22 Full Israeli-Saudi Normalization Still Unlikely As a rule, historians likemyself are better off leaving predictions to those practiced in making them. This applies even more where the unpredictable Donald Trump is concerned. But history does give perspective, and using that perspective for a tentative glimpse ahead is warranted. Even before the Hamas-Israel War, Saudi Arabia’s price for full normalization was too high for Biden’s Washington: NATO-like status for Riyadh; fast-tracked US arms sales; and a civilian nuclear program. And Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman would have demanded some kind of Israeli gesture towards the Palestinians—certainly unlikely with the current Israeli government. That said, steps short of full normalization might have been possible, and, given the right circumstances, might still be. Even an autocrat like Muhammad bin Salman cannot afford to ignore the effects of Gaza’s devastation on a largely sympathetic Saudi population ButsincetheHamas-IsraelWar, suchdevelopments have become much more unlikely. Although the leaders of Saudi Arabia have little warmth left in their hearts for the Palestinians, even an autocrat like Muhammad bin Salman cannot afford to ignore the effects of Gaza’s devastation on a largely sympathetic Saudi population. Peace with Israel is not his main concern, but rather transforming his country, which involves granting social liberalization in exchange for limiting political freedom. Most Saudis accept that bargain. (Those who might have needed more convincing are reminded of the gruesome murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.) A controversial full normalization with Israel only complicates matters for him. In the past, Bin Salman had made quite favorable statements towards Israel. He left anti-Israel statements to Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah. But at the 11 November 2024 Saudi-hosted Joint Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit, he accused Israel of committing genocide, and stood by Iran against Israeli attacks. Hosting this summit, which was attended by Iran, is only one of several recent Saudi steps toward Tehran. For over one hundred years, the Saudis’ main concern has been the security of the regime. They have hedged their bets with Iran in the past due to perceived lack of US commitment to their security. And that is also why they had previously linked normalization to US security guarantees. Riyadh still fears Iran, particularly an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. If the Trump administration can convince Riyadh that it has the both the willpower and the staying power to take on Iran, perhaps the current Saudi trend can be stopped. But Trump himself is completely unpredictable, and possible picks for influential posts contain both old-time conservative anti-Iran hawks and isolationists. At the present time, Riyadh has little to gain from full normalization with Israel, and it is difficult to imagine the Trump administration putting the necessary pressure on Israel. Still, combined with a hard line on Iran and some smaller gestures towards the Palestinians, steps short of normalization might eventually be possible. These could include, for example, direct flights to Saudi Arabia for Israeli Muslim pilgrims who now must fly via Amman on Jordanian papers. Given the right circumstances, even mutual interest sections in the UAE Embassy might be possible. But a lot would have to fall into place to bring even these small steps to fruition. Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum is Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He specializes in the countries of the Persian Gulf, including their relations with Israel.
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NDU2MA==