The Israel–Iran War: Israel’s New Strategic Opening

51 The 2025 Iran war was a 1967 moment for the Middle East. This comparison is based on several basic similarities: a. An Israeli decisive military victory on several fronts changed its regional strategic posture. b. The war downgraded and put into question the leading radical ideological paradigm of its time (Nasserism then; ‘Resistance’ now). c. The regional position of the United States was strengthened as a result of the war. There are shifts in loyalties towards Washington (Egypt then; Syria now), but other forces may move towards its opponents (Russia then; China now). d. Israel added a significant strategic asset (territory then, security superiority now), and must decide how to positively exploit it. e. Stagnation is not an option. Israel’s rivals want to reverse the balance (the Yom Kippur War and the Palestinian struggle then; delegitimization and counter force now), and real moves have to be made to profoundly shape the region. HOWDID THE ARAB SIDE VIEWTHE DAY AFTER THE 1967 WAR? There were five streams of thought in the region after 1967: a. Few liberal intellectuals started talking about peace. A very small group of thinkers contemplated recognition of, and coexistence with, the State of Israel. They included the Egyptian Mohamed SidAhmed, who wrote When the Guns Fall Silent after the 1973 war to capture President Sadat’s approach. b. The official lowest common denominator was the “Three Nos” approach of the Khartoum Arab Summit (“no peace, no negotiations, no recognition”). The summit was led by radical Arab leaders of the period. c. Egyptian president Anwar Sadat, who was the most innovative Arab leader of the 20th century, identified the need for a paradigmatic shift toward the United States and peace with Israel. d. Radical Islam flourished as the leading paradigm of socialism-Nasserism-Baathism decayed, and the era of jihadist terrorism was ignited. e. As the Arab nationalist struggle against Israel grew less popular, the radical Palestinian struggle took over, led by the PLO. The main takeaway is the understanding that a strategic change in regional posture tends to accelerate a radical response more than a pragmatic one, especially in terms of popular public opinion. The real challenge is how to make the post-Iran war moment a Sadat-Begin one and not a Khomeini-Bin Laden-Hamas one. THE PREVAILING PARADIGMS ARE NOW OBSOLETE At such a critical moment, we must adopt a new way of thinking about regional geo-strategy. Old paradigms, some a result of the previous 1967 moment, have not brought the region to safe harbor in the last half century. They should be either taken entirely off the table or updated to confront the challenge as it currently exists. Pragmatic solutions must replace ‘big ideas’ that A 1967 Moment: The Path Forward After the Iran War Col. (res.) Shay Shabtai Senior Researcher at the BESA Center specializing in national security, strategic planning, and strategic communication. He is also a cyber security strategist and consultant to leading Israeli companies.

RkJQdWJsaXNoZXIy NDU2MA==