The Radicalization of the Israeli Arabs

Efraim Karsh
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© The Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University
Ramat Gan 5290002 Israel
Tel. 972-3-5318959
Fax. 972-3-5359195
office@besacenter.org
www.besacenter.org

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# The Radicalization of the Israeli Arabs

## Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Executive Summary</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zionism’s socioeconomic delusion</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel’s Arab citizens: How deprived are they?</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radicalization and its consequences</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The road to the May 2021 insurrection</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The May 2021 riots by the Israeli Arabs, like their October 2000 precursor, were not an act of social protest but a nationalist/Islamist insurrection in support of an external attack. It was not socioeconomic grievances that drove the Israeli Arabs to wreak wanton violence on their Jewish compatriots for the second time in 20 years but the growing radicalization attending the decades-long betterment of their socioeconomic condition.

If in the 1950s and the early 1960s, when the Israeli Arabs’ socioeconomic condition was at its lowest, there were hardly any manifestations of political, nationalist, or religious dissidence among them, the more prosperous, affluent, better educated, and politically aware they became, the greater their leadership’s incitement against their state of citizenship—to the point where many ordinary Arabs have come to openly challenge their minority existence in the Jewish State. Hence the October 2000 uprising after a decade that saw government allocations to Arab municipalities grow by 550% and the number of Arab civil servants nearly treble, and hence the far more violent May 2021 insurrection—after yet another decade of massive government investment in the Arab sector, including a NIS15 billion ($3.84 billion) socioeconomic aid program.

Of course, many Israeli Arabs would still be content to get on with their lives and take advantage of the freedoms and opportunities afforded by Israel, no matter how much they might resent their minority status in a Jewish state. Yet from the onset of the Arab-Israeli conflict a century ago, Palestinian Arab society has always comprised militant segments sufficiently large to allow its perennially extremist leadership to sway the silent majority into repeated disasters. As a British commission
of enquiry headed by Lord Peel observed as early as 1937: “We have found that, though the Arabs have benefited by the development of the country owing to Jewish immigration, this has had no conciliatory effect. On the contrary, improvement of the economic situation in Palestine has meant the deterioration of the political situation.”

Just as Hajj Amin Husseini and Yasser Arafat immersed their hapless subjects in disastrous conflicts that culminated in their collective undoing and continued statelessness in total disregard of the massive material gains attending Arab-Jewish coexistence, so Israel’s Arab leaders used their constituents’ vast socioeconomic progress over the past decades as a vehicle of radicalization rather than moderation.

In this respect, the participation of the Islamist Ra’am party in the motley ruling coalition established after the May 2021 riots signifies the continuation of this dangerous trend rather than the growing Israelization of the country’s Arab community. Unlike the participation of the now-defunct United Arab List (not to be confused with today’s Joint List) in the 1974-77 Labor-led governments, let alone the participation of Labor and Likud Arab ministers and deputy ministers in successive governments, which implied acquiescence to Israel’s Jewish nature, Ra’am’s participation is an opportunistic ploy to strengthen the position of the Arab sector, especially Ra’am’s predominantly Bedouin constituency, vis-à-vis the state without accepting its legitimacy. And while Ra’am will undoubtedly be able to extort far-reaching short-term gains that will further erode Israel’s sovereignty and governability over its Arab minority, this development is bound to backfire in grand style by intensifying Arab radicalization and Jewish frustration, which will put the two communities on a collision course before too long.
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INTRODUCTION

In May 2021, while Hamas was raining some 4,000 rockets and missiles down on Israel’s towns and villages, Israeli Jews were horrified as their Arab compatriots unleashed a tidal wave of violence in support of the terror organization’s assault on their joint state. For two full weeks, the cities of Jaffa, Haifa, Acre, Ramla, and Lod, among others—long considered showcases of Arab-Jewish coexistence—were rocked by mass rioting and vandalism. Synagogues and religious seminaries were torched and Torah scrolls desecrated. Cars were stoned and burned, private establishments were ransacked, and transportation arteries were blocked, cutting off Jewish localities. Rampaging mobs wielding iron bars, Molotov cocktails, stones, and even firearms roamed the streets in search of Jewish victims. Jewish residents were attacked in their homes, at times with firearms, by Arab neighbors with whom they had coexisted peacefully for decades. When hundreds of Jewish families fled the cities in fear for their lives, their homes were swiftly plundered and ravaged.

Reluctant to acknowledge this volcanic eruption for what it is and what it portends—a nationalist/Islamist insurrection rejecting Arab minority status in the Jewish state—the Israeli media, the chattering classes, and many politicians attributed the uptick in violence to the supposed longstanding discrimination and marginalization of the Arab minority. “Since Israel’s establishment there existed an inbuilt inequality between the Jewish and the Arab sectors,” lamented newly appointed minister of internal security Omer Barlev. “And this inequality has increased over time due to the rapid development of the Jewish sector and the immobility of the Arab sector.”

Efraim Karsh is Director of the BESA Center for Strategic Studies, Emeritus Professor of Middle East and Mediterranean Studies at King’s College London, and editor of Middle East Quarterly.
This conventional wisdom couldn’t be further from the truth for the simple reason that the riots came after a decade of unprecedented government investment in the Arab sector, just as the October 2000 riots by the Israeli Arabs came on the heels of a decade-long integration of the Arab minority into Israel’s socioeconomic fabric.

In the modern world, socioeconomic progress has never been a recipe for political moderation and inter-communal coexistence but has rather been superseded by nationalist, religious, and xenophobic extremism. So it has been with the Palestinian Arabs and Israel’s Arab citizens, whose political extremism and propensity for violence, from the days of the British mandate (1920-48) to date, have intensified in tandem with improvement in their socioeconomic lot. As a British commission of enquiry headed by Lord Peel observed as early as 1937: “We have found that, though the Arabs have benefited by the development of the country owing to Jewish immigration, this has had no conciliatory effect. On the contrary, improvement of the economic situation in Palestine has meant the deterioration of the political situation.”

**ZIONISM’S SOCIOECONOMIC DELUSION**

From its earliest days, the Zionist leadership, dominated for first three quarters of the 20th century by the Labor movement, held the hope that the vast economic gains attending the Jewish national revival would ameliorate the hostility of the local Arab populace and make it permanently reconciled, if not positively well disposed, to the idea of Jewish self-determination.

As early as 1915, the 29-year-old political activist David Ben-Gurion argued that “the Hebrew settlement is not designed to undermine the position of the Arab community; on the contrary, it will salvage it from its economic misery, lift it from its social decline, and rescue it from physical and moral degeneration. Our revival in the Land of Israel will come through the country’s regeneration, that is: the renaissance of its Arab inhabitants.” In December 1947, shortly after the Palestinian Arabs had initiated a violent effort to subvert the UN resolution partitioning Mandatory Palestine into two states, Ben-Gurion, soon to become Israel’s first prime minister, argued that despite appearances
of implacable enmity, “If the Arab citizen will feel at home in our state and his status will not be in the least different from that of the Jewish citizen… if the state will help him in a truthful and dedicated way to reach the economic, social, and cultural level of the Jewish community, then Arab distrust will correspondingly subside and a bridge will be built to a Semitic, Jewish-Arab alliance.”

Five decades later, Ben-Gurion’s foremost disciple, Shimon Peres, still espoused this hopeful outlook. In his acceptance speech upon receiving the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize, the then-foreign minister presented Israel’s economic, technological, and educational prowess as the key not only to Palestinian-Israeli peace but to the advent of a “New Middle East” that would serve as “a spiritual and cultural focal point for the entire world”:

In the Middle East most adults are impoverished and wretched. A new scale of priorities is needed, with weapons on the bottom rung and a regional market economy at the top. Most inhabitants of the region—more than 60%—are under the age of eighteen. A new future can be offered to them. Israel has computerized its education and has achieved excellent results. Education can be computerized throughout the Middle East, allowing young people to progress not just from grade to grade, but from generation to generation. Israel’s role in the Middle East should be to contribute to a great, sustained regional revival.

When this pipe dream collapsed six years later amid a horrendous war of terror waged by Peres’s “peace partner” and co-recipient of the Nobel Prize, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat, an official Israeli state commission of inquiry headed by deputy chief justice Theodore Orr, appointed to investigate the mass riots launched by Israel’s Arab citizens in support of this terror war, ascribed the rampaging to the Arab community’s supposed socioeconomic deprivation in the Jewish state. “The state and successive generations of its government have failed to address in a comprehensive and deep fashion the difficult problems created by the existence of a large Arab minority inside the Jewish state,” read the
commission’s report. “Government handling of the Arab sector has been primarily neglectful and discriminatory. The establishment did not show sufficient sensitivity to the needs of the Arab sector, and did not do enough to give this sector its equal share of state resources.”

Even Ze’ev Jabotinsky, the founding father of the branch of Zionism that was the forebear of today’s Likud party, who maintained that Arab acquiescence in the Jewish national revival would only follow upon the establishment of an impregnable Jewish “Iron Wall,” overestimated the importance of the socioeconomic factor for Arab-Jewish reconciliation once the Arabs had disabused themselves of the hope to destroy the Jewish national home. Asked by the Peel commission whether he still subscribed to the view that “on a long view the Jewish village cannot prosper unless the Arab village prospers with it,” he replied: “Yes. I think on the whole it is true and I think Palestine, such as I dream of it, should be a country of very happy Arabs.... When we shall become a majority and make the country rich and develop all its possibilities and utilize all its resources, then it will be a prosperity in which the Arabs will be happy.” Meir Grossman, Jabotinsky’s right-hand man, put the matter in similar terms. “It is nonsense to say that we want to keep the Arabs down,” he stated. “It is in the interests of the Jews that the Arab population should rise from its present low economic level, become a prosperous element, and thus make possible the development of trade and industry on a large scale.”

The historical record doesn’t support this thesis. During the Mandate years (1920-48), for example, the inflow of Jewish people and capital revived Palestine’s moribund condition and raised the well-being and standard of living of its Arab residents well above that of the neighboring Arab states. The expansion of Arab industry and agriculture, especially in the field of citrus-growing, Palestine’s foremost export product, was largely financed by the capital thus obtained; and Jewish know-how did much to improve Arab cultivation methods. As a result, Arab-owned citrus plantations grew six-fold in 1919-39 as did vegetable-growing lands, while the number of olive groves quadrupled and that of vineyards increased threefold.
More broadly, the vast expansion of the country’s public infrastructure attending the Jewish national revival—from health services, to water supply and sanitation, to reclamation and anti-malaria work, among other fields—slashed Arab mortality and led to the doubling of the Arab population after decades of steady decline. Life expectancy among Muslims rose from 37.5 years in 1926-27 to 50 in 1942-44 (compared to 33 in Egypt), while child mortality was reduced by 34% in the first year of age, by 57% in the third, and by 67% in the fifth. Malaria, which in 1918 killed 68 of 1,000 people in the Beit Jibrin region alone, was effectively eradicated, with three people in the entire country dying of the disease in 1942. Small wonder that the largest increases in Arab population took place in localities where Jewish development was most pronounced: in Haifa, the Arab population grew by 86% in 1925-31; in Jaffa by 62%; and in Jerusalem by 37%. By contrast, in purely Arab towns such as Nablus and Hebron, population growth was only 7%, and in Gaza there was a 2% decrease.

Yet rather than promote Arab-Jewish coexistence, these vast socioeconomic gains served to fuel Arab extremism. Having inculcated its constituents with an abiding hatred for their Jewish compatriots, the Palestinian Arab leadership, headed from the early 1920s to the late 1940s by Mufti of Jerusalem Hajj Amin Husseini, unleashed repeated waves of anti-Jewish violence—in 1920, 1921, 1929, and 1936-39. These culminated in the 1947-48 genocidal attempt to destroy Palestine’s Jewish community and to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state—leading to the collapse and dispersal of Palestinian Arab society.

**Israel’s Arab Citizens: How Deprived Are They?**

Just as socioeconomic considerations had no moderating impact on the Palestinian Arab leadership’s desire to destroy the Jewish national cause, so too have they failed to reconcile Israel’s Arab citizens to their minority status in the Jewish State. Quite the reverse, in fact. Following in the footsteps of their Mandatory Palestine predecessors, the Israeli Arabs’ radicalization intensified in tandem with their vast material progress. If in the 1950s and the early 1960s, when their socioeconomic condition was at its lowest, there were hardly any manifestations of political,
nationalist, or religious dissidence among the Israeli Arabs, the latter part of the 1970s saw the onset of annual waves of violent protest (the so-called “Land Days”) by the much better off Arab community. These escalated into an open uprising in October 2000—after a decade that saw government allocations to Arab municipalities grow by 550% and the number of Arab civil servants nearly treble. It then spiraled into a far more violent insurrection in May 2021—after yet another decade of massive government investment in the Arab sector, including a NIS15 billion ($3.84 billion) socioeconomic aid program.

The scope and quality of the socioeconomic progress made by Israel’s Arab citizens over the past 73 years cannot be overstated. The end of the 1948 war found the Palestinian-Arab community profoundly shattered, with only 158,000 of the 750,000 Arab residents of the territory that came to be Israel staying put through the hostilities. But these numbers did not stay low for long. Thanks to remarkable fertility rates, greatly reduced mortality, and the return of tens of thousands of refugees under the terms of Israel’s family reunification program, the proportion of Arabs grew steadily over the decades. By the end of 2019, Israel’s Arab minority had leapt twelve-fold in number to over 1.9 million, or 21% of the state’s total population (compared to 17.8% at Israel’s establishment).

Far from lagging behind, the rate of development of Israel’s Arab citizens has often surpassed that of their Jewish compatriots, with the result that the gap between the two communities has steadily narrowed. Thus, for example, mortality rates among Israeli Arabs have fallen by over two-thirds since Israel’s establishment while life expectancy has increased 30 years, reaching 80 in 2019 (women 81.9, men 78.1). This improvement is all the more remarkable when compared to that of the Jewish majority: if at the end of the 1940s the life expectancy of Israeli Arabs was 15 years lower than that of their Jewish counterparts, by the 1970s the gap had narrowed to two to four years and has remained virtually unchanged since then (3.45 years in 2019).

Not only does this compare favorably with the Arab and Muslim worlds, but Israeli Arabs can expect to live as long Americans (80.4) and longer than the average EU citizen (77.6). Thanks to Israel’s medical and health education programs, infant mortality rates have similarly been
slashed: from 56 per 1,000 live births in 1950 to 5.6 in 2019—slightly above the US mortality rate (5.2 deaths/1,000 live births) and much lower than that of Arab and Muslim states (in Algeria, for example, it is 24.9 deaths/1,000 live births; in Iraq 20.1; in Egypt 18.2; in Iran 15.1; in Indonesia 20.2, etc.).

No less remarkable have been the advances in education, with the number of Arab schoolchildren growing more than forty-fold since Israel’s establishment, over three times the rate of the Arab population’s growth. In 1961, fewer than half of Israeli Arab children attended school, with the average child having just one year of schooling. By 2019, virtually all Arab children attended school (a slightly higher rate than their Jewish compatriots—96.4% vs. 94.9%) with the average child having 12 years of schooling. The rise was particularly dramatic among Arab women, who received virtually no school education in 1961 and are today equally, indeed better, educated than their male counterparts. In 1970–2000, for example, the proportion of women with more than eight years of schooling rose nearly seven-fold (from 9% to 59%), and by 2002 there were more Arab girls than boys enrolled in high school education (89% vs. 83%). By the end of the decade, younger Israeli Arab women had become more educated than their male counterparts (31% vs. 28% with 13 years of study or more).

Nor do Jewish schools enjoy better operational conditions than their Arab counterparts. Both study in similarly congested classes (26.3 students in primary education in the Jewish sector vs. 26.4 in the Arab sector in 2018-19) and have a similar student/teacher ratio (11.8. students per teacher in Arab primary schools vs. 11.9 in the Jewish sector). Likewise, the level of Arab and Jewish entitlement to matriculation certificate grew almost identically over the past two decades (from 45.3% to 63.4% and from 63.9% to 80.1% respectively), with both groups performing at a similar level at the top rung of the matriculation exams (the so-called “five study units”). Thus, for example, while a higher percentage of Jewish students obtained top-level certificates in English, mathematics, and computer science (62.3% vs. 34.4%, 24.2% vs. 15.6%, and 12.2% vs. 6.7% respectively), a higher ratio of Arab students got top-level certificates in biology, chemistry, and physics (35.7% vs. 17.4%, 26.2% vs., 8.5%, and 15.6% vs. 15.4% respectively).
These achievements were further underscored by the seemingly higher level of teaching in the Arab sector. In 2019-20, for example, the level of Arab primary school teachers’ compatibility to a number of key subjects was much higher than their Jewish counterparts: 56.1% vs. 20.5% in mathematics; 69.8% vs. 40.1% in English; and 48.2% vs. 13.1% in Hebrew. And while this gap was substantially reduced in higher secondary education, Arab teachers’ compatibility to taught subjects remained higher: 78% vs. 66.8% in mathematics; 81.1% vs. 54.85% in English, and 63.9% vs. 60.3% in Hebrew.20

No less dramatic has been the story in higher education where the numbers of Arab graduates multiplied 15 times between 1961 and 2001. And while the pace slowed in the first decades of the 2000s, it was nevertheless highly impressive: a threefold increase from 1999-2000 through 2017-18, nearly doubling the relative share of Arab students in the total student population, from 8.3% to 16%. In certain fields, the relative ratio of Arab students is higher than that of their Jewish counterparts. Particularly notable are paramedic studies and education and teacher training, where Arab students comprise about a third of the first degree studentship—way above their relative share of the country’s population. Other hitherto neglected fields of study saw breathtaking growth in Arab students over the past two decades—from an eight-fold leap in business and management science (from 2% in 1999-00 to 17% in 2017-18), to nearly a three-fold leap in social sciences (from 6% to 15%) and a two-fold increase in engineering as well as in natural sciences and mathematics. In 2015, some 31.7% of the total Arab population had post-secondary and higher education.21

What about the Israeli Arabs’ standard of living? In the late 1940s, following the flight of its more affluent classes and the breakdown of economic relations with neighboring Arab states, the Arab minority in Israel was left largely impoverished. As they became increasingly incorporated into local economic life, Arabs experienced a steep rise in earnings and a visible improvement in their material circumstances. By the early 2000s, more Arabs than Jews owned the dwellings they lived in—91.5% vs. 68.6% in 2000; 82.3% vs. 70.4% in 2008; 87.6% vs. 69% in 2018—with housing density in the Arab sector dropping sharply (e.g., the percentage of four-plus persons per room fell from 11% in
1984 to 0.8% in 2009) and Arab ownership of key durable goods often surpassing its Jewish counterpart. In 2018, for example, 99.9% of Arab households owned refrigerators compared to 99.8% of Jewish households. The same applied to deep freezers (45.4% vs. 21.4%); washing machines (98% vs. 96.3%); televisions (97.2% vs. 86.2%); two cellular phones or more (86.1% vs. 74.7%); at least one car (74.6% vs. 72.6%); and electric scooters (4.9% vs. 3%).  

Contrary to the standard image of cramped neighborhoods and acute land shortages, population density in Arab localities is substantially lower on average than in equivalent Jewish locales. While Jewish neighborhoods in central Israel, where most of the country’s population lives, are hopelessly congested—27,847 persons per square kilometer in B’nei Brak; 18,703 in Giv’atayim 15,765 in Bat Yam, 10,301 in Holon, and 8,894 in Tel Aviv, among other places—the urban Arab population in the same area enjoys a much more spacious existence: 2,325 persons per square kilometer in Taibe; 1,894 in Tira; 2,162 in Umm Fahm; and so on. Even the Galilean city of Nazareth, Israel’s largest and most congested Arab locality, has a population density of 5,465—less than a fifth of its Jewish equivalent.  

As for income statistics, it is undeniable that, on average, Israeli Arabs still earn less than Jews. But to what is this attributable? For one thing, the average Muslim in Israel is 8.5 years younger than his or her Jewish counterpart; all over the world, younger people earn less. For another thing, far fewer Arab women enter the labor market than do Jewish women (e.g., 25% vs. 64% in 2016), with the attendant lower family income. The salience of these and other factors—family size, level of schooling, cultural tradition, and so forth—may be judged by looking at segments of Israeli Jewish society like the ultraorthodox (Haredi) or residents of development towns (localities established during the 1950s and 1960s to absorb the fresh waves of Jewish immigration, mainly from Arab and Muslim countries), whose income levels more closely resemble those in the Arab sector.

Consider for example the earning situation in Arab Nazareth and the mostly Jewish Upper Nazareth (renamed Nof Hagalil in 2019). While the average monthly salary in Nazareth is lower than in Nof Hagalil
(NIS6,788 vs. NIS7,751 in 2018), average self-employed monthly earnings there are higher: NIS9,338 vs. NIS9,228. No less important, income inequality was lower in Arab Nazareth than in Jewish Nof Hagalil: 0.4 vs. 0.41 on the Income Gini coefficient (a value of 0 represents absolute equality, a value of 1 absolute inequality).  

Similarly, in 2003-13 the average monthly salaries of Arab teachers grew by 66%, compared to a 62% increase in Jewish state schools and 57% in Jewish religious and Haredi schools, putting their remuneration on a par with the religious sector and far above those in the Haredi sector (NIS10,313 vs. NIS7,686 in 2013). In primary education, salaries of Arab school managers were higher than those of their Jewish counterparts (NIS22,722 vs. NIS22,217 in 2012) and far higher than those in the Haredi sector (NIS22,722 vs. NIS18,044).  

Nor has the government given short shrift to the economic needs of the Arab sector. Allocations to Arab municipalities have grown steadily over the past decades and are now on a par with, if not higher than, subsidies to the Jewish sector. By the mid-1990s, Arab municipalities were receiving about a quarter of all such allocations, above the ratio of Arabs in Israel’s overall population, and their relative growth has continued to date.

In numerous cases, contributions to Arab municipal budgets substantially exceed contributions to equivalently situated and sized Jewish locales, let alone the larger and more established Jewish cities where government allocations amount to a fraction of the municipal budget. In 2018, for example, relative disbursements to the Arab towns of Umm Fahm, Kafr Qassem, Arabeh, Qalansawa, and Tamra were 1.5 times higher than to development and/or Haredi towns (e.g., Beit Shean, Beit Shemesh, Ofakim, Dimona, Bne’i Brak), twice as high as those to lower middle class Jewish towns (e.g., Eilat, Ashdod, Bat Yam, Or Akiva), and nearly four times higher than to more affluent Jewish towns (Ramat Hasharon, Raanana, Kfar Saba, Giv’at Shmuel, Hod Hasharon, Qiryat Ono).  

The state’s efforts to improve the Arab sector’s socioeconomic lot gained considerable momentum in the 2010s. Manifested in a string of
government decisions—from a five-year plan for the economic development of 12 localities comprising a quarter of Israel’s Arab population (2010), to two multi-annual plans for the development and empowerment of the Druze and Circassian sectors (2011, 2016), to four plans for the development of the Bedouin community (2011, 2016, 2017), to a plan for improving personal safety in the Arab sector (2016)—this affirmative action reached its peak on December 30, 2015 in the form of Government Decision 922. This authorized a NIS15 billion ($3.84) five-year socioeconomic development plan in the fields of education and higher education; public infrastructure and transportation; commerce and industry; employment; health; public security; sports and culture; construction and housing; and municipal, social, welfare, and community services.

**Radicalization and Its Consequences**

As noted, not only did the vast improvement in the Israeli Arabs’ socioeconomic condition fail to reconcile them to their minority status in the Jewish State but the more prosperous, affluent, and better educated they became, the greater their leadership’s incitement against their state of citizenship to the point where many ordinary Arabs came to openly challenge the fundamental principles underpinning Israel’s very existence.

The process began with the June 1967 War, which brought the Israeli Arabs into renewed direct contact with both their West Bank and Gaza brothers and the wider Arab world. Family and social contacts broken in 1948 were restored, and a diverse network of social, economic, cultural, and political relations was formed. For the first time since 1948, Israeli Muslims were allowed by Arab states to participate in the sacred pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, thus breaking an unofficial ostracism and restoring a sense of self-esteem and pan-Arab belonging—and encouraging a correlative degree of estrangement from Israel.

Six years later came the October 1973 war, shattering Israel’s image as an invincible military power and tarnishing its international reputation. One result was quickly felt on the local political scene. During the 1950s and 1960s, most Arab voters had given their support to Israel’s
The Radicalization of the Israeli Arabs

ruling Labor party and/or a string of associated Arab lists. This had already begun to change by 1969, when Raqaḥ, a predominantly Arab communist party and a champion of radical anti-Israelism, made its successful electoral debut. By 1973, in elections held three months after the October war, Raqaḥ (or Hadash, as it was later renamed) had become the dominant party in the Arab sector, winning 37% of the vote; four years later, it totally eclipsed its rivals with 51% of Arab ballots cast. By the late 1990s, things had moved so far in an anti-Israel direction that many Arabs, apparently finding Raqaḥ/Hadash too tame, were shifting their allegiance to newer and still more militant parties.32

Things came to a head on March 30, 1976 in the form of mass riots in protest against the government’s announced intention to appropriate some 5,000 acres of the Galilee for development. Though most of the land was owned by either the state or private Jewish individuals, the announcement triggered a wave of violence that ended in the deaths of six Arab rioters and the wounding of dozens more. “Land Day,” as the disturbances came to be known, was thenceforth commemorated annually in renewed and increasingly violent demonstrations, often in collaboration with the PLO and its political affiliates in the West Bank.33

Meanwhile the “Palestinization” of the Israeli Arabs continued apace. In February 1978, scores of Palestinian intellectuals signed a public statement urging the establishment of a Palestinian state. A year later, Israeli Arab students openly endorsed the PLO as “the sole representative of the Palestinian people, including the Israeli Arabs,” voicing support for the organization’s pursuit of the “armed struggle” (the standard euphemism for terrorist attacks), indeed for its commitment to Israel’s destruction.34

By then, extremist politics and violence had become institutionalized, with the PLO funneling funds to Arab bodies and institutions in Israel and Israeli Arabs increasingly implicated in the sale of weapons and explosives to terrorist organizations in the territories.35 December 1987 saw the outbreak of the first widespread Palestinian uprising (intifada) in the West Bank and Gaza. Showing their support for their brethren in the territories, Israeli Arabs committed acts of vandalism (burning for-
ests, stoning private cars, destroying agricultural crops and equipment) and launched armed attacks on Jews within Israel proper. In the course of two years, the number of such individual attacks rose sharply from 69 (in 1987) to 187 (in 1989), and acts of sedition from 101 to 353.

If the intifada years (1987-93) strained Arab–Jewish relations within Israel to their limits (till then), the Rabin government’s delusional embarkation on the Oslo “peace process” in September 1993 took this radicalization to unprecedented heights. In recognizing the PLO as “the representative of the Palestinian people,” Israel effectively endorsed the organization’s claim of authority over a fifth of its citizens and gave it carte blanche to interfere in its domestic affairs. Such a concession would be a sure recipe for trouble even under the most amicable of arrangements; made to an irredentist party still officially committed to the destruction of its “peace partner,” it proved nothing short of catastrophic. If in the mid-1970s less than half of Israeli Arabs defined themselves as Palestinians and one in two repudiated Israel’s right to exist, by 1999 more than two-thirds of them identified as Palestinians and four out of five repudiated Israel’s right to exist.36

From the moment of his arrival in Gaza in July 1994, Arafat set out to make the most of what Israel had handed him, indoctrinating not only the residents of the territories but also the Israeli Arabs with an ineradicable hatred of Israel, Jews, and Judaism. His intention was made clear as early as his welcoming speech, which smeared his new peace partner with extensive references to “The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” and ended with a pledge to “liberate” Israel’s Arab citizens from their alleged subjugation. “I am saying it clearly and loudly to all our brothers, from the Negev to the Galilee,” Arafat proclaimed, “and let me quote Allah’s words: ‘We desired to be gracious to those that were abased in the land, and to make them leaders, and to make them the inheritors, and to establish them in the land.’”37 Within a month of his arrival in Gaza, Arafat had secretly ordered the extension of the Palestinian Authority’s activities to Israel’s Arabs, allocating $10 million in initial funding (in addition to $20-25 million for real estate purchases in Jerusalem) and appointing Ahmad Tibi, his political adviser and an Israeli citizen, to head the subversive operation.38 In subsequent years, PLO and PA interference in Israel’s domestic affairs would range from
mediation of internal Arab disputes, to outright attempts to influence the outcome of Israeli elections, to the spread of vile propaganda calling for Israel’s destruction.

In a Knesset debate on September 21, 1993, a week after the euphoric signing of the Oslo I Accord on the White House loan, Likud MK Benny Begin warned of the agreement’s likely radicalization of the Israeli Arabs and made an impassioned plea for restraint: “I urge Israel’s non-Jewish citizens in Wadi Ara, the Galilee, and Acre to understand that this agreement will plunge us all into a fundamental instability that might undermine the edifice we have laboriously constructed for over 40 years.”

This plea proved unavailing. When, in February 1994, a Jewish fanatic murdered 29 Muslims at prayer in Hebron, large-scale riots erupted in numerous Arab localities throughout Israel with mobs battling police for four full days. The scenario repeated itself in April 1996 when dozens of Palestinians in south Lebanon were mistakenly killed in an Israeli bombing of terrorist targets, and yet again in September 1996 when Arafat, capitalizing on the opening of a new exit to an archaeological tunnel in Jerusalem, stirred a fresh wave of mass violence in which 15 Israelis and 58 Palestinians died.

Things came to a head at on September 29, 2000, when Arafat launched his war of terror against Israel. The next day, the “supreme follow-up committee of the heads of Arab municipalities in Israel”—the effective extra-parliamentary leadership of the Israeli Arabs—issued an official statement deriding the killing of seven Palestinian rioters as a “premeditated, horrendous massacre” and proclaiming a day of national mourning, strikes, and demonstrations. “The blood of our wounded has mixed with the blood of our people in defending the blessed al-Aqsa and crossed the green line [i.e. the pre-1967 line],” ran the statement. “It does not stand to reason that we’ll remain aloof in the face of the... barbaric actions in Jerusalem and the attempt to desecrate al-Haram al-Sharif and to subject it to Israeli sovereignty.”

Responding to their leadership’s call, on October 1 the Israeli Arabs unleashed a tidal wave of violence against their Jewish compatriots that lasted for a full 10 days and was suppressed with great difficul-
ty and the killing of 13 rioters. “The October 2000 events shook the earth,” read the report of the Orr commission appointed to investigate the causes of the eruption:

They involved thousands of participants in many simultaneous places and the intensity of the violence and aggression was extremely high. Various means of attack were used against civilians and members of the security forces, including Molotov cocktails, metal steel marbles unleashed from slings at high speed, stone throwing by various means, rolling of burning tires and in some cases also live fire. Jews were attacked on the roads merely for being Jewish and their property was vandalized. In a number of instances, they were just inches from death at the hands of rioting mobs; indeed, on one occasion a Jewish citizen was killed. Attempts were made to invade and threaten Jewish localities. Main roads were blocked for prolonged periods of time and traffic to various Jewish localities was severely disrupted, at times even cut off for a long time. The aggression and violence were characterized by great determination, lasted for long periods of time, and persisted even in the face of attempts to stop them through various means of crowd dispersal.41

Yet while acknowledging that the riots brought Israel to the verge of full-fledged internecine strife, and rebuking Israeli Arab leaders for failing to direct their grievances to democratic channels and for having delegitimized the state and its institutions in the eyes of their constituents, the commission viewed the riots as essentially an act of social protest attending the “primarily neglectful and discriminatory” handling of the Arab sector by successive Israeli governments.42

As we have seen, this self-incriminatory diagnosis is not only totally misconceived but the inverse of the truth. Israeli Arab violent defiance of the state and its institutions in previous decades had increased, not declined, in tandem with socioeconomic improvement. Indeed, the Arab community’s behavior in the subsequent two decades would further disprove the Orr commission’s conclusions.
However exceptional in scope and intensity, the October 2000 riots were by no means the only Israeli Arab violent eruption during Arafat’s four-year-long war of terror. Not only did the annual commemoration of the killed rioters become a hotbed of violence, at times in collaboration with the PLO/PA, but Israel’s defensive counterterrorist measures occasionally triggered violent reactions by its Arab citizens. Thus, for example, when, on March 29, 2002, two days after a Hamas suicide bomber murdered 30 Israelis and injuring another 140 while they celebrated the Passover Seder in a coastal town hotel, the IDF launched a large-scale operation (code-named Defensive Shield) against the West Bank terror infrastructure that had murdered hundreds of Israelis in the preceding months, violent demonstrations broke out in Arab settlements throughout Israel and the Israeli Islamic movement initiated widespread activities in support of the West Bank Palestinians. Similar violent outbursts occurred in December 2008-January 2009, when Israel moved to end years of rocket and missile attacks from Hamas-controlled Gaza on its towns and villages (Operation Cast Lead).43

The repeated violent eruptions came against the backdrop of steadily growing identification of Israeli Arab leaders with the Jewish State’s sworn enemies. Thus we have Azmi Bishara, founding leader of the ultranationalist Balad Party (with seats in the Israeli parliament since 1999), travelling to Damascus to commemorate the death of Hafez Assad, one of Israel’s most implacable enemies, from where he implored the Arab states to enable anti-Israel “resistance activities,” expressed admiration for Hezbollah, and urged the Israeli Arabs to celebrate the terrorist organization’s supposed achievements and internalize its operational lessons.44 His subsequent prosecution for visiting an enemy state and supporting a terrorist organization only served to boost his international profile and intensify his recklessness—so much so that in 2006 he fled Israel to avoid arrest and prosecution for treason, having allegedly assisted Hezbollah during its war with Israel in the summer of that year.

Bishara’s Arab peers didn’t lag far behind. Ignoring legislation forbidding unauthorized visits by Israelis to enemy states, they embarked
on a string of trips to neighboring Arab states where they conferred with various heads of the anti-Israel “resistance” and at times even participated in violent anti-Israel activities. Knesset Member (MK) Ahmad Tibi, whose years in Arafat’s service would have made him persona non grata in Hafez Assad’s Syria given the latter’s loathing of the Palestinian leader, was beside himself with joy on meeting the deceased tyrant’s son, who would soon go on to massacre hundreds of thousands of his own citizens. “Heads of state are begging to shake [Bashar] Assad’s hand, crawling to shake his hand,” he gloated at an Israeli Arab election gathering (in January 2009). “Yet what they fail to obtain despite their crawling, others get.” The following year, Tibi travelled to Libya with a delegation of Israeli Arab parliamentarians to meet the long-reigning dictator Muammar Qaddafi, whom he lauded as “King of the Arabs” and who was praised by one of Tibi’s peers as “a man of peace who treats his people in the best possible way.” Confronted with scathing Knesset criticism upon their return, MK Taleb Sana was unrepentant. “Israel’s enemy is Israel itself,” he said. “As Qaddafi said during the visit, they have no problem with Jews but only with Zionism. Perhaps you’ll learn and understand some time—that is, abolish the Jewish state of Israel.”

By this time, open calls for Israel’s destruction had substituted for the 1990s’ euphemistic advocacy of this goal. Bishara, whose Balad party was predicated on making Israel “a state of all its citizens”—the standard euphemism for its transformation into an Arab state in which Jews would be reduced to a permanent minority—became increasingly outspoken after his flight from the country, predicting the Jewish state’s fate to be identical to that of the crusading states. His successor, MK Jamal Zahalka, preferred a more contemporary metaphor, claiming that just as South Africa’s apartheid had been emasculated, so its purported Zionist counterpart had to be destroyed. And Sheikh Raed Salah, leader of the northern branch of the Islamic Movement in Israel, who never tired of crying wolf over the Jews’ supposed machinations to destroy the al-Aqsa Mosque, “while our blood is on their clothes, on their doorsteps, in their food and water,” prophesied Israel’s demise within two decades should it not change its attitude to the Arab minority.
Such views were by no means limited to the extreme fringes. In 2006, the “national committee of the heads of local Arab municipalities in Israel” issued a lengthy document outlining its “Future Vision for the Palestinian Arabs in Israel.” The document derided Israel as “a product of colonialist action initiated by the Jewish-Zionist elites in Europe and the West,” which, it charged, had pursued “domestic colonialist policy against its Palestinian Arab citizens.” The document then rejected Israel’s continued existence as a Jewish state and demanded its replacement by a system that would ensure Arab “national, historic and civil rights at both the individual and collective levels.”

No less significantly, in May 2001 the “supreme follow-up committee of the Arabs in Israel” escalated “Nakba Day” events—observed alongside Israel’s Independence Day to bemoan the “catastrophe” allegedly wrought on the Palestinians by the establishment of the Jewish state—by instituting a national minute of silence. Seven years later, as Israel celebrated its sixtieth year of existence, the committee initiated what was to become an annual event by dedicating these events to the “right of return,” the standard Arab euphemism for Israel’s destruction through demographic subversion. Even in Haifa, an epitome of Arab-Jewish coexistence since the early 1920s, local politicians attempted to replace the name of Zionism Avenue with its pre-Israel precursor.

These incendiary activities had their predictable effect. By the time of the 2009 national elections, some 40% of Israeli Arabs were denying the existence of the Holocaust while one in two were opposed to sending their children to Jewish schools or having Jewish neighbors. Small wonder that the 1990s and 2000s saw the demise of Arab votes for Jewish/Zionist parties and their diversion to militant purely Arab parties that were openly opposed to Israel’s very existence, and this process gained considerable momentum in the 2010s. In the 1992 elections, the Arab parties won five of the Knesset’s 120 seats; by 1999, this number had doubled. In the 2015 elections, the Arab parties won 13 seats by running in a unified bloc (the Joint List) in order to reach the Knesset entry threshold. In March 2020 they scored their greatest-ever success by winning 15 seats.
Rather than strive to nip this growing radicalization in the bud, successive Israeli governments ignored the real nature of the development and instead sought to woo the Israeli Arabs by additional socio-economic incentives (à la the Orr commission’s misconceived recommendations). Meanwhile, the legal system grew increasingly reluctant to enforce legislation designed to prevent the subversion of Israel’s national security and sociopolitical order, notably Article 7A of the “Basic Law: The Knesset” stipulating that:

A list of candidates shall not participate in elections to the Knesset, and a person shall not be a candidate in elections to the Knesset, should there explicitly or implicitly be in the goals or actions of the list, or the actions of the person, including his expressions, as the case may be, one of the following: (1) Negation of the existence of the State of Israel as a Jewish and democratic state; (2) Incitement to racism; (3) Support for an armed struggle by an enemy state or of a terrorist organization, against the State of Israel.55

Unlike 1965, when the Supreme Court ratified the disqualification by the Knesset’s Central Elections Committee of an irredentist Israeli Arab movement that rejected Israel’s existence from participating in national elections on the grounds that “no free regime—particularly in light of the lessons of recent history—can lend a hand to the recognition of a movement that undermines that very regime,”56 in recent decades it has systematically blocked all attempts at disqualification despite unequivocal violations of Article 7A. Hence not one of the Arab MKs who visited enemy states and openly identified with their genocidal designs on Israel was barred from participating in elections, let alone prosecuted; nor were Arab parties and/or MKs made accountable for their rejection of very Israel’s existence (whether directly or through such platitudes as support for the “right of return”—the standard Arab euphemism for Israel’s destruction via demographic subversion),57 identification with terror organizations (in March 2016, for example, Balad and Hadash berated the Arab League’s designation of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization as undermining the struggle against Israeli expansionism and aggression),58 or even collaboration with them (e.g., the participation of Hadash and the Joint List’s leader Ayman Odeh in PLO-organized events and reported receipt of PLO money).59
As a result, Israeli Arab politicians’ rejection of Israel’s Jewish nature has become ever more blatant and pronounced. Thus we have Tibi telling President Reuven Rivlin during the September 2019 parliamentary consultations on the formation of a new government that “we are the owners of this land... we did not immigrate here, we were born here, we are a native population.” Six months later, after another round of national elections brought the Joint List’s Knesset representation to an unprecedented tally of 15 MKs, Tibi was far more brazen. “The expression ‘Eretz Israel’ [Land of Israel] is colonialist,” he stated in a radio interview. “I reject with disgust the phrase ‘Judea and Samaria,’ it is the Palestinian West Bank, in the occupied Palestinian territories.” And Odeh was no less forthright, telling Rivlin that “We are not solely interested in full civil equality. We are a national group that deserves full national equality.” In other words: ending Israel’s existence as a Jewish state in favor of a binational state in which Jews would be reduced to their “rightful place” in Islamic history as a “tolerated religious minority.”

Given this mindset, it is hardly surprising that when in late April 2021 Hamas drew thousands of rioters to the Temple Mount by using the age-old canard of an imminent Jewish threat to the al-Aqsa Mosque, Odeh embraced the ensuing jihadist violence on the holy site with alacrity, in total disregard of his party’s communist-secularist ideology. “Salutes from the coastal plain, from the Galilee, from the Triangle, and from the Negev to the Jerusalem youth who are waging an intifada against the occupation,” he wrote on his Facebook page on April 24. The next day, as Israeli police sought to calm the situation by removing some roadblocks on Temple Mount, Odeh escalated his rhetoric. “The occupation is retreating before the Jerusalem youth and is removing the barriers at the Damascus Gate,” he gloated. “These are great and honourable positions by the people of Jerusalem, which will ebb and flow until the outbreak of the decisive intifada that will end the occupation and raise the flag of Palestine over Jerusalem’s mosques and churches, and over the walls of liberated Jerusalem.”

Echoing Arafat’s ominous threat to sacrifice millions of “martyrs” in order to hoist the Palestinian flag over Jerusalem’s walls, Odeh upped his rhetoric once Hamas triggered the fourth war with Israel in a de-
cade by firing missiles on its capital city as Israelis were celebrating Jerusalem Day (May 10). Having long proclaimed the supremacy of the Israeli Arabs’ Palestinian identity over their Israeli citizenship,63 he praised their violent assault on their Jewish compatriots in support of Hamas as “a stand of glory and belonging.” “Nothing will separate us,” he stated. “We are one people, and we’ll support the most righteous cause in the world until the end of the occupation and the establishment of the state of Palestine with Jerusalem as its capital.”64

He amplified this message on numerous occasions in the coming days, misrepresenting the rapidly spreading Arab violence across Israel’s cities as both patriotic support for their Gaza brethren and an act of self-defense against “settler attacks” backed by the “fascist security forces” on Israel’s Arab citizens.65 “When we are united and struggle together we [may] lose one day, yet win a lifetime by asserting our dignity and status,” he proudly stated as the Gaza war and the violence across Israel’s cities entered their second week. “Our people wrote glorious days over the past week, especially the young ones who showed admirable fierce nationalism. We acted like a united people committed to a collective decision—[this] is a great value that greatly strengthens our people’s position.”66

Not to be outshone by his peer, Tibi applauded the escalating Temple Mount violence as a heroic defense of al-Aqsa by “the youth of Jerusalem and the youth of the ‘inside’ [i.e., Israel’s Arab community] against the “occupation forces” and “occupation police.” When Hamas missiles began falling on Israeli towns and villages, Tibi uttered no word against this indisputable war crime and instead praised the spreading Arab violence across Israel’s cities as “underscoring our unity with our Palestinian people, with the just cause, with our blessed al-Aqsa Mosque, with our people in Sheikh Jarrah, and against the killing of children in Gaza.”67 In the next 10 days, as thousands of Hamas missiles continued to batter Israel’s population centers, Tibi vehemently defended the terrorist assault on his country of citizenship as a “just struggle against occupation,” ignoring altogether that the Gaza population has been living under PA rule since May 1994 and under Hamas rule since 2007. In his account, Israel has never intended to release its grip of the Palestinians and has used the decades-long peace negotia-
tions as a ploy to sustain the “occupation” by other means, which fully justified the continuation of Palestinian “resistance.”

Even Mansour Abbas, head of the Islamist Ra’am party, who sought to keep a low profile so as to avoid alienating his Jewish partners during negotiations on the formation of a “government of change” that would oust PM Benjamin Netanyahu, didn’t shrink from whitewashing the scope and intensity of Arab violence by putting it on a par with the handful of violent Jewish responses. In a letter to Netanyahu on May 25, Abbas and his fellow Ra’am MKs condemned the detention of some 1,500 suspected rioters as a deliberate act of collective punishment aimed at intimidating and suppressing Arab youth—“an indigenous group entitled to special protection under international law”—and demanded the immediate suspension of the ongoing police campaign to bring rioters to justice.

**CONCLUSION**

The May 2021 Israeli Arab riots, like their October 2000 precursor, were not an act of social protest but a nationalist/Islamist insurrection in support of an external attack. It was not socioeconomic grievances that drove the Israeli Arabs to wreak wanton violence on their Jewish compatriots for the second time in 20 years but the growing radicalization attending the decades-long betterment of their socioeconomic condition. The more prosperous, affluent, better educated, and politically aware the Israeli Arabs have become, the greater their leadership’s incitement against their state of citizenship—to the point where many ordinary Arabs have come to openly challenge their minority existence in the Jewish State.

Of course, many Israeli Arabs would still be content to get on with their lives and take advantage of the freedoms and opportunities afforded by Israel, no matter how much they might resent their minority status in a Jewish state. This has been evidenced *inter alia* by their vociferous protests whenever Israeli politicians propose the inclusion of frontier Arab-Israeli settlements in a future Palestinian state as part of a land exchange within the framework of a peace agreement. Indeed, even many East Jerusalemites, who are entitled to Israeli social benefits and are free
to travel across Israel’s pre-1967 borders, would rather become citizens of the Jewish state than citizens of a new Palestinian one. 70

Yet from the onset of the Arab-Israeli conflict a century ago, Palestinian Arab society has always contained militant segments that were large enough to allow its perennially extremist leadership to sway the silent majority into repeated disasters. Just as Hajj Amin Husseini and Yasser Arafat immersed their hapless subjects in disastrous conflicts that culminated in their collective undoing and continued statelessness in total disregard of the massive material gains attending Arab-Jewish coexistence, so Israel’s Arab leaders used their constituents’ vast socioeconomic progress over the past decades as a vehicle of radicalization rather than moderation.

Contrary to the celebratory media hype, Ra’am’s inclusion in the motley ruling coalition established after the May 2021 riots signifies the continuation of this dangerous trend rather than the growing Israelization of the country’s Arab community. This is not the first time an Arab party has joined a ruling Israeli coalition: the now-defunct United Arab List (UAL—not to be confused with today’s Joint List) participated in the Golda Meir and Yitzhak Rabin governments as early as 1974-77. 71 Yet while the UAL’s cabinet membership, let alone that of Labor and Likud Arab ministers and deputy ministers, implied acquiescence in Israel’s Jewish nature (as did outside support by small Arab parties in the 1950s and 1960s), Ra’am is an Islamist party that rejects the idea of a Jewish state altogether. Its participation in the ruling coalition is nothing but an opportunistic ploy to strengthen the position of the Arab sector, especially the Bedouin community that constitutes its electoral mainstay, vis-à-vis the state without accepting its legitimacy. Hence its categorical insistence on legitimizing the illegal Bedouin settlements in the Negev that have effectively stymied government sovereignty over vast tracts of that desert—which comprises nearly two-thirds of Israel’s total territory—and made them no-go zones for Israeli Jews. 72 And hence its threat of a religious war should Jews be allowed to pray on the Temple Mount—Judaism’s holiest site—and insistence that “the blessed Al-Aqsa Mosque, with all its 144 dunums area [i.e., the entire Temple Mount], is an exclusive Muslim possession and no one else has any rights there.” 73
Dating back to Hajj Amin Husseini’s 1920s exploitation of the Temple Mount as the foremost rallying cry for anti-Jewish violence, and to Arafat’s denial of the existence of the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem, this denial of the Jews’ millenarian attachment to their holiest site, and by extension to the Land of Israel, is a sad testament to how little the Palestinian/Israeli Arab leaders have progressed over the past century.

By predicing its precarious existence on an anti-Zionist party seeking Israel’s eventual transformation into an Arab/Muslim state, the June 2021 motley government has set an extremely dangerous precedent—not only for the strength and well-being of Israeli democracy (i.e., a government headed by marginal parties enjoying minuscule electoral support), but also for the future of Arab-Israeli relations in Israel. For, while Ra’am (and, for that matter, the Joint List, which may well join the ruling coalition once the floodgates to participation by anti-Israel parties in government have been thrown open) will undoubtedly be able to extort short-term gains that will further erode Israel’s sovereignty and governability over the Arab sector, this development is bound to intensify Israeli Arab radicalization and Jewish frustration, and will put the two communities on a collision course before too long.
NOTES

1 Ynet (Tel Aviv), July 14, 2021.


3 David Ben-Gurion, Anahnu Ushkheneinu (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1931), pp. 8-9.


9 “Palestine, as I Saw It, interview for The Jewish Chronicle (London) With Mr. M. Grossman,” May 22, 1925.


13 Ibid., Table 3.5: Life Expectancy, by Sex, Religion, and Population Group.

15 Ibid., “Infant Mortality Rate (Deaths/1,000 Live Births)”; CBS, “Statistical Abstract of Israel 2020,” Table 3.13: Infant Mortality by Rates, by Selected Causes, by Religion and Age (rates per 1,000 live births).

16 CBS, “Statistical Abstract of Israel 2020,” Table 4.15: Students in Grades 1-12, by Age, Sex and Population Group.”


18 CBS, “Statistical Abstract of Israel 2020,” Table 4.8: Average Number of Students per Class in Primary Education, by Grade (1-6), Educational Sector and Supervision; ibid., Table 4.44: Average Number of Students per Teacher.

19 Ibid., Table 4.20: Matriculation Examinees, by Entitlement to a Certificate and Selected Characteristics; ibid., Table 4.22: Entitled to a Matriculation Certificate at the Level of 5 Study Units in Selected Subjects, by Selected Characteristics.

20 Ibid., Table 4.49: Percentage of Compatibility to the Subject Among Teaching Staff in Mathematics, English and Hebrew.


23 CBS, “Statistical Abstract of Israel 2020,” Table 2.24: Population and Density per sq. km. in Localities with 5,000 Residents and More on 31.12.2019; ibid., Table 2.25: Localities, Population and Density per sq. km., by Metropolitan Area and Selected Localities.

24 Ibid., Table 2.19: Population, by Population Group, Religion, Age and Sex, District and Sub-District.


26 CBS, “File of Local Authorities in Israel 2019.”

28 CBS, “File of Local Authorities in Israel—2019.”


38 For a heated debate of the episode see the 13th Knesset’s 379th session, Jerusalem, Oct. 25, 1995, pp. 221-34.


40 “Vaadat Orr: Shaar Sheni,” 7, 45.

41 “Vaadat Orr: Shaar Shishi,” 3.

42 Ibid., 5.


45 Thus, for example, Ahmad Tibi visited Lebanon in 2005, Jamal Zahalka and Wasil Taha visited Lebanon and Syria in 2006, Said Nafa visited Syria in 2007, and Hanin Zu’bi participated in the May 2010 violent attempt to breach Israel’s naval blockade of the Hamas-held Gaza Strip.


48 Ibid., Apr. 27, 2010.


55 “Basic Law: The Knesset (5718-1958).” (Unofficial translation by Dr. Susan Hattis Rolef)


57 See, for example, the Joint List’s platform.


60 Arutz Sheva, Sept. 23, 2019.


63 See, for example, MEMRI, Special Dispatch No. 6734, Jan. 11, 2017.

64 Odeh’s Facebook page, May 10, 2021.

65 Ibid., May 11, 12, 14, 2021.


67 Ahmad Tibi’s Facebook page, May 7, 11, 2021.

68 See, for examples, Tibi’s interviews with Israeli TV channels on May 13, 17, 18, 20, 22, 2021, posted on his Facebook page.

69 RotterNet (Tel Aviv), May 25, 2012. The letter was also addressed to the minister of internal security, the general attorney, and the chief of police.


71 The Knesset, “All Governments of Israel.”

72 Thus, for example, the Negev Bedouin population accounted for 90% of the administrative orders for demolition of illegally built constructions, issued in Israel in 2012-14 (1,336 of 1,473); and even this number (of which only a quarter were implemented) was a drop in the ocean given that already a decade earlier the number of illegal buildings in the Bedouin sector had been estimated at 28,000. See: Knesset Research and Information Center, “Sugiot Behasdarat Nose Hakarkaot Bekerev Hauchlusiya Habedouit Banegev,” Oct. 30, 2017, pp. 3-5; ibid., “Bniya Bilti Hukit Veharisat Mivnim Belsrael,” Oct. 20, 2015, pp. 13-15; Iris Hann, “Akifa shel Averot Bniya Bashtahim Haptuhim,” Jerusalem Center for the Study of Israel, 2013, p. 43.

73 Panet.co.il, July 19, 2021; Al-Quds, July 19, 2021.
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