23 All Iranian ballistic missiles carry heavy explosive warheads ranging between 500 and 700 kg. One variant of the Ghader F, dubbed “Barani”, carries a cluster munitions warhead consisting of 80 bomblets, each containing seven kg of explosives. All Iranian ballistic missiles have separating warheads that detach from the missile once its rocket motors propel it to its final speed. Once the rocket’s burn ends, the rocket motor and the fuel tanks, having the same speed as the warhead, follow it all the way down from space to the upper atmosphere, and hit the ground as a cloud of debris some distance behind the warhead impact point. The type of incoming rocket can be identified from examination of the debris. Images published in Israel’s media gave the impression that the overwhelming majority of Iranian missiles were from family A (single-stage liquid propellant) and family C (single-stage, slant launched solid propellant). Iranian media reported the launching of the two-stage solid propellant Sejil, and there is indeed at least one media image showing a Sejil on its ascent. However, there are no reports of Sejil debris being found in Israel. Other Iranian media reports allude to the launching of a “new type of Iranian missile, previously undisclosed” that has a range of 6,000 Km. This may allude to a family D missile, the very heavy Khoramshar. However, no evidence was found in Israel to corroborate this report. The IDF recorded three cluster warhead impacts within the country. Defending Israel during the 12 days of war with Iran were not only Israel’s heavy interceptors, the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3, but also two US Army THAAD batteries as well as AEGIS destroyers of the US Navy What was Iran’s targeting policy? Some Iranian media sources say the targets in Israel were scientific labs, Ben-Gurion Airport, and command centers and air bases. From the pattern of Iranian missile impacts, it appears that they did focus on scientific institutions, including the Weizmann institute (which was hit), Ben-Gurion University in Be’er Sheva and Tel Aviv University (which were not). The hits on the Haifa oil refinery (which was damaged) and the Ashdod refinery (whichwas not) suggest that Iran was aiming to disrupt Israel’s fuel supplies. This impression is enhanced by the fact that Israel’s navy downed about 30 Iranian UAVs in the Mediterranean Sea, perhaps on their way to attack Israeli gas rigs. The missile hits in central Tel Aviv could have been an attempt to strike the Kirya military district (Israel’s Pentagon). Little information was released about attacks on and damage to military installations. It stands to reason that Iran would try to do its utmost to shut down Israel’s air bases. Yet from the undiminished tempo of Israeli air force (IAF) operation throughout the campaign, it seems the Iranians did not inflict critical damage on Israel’s air bases. There is no indication that Ben-Gurion Airport was hit (once the fighting was over, it sprang back to full-scale operation within a few hours). As mentioned, of the 550 or so Iranian ballistic missiles launched at Israel during the 12 days of war, only between 59 and 64 managed to strike Israeli soil, indicating a failure rate of somewhere between 88% and 90%. It stands to reason that so high a rate of failure came not only from the success of Israel’s missile defense but also from technical failures in the missiles themselves. In True Promise I, about 50% of Iran’s missiles suffered malfunctions. Assuming the Iranians improved the quality of their missiles in the interim so only 25% malfunctioned, it still means Israel’s defense managed to down between 84% and 86% of incoming missiles (the IDF spokesperson disclosed an 86% success rate for missile defense). Defending Israel during the 12 days of war with Iran were not only Israel’s heavy interceptors, the Arrow 2 and Arrow 3, but also two US Army THAAD batteries as well as AEGIS destroyers of the US Navy. As the campaign evolved, media reports in Israel hinted at a growing shortage of Arrow interceptors and the need to economize. This could explain the large number of THAAD interceptors consumed – about 170 rounds, according to US media sources. No information was released on how many Israeli interceptors or US Navy Standard Missile 3 interceptors were used. For the first time ever, Israel used “offensive defense” tactics against Iran’s missiles. Action videos released by the IDF show scores of Iranian launchers out in the open being blown up by undisclosed air to ground weapons. Most of the launchers were still carrying their missiles when being struck, some in an erect position seconds
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