The Israel–Iran War: Israel’s New Strategic Opening

15 therefore unable to defend itself by itself, an old Israeli defense principle. The strategic implications of this dependence are already being reflected in Israel’s shift toward the American position on the issue of a ceasefire in Gaza. 2. Rising Lion was made possible by a long war that created the essential conditions. First, the war on Israel initiated by Hamas on Oct 7, 2023, led to the removal of the Iranian outposts that had deterred Israel from going after the Iranian nuclear program in the past: Hamas in Gaza, and then Hezbollah in Lebanon in the fall of 2024. Second, the two rounds of blows between Israel and Iran, in April and October 2024, enabled Israel to destroy key components of Iran’s air defense systems and missile factories. Thus, a window of opportunity was created for a larger operation later on. Third, mapped and more, there is still a real possibility that the Iranians will accelerate their nuclearization and missile program. This fact illustrates the validity of the fundamental premise of David Ben-Gurion’s security doctrine: Israel is not a regional power. It does not shape the region to its will and cannot change its basic hostility towards the Jewish State. All Israel can do is build a highly capable military force and take military initiative from time to time in order to remove extreme and immediate threats, and in so doing, achieve temporary and relative security. The offensive in Iran highlights this diagnosis. As successful as Rising Lion was, it also made clear the unprecedented dependency of Israel on American direct military participation. Israel had to wait for the American strike on the Fordow facility and heavily rely on US and foreign assistance for its missile and air defense. It was Photo: Shutterstock

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