1 Reshaping the Global Landscape: How will Trump’s return redefine global dynamics? Prof. Eitan Shamir, Editor The Bar-Ilan University Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies Research Digest:
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3 Reshaping the Global Landscape: How will Trump's return redefine global dynamics? List of Articles NOTE FROM THE EDITOR Prof. Eitan Shamir 5 WHAT WILL DONALD TRUMP’S FOREIGN POLICY LOOK LIKE? Prof. Jonathan Rynhold 6 CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN TRUMP’S APPROACH TO ISRAEL Prof. Eytan Gilboa 8 ISRAEL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRUMP ERA – “SHAPING THE DAY AFTER” Ran Segev 10 DONALD TRUMP’S SECOND PRESIDENCY Prof. Shmuel Sandler 14 DONALD TRUMP’S VICTORY IS SHUFFLING THE CARDS IN TEHRAN Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael G. Bouchnik-Chen 16 TRUMP’S SECOND TERM: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ENERGY SECTOR Ambassador (Emeritus) Michael Harari 18 HOW TRUMP WILL AFFECT ISRAEL AND IRAN Yaacov Lappin 20 FULL ISRAELI-SAUDI NORMALIZATION STILL UNLIKELY Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum 22 DONALD TRUMP AND THE PALESTINIANS Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Bartal 24 US-IRAN STRATEGY DURING DONALD TRUMP’S SECOND TERM Cdr. David A. Levy 26 TRUMP AND ERDOĞAN: THE FUTURE OF US-TURKEY RELATIONS Prof. Efrat Aviv 28 WHAT MIGHT PRESIDENT TRUMP’S POLICY TOWARD THE FSU STATES LOOK LIKE? Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin and Ariel Kogan 30 TRUMP AND THE HINDU PACIFIC Dr. Lauren Dagan Amos and Dr. Alon Levkowitz 32 DONALD TRUMP AND KIM JONG-UN: BACK TO SQUARE ONE? Dr. Alon Levkowitz 34 DONALD TRUMP AND SOUTH KOREA Dr. Alon Levkowitz 36
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5 In the complex and often unpredictable realm of global politics, few political developments carry as much potential for transformative impact as the prospect of a second Trump presidency. This collection of expert analyses delves into the multifaceted implications of such a scenario, offering a comprehensive and nuanced exploration of how a Trump return to the White House could reshape global strategic landscapes. With a special focus on the Middle East and Israel, the publication provides an in-depth examination of how potential shifts in US foreign policy could reconfigure regional dynamics and strategic relationships. The geopolitical reverberations of an American presidential administration extend far beyond the borders of the United States, touching diplomatic relations, economic frameworks, security alignments, and regional power dynamics. Our contributors bring a diverse and sophisticated lens to this critical analysis, examining potential shifts from multiple geographic and strategic perspectives. From the intricate dynamics of IsraelUS relations to the strategic calculations of Middle Eastern nations, from the complex geopolitical interactions in Asia to the potential recalibrations in regional and global energy markets, this volume offers a rich tapestry of informed insights. Each of our experts has a unique vantage point drawn from deep professional expertise, knowledge of historical context, and nuanced understanding of international relations. The mosaic of perspectives presented here is not about predicting an inevitable outcome, but about understanding the potential strategic implications of significant geopolitical shifts. By exploring these diverse scenarios, we aim to provide readers with a sophisticated, multi-dimensional understanding of how a potential Trump presidency could influence global dynamics. Prof. Eitan Shamir is Managing Director of the BESA Center. His research focuses primarily on military strategy, command structures, and innovation within the military sphere. Note from the Editor Photo: Shutterstock Prof. Eitan Shamir Managing Director of the BESA Center.
6 What Will Donald Trump’s Foreign Policy Look Like? The Trump administration will be united by a hawkish approach to foreign policy. It will be willing to usemoremilitary force and use itmore frequently than the Biden administration, while being less concerned about “collateral damage” (i.e., the death of civilians in harm’s way) and the humanitarian cost of war more generally. The administration will also be more prepared to act unilaterally than its predecessor. However, it will be divided about the depth and breadth of America’s commitment to its allies. While some of Trump’s key nominations are traditional Republicans who view allies as an essential component of a grand strategy based on international leadership, the president himself has been outspoken in expressing isolationist views. Trump is not interested in America leading an international order, but rather in focusing on defense of the homeland and protecting America’s economic interests with tariffs rather than by promoting free trade. Duringhis first administration, the US did not respond militarily to serious attacks on its allies in the Middle East, notably on Saudi oil processing facilities in 2019. Trump also seemed prepared to withdraw from NATO, America’s most important alliance. It remains unclear whether this is mere posturing or an underlying conviction. Either way, there will be heavy pressure on US allies to contribute more in financial and military terms. According to these criteria, Israel comes out very well in military terms – it fights its own battles and is highly effective. But it is by no means clear that Trump would have been inclined to act as quickly and generously as did President Biden following October 7. Biden’s response came from the gut. He is deeply committed to the defense of Israel out of conviction, and strongly believes that America’s alliances in general are critical to its security. Trump lacks these attributes; he personally takes a more transactional approach. His pro-Israel policy was marked more by support on symbolic and political issues, like moving the US embassy to Jerusalem, than any upgrading of the strategic relationship. Moreover, given that Trump cannot stand for reelection, he is no longer beholden to the proIsrael evangelical base of the Republican Party. Some of Trump’s nominations have indicated that they would support US involvement in an Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear program. Other more isolationist-leaning figures have hinted that they would not On the other hand, leading figures in his administration will no doubt share Biden’s convictions on the de facto alliance with Israel. Not backing Israel would damage America’s credibility worldwide and invite challenges by America’s adversaries on other US allies. Moreover, the main concern of isolationist-leaning members of the administration is that the US must not be drawn into a long costly war. The Biden administration managed to supply Israel with over 500 transport planes full of military equipment without triggering such a war. It is an open question whether the Trump administration would actively support an Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear program. This is of critical importance because the US has far greater capabilities than Israel. Moreover, direct US involvement has the potential to provide a highly effective deterrent against restarting the program, at least during Trump’s term in office. Prof. Jonathan Rynhold is the head of the Department of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University. His research focuses on US-Israeli relations, Israeli politics and foreign policy, and the Middle East peace process.
7 The Trump administration will definitely take a tougher line than the Biden administration regarding the Iranian nuclear program. We should expect much tougher sanctions and a harshmilitary response to any Iranian, or Iranian proxy, attack on Americans. Nonetheless, the goal will be to negotiate a better deal with Iran. In contrast to the foreign policy doctrine of George W. Bush, Trump has no interest in regime change. The president views such ambitions as the cause of the “forever wars” that he has vowed to avoid. This also means the US will avoid putting “boots on the ground”. Some of Trump’s nominations, likeMarco Rubio, have indicated in the past that they would support US involvement in an Israeli attack on the Iranian nuclear program. Other more isolationist-leaning figures, such as Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, have hinted that they would not support this. As with everything else, the key decision-maker will be the President himself. On the one hand, the President is instinctively inclined to prioritize a diplomatic deal. He had no issue with trying to do a nuclear deal with North Korea, even holding a friendly meeting with Kim Jong-un – leader of the odious regime in Pyongyang – while offering to withdraw all 25,000 US troops from South Korea. With that said, Trump walked away from that deal when his terms were not met. In the Iranian case, there is an added reason why Trump might support an Israeli military strike. The FBI has confirmed that the Islamic Republic of Iran was involved in two assassination attempts on Trump’s life. No American president has ever allowed US foreign relations to be more influenced by personal ego than Donald Trump. This personal angle on the issue could very well tilt Trump’s inclination decisively. Another potential challenge will be on the financial side of the special relationship. Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid and Trump has already gone on record saying that Israel should receive this in the form of loans rather than grants. In the twilight of the Obama administration, annual aid to Israel was set at $3.8 billion a year until 2028 – that is, about 1% of Israel’s GDP and about 15% of its defense budget. The Trump administration will definitely take a tougher line than the Biden administration regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Nonetheless, the goal will be to negotiate a better deal with Iran In the last year, the Biden administration granted Israel over $14 billion in extra aid to assist with the war. This was held up for a long time by Republicans in Congress on Trump’s orders. While foreign aid is unpopular with Republicans in Congress, Israel is an exception because of robust evangelical support for Israel. Evangelicals make up about two-thirds of the Republican base. Trump no longer needs evangelical support to get re-elected as he cannot run again, but Congressional Republicans continue to require evangelical support. When it comes to financial matters, Congress has a great deal of influence, so Trump may decide that cutting aid to Israel is not worth the fight. However, even in that case, inaction could have serious consequences for Israel because when the current deal runs out, there may not be the political will to sign a new deal. Once the continuity of aid is broken, it will be very hard to restore. On the other hand, since Israel has to spend all the aid it receives inside the US, Trump may be persuaded to view such aid as indirectly supporting the American arms industry. On a related point, Trump has spoken of imposing “across the board” tariffs on imports to the US. This could seriously damage the Israeli economy. America is Israel’s largest trading partner and Israel has a large trade surplus of almost $6 billion. International trade accounts for about two-thirds of the Israeli economy compared toabout a thirdof theUSeconomy. Though unlikely, the possibility cannot be ruled out that while evangelicals will continue to donate money to Israel (estimated at about $100 million a year), they may take the view that the US government should adopt the line preferred by Trump. Photo: Shutterstock
8 Continuity and Change in Trump’s Approach to Israel Many Israelis, from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to ordinary citizens, are happy with Donald Trump’s victory in the recent US presidential election and expect him to support Israel as emphatically as he did during his first term. This, however, may not be the case. Four sources of information may help to forecast Trump’s approach to world affairs and Israel: the theory and history of presidential performance during second terms, Trump’s policies during his first term, statements he made during his election campaign, and the people he has chosen to nominate to key positions in foreign policy and national security. Theory and history aren’t that useful where Trump is concerned because he has systematically defied both throughout his political career. But we do know that in second terms, presidents often behave differently than they did in their first and are more concerned about their legacies. This is especially true for Trump, who lost his bid for a second term, waited four years, came back and won. He has grown older, and in the last four years much has occurred in the US, the world and the Middle East. Trump is unpredictable and at times erratic, but there is almost invariably both continuity and change in US policy. Trump’s main motivation is to rebuild his reputation both inside and outside the US. Winning a second term has rehabilitated him domestically, and winning the Nobel Peace Prize would rehabilitate him internationally. Trump has said he will be a man of peace, striving to end the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East and reduce the threat of World War III. During his first term, like his predecessors Barack Obama and Joe Biden, Trump identified China as the number one challenge to US domination in world affairs. China has become a partner with Russia, North Korea and Iran in the “axis of evil.” This axis is helping Russia in the war against Ukraine. Israel dealt a major blow to the axis by destroying the “ring of fire” Iran established around its borders. The regime change that just occurred in Syria is only the most recent element of this regional transformation. Theory and history aren’t that useful where Trump is concerned because he has systematically defiedboththroughouthispolitical career Iran fears Trump because he might restore harsh sanctions or give the green light to an Israeli attack on its oil and/or nuclear facilities. The regime could either seek a nuclear agreement with Trump or break out to the bomb. They have indicated interest in nuclear negotiations with Trump, and he has suggested that he might be interested as well. The prospect of another nuclear agreement that is full of holes will not appeal to Israel. Trump has stated that he wants the war in Gaza to be over and all Israeli hostages to be released by his inauguration on January 20, 2025. He also appears to want to implement Biden’s vision of adding Saudi Arabia to the AbrahamAccords via normalization of relations with Israel. One of Riyadh’s core conditions is some kind of Israeli commitment, albeit vague, to Palestinian statehood. Trump’s 2020 “Deal of the Century” to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict Prof. Eytan Gilboa is an expert on US-Israel relations, international communication, and public diplomacy. He is the founding head of both the School of Communication and the Center for International Communication at Bar-Ilan University.
9 included the establishment of a Palestinian state over 70% of Judea and Samaria and Gaza. While neither Benjamin Netanyahu nor his coalition partners are likely to share Trump’s vision of a Palestinian state, Netanyahu’s ability to resist Trump’swill – unlike his dealingswith Biden on this issue – will be substantially reduced While neither Benjamin Netanyahu nor his coalition partners are likely to share Trump’s vision of a Palestinian state, Netanyahu’s ability to resist Trump’s will – unlike his dealings with Biden on this issue - will be substantially reduced. Netanyahu has called Trump the greatest friend of Israel to ever serve at the White House. It remains to be seen whether he will retain that assessment through Trump’s second term. Photo: Kobi Gidon, GPO
10 Israel at the Beginning of the Trump Era – “Shaping the Day After” The election of Donald Trump to the presidency heralds a new era in US domestic and foreign policy. Although President Trump will not take office until January 20, 2025, it is already possible to examine the possible implications of his election for the Middle East and the potential created to bring about strategic changes in the region, in cooperation between Israel and the new administration. Israel, for the first time in years, has an opportunity to conduct an in-depth strategic dialogue with a team of senior officials who have previously been exposed to Israel’s security needs In recent days, the president-elect has completed a round of senior appointments to key positions in managing US foreign and security policy. It seems that Israel, for the first time in years, has an opportunity to conduct an in-depth strategic dialogue with a team of senior officials who have previously been exposed to Israel’s security needs and have shown attention and willingness to examine a joint strategy to achieve three main goals: • containing Iran, reducing its regional influence and, above all, preventing it from achieving a military nuclear capability; • allowing Israel, against the backdrop of the regional war, to realize its security goals in both Gaza and Lebanon; and • renewing efforts to promote normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia as a complementary step to the Abraham Accords and as part of a regional structure that will contribute to strengthening stability and economic prosperity in the region. I will focus below on the realization of the achievements of the war, the so-called “Day After”. The end of the multi-front war – “The Day After” design At this stage, it is not possible to assess whether the settlement efforts in Lebanon led by the Biden administration will mature sufficiently to ensure a lasting ceasefire in Lebanon by January 20, 2025. However, it appears that these efforts, which are based on Israel’s military achievements in this arena, are based on the changed reality on the ground, which should be reflected in the arrangements of the “day after.” The severe blows suffered by Hezbollah; Iran, the organization’s patron; and the organization’s leadership removed the basic condition they had previously set for a settlement in Lebanon, which prevented the advancement of an end to the war in Gaza. It appears that the Trump administration shares the Israeli view that the settlement in Lebanon should “stand on its own two feet” and be completely separate and unconditioned by developments on the war front in Gaza. The collapse of the principle of unity of arenas creates a situation of clear prioritization in the political handling of the two main war arenas. In Lebanon, Israel is setting concrete goals of 1) pushing Hezbollah’s military presence north of the Litani River; 2) creating a security reality that prevents Hezbollah from regaining a foothold near the border with Israel; and 3) preventing the organization from rearming itself with Iranian assistance. It is currently unclear what enforcement mechanism will maintain the Ran Segev served for 31 years in a variety of senior roles in the Israeli security establishment, mainly in the fields of intelligence and national security.
11 arrangement in Lebanon. However, it is clear that given the risk that this mechanism will not be effective, Israel must maintain freedom of action in this arena in order to prevent violations and erosion of the arrangement. Israel learned this lesson from Security Council Resolution 1701, which was put in place at the end of the Second Lebanon War in 2006 with similar aims and which proved hopelessly ineffective. It was such an utter failure that Hezbollah succeeded in massively rearming itself and posing a dramatically greater threat to Israel. Israel cannot allow that pattern to repeat itself. Theprincipleofmaintaining Israeli freedomof action in Lebanon must be the basis for future cooperation between Israel and the US administration on the Lebanese issue in order to limit Hezbollah’s ability to recover while relying on Iran’s military, economic, and political assistance. It seems highly likely that an arrangement based on this principle will receive the backing of the Trump administration. The post-war challenge in Gaza will require ongoing dialogue with the US and assistance from the Trump administration in providing a political umbrella for moves on the ground During the multi-sector war in which Israel has been engaged since October 7, 2023, it has managed to create a new security reality on its southern border, opposite the Gaza Strip. The Hamas organization was hit very hard, most of its military command center in the Strip was eliminated, and its ability to conduct an effective guerrilla war against the IDF was greatly reduced. Hamas continues to wage terror against our forces in the Gaza Strip and maintain its position among the population through its control of humanitarian aid. It seems that during 2025, Israel will work to shape a civilian reality in the Gaza Strip that completely negates the possibility of the organization’s recovery and significantly erodes its civilian control over large parts of the population. At the same time, Israel will work to foster a local civilian alternative, with inter-Arab and possibly even international backing, that constitutes an alternative to Hamas’s civilian control in the Strip. This challengewill requireongoingdialoguewith the US and assistance from the Trump administration in providing a political umbrella for moves on the ground, including the possibility that the US administration will help encourage moderate Arab elements, such as the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, to contribute to building the civilian alternative in Gaza as part of the reconstruction of the Strip. In Lebanon, Hezbollah suffered severe blows. The organization’s charismatic leader Hassan Nasrallah was killed and its command center severely damaged. A large part of the organization’s missile and rocket arsenal was also destroyed and many of its operatives were killed. But the IDF’s main achievement along the border—the takeover of a security strip along Israel’s northern border while destroying the military array that Hezbollah had Photo: Avi Ohayon, GPO
12 Photo: IDF Spokesman
13 built in the area as a base for an October 7-style attack on theGalilee—is already creating a different reality in southern Lebanon. Preventing Hezbollah from regaining control south of the Litani River, as well as preventing the recovery of its rocket and missile array, will be a major challenge for Israel’s security policy in the north. From the Israeli point of view, the contribution of the American administration to the effort to restore the political system in Lebanon so that it can exert counterpressure on Hezbollah is of great importance. Active American involvement in the Lebanese domestic arena is especially important in light of the changes wrought by the war in Lebanon. Forthefirsttime,Hezbollah’s leadershipwasseverely damaged, and the leader who led its moves in the Lebanese domestic arena is dead. The organization’s military capability has been significantly damaged, and Lebanon is facing a humanitarian disaster due to the displacement of over a million Lebanese from their homes. There is also significant damage to infrastructure in Beirut and south Lebanon that will require large-scale foreign aid for reconstruction. It seems that if the Trump administration acts in accordance with Israel’s interest in formulating an aid package from Arab sources that strengthens the moderate elements in the Lebanese domestic arena, there is a good chance that Iran’s paralyzing grip on the Lebanese political system will finally come to an end. The ultimate test of the strategic partnership will be the challenge of formulating a joint strategy to prevent Iran from acting immediately after the war to rebuild its proxy organizations, especially in the northern arena The war has demonstrated that Israel is a regional military power capable of severely damaging Iran’s proxies, the so-called “axis of resistance,” which formed the main component of its “ring of fire” on Israel’s borders. Iran’s enormous investment in terms of finances, weapons, training, and building military capacity has gone down the drain. At the same time, Israel has proven to the US that it is a security asset with military and technological superiority over its rivals. In addition, it seems that leading figures in the Trump administration were particularly impressed by the fact that the IDF fighters who accomplished these achievements were mostly uniformed civilians determined to defend their home and country. The two previous attempts by American administrations to shape a newpolicy in theMiddle East, in Afghanistan and Iraq, collapsed precisely because these basic components were lacking – a society determined to defend its country alongside technological advancement and a developed economic capability to support the military effort. Israel’s achievements in the military arena increase the confidence of the leading team in the Trump administration that Israel constitutes a first-rate strategic asset in the Middle East. It is to be hoped that this confidence will be translated into concrete steps that allow Israel to shape a security and political reality on both the northern border with Lebanon and in the Gaza Strip that will ensure the removal of the security threats to the civilian populations of both the Galilee and the western Negev and allow the residents of those areas to return. The ultimate test of the strategic partnership will be the challenge of formulating a joint strategy to prevent Iran from acting immediately after the war to rebuild its proxy organizations, especially in the northern arena. Beyond that, the Iranian nuclear issue will continue to be at the center of strategic dialogue between Israel and the United States. It is hoped that in the Trump era, a coherent strategy will be formulated for the first time—one that combines massive economic pressure with a credible and concrete military threat sufficient to deter Iran from advancing its plan to obtain nuclear weapons. Dialogue with President Trump and his administration’s leading security and foreign affairs team has already begun during the transition period. It is based on the assessment of both Israel and the Trump administration that a nuclear Iran would be a tremendous danger to the future of the Middle East and the free world and must be prevented at all costs.
14 Donald Trump’s Second Presidency Whatever queries we might have, it’s hard not to respect Donald Trump’s 2024 electoral victory. Before providing some insights into his foreign policy, we must address the man himself and his political strategy. After four years of ups and downs in the White House and an excruciating downfall in 2020, the defeated president did not easily give up his place there. Over the last four years, we have witnessed an unceasing campaign by a man in his late 70s who was determined to return to the White House. Ultimately, he pulled out a victory over an incumbent VP at the electoral level as well as in the popular vote, by a margin of 4 million votes. Donald Trump is a multifaceted and very determined individual—a person unwilling to accept conventional norms as binding. As a second-term president, we can assume he will seek to leave his mark on history. We cannot ignore his capricious personality, which was on full display during his previous administration. The two central issues most strongly prevalent in his election campaign, and which, according to all estimates, brought him victory, were revitalizing the American economy and stemming illegal immigration to the US. From this, we can assume that his primary focus will be on the domestic arena. However, due to the strong linkage between the two arenas and the global status of the US, Trump will have to deal with foreign policy. Here he will encounter conflicts between different values, so we can expect a less coherent policy. Trump’s foreign policy and national security personnel selections are undoubtedly extremely positive for Israel. Trump’s appointments for Secretary of State, the Pentagon, National Security Advisor, ambassadors to Israel and the UN, and the President’s Middle East envoy collectively constitute a team sympathetic to Jerusalem. To balance this team, he appointed his in-lawMassad Boulus, a Lebanese-American businessman, as his advisor on the ME. There is no doubt that this sends a message to the region, the Arab states, and Iran. However, another common denominator running through Trump’s appointments is loyalty to the President. Three key officials from the previous term - Vice President Pence, Secretary of State Pompeo, and Ambassador Haley - will not be included in the new administration. Trump will be expecting his newly appointed officials to be committed to executing his political strategy. Trump’s foreignpolicy andnational security personnel selections are extremely positive for Israel Given these insights, what can we expect from the new administration’s initial foreign policy? We can assume that the Russia-Ukraine war, the Israel-Iran struggle, and the growing tensions between China and Taiwanwill occupy the incoming administration. Trump’s perceived disregard for allies, lack of sympathy for the Ukrainian cause, and demand of PM Netanyahu that he end the war would indicate that most of his attention will be given to Asia. Relations with China encompass strategic and economic issues. The intention to impose tariffs on imports from China was already on the agenda during Trump’s previous term and even intensified during Biden’s presidency. Pressure is also likely to be applied to Zelensky to reach an agreement with Russia, thus separating Putin from Beijing. All of the above pose a big question for Netanyahu: What will be Trump’s position on Iran during or after Israel concludes its multiple-front war? Prof. Shmuel Sandler is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Bar-Ilan University. He is an expert on Israeli electoral politics, Israeli foreign policy and national security, and US foreign policy.
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16 Donald Trump’s Victory Is Shuffling the Cards in Tehran Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections has ratcheted up anxiety in Iran that the president-elect will instantly resume his wellknown policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran via tough economic and commercial sanctions. Iran’s Vice President for Strategic Affairs Muhammad Javad Zarif was quoted on November 9 as suggesting that Trump do a cost-benefit analysis on his “maximum pressure” policy to decide whether it is worth continuing. He recalled that Trump’s previous standpoint vis-à-vis Iran led Tehran to increase uranium enrichment to 60% purity, which is practically the grade of fissile material needed for nuclear devices. In a communique on November 7, Iran’s Foreign Ministry expressed the hope that Trump’s election Col. (res.) Dr. Raphael G. Bouchnik-Chen is a senior research fellow at the BESA Center. He specializes in Middle Eastern and international strategic affairs. Photo: Shutterstock
17 will be an opportunity for the new administration to reconsider wrong policies of the past. Amid reports of an alleged Iranian plot to murder Donald Trump, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi indirectly accused Israel of fabricating the story in order to harm confidence-building between Iran and the US – notwithstanding the fact that in February 2023, high-ranking IRGC commander Amir Ali Hajizadeh said Iran has a holy mission to kill Trump in retaliation for the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. Newly installed (July 2024) Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian, considered a reformist, has asserted that he is committed to a conciliation process with the West in order to work towards lifting Western sanctions imposed on Iran. Pezeshkian’s administration has contended that the JCPOA (the nuclear accord of July 2015) in its current format is “not good enough” anymore, and that an amended agreement is necessary. Therefore, resuming the nuclear talks should be a high priority on the international agenda. The emerging Iranian “smiling” diplomacy backed by Supreme Leader Khamenei may have important ramifications for the current boiling military tension between Iran and Israel. Though Iran has not yet backed off from its declared intention to retaliate against Israel following the massive Israeli air attack against strategic assets deep in Iranian territory (October 26, 2024), its “foot-dragging” on this matter may have a significant effect on Iranian behavior versus the US. By manifesting a certain policy of restraint towards Israel, Iran may be delivering a message to President-elect Trump of its desire to open a new chapter in Iran-US relations. It would be wise to suspect the Iranian regime’s real intentions with regard to its approach to the incoming US administration In the meantime, Iran is currently engaged in a diplomatic offensive directed towards the Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia. This demarche is linked to Tehran’s willingness to consolidate its posture in this strategic region. However, it is likely that in Saudi Arabia, there are expectations that with Trump, the US could return as the regional hegemon and provide a sense of strategic direction in which Saudi Arabia can play a key role. One thing is clear. High-ranking political figures in Iran, including government officials, are using moderate rhetoric to signal an allegedly sincere desire to cultivate a channel for dialogue with Donald Trump’s administration. One can also argue that Iran’s rapid developments in its nuclear program can serve as serious leverage in future negotiations with the West. Experience suggests that it would be wise to suspect the Iranian regime’s real intentions with regard to its approach to the incoming US administration. The mullahs’ top priority was, and still is, to reach a sufficient military nuclear capability to annihilate the State of Israel. To the regime, that end justifies the means.
18 Trump’s Second Term: Implications for the Energy Sector Examining the implications of President Trump’s reelection appears at first glance to be an easy task for most experts, especially when it comes to the energy sector. After all, we can draw conclusions from his first term, as well as from the rhetoric that characterized his campaign. However, the picture is a bit more complex. Let’s start with the obvious. The Trump administration will refocus on the familiar energy sectors, oil and gas and perhaps nuclear. As the president-elect said during the campaign, “We have more liquid gold than any country in the world. More than Saudi Arabia. More than Russia”, implying that it should be exploited economically and perhaps also politically. Moreover, President Trump’s lack of concern for the climate crisis does not augur well for the renewable energy sector. As you may recall, Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement during his previous term. Regardless of what he does now, he is unlikely to cooperate with the ambitions of the climate conference for a newmechanism to finance renewable energies for developing countries. But other factors need to be considered. The many investments made with government encouragement during the Biden administration in the fields of renewable energy have been successful. They are driving an economic sector that is vibrant in terms of both employment and profits, in “red” (Republican) as well as “blue” (Democratic) states. The Biden administration also managed to pass the IRA (Inflation Reduction Act), which encouraged investments in these areas. Should Trump wish to repeal the law, there is no certainty that he will be able to, given the balance of power in the Senate (despite the Republican majority) and also in the House. Given that this sector is economically successful, Trump might prefer in any case to avoid doing it any serious harm. It is also worth noting Elon Musk, who is very close to the president, created and owns Tesla, the electric car manufacturer. As the president-elect said during the campaign, “We have more liquid gold than any country in the world. More than Saudi Arabia. More than Russia” We can therefore cautiously summarize the outlook for the incoming administration’s energy policy as follows: Rhetorically, we will return to his first administration’s tone, with clear hostility to the discourse surrounding the climate crisis and a stress on the need to invest in America’s “liquid gold” to generate profits and improve the state of the American economy. This will also be done in practice by encouraging investment and expanding gas and oil production, including fracking technology. Trumpmight also lift the Biden administration’s freeze on granting new licenses for the construction of gas liquefaction facilities in the US. At the same time, the administration will adopt a more selective and focused policy towards the renewable energy sector. This could entail reductions in environmental regulations that demand stricter standards and sometimes even exact fines for polluting energy companies. Another very important angle concerns Europe. The Biden administration, which formed a Western coalition against President Vladimir Putin in response to the invasion of Ukraine, sought to Ambassador (Emeritus) Michael Harari was Israeli Ambassador to Cyprus (2010-2015). He is a consultant in strategy, policy and energy.
19 greatly reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian gas and succeeded in doing so. In the first half of 2024, 47% of the liquefied gas purchased by Europe came from the US (!) and only 18.7% from Russia. The rest came from countries like Algeria, Qatar, and others. From the US perspective, this is a political achievement as well as an economic one. From the European perspective, this constitutes an unhealthy dependence on a single energy supplier. European countries were not afraid of this dependence under the Biden administration, but a Trump administration is a different story. On the one hand, Trump will likely want to persevere to continue reaping the economic gains that result from the arrangement. On the other hand, it is difficult to assess how this calculation will be affected by Trump’s policy toward Russia and desire to bring an end to the war. Brussels and quite a few capitals on the European continent will be closely and anxiously following Trump’s decision-making on this front and its possible consequences. The importance of the Persian Gulf, from the perspective of the Trump administration, remains the same, both in light of its desire to maintain low energy prices (meaning it will be less comfortable than its predecessor about allowing an attack on Iranian oil facilities) and in light of its desire to promote normalization (a new “deal of the century”?) between Saudi Arabia and Israel. European countries were not afraid of their great dependence on US liquefied gas under the Biden administration, but Trump is a different story In the Eastern Mediterranean, the natural gas in the region, which is mostly Israeli, has a major impact on the region at large. Israeli exports to Egypt and Jordan are of considerable importance to the economies of those countries and therefore to stability in the wider region. Egypt, as is well known, exports some of the gas imported from Israel to Turkey and Europe, but this is accounted for by its urgent need for precious foreign currency and is not necessarily a “tie-breaker” from Europe’s perspective. The maritime agreement between Israel and Lebanon did not prevent the war on the northern front, but it was not supposed to. In any case, the agreement was not dissolved and remains in place. Greek-Turkish hostility and the Cyprus problem will require much more effort to solve, despite positive developments in bilateral relations between Ankara and Athens. It is difficult at this stage to assess to what extent, if at all, the Trump administration will want to get involved. Photo: Shutterstock
20 How Trump Will Affect Israel and Iran The arrival of a second Trump administration could significantly improve Israel’s strategic posture and place the Iranian regime under new pressure. Durin President Trump’s previous term, US-Israel relations strengthened, with policies that favored Israel’s security concerns. A breakthrough occurred between Israel and the moderate Gulf Arab states under the framework of the 2020 Abraham Accords, which disturbed Iran greatly. The second Trump term could further free Israel’s hand to offensively engage its adversaries without as much concern for diplomatic repercussions, or the withholding of arms – a tactic the Biden administration came to favor to show its displeasure with Israel’s war effort. While the Biden administration did provide over $17 billion of military aid to Israel after the October 7 mass murder attacks by Hamas, it has also consistently pressured Israel to prematurely abandon its war efforts against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran. Biden has urged Israel to make do with limited offense in the face of an existential seven-front war that has been forced upon it by the Iranian axis. It is likely that support for future Israeli actions against Iran, whosenuclear programis racingahead, will be more forthcoming from a second Trump administration. An early indication of Trump’s appointees suggests not only unconditional support for Israel’s security, but also a hard line against Iran. Yaakov Lappin is an Israel-based military affairs correspondent and analyst. He provides insight and analysis for a variety of media outlets.
21 Appointees like Michael Waltz as incoming National Security Advisor, Mike Huckabee as US Ambassador to Israel, Elise Stefanik as US Ambassador to the United Nations, Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, and Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, together with Republican control of Congress for the next two years, suggest a highly significant opportunity for Israel, with particular relevance for the Iranian nuclear program. The alignment of US and Israeli policies might embolden Israel to take more decisive actions against Iran while enforcing any future arrangement in Lebanon and completing the task of crushing Hamas in Gaza. Furthermore, a second Trump administration could continue the trend of diplomatic normalization between Israel and Arab states, as evidenced by the Abraham Accords signed in 2020. The Sunni Arab moderate bloc would be strengthened by clear signaling from Washington that attempts to contain and appease the Islamic Republic of Iran have ended. On the international stage, the US might renew its “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran, reinstating sanctions and discouraging other nations from engaging economically with Tehran. This could significantly impact Iran’s economy, limiting its ability to fund proxy organizations and invest in its nuclear program. It is likely that support for future Israeli actionsagainst Iran,whose nuclear program is racing ahead, will be more forthcoming from a second Trump administration However, any move by the future Trump administration to try and contain Russia in a less confrontational manner could end up strengthening Iran, which has become a major supplier of firepower to Moscow. The IranianRussian-Chinese coalition is a mutually reinforcing triangle that allows each member to circumvent sanctions and provide resources the other members lack. With Iranian-made suicide drones flying into both Israeli and Ukrainian cities, it will be vital for the next American administration to make the linkage between the Middle Eastern regional conflict and the global challenges to the American-led world order and international security. Photo: Shutterstock
22 Full Israeli-Saudi Normalization Still Unlikely As a rule, historians likemyself are better off leaving predictions to those practiced in making them. This applies even more where the unpredictable Donald Trump is concerned. But history does give perspective, and using that perspective for a tentative glimpse ahead is warranted. Even before the Hamas-Israel War, Saudi Arabia’s price for full normalization was too high for Biden’s Washington: NATO-like status for Riyadh; fast-tracked US arms sales; and a civilian nuclear program. And Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman would have demanded some kind of Israeli gesture towards the Palestinians—certainly unlikely with the current Israeli government. That said, steps short of full normalization might have been possible, and, given the right circumstances, might still be. Even an autocrat like Muhammad bin Salman cannot afford to ignore the effects of Gaza’s devastation on a largely sympathetic Saudi population ButsincetheHamas-IsraelWar, suchdevelopments have become much more unlikely. Although the leaders of Saudi Arabia have little warmth left in their hearts for the Palestinians, even an autocrat like Muhammad bin Salman cannot afford to ignore the effects of Gaza’s devastation on a largely sympathetic Saudi population. Peace with Israel is not his main concern, but rather transforming his country, which involves granting social liberalization in exchange for limiting political freedom. Most Saudis accept that bargain. (Those who might have needed more convincing are reminded of the gruesome murder of Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi in 2018.) A controversial full normalization with Israel only complicates matters for him. In the past, Bin Salman had made quite favorable statements towards Israel. He left anti-Israel statements to Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah. But at the 11 November 2024 Saudi-hosted Joint Arab-Islamic Extraordinary Summit, he accused Israel of committing genocide, and stood by Iran against Israeli attacks. Hosting this summit, which was attended by Iran, is only one of several recent Saudi steps toward Tehran. For over one hundred years, the Saudis’ main concern has been the security of the regime. They have hedged their bets with Iran in the past due to perceived lack of US commitment to their security. And that is also why they had previously linked normalization to US security guarantees. Riyadh still fears Iran, particularly an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. If the Trump administration can convince Riyadh that it has the both the willpower and the staying power to take on Iran, perhaps the current Saudi trend can be stopped. But Trump himself is completely unpredictable, and possible picks for influential posts contain both old-time conservative anti-Iran hawks and isolationists. At the present time, Riyadh has little to gain from full normalization with Israel, and it is difficult to imagine the Trump administration putting the necessary pressure on Israel. Still, combined with a hard line on Iran and some smaller gestures towards the Palestinians, steps short of normalization might eventually be possible. These could include, for example, direct flights to Saudi Arabia for Israeli Muslim pilgrims who now must fly via Amman on Jordanian papers. Given the right circumstances, even mutual interest sections in the UAE Embassy might be possible. But a lot would have to fall into place to bring even these small steps to fruition. Prof. Joshua Teitelbaum is Professor of Modern Middle Eastern History in the Department of Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan University. He specializes in the countries of the Persian Gulf, including their relations with Israel.
23 Photo: Shutterstock
24 Donald Trump and the Palestinians Donald Trump’s first term in the White House was seen as a disaster for the Palestinians. This concept applies to all currents of Palestinian society, including the PLO, as well as the Iranian proxy organizations that operate within Palestinian society, Islamic Jihad and Hamas. The Trump administration was considered sympathetic to Israel and close to the views of the Israeli right. Trump transferred the American embassy to Jerusalem on May 14, 2018 (a symbolic date related to Israeli Independence Day), and also halted funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine refugees (UNRWA) in September 2018. The stopping of UNRWA funding was meant to pressure Palestinian leadership to agree to the president’s peace vision, which he called the “Deal of the Century”. “I stopped massive amounts of money that we were paying to the Palestinians. We’re not paying until you make a deal,” Trump declared in September 2018. The Palestinians did not agree to the deal and opposed all other American proposals during Trump’s presidency. It is therefore hardly surprising to see mainly hostile reactions to his election among the Palestinians. Trump’s reelection forces the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, led byMahmoudAbbas, to try to open a new page in their relationship with him and avoid the mistakes of the past Lt. Col. (res.) Dr. Shaul Bartal is a senior researcher at the BESA Center. His research is focused on the Israeli-Arab conflict and Tunisian politics.
25 Photo: Shutterstock Trump’s reelection forces the leadership of the Palestinian Authority, led by Mahmoud Abbas, to try to open a new page in their relationship with him and avoid the mistakes of the past. The Arab networks reported that a phone conversation took place between Mahmoud Abbas and Trump for the first time since 2017. During conversation, Abbas congratulated Trump on his victory and talked to him about stopping the war in Gaza. The Palestinian leadership does not hide its fear of another “deal of the century” that would once again authorize Israel to annex settlements in the West Bank. The Fatah websites have highlighted the faction’s desire to turn over a new leaf in its relationship with Trump, while Hamas, ever loyal to the Iranian line, has condemned Trump as an impulsive and greedy narcissist. Hamas understands that the new-old regime will expand the Abraham Accords and strengthen the alliance of the Sunni countries and Israel against the Shiite alliance (which includes Hamas and Islamic Jihad, though both are Sunni, and is supported by China and Russia). Hamas has concluded that now is the time to ramp up the “resistance” in order to face down the Americans’ attempts to stabilize the Middle East. It appears, then, that the two currents in Palestinian society, Fatah and Hamas, also reflect the inter-bloc rivalry in the Middle East that Trump will try to stabilize during his term.
26 US-Iran Strategy During Donald Trump’s Second Term The Trump transition team has begun to reveal its foreign policy agenda, and one thing is clear: It’s bad news for the Iranian regime and the “Islamic Revolution” it patronizes. President Trump’s nominees strongly support a close WashingtonJerusalem relationship while advocating for an aggressive approach to Tehran. In the closing stages of his 2024 campaign, Donald Trump invoked Ronald Reagan’s “Peace through Strength” doctrine. It was rumored that senior policymakers in Trump’s first administration were reading Peter Schweizer’s book, Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy That Hastened the Collapse of the Soviet Union. In 2018, an anonymous White House official said “It’s no secret” that Schweizer’s book shaped their approach, revealing that elements of Reagan’s Cold War strategy informed the Trump administration’s use of sanctions, regional alliances, and support for Iranian opposition groups. Ronald Reagan’s strategy to defeat the Soviet Union combined economic pressure, military buildup, ideological warfare, and diplomatic isolation. He worked with allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, to lower oil prices, straining the USSR’s economy, and collaborated with Saudi Arabia in Afghanistan to support the mujahideen, further draining Soviet resources. Reagan imposed technology restrictions to hinder modernization and initiated a defense buildup, including the Strategic Defense Initiative, forcing costly Soviet military spending. During his first term, inspired by Reagan’s approach, Donald Trump pursued a similar strategy to counter Iran, aiming to exploit its economic and ideological weaknesses while avoiding direct conflict. Trump’s administration worked with allies to lower oil prices and intensified sanctions on Iran, particularly targeting its oil and financial sectors to weaken Iran’s economy. Militarily, Trump strengthened US alliances in the Middle East, enhancing regional defenses to deter Iranian aggression. He also employed cyber operations to disrupt Iran’s nuclear and military advancements. With the killing of Qassem Soleimani, the US administration disrupted Iran’s support for its proxies. Finally, by supporting Iranian opposition groups and promoting dissent within Iran, Trump sought to weaken the regime internally, challenging its ideological hold and pushing for a shift in Iran’s regional behavior. President Trump’s nominees strongly support a close Washington-Jerusalem relationship while advocating for an aggressive approach to Tehran Trump has started assembling his foreign policy teamtoexecutehisReaganesqueapproach. Florida Senator Marco Rubio, nominated for Secretary of State, has long championed stringent sanctions on Iran and opposed the 2015 nuclear deal. Michael Waltz, Trump’s pick for National Security Adviser, supports a strong US presence in the Middle East to counter Iranian activities. Secretary of Defense nominee Pete Hegseth has pushed for a decisive military stance against Iran. Elise Stefanik, Trump’s choiceforUNAmbassador,hasemergedasaleading advocate against antisemitism and called for intensified sanctions to curb Iran’s influence. Mike Cdr. David A. Levy is a retired US Navy Commander and a former US diplomat. His areas of expertise are maritime affairs, Middle East security, and US military and national strategy.
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