, Dr. Doron Itzhakov, Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Mordechai Kedar, Mr. Yaakov Lappin, Prof. Udi Lebel, Dr. Alon Levkowitz, Prof. Ze'ev Maghen, Ambassador Arye Mekel, Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael Ofek, Col. (res.) Mr. Uzi Rubin, Dr. Jonathan Rynhold, Prof. Shmuel Sandler, Maj. Gen. (ret.) Dr. Emanuel Sakal, Dr. Eitan Shamir, Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Dany Shoham, Prof. Shlomo Shpiro, Dr. Max Singer, Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum

Publications Editor (Hebrew): Alona Briner Rozenman

Publications Editor (English): Judith Levy

Militant Islam's War Against the West

Table of Contents

Executive Summary.....	7
Islam and Islamism	9
The Islamist War Against the West	10
The Other Side of the War	17
The Nature of the War	18
The Decisive Struggle Is Within Islam	24
How Will the War End?	25
Notes	33

Militant Islam's War Against the West

Max Singer

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For more than 30 years, an ideological movement called Islamism has been at war with the West. This paper presents a long-term perspective on the nature of this war, alternative Western reactions to the attack, possible future developments, and the likely outcome.

Only a small fraction of the world's 1.6 billion Muslims support Islamism's war against the West. But Islamist ideology is based on mainstream Muslim thinking and behavior, and Islamism is important because of its potential appeal to Muslims, even though many Muslim scholars and thinkers insist that its ideology is not the correct understanding of Islam.

The war has so far had limited effect on world affairs and casualties in the West have been a fraction of past wars. Most of the turmoil in the Middle East results primarily from other causes, including Western responses in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The most important feature of the war is the possibility that some Islamists will obtain and use nuclear or biological weapons, which would be a world history-changing disaster.

The war could come virtually to an end in a short time if Iran's revolutionary regime were replaced and the Saudi program of exporting

Dr. Max Singer, a founder and senior fellow of the Hudson Institute, is a senior fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

radical Islamic ideas stopped. But it could become far more harmful if significantly more Muslims came to believe that Islam is under attack by the West. Much of the popular Muslim support for Islamism's war is based on Muslim belief that the West is trying to destroy Islam.

The decisive feature of the war is that the Islamists cannot win. That is, they cannot achieve their goal of conquering the world. Sooner or later the diverse Muslim world will put a stop to a war it cannot win and will gradually change enough in this century to join the competitive global modern information economies and their social-political systems.

Militant Islam's War Against the West

Max Singer

ISLAM AND ISLAMISM

Islam is a rich and old religion, and its writings and history permit a variety of views about what it commands and permits. Non-Muslims cannot judge what is “true Islam.” In an important sense, Islam is what Muslims do and believe. And Islam, like other great religions, has changed in the past and can again in the future.

Islamism (that is, radical or militant Islam)¹ is an ideology based on the view that Allah requires that the entire world become Muslim and be governed by Muslim law. This view says that Islam commands Muslims to deny the legitimacy of “infidel” governments and to be permanently at war – in some way – against all non-Muslim governments. The US and all democracies are permanent enemies, regardless of what they do.²

Islamists claim that there is no such thing as “Islamism”; they assert that their “ideology” is no different from the religion of Islam, which does not separate religion from politics. And while many Muslims and scholars agree that Islamism’s view is correct, many others don’t share the Islamists’ world-conquering view. They believe themselves to be good, loyal Muslims though they are not supporting Islamism. Highly qualified Muslim scholars and thinkers reject Islamism’s claim to be the true Islam,³ not least since Islamist ideology includes, in addition to standard Muslim doctrines, modern political ideas taken from fascism and communism.⁴

A major difference among Islamist groups concerns how much war is required or appropriate at any time. Some, including parts of the Muslim

Brotherhood, the leading international Islamist organization, favor postponing most forms of violence for practical reasons. But all agree: Islam forbids permanent peace with the non-Muslim world, authorizes violence to expand Islamic rule, and regards the West as enemy.

Much in Islamic writings and history supports the Islamist understanding.⁵ And as a theoretical position, their view fits with what most Muslims understand as Islam: the world is divided between *Dar al-Islam* (the Abode of Islam) and *Dar al-Harb* (the Abode of War), and the natural order is for Muslims to rule.⁶ This is not a fringe or foreign view, but it is important to understand that other interpretations also have support in Islamic history and writings. But whatever the theoretical view, only a small percentage of Muslims currently act to support a war against non-Muslim countries.⁷ Islamists generally also believe that the West is attacking the religion of Islam and wants to destroy it. Islamist leaders thus have a combination of offensive and defensive motivations. But it would be hopeless to try to end the war by trying to assuage their defensive concerns.⁸

The significance of the Islamist war against the West comes from the fact that, although it is in some ways a modern totalitarian ideology, it is deeply connected to the religion of more than 1.6 billion people, over 20% of the world's population. Because it claims to be the true Islam, and is able to use the perception that Islam is being attacked, it has the vast Muslim world as a potential base. The question of whether Islam "truly" commands war against infidels is not as important as Muslims' individual responses.

THE ISLAMIST WAR AGAINST THE WEST

Islamism does not have a headquarters. Its coherence comes from shared ideas and goals among diverse supporters. In addition to the more conspicuous ISIS and al-Qaeda, there are substantial organized groups of Muslims, especially the branches of the Muslim Brotherhood and the revolutionary Islamic regime of Iran, which claim to be in a religious war against the West, especially the US and Israel. These groups have carried out many violent attacks and killed thousands of people and aim to replace governments or to destroy states. There is no apparent limit to how many people some of these groups are prepared to kill in their campaign. And, implausible as it sounds, many believe that they can eventually conquer the

whole world for Islam. Islamists have potential support from many non-Islamist Muslims. They also sometimes have political support from non-Muslims who are anti-Western or anti-American, including governments like Venezuela, Russia, or China.

But the Islamist movement is deeply divided – most strongly by the Sunni-Shiite enmity. And although its primary enemy is the West, much of its practical effort is focused on fighting other Muslims for influence or to gain control of Muslim countries. As the war against the West lasts there will be major divisions and internal conflicts within radical Islam – despite the shared goal of spreading Islam throughout the world. There will be conflicts about the basic strategy for their hopeless war, as well as conflicts between Sunnis and Shiites, and among national components – even though in principle they believe nations are not important compared to Islam. But there will also be cooperation between rival elements.

Efforts to Gain Control of Muslim States

The most visible part of the war in the West has been terrorist attacks against the US and Western European countries. The most significant of these was the 9/11 attacks that killed some 3,000 people, which may be half of all those killed in attacks in Western countries in this century. But the main component of the Islamist war is to achieve control of Muslim governments as a springboard for further expansion – for example the Muslim Brotherhood's brief control of Egypt's government in 2012-13,⁹ or Ayatollah Khomeini's takeover of Iran in 1979.

Much of this effort is ideological. Since 1979, the Saudis and others from the Gulf area have spent well over \$100 billion spreading the Wahhabi version of Salafi Islam¹⁰ throughout the world, principally by opening mosques and paying for Imams.¹¹ The result has been a transformation of how Islam is understood by Muslims in most countries. This transformation is most visible in changes in Muslim dress and in the stricter observance of Muslim conduct, including rules about food, drink and other personal practices. But it also includes a great increase in Muslim belief in the inherent conflict between Islam and infidels, and in Islamic obligation to bring the whole world under Muslim law.

The Saudi funded teaching of Salafism does *not* include specific advocacy of terrorism or support for Islamist fighting organizations. But it does teach that Islamic law is related to jihad, part of the ideological basis of Islamism and terrorism. International Muslim support for Islamism would almost certainly be only a fraction of what it is today had it not been for the massive export of Salafism since 1979.

Saudi funding since 9/11 has mostly not been governmental; it has come from individuals, mostly members of the extended royal family. But since almost all the money in the kingdom comes directly or indirectly from the government-controlled oil, even if it is nominally in private hand, the Saudi government could largely stop this.

While some of the funding comes from individual belief and commitment to Wahhabism, the program primarily reflects the political alliance that was the original basis of the Saudi regime, between Wahhabi clerics and the Saudi royal family. This traditional political arrangement has been changing. The family has built additional political support and is less dependent on the clerics. And the clerics may be more sensitive to current political and other practical factors than before.

It is impossible to predict the future of the Saudi regime. The new crown prince, Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), is trying to solidify his power by acting against, even imprisoning, major members of the royal family, and by taking control of the previously divided security agencies. It seems clear that the norms that had preserved family unity, and stable government, for more than 60 years can no longer be counted upon. MBS may be able to create stability by convincing all major factions of the royal family that they have to accept his dominance. But it is more likely there will be a long period of uncertainty and contention about Saudi rule and policy, and possibly serious political instability.

The Saudi government and royal family have not been in favor of jihad against the West, and they understand that spreading Salafism strengthens the Islamism that is dangerous to them. The expansion of their program began in 1979 in response to Khomeini's commitment to the worldwide spread of the Islamic revolution.¹² Saudi leaders felt they could not afford

to let Khomeini and Shiite Iran be the sole representatives of radical Islam. A competing Sunni force was needed to appeal to radical Muslims. This need was made vivid by the seizure of the Kaaba in Mecca in November 1979 by a radical local Sunni group, an episode terminated only with the help of French military officers. It is reported that the negotiations between the royal family and the ulema during the crisis included the family's commitment to an expanded program of international proselytization.¹³

Many elements of the royal family, certainly including MBS, must be at least ambivalent about their vast program of exporting Salafism. This will be part of the struggle now taking place in Saudi Arabia, and might give the US an opportunity to put pressure on the royal family to drastically curtail the program. The struggle could also produce the opposite results.

The Rise and Fall of ISIS

As noted earlier, the ultimate goal of Islamism is the creation of a caliphate that rules the whole world through Islamic law. The creation of a state that governs a territory and a population is one step in that direction. As such, ISIS rule over large tracts of Syria and Iraq was a component of Islamism's war for world domination, as evidenced by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's self-proclamation as caliph. But despite the fact that ISIS was part of Islamism's war, Iran – the leading component of Islamism – treated the organization as a deadly enemy. Partly this was because ISIS is a Sunni organization, although Shiite Iran has given extensive support to the Sunni al-Qaeda terror group, from which ISIS originally ensued.¹⁴

Yet the proclamation of an Islamic state and caliphate had great appeal to a large number of Muslims around the world, attracting tens of thousands of volunteers to come to fight for it. Existing Islamist organizations in Egypt and Libya also declared themselves “provinces” of the newly proclaimed caliphate and swore allegiance to Baghdadi.

Had ISIS been able to build an army capable of defending its territory and governing successfully, it could have become a critical part of Islamism's war, perhaps even the decisive arena. That is, if ISIS had been successful enough and lasted long enough, its eventual fall might have been the decisive development leading to Muslim rejection of Islamism,

akin to the collapse of the Soviet Union on the international communist movement. But its swift and ignominious fall will probably not have a decisive effect on Islamism's appeal.

As it were, ISIS' failure to build an adequate military force was partly the result of lack of money and weapons, as well as US and other support for its enemies. But its failure was primarily a result of its incompetence and disunity. Its military loyalty, motivation, and competence were not even good enough to outclass the Iraqi and Syrian foreign-backed armed forces as well as the Kurdish Peshmerga militias. Nor did ISIS win the loyalty and respect of the population it governed; its stringent Islam was brutal and unpopular.

But even if ISIS had created a military force capable of defeating local standing armies and/or militias, it could not have built a force capable of standing up to Israeli or US forces in a battle.¹⁵ After the loss of its territorial base, the current ISIS will probably revert to being one of the shifting groups of Islamist terror organizations, with only modest significance.

Attacks on US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan

The primary US motivation to send forces into Iraq and Afghanistan, however misguided, was to strengthen defenses against Islamist attacks like 9/11 and to prevent the Saddam Hussein regime from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The war against the US and its allies in Iraq involved many groups with many motivations, mostly not related to Islamism. But Iran also acted against US forces, partly because of its Islamist ideology and partly because an independent Shiite government in Iraq would have challenged Tehran's claim to speak for Shiism. Many thousands of Muslims also came to fight against the US either because of Islamism or to support Muslims who saw themselves defending their country from American occupation.

In Afghanistan the Taliban are partly Islamists, as are Pakistani elements, and of course al-Qaeda. But most of the fighting is not part of Islamism's war. The US attacked the Taliban government of Afghanistan because it had hosted al-Qaeda on its territory and helped it organize 9/11. Although the war there started as part of the defense against Islamism, most of what has subsequently happened revolved around control of Afghanistan.¹⁶

In brief, while the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are related to Islamism's war against the West, and especially policies of active defense against Islamist attack, how those wars have unfolded was driven by other concerns. They are an illustration of how common it is for international action to get out of hand and lead to unintended results.

Iran's Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Regional Power

Before 1979 there were Islamists but they had very little effect on the world. Militant Islam's war against the West began to be visible when Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini became head of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the wake of the revolution overthrowing the Shah of Iran. Khomeini declared the commitment of the revolutionary Republic of Iran to the spread of that revolution and to the defeat of the West. Since then Iran has been systematically and actively involved in promoting Militant Islam's war – creating and supporting regional terrorist organizations and conducting ideological campaigns. It has been the main force behind Islamist activity in many parts of the world.

The Iranian government's international promotion of Islamism is undoubtedly based on its ideological commitment to Islamist ideology. But it is impossible to say how much of its motivation for local political moves and to acquire nuclear weapons (NW) is Iranian national power-seeking, rather than Islamism.

Is the Growth of Muslim Power in Europe Part of the Islamist War?

So far militant Islam has not tried to take over any non-Muslim majority country. Muslim fights for control of Nigeria and other African states, and the Palestinian effort to destroy Israel are primarily local conflicts rather than parts of the Islamist war for control of the world. They will continue even when Islamism is rejected, though Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood and is committed to its world-conquering worldview.

A number of serious observers, notably the eminent historian Bernard Lewis, have argued that Islam will eventually gain control of Europe.¹⁷ This assessment is based, on the face of it, on a not wholly ungrounded assumption given the rapidly growing number of European Muslims as

a result of both far higher birthrate than their non-Muslim counterparts and mass migration,¹⁸ and, on the other, the urging by prominent Islamist ideologues (notably Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader Yusuf Qaradawi) and political leaders, such as Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, of "missionary migration" and non-assimilation in their host societies.¹⁹ And while these trends are not primarily an Islamist issue, it is probably true that European Muslims would not be as aggressive, or as united in rejecting European values and loyalty, if anti-Western feelings, partly based on Islamism, did not have so much support in the Middle East and the Arab worlds. When the emotional support for the war against the West recedes outside Europe, Muslim separatism and aggressiveness in Europe will likely be reduced as the influence of successful Europeanized Muslims who choose the personal benefits of "acting European" over unity with other Muslims becomes more important and there are more second, third and fourth generation immigrants, and more intermarriage.

But suppose that in some European states increasing Muslim power continues until a tipping point is passed and the non-Muslim majority no longer has the ability to control their state. This might require Muslim control of the police and the army, which seems unlikely if not impossible. What would follow from Muslim domination of France, for example? The country would become distinctly less prosperous; most talented people would leave, and many non-Muslim French people would be financially exploited by French Muslims.

These results would quickly become inescapably clear to other Europeans, and it is hard to believe that non-Muslim majorities wouldn't act to prevent the same thing from happening to their countries. The large majority of non-Muslims in each country continue to have the ability to take control and to enforce their values and laws against an aggressive Muslim minority.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE WAR

Most of the West, and especially its governments, decline to say that they are at war: they say they are fighting “terrorism.” But terrorism is a tactic or a weapon, a metaphorical enemy – not the real enemy, let alone its ultimate goal.

It is worth recognizing there are two ways the West could rationally respond to being attacked by a worldwide ideological movement that has killed thousands of its citizens and is trying to destroy it. One is to say it is at war with those who have “declared war” against, and attacked, its values and societies. The alternative response is disdain, despite full recognition of the scope and purpose of the attack, namely refusal to dignify the challenge as a war and insistence that while Islamists must be destroyed, they are not important enough to go to war with. The West must eliminate or reform any organization that has attacked it, but fighting terrorist gangs does not have to amount to a full-fledged war. Recognition of the nature and strength of Islamist enmity to the West, and its connection to Islam, is not inconsistent with a disdainful denial that there is a war.

The Western response to the Islamist attack depends on changeable political realities. Future events, especially the number and size of successful Islamist terror attacks, could radically change the balance of political support for different policies concerning Muslim citizens. In the US the effectiveness of the “Islamophobia” weapon protecting Islamist organizations would be drastically reduced if there were a large increase in terror casualties. Smaller terrorist successes could also produce a change in national opinion about how the war should be fought.

While political correctness has proven to be a surprisingly powerful force, it is a social fashion that may be reversed overnight by the need for self-preservation. Europeans are probably still capable of the ruthlessness they have demonstrated in the past. It is reasonable to believe that self-preservation instincts will kick in well before Western Europe is dominated by its Muslims. The large majority of non-Muslims in each country continue to have the ability to take control and to enforce their

values and laws against an aggressive Muslim minority. Governments can eliminate “no-go areas;” but this requires determination and willingness to accept casualties, violence, and reductions in civil liberties, and a nation that sees itself as fighting for its life is likely to expel disloyal and violent Muslims who violate the law. And such expulsions will curb the supremacist ambitions of other Muslims.

Central and Eastern Europe are resisting potential Muslim dominance more than western Europeans, a difference that is weakening the European Union and will make it easier for Western European countries to adjust their policies.

THE NATURE OF THE WAR

Ideology Matters, but States Are What Count

Non-state groups like al-Qaeda and Hezbollah are at the forefront of the Islamist war. But only rarely are such groups able to achieve significant effects if they are not aided or tolerated by states. International politics are determined by the actions of states. Non-state actors and ideologies need to be understood primarily as they affect the behavior of states.

While it may be possible for non-state Islamist terrorist groups to carry out major terrorist attacks, evidence to date suggests that large casualty terror attacks are rare without the support of a state. The state may provide money, safe heavens to train and organize attacks, technical assistance, or the focused persistence that a professional bureaucracy can provide.

If all states decided not to support terrorism or allow terrorist groups sanctuary, and there are no ungoverned territories, radical Islamic groups would not be a significant problem. Militant Islam is a danger to the extent that it has the potential to gain control of or to influence states. The conflict with militant Islam is a struggle for control of states, especially Muslim majority states.

Much of the Middle East's Volatility Is Not Caused by Militant Islam

A critical feature of the conflict with Islamism is to recognize how much of current troubles in the Middle East are not caused by the Islamist war. Syria and Iraq were in turmoil before ISIS came into existence. The Syrian war is a revolt against the brutality of Assad's Alawite rule, and is sustained by the Sunni-Shiite conflict and other rivalries of outside powers; it was not caused by the ISIS, and will continue in one form or another after ISIS' demise. Libya's chaos is more tribal than ideological.²⁰ The Sunni-Shiite conflict operates on both sides of the divide between Islamists and anti-Islamists. It is not militant Islam that is responsible for the failure of the territorial state in the region, though it has played a substantial part.

While the Islamic Republic of Iran is responsible for much of the violence and disorder in the region, it may not be correct to attribute all of Tehran's behavior to its Islamist fervor; there is also an element of Persian imperialism. Similarly, Erdoğan's motivation is partly Islamism but also Turkish, or rather neo-Ottoman imperialist ambitions.²¹ Most of the Sub-Saharan conflict is violent Muslims focused on taking over their own countries, not on fighting the West to take over the world. Therefore it is necessary to understand that the Islamist war is only one of the many forces shaping international events, even in the Middle East.

Islamists Can Hurt the West

While militant Islam cannot win, it can inflict great costs on the West. To put the war's potential in perspective one needs to appreciate the ways in which militant Islam might cause history-changing harm. There are three principal threats:

- Nuclear and/or biological weapons. If weapons of mass destruction are used, millions of people could be killed and the dark shadow of nuclear war would fall over international politics. This would not result in militant Islam winning but WMD would make the conflict truly disastrous.
- Control of nearly all of the Persian Gulf oil supply. The West needs Persian Gulf oil supplied to international markets. With increased

Western sources of oil, caused by the fracking revolution and reduced costs of deep undersea oil, Persian Gulf producers have even less ability to control long-term prices than formerly. The main way that Islamists could use oil to hurt the West would be so much violence and destruction on the Arabian peninsula that it became impossible to produce and ship oil for six months or more – not a likely result.

The main significance of the oil for international politics is that it provides large amounts of money used to finance Islamist and/or terrorist activity. And it is the basis of the power of countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE. If militant Islam gained control of all the oil produced in the Persian Gulf region (close to 30% of world production), it might be able to cause serious mischief for the West. While the world's vulnerability to cuts in oil supply is overestimated, long-term control of 30% of the current supply could be a powerful tool for creating harm. Of course, militant Islam is now far away from gaining control of the area.

- Accelerating national decay in the West. Many Western nations have refused to recognize the facts about the Islamist war and the connection to Islam. They accommodate and make concessions to groups that have contempt for their values and laws, and fail to support moderate Muslims who resist Islamists. At some point a nation that allows its citizens to be killed and assaulted by an enemy that it is afraid to confront may morally collapse, resulting in internal conflict, loss of economic energy and creativity, declining integrity, and political illness. While it is not possible to predict the point where decisive decay will set in, it is important to recognize the risk created by extreme national spinelessness. Internal decay may not be clearly visible until a society has an external challenge that it cannot meet. The Islamist attack on the West may be the external challenge that makes internal decay decisive.

But Militant Islam Cannot Win

Much as it can hurt the West, militant Islam cannot win; Islam will never rule the world. Sooner or later that fact will sink in and affect the course of the conflict. Since the Islamists' ultimate goal is world domination, by

their own standard they will have failed and will have been defeated if at the end not all countries are ruled by Muslims. They cannot pretend to a lesser goal.

There is no strand of Islamic thinking that justifies partial victory. Nothing in the Koran or the Hadith suggests that Allah would accept, for example, Europe and Asia being Muslim and the Americas being ruled by infidels – except as a temporary arrangement. If Islam could accept the Americas being non-Muslim, then all countries that now have non-Muslim majorities could stay non-Muslim. That is, the Islamist view of Islam implies that the ultimate survival of non-Muslim governments anywhere in the world would be a defeat for their cause – or a demonstration that their view of Allah’s requirements is wrong.²²

Although many of the Islamist leaders have a great commitment to their cause, while much of the West, especially Western Europe, has lost its faith, Muslims have too little power – measured by economic strength, military capabilities, technological advancement, organization, population size, and competence – to take over the rest of the world.

It is doubtful whether Europe is on the way to becoming Muslim-controlled as suggested by some Western observers.²³ But even if this were to be the case, it would not enable Muslims to achieve world domination. Europe is no longer the main part of modern civilization.

It is very hard to see how Islam could take over China, India, and Japan. And while Americans may not have the character that they used to, it seems extremely unlikely that they would accept having Muslim rule and Islamic law (or sharia) imposed on them.

Militant Islam is trying to increase the number of countries under Sharia law, but since the 1979 Iranian revolution they have not added a single country (except Sudan). An Islamist government gained control of Egypt but only lasted one year. ISIS created a caliphate in parts of Iraq and Syria but lost these territories in less than three years. Erdoğan is progressively undermining the secularist republic established by Turkey’s founding father Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), moving toward transforming Turkey into an Islamist state, but it is doubtful whether his effort will be completed.

Militant Islam may of course be able to continue to kill Westerners every week but is unlikely to produce more progress toward victory; and in many countries terror attacks are more likely to encourage nationalist or populist groups who want to fight back harder.

Any country that cannot tolerate its deaths from terrorism may reduce that toll by improving security – paying a cost in money, in convenience and illusions, or in reduced civil liberties. Countries can also protect themselves by acting against those states from which they have been attacked. No Western state is unable to withstand the current range of terror casualties. Absolutely intolerable numbers of victims can only be produced by nuclear or biological weapons.

The US was unwilling to use large ground forces to attack ISIS. But is it plausible that it would continue to hold itself back if some new ISIS succeeded in a number of mass casualty attacks, like 9/11 or bigger, in the US? So how can terrorism produce victory for Islamism?

The fundamental reason militant Islam cannot take over the world is that modernization – which produces freedom and wealth – continues to spread. The main force in history over the last two centuries is the gradual transformation, one country at a time, to free post-industrial societies with economies dominated by information and ideas, able to overcome material issues. This century began with less than 15% of people in modern countries; not long after the century ends some two thirds of all people are likely to be living in free, wealthy, perhaps fully modern countries. Never before has there been a comparable change in the lives of ordinary people.²⁴

Of course, this process of modernization may end before it transforms the entire world. Something in the nature of modern post-industrial societies may bear seeds of decay that will turn the course of history around. But while my prognosis might be wrong, the expectation should be that the powerful trend of the last two centuries will continue. Policy should be based on the likely case, not on a-historic fears; and if internal failures in the West bring modernization to a halt, that will be its dominant problem, not the conflict with militant Islam.

There is no way that the entire Muslim world will be willing to forego joining the rest of the world in becoming wealthy and free in order to continue a hopeless struggle to gain Muslim rule everywhere. While many Muslims despise and reject what they see as immoral features of the modern world, those sentiments cannot control the entire Muslim world for a century. Piece by piece this world will sooner or later recognize that they cannot conquer the world and instead should start on the road to becoming part of the modern world.²⁵

It is of course arguable that Islam and much of the culture of many Muslims is inherently in conflict with liberal democracy and therefore with modernity. It is also clear that, unlike Western Christian societies, which have undergone a profound process of secularization and separation of state and church over the past 200 years, Islam has remained largely entrenched in its original format combining religious and temporal powers and seems reluctant to embrace modernity, as evidenced inter alia by the fact that many fewer books are translated into Arabic now than half-a-century ago.²⁶ Without disputing such arguments, they speak to the present and the past. Eventually the desire of Muslims to be part of the modern world will be stronger than the current forces that drive militant Islam's war against the West, and they will find ways to make their faith compatible with what they need to do to become modern. It is even more difficult to imagine one-and-a-half billion people living for centuries in half developed countries while the rest of the world is living modern lives like those of Western Europe, the US, Japan and South Korea today. Gradually the Muslim world will be split. There will be a growing model of an Islam that is compatible with modernity.

Some argue that militant Islam is now winning – because democratic governments refuse to recognize that it is waging war against the West. This is a reasonable perspective on the short term but it misses the long-term point. While militant Islam's successes and gains may be real, they are not a path to victory. They impose unnecessary losses upon the West, but do not have a substantial effect on the overall balance or the final outcome. The West needs to wake up to the nature of the problem and start to fight back more effectively, but not because Islamism has any chance of achieving the goals to which it is tied by its ideology.

Terrorist killings in Paris or Florida have helped ISIS recruit fighters. And militant Islamists take satisfaction in killing infidels. But what are they accomplishing? How are they increasing their capacity for world domination? What can they think such attacks will force countries to do?

Terror attacks that kill 20, or 100, or 200 French or Americans are not going to force fundamental concessions to Islam. So far the response has primarily been to very slowly strengthen security measures against terrorism, without admitting its connection to militant Islam, especially during the Obama years when the administration adamantly insisted on attributing terror attacks to “violent extremists.”

THE DECISIVE STRUGGLE IS WITHIN ISLAM

The understanding that militant Islam cannot win its war leads to a second fundamental perspective: in the long run the crucial struggle is within Islam, not between Islam and the rest of the world. The final defeat of Islamism will only come when sufficient parts of the Muslim world decide to no longer accept the problems and costs caused by the war and its interference with progress. In other words, the Islamist war has two components: physical actions and ideological conflict. Even when the physical actions are defeated the ideological struggle can continue.

Marxism was an attempt for world domination that existed for half-a-century before, in 1917, its Leninist branch gained control of Russia and created the Soviet Union. This physical threat ended in 1991 as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the success of market-based economies have largely eliminated Communist ideology as a factor in international affairs.

Yet even before and after the Soviet Union existed, Marxist ideologies were a factor in world affairs because they had enough depth and substance – however false – to absorb the thinking and gain the respect of generations of intellectuals and idealists. Few ideologies are “rich” enough to maintain appeal for generations as Marxism has. Islamism has intellectual heft because it claims to be based on the rich historical and intellectual heritage of Islam but as a result it can only speak to Muslims.

Because Islamism is inherently tied to Islam, the ideological struggle against it must be within the Muslim world. Until enough Muslims decide the war is not worth it, militant Islam will be able to recruit new supporters no matter how many defeats it suffers.

HOW WILL THE WAR END?

Replacement of the Islamic regime in Iran and drastic curtailment of Saudi and others' export of Salafism would mean the end of the war as it is now. The war could continue if Turkey or Pakistan joined Iran. But when there is no substantial danger that Turkey, Pakistan, or any other large Muslim country will come under the control of Islamists, there will be no reason for the West to consider itself at war.

After the end of the war, there will still be significant instability in the Middle East. A number of former states will not have governments, and therefore individual terrorists will have places to hide. It will take at least a generation before stable and effective government is achieved throughout the region. Dictatorships – mostly military – will probably rule much of the Middle East for an additional generation. The end of the Islamist war will not end violent Muslim efforts to gain control of Nigeria and other African countries, nor efforts to “restore” Israel to Muslim control.

What will influence Muslim decisions whether to join or support religious war against the West? It is not likely to be intellectual debate about the meaning of Islam and what is required of the faithful. Rather, over the long term the decisive issue will be whether militant Islam can actually succeed. Most people want to be on the winning side. Expected defeat also has religious significance.

The other critical issue is how many Muslims believe that Islam is being attacked by the West. The main long-term objective in the fight against militant Islam is to influence events to convince more Muslims that Islam is not under attack, that the war against the West cannot be won, and that sacrificing their hopes for a better life in order to support the war would be in vain.

A fundamental dilemma facing militant Islam is that if it only makes small attacks against the West, it does not look as if it can win. But big attacks are likely to galvanize the West, the US in particular, into fighting more strongly against militant Islam. This creates a no win situation for the Islamists. They will either demonstrate that they are not strong enough to really attack the tiger or else they will attack the tiger and be devoured.

Therefore, the war will end when enough of the Muslim world decides that the Islamist war against the non-Muslim world is unwinnable and that it hurts Muslims' ability to build modern lives for themselves and their families. What Islamist-ruled state might constitute a role model that ordinary Muslims admire and wish to emulate? Turkey was an example of Muslim success, but is becoming an embarrassment. In Islamist Iran prostitution and drug abuse have dramatically increased and many fewer people attend mosques than before Khomeini came to power. Wherever radical Islam is in power or strong, Muslims around the world see only trouble. It seems very unlikely that this experience will change. Shahids can be heroes, but they cannot be signs of victory. So long as Islamism's heroes are shahids, it is demonstrating that it can't win. The killing of hundreds or thousands of infidels a year in Western countries is not likely to make Muslims believe they are taking over the world – unless there is absolutely no response by the West, or unless one Western country after another becomes Muslim territory.

Suppression of Muslim Dissent, and its End

An important feature of the long-term internal conflict within Islam is that Islamists suppress Muslim leaders and thinkers who oppose the war against the West. As a result, internal Muslim public debate, especially outside Asia, has been largely one-sided because most of the other side is afraid to speak. A key turning point will be when Muslim communities decide that it is no longer acceptable to suppress non-Islamist voices. There is reason to think suppression depends on unspoken acceptance by Muslim communities, and when that acceptance is withdrawn the suppression will gradually weaken and become less effective.

Non-Muslims cannot take a serious part in this critical debate. The most useful influence they have is by defeating all violent efforts against the West and by demonstrating that they believe in Western values and will not allow themselves to be defeated. The best way outsiders can help moderates against extremists is to refrain from making concessions and to defeat their violence. Successes by militant Islam make it harder for moderate Muslims to overcome the appeal of Islamists.

The War Could Get Much Worse

While the war could become much less troublesome than it has been in recent years, it could also get much more harmful, in two ways. Islamists could acquire nuclear or biological weapons and use them, and more of the Muslim world could join the fight against the West - and multiply the level of terrorism.

At the moment only Iran is controlled by Islamists committed to jihad, and the Islamist regime has been cautious, focused on asserting Iran's hegemony throughout the Middle East rather than attacking the US or Europe before acquiring a nuclear force. It takes care to almost always operate through proxies rather than with its own forces. So long as militant Islam only controls small countries, the harm it can do is limited by the possibility that such small countries can be conquered. But the US cannot take over the big Muslim countries like Iran, Turkey, or Pakistan. It must use more limited, political, measures to influence them.

In the event of a steady stream of Islamist terrorist attacks in the US and Western Europe, including a string of massive attacks a la 9/11 or worse, public attitudes towards the conflict and Muslims more generally would change radically. The US would go from being excessively "understanding" towards Muslims to being excessively suspicious and punitive. It is likely that significant barriers would be raised between the West and Muslim countries and life would be made much more difficult for Muslim citizens of the West. The conflict with Islamism would become much more painful and costly to both sides, especially to Muslims. And the war would be a much more important feature of international life than it has been.

Defensive War in Muslim Perception

The Islamist ideological war against the West is an offensive war for control of the world. But it is also a defensive war by Muslims who believe that the West is attacking Islam and that Islam must “fight back.” The Islamist leadership mostly understands the offensive nature of its program but perceptions about a deliberate Western design to weaken or destroy Islam are also a central part of their thinking. There is no hope of convincing them that the West does not want to destroy Islam. They must be fought and defeated.

The alleged “defensiveness” of the Islamist war against the West is not just sophistry or paranoia. Many ordinary Muslims view their religion as being under attack for one or more of the following reasons:

- **Western troops have been fighting Muslims in Arab countries and Afghanistan.** Because the fight against terrorism is more effective if terrorists can be denied safe havens. Therefore there has been Western military intervention to prevent or destroy such havens, and continued presence to prevent their reemergence. But inevitably many Muslims view Western actions to prevent safe havens as an attack on Islam. They draw conclusions about being under attack from the fact that there are Western troops in Muslim countries but no Muslim troops in Western states. Although many Muslims recognize that while the Western troops are fighting Muslims, they are often doing so in support of other Muslims, and in the Balkans fought for Muslims against Christians.
- **Western creation of Israel, a Jewish state, on “formerly Muslim territory.”** It doesn’t matter whether it was the League of Nations or its UN successor that recognized the Jewish right to statehood in the Jewish ancestral homeland. Israel and Judaism are part of the Western (non-Muslim) world, and Israel is living on land that had been Muslim land for many generations. No Western even-handedness between Israel and the Palestinians, or even support for the Palestinian cause, can exculpate Western responsibility for Israel’s existence. This anti-Western Muslim grievance could only be assuaged by Israel’s transformation into a Muslim state.

- **Western attempts to impose “women’s rights” and other Western values on Muslim countries.** While Westerners may not see themselves as having a program to force Muslims to reform their religion, they cannot claim that their policy towards Islam is nothing more than “live and let live.” Much of the West is engaged in a campaign to rights of women and gays and the superiority of liberal democracy – viewed by Muslim as antithetical to their religious precepts and traditional ways of life.
- **Spreading “decadent” Western values (e.g., sexual liberalism) throughout Muslim societies via movies, TV, and other agents of Western culture.** Furthermore, the penetration of “immoral and decadent” Western habits and lifestyles, propagated by the media and entertainment, are widely seen as threatening some of Islam’s core values. This argument does not have the emotional firepower of the cry “Muslims are being killed,” but it has the advantage of being much less ambiguously true. Values that many Muslims see as important parts of Islam are undoubtedly threatened by the West’s example and appeal - as are some Western traditional values.²⁷
- **Islam’s decline and attendant conspiratorial thinking.** The perception of Western aggression can also come from the simple realization of the glaring gap between Islam’s past imperial omnipotence and progress and its unhappy state today, lagging behind much of the world in many key respects. This can lead to the self-pitying question “who could have done this to us?” and the belief that Western enmity must be the cause of Islam’s decline.

Assuaging Muslim Fears of Western Attacks on Islam

The biggest costs of the fight up to now have come from some of the West’s efforts to prevent terrorist safe havens. A different strategy would be to only use measures short of sending Western armies to eliminate safe havens.

The next issue is how Western nations talk about terrorism and the fight against it. Islamists insist that the US is against Islam regardless of what its government says. The question is whether this claim will become more

convincing if the US speaks more realistically about the relationship of Islamism, and certain Islamic ideas, to terrorism.

Presidents Bush and Obama believed that connecting Islamism with terrorism would create too great a danger. Both went out of their way to describe Islam as a religion of peace; and President Obama even directed that no one in the US executive branch would ever mention Islamism or Islam having any connection to terrorist attacks. Thus, for example, When in November 2009 Palestinian-American military psychiatrist Maj. Nadal Hassan murdered thirteen people and wounded forty-three others in a Texas military base to the shouts of “Allahu Akbar,” a Department of Defense report treated the massacre as workplace violence.²⁸ When in August 2014 Hassan wrote to ISIS’ self-styled caliph Abu Bakr Baghdadi requesting “formally and humbly” to become a citizen of his self-proclaimed caliphate,²⁹ the administration remained conspicuously mute.

President Trump, in his May 2017 speech to the summit meeting of 53 Muslim countries in Riyadh, used a bold but somewhat subtle approach to the issue. A major share of the speech was devoted to urging the Muslim leaders he was addressing to act strongly against “terror” and “extremism” and saying that they, the Muslim countries, had a special responsibility to deal with the problem. His greatest emphasis was on urging the Muslim leaders to “drive them out” (violent extremists). The context clearly implied a relationship between Islam and the problem of terrorism but only once did he use the words “Islamist terrorism.” (“That means honestly confronting the crisis of Islamist extremism and the Islamist terror groups it inspires.”) He showed that even speaking to a large audience of Muslim leaders he was unafraid to recognize the cause of the terror. At the same time he was discreet enough to avoid unnecessary offence by using the word “Islamist” in only one sentence. This approach seemed effective in avoiding a major backlash or overt rejection of his position. It is perhaps a demonstration that Western government statements do not have to be logically consistent. They can be clear about the nature of Islamist ideology without leading the center of the Muslim world to feel that the religion of Islam is under attack.

A major obstacle inhibiting the ability to resist the ideological attack by Islamism is the slogan “Islamophobia.” Excessive fear of or prejudicial animosity to Islam and to Muslims should be condemned like other forms of religious, racial, or ethnic prejudice. But the charge of “Islamophobia,” against any criticism of Islam or of Muslims - however specific, true, and relevant – has become the critical political weapon of Islamists and their supporters, widely accepted by academics, the media, and important sectors of political opinion.

To meet the Islamist ideological challenge, Western governments and leaderships need to stop giving legitimacy and help to local Muslim organizations dominated by Islamists like the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), and the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC).

The US government correctly decided to make great efforts to increase understanding and friendly relations with Muslim Americans. Unfortunately it was deceived into working with the wrong Muslim organizations. Over the last 40 years, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups have carried out a massive, well-funded, and successful program of gaining control of the most prominent American Muslim organizations and the major mosques. These organizations used their access to the government and control of mosques to freeze out genuinely moderate Muslims and to brand Muslim dissenters from their line as “Islamophobes.” The British government made the same mistake.

Rejecting Islamists does not mean rejecting anybody who challenges Western policies or deems them antithetical to Muslims. The Islamist ideological war against the West and liberal democracy does not require sacrificing the long American tradition of respecting the right of dissent from government policy. What is needed is a government decision that the Brotherhood and like-minded groups should not be given any kind of support or endorsement by Western governments. The political struggle to correctly identify the organizations that are the enemies of the West must be won before local Muslim communities can have a real choice about who or what they support politically.

While most discussions in the Muslim world pay little attention to facts, there is some rational discourse about international policy that could be affected by official US statements about Islamism. The unfortunate reality is that even if Washington speaks and acts completely rationally and reasonably to protect itself from Islamist terror attacks, many Muslims will see those defensive actions as part of a US and Western attack on Islam. No matter how careful Western governments are to make a distinction between Islamism and the religion of Islam, most Muslims will interpret US actions against Islamism as attacks on Islam.

Speaking carefully may help but it cannot be relied on to succeed. It is not clear how much such talk actually affects Muslim behavior. Avoiding actions against Islamists and terrorists for fear of being seen as anti-Islam can't go too far without crippling security and giving the impression that the West is scared and vulnerable. Western decisions about protecting itself against Islamism's attack are more important than what Western governments say about Islamism and its war.

Notes

- 1 For the history of Islamism and related terms see Chapter 5 of Martin Kramer's *The War on Error* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2016).
- 2 The best discussions of Islamist ideology can be found in the journal *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, published by Hudson Institute.
- 3 Christine Douglas-Williams's *The Challenge of Modernizing Islam* (New York: Encounter Books, 2017) contains interviews and reports on eight Muslims who reject Islamism's view of Islam in different ways.
- 4 Daniel Pipes, "Distinguishing between Islam and Islamism," Center for Strategic and International Studies, June 30, 1998. See also Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), Chapter 3.
- 5 Sayyid Qutb, *Milestones* (New Delhi: Islamic Book Service, 2001), especially Chapter 5.
- 6 "There is only one place on earth which can be called the home of Islam (Dar al-Islam), and it is that place where the Islamic state is established and the Shari'a is the authority...The rest of the world is the home of hostility (Dar al-Harb). A muslim can have only two possible relations with Dar al-Harb: peace with a contractual agreement, or war"- Qutb, *Milestones*, p. 118.
- 7 Irshad Manji, *The Trouble with Islam: A Wake Up Call for Honesty and Change* (Toronto: Penguin Random House of Canada, 2003).
- 8 Uriya Shavit, *Islamism and the West: From "Cultural Attack" to "Missionary Migrant"*, Routledge 2013; Efraim Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism: A History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013; rev. ed.), Chapter 12.
- 9 See, for example, Raymond Ibrahim, "The Muslim Brotherhood: Origins, Efficacy, and Reach," *World Watch Monitor*, July 4, 2013.
- 10 Salafism is a stream of Islam based on the idea that authentic Islam is the faith as it was practiced by the first few generations after Muhammad (the Salaf). Wahhabism is a particular school within Salafism based on the teaching of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab - an 18th century religious preacher and ideologue from the Najd region of Arabia. All Wahhabis are Salafists, but not all Salafists are Wahhabis.

- 11 See, for example, Uriya Shavit and Frederic Wiesenbach, "Muslim Strategies to Convert Western Christians," *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2009, pp. 3-14; Daniel Pipes, "No Saudi Money for American Mosques," *The Hill*, August 22, 2016.
- 12 See, for example, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations*, (London: KPI, 1985), pp. 13-23, 31, 48-49, 127; Farhad Rajaei, *Islamic Values and World View: Khomeini on Man, the State and International Politics* (Lanham: Universities of America Press, 1983), pp. 82-83.
- 13 Yaroslav Trofimov, *The Siege of Mecca: The 1979 Uprising of Islam's Holiest Shrine* (New York: Anchor Books, 2007).
- 14 ISIS was also rejected by Sunni al-Azhar University and its leading scholar Yusuf Qaradawi. Some ISIS members responded by calling for the killing of Qaradawi and other prominent clerics.
- 15 While guerrilla forces can cause great difficulties to a high quality army which is trying to govern a territory, such forces cannot stand in battle against, or protect a government from conquest by, a good modern army which does not have to defend a local population.
- 16 After overthrowing the Taliban in 2001, the US adopted the goal of creating a reasonably democratic government to rule Afghanistan, something that proved beyond its capacity as the country is torn by regional, ethnic and religious groups that have historically resisted central control, and because there was no basis in Afghan history or politics that could be built on to create an effective national government.
- 17 "Bernard Lewis in *Jerusalem Post* - Muslims 'about to take over Europe,'" *Jerusalem Post*, January 30, 2007.
- 18 According to a recent Pew survey, Europe's Muslim communities (roughly 5% of the total population) could more than double between now and 2050 if migration to the continent continues at medium or high levels. Pew Research Center, "Europe's Muslim population will continue to grow - but how much depends on migration," December 4, 2017.
- 19 Uriya Shavit, *Islamism and the West: From "Cultural Attack" to "Missionary Migrant"* (London: Routledge, 2014).
- 20 Eran Lerman, "The game of camps: Ideological fault lines in the wreckage of the Arab state system," *Mideast Security and Policy Studies* No. 124, The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, 2016.
- 21 See, for example, Michael Rubin, "Shifting Sides? The Problems of Neo-Ottomanism," *National Review Online*, August 10, 2004; Burak Bekdil, "Turkish

- Sultan's New Grand Vizier: What is his Main Goal?" *Gatestone Institute*, May 24, 2016; Ilias I. Kouskouvelis, "The Problem with Turkey's 'Zero Problems'," *Middle East Quarterly*, Winter 2013, pp. 47-56.
- 22 Qutb, *Milestones*, p. 118.
- 23 I elaborated on this issue at some length in my *History of the Future* (Lanham MD: Lexington Books, 2011), Ch. 5.
- 24 *Ibid.*
- 25 In an interview with *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* entitled "End of Islamism and the Future of Tunisia" (Hudson Institute, April 2016), Said Ferjani explains how the Islamist Ennahdha party of Tunisia came to recognize the Muslim need to modernize by distinguishing between the political and the personal spheres. It illustrates one of the ways this transition can be made.
- 26 See, for example, Karsh, *Islamic Imperialism: A History*; Elie Kedourie, *Islam in the modern world and other studies* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981); Bernard Lewis, *What went wrong? The clash between Islam and modernity in the Middle East* (New York: Perennial, 2003); Ira M. Lapidus, *Islam and Modernity* (London: Frances Pinter, 1987); Muhammad Khalid Masud, Armando Salvatore, and Martin van Bruinessen (eds.), *Islam and modernity: key issues and debates* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).
- 27 "Disco is the new Crusader - Roots and systemization of the cultural attack," in Shavit, *Islamism and the West*.
- 28 "Protecting the Force: Lessons from Fort Hood," DoD Independent Review Related to Fort Hood, January 2010, D-2.
- 29 Chelsea J. Carter, "Fort Hood Shooter writes to Isis leader, asks to become 'citizen' of Islamic state," *CNN*, August 29, 2014.

Recent BESA Center Publications

Mideast Security and Policy Studies

- No. 125 Medium-Intensity Threats: The Case for Beefed-Up IDF Ground Forces, *Eado Hecht and Eitan Shamir*, October 2016 (English, online only), March 2017 (Hebrew)
- No. 126 The Libyan Tragedy and Its Meaning: The Wages of Indecision, *Eran Lerman*, December 2016
- No. 127 North Korea and the Middle East, *Alon Levkowitz*, January 2017
- No. 128 The IDF's Small Wars, *Efraim Inbar ed.*, February 2017 (Hebrew)
- No. 129 Israel's Inelegant Options in Judea and Samaria, *Yaakov Amidror*, February 2017 (Hebrew), April 2017 (English)
- No. 130 The Kurds in a Volatile Middle East, *Ofra Bengio*, February 2017
- No. 131 Qatar: The Limits of Nouveau Riche Diplomacy, *Gil Feiler and Hayim Zeev*, April 2017
- No. 132 Are Lone Wolves Really Acting Alone? The Wave of Terror 2015- 2008, *Shaul Bartal and Hillel Frisch*, May 2017 (Hebrew) - online only
- No. 133 Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and the New Regional Landscape, *Joshua Teitelbaum, ed.*, May 2017
- No. 134 Rethinking the Six-Day War, *Efraim Karsh, Gabriel Glickman, and Efraim Inbar*, June 2017
- No. 135 Washington and Moscow: Confrontation or Cooperation? *Jiri Valenta and Leni Friedman Valenta*, June 2017
- No. 136 Foreign Investment in Israel's Strategic Industries, *Efraim Chalamish*, July 2017
- No. 137 A Dense Triangle: Israel, Hamas-Gaza and the Palestinian Authority, *Hillel Frisch*, August 2017 (Hebrew)
- No. 138 The Low-Profile War Between Israel and Hezbollah, *Yaakov Lappin*, August 2017
- No. 139 Greece, Israel, and China's "Belt and Road» Initiative, *George Tzogopoulos*, October 2017
- No. 140 Arabs and Turks Welcomed the Balfour Declaration, *Efraim Karsh*, November 2017
- No. 141 Schoolbooks of the Palestinian Authority (PA): The Attitude to the Jews, to Israel and to Peace, *Arnon Groiss and Ronni Shaked Arnon Groiss*, December 2017 (Hebrew)
- No. 142 Conflicting Interests: Tehran and the National Aspirations of the Iraqi Kurds, *Doron Itzchakov*, December 2017
- No. 143 Russia's Strategic Advantage in the Baltics: A Challenge to NATO? *Jiri Valenta and Leni Friedman Valenta*, January 2018
- No. 144 Surviving Donald Trump: Israel's Strategic Options, *Louis René Beres*, February 2018
- No. 145 Militant Islam's War Against the West, *Max Singer*, March 2018

Policy Memoranda

- No. 7 The Gaza War, 2014 – Initial Assessment, *Efraim Inbar and Amir Rapaport*, December 2014 (Hebrew)
- No. 8 Perfect Storm in the Middle East, *Yaakov Amidror*, June 2015 (Hebrew), July 2015 (English)
- No. 9 Israel-Greece Relations, *Arye Mekel*, September 2015 (Hebrew)
- No. 10 Space Wars, *Aby Har-Even*, May 2016 (Hebrew)

Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy

- No. 28 The IDF Force Structure (Hebrew) May 2014
- No. 29 Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations: Where to? (Hebrew) August 2014
- No. 30 IDF Challenges (Hebrew) August 2016