31 Washington would be able to move on with an increased “soft power” policy at the expense of the other diplomatic and/or political tools. We may expect, however, that Kazakhstan, as the regional geopolitical superpower, would become a major channel for American policy in the area, whatever it will be. In the Southern Caucasus, the White House and the State Department face an uneasy dilemma amid the concluded but unresolved AzerbaijaniArmenian conflict. At first glance, some top Republicans declaratively supported Armenia; however, their top-rank political strata realize the Armenian deep strategic connection with the Iranian regime and the significant role played by Yerevan as an intermediate element of the Moscow-Tehran vector. Markus Ritter, who heads the European Union mission monitoring Armenia’s border, said the Iranians “are here in the region, the best friends of the Armenians.” While Russia and Azerbaijan bristle at the European presence, he said, Iran seems to accept it. In the coming Trump presidency, Armenians fear that a harsher US policy toward Iran could ricochet against their country and embolden Azerbaijan. That is why, regardless of American empathy towards the Armenian people, in the event of a direct clash between the pro-American bloc and Iran and its allies, Washington’s geopolitical interests might make Armenia a target of diplomatic, economic, and military sanctions. Of course, this may not occur if Yerevan and Baku normalize relations and sign a peace treaty before then. On the other hand, it is likely that the upcoming American administration, which is quite pro-Israeli, will value Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with the Jewish state and may be less receptive to calls to condition Washington’s cooperationwithBaku through “democratization.” With its extensive cooperation and mutual relations with the FSU states, Jerusalem may be able to promote, moderate, and even participate in these policy trends. Photo: Shutterstock
RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NDU2MA==