16 less directly tied to the war but also not completely detached from it were the strategic conditions created when the Trump administration entered into negotiations with Iran and bound it within a 60-day timeframe. This greatly improved the chances that the United States would join an Israeli campaign against the Iranian nuclear programwith the failure of the talks and the possible success of an Israeli military initiative. Without this possibility, the Israeli offensive had a low chance of achieving its goal. That refers not only to the destruction of the Fordow site, but more importantly to the reliable threat of repeated future American strikes if needed. In view of the essential nature of the preliminary conditions, the challenge now facing the IDF is to build an ability to repeat a successful operation in Iran when at least some those conditions are not met. Scenarios could include a rapid restoration of Iran’s air defense capabilities or a moving of the Iranian center of gravity to the east of the country, an additional 500-1,000 km away from the area where Israel operated during Rising Lion. 3.Westvs. Eastandqualityvs. quantity. Somemilitary researchers, particularly those focused on the war in Ukraine, emphasized the advantages of the Eastern approach to war over theWestern. In short, members of this school saw the Western tendency toward expensive equipment, modern platforms and precision munitions as a kind of addiction. They maintained that quantity defeats quality, and Western armies will not be able to withstand the strength of the industrial war approach. Operation Rising Lion contradicted that premise by clearly defeating quantity (missiles, simple kamikaze UAVs and bunkers in this case) with quality (advanced fighter jets, special munitions and advanced intercepting capabilities). Iran did manage to hit several strategic sites but failed to cause critical functional damage. Thewar illustrated the potential inherent in a significant qualitative advantage based on many layers (intelligence, special forces, technology, platforms, and people) over the Iranian approach, which assumed quantities would triumph. But this observation must be followed by a warning. If a qualitative advantage is not sufficiently established, or if the war in question drags on into a prolonged attrition, the Eastern industrial approach might have the upper hand. 4. Approaches to aerial operations. The IAF was successful, as it operated in Iranian airspace, at implementing its distinctive approach to war. This approach, which was developed in the decades following the 1973 War, has several principles. The first is ensuring air superiority through the suppression and destruction of air defense systems as a prerequisite for future missions. The second is the hunting of stealth surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missile launchers through the permanent presence of manned and unmanned aerial vehicles. These two principles enable the third: a massive and flexible capacity to deliver a variety of short-range, more affordable munitions to their targets by repeated fighter-jet sorties. This approach, which was previously used in the skies of Syria and Lebanon, was adapted to the very different challenge of Iran by integrating stand-in covert stratagems and other components. This uniquely Israeli mode of operation is distinctly different from that of the Americans and could serve as a doctrinal learning platform. The American barrier of fear, driven by two decades of failed interventions in the region, was broken. The war demonstrated that amilitary operation of defined limited goals can enhance, rather than drain, national power 5. Decapitation. The operation illustrated how highly centralized military organizations, including well-trained state armies like the Iranian IRGC, are vulnerable in terms of command and control and chain of command. This is not a trivial or selfevident observation. An orderly state military force is expected to have a redundant command and control system and layers of backups regarding the chain of command. In reality, the IRGC and the Iranian military failed to recover for the duration of the entire offensive. This provided Israel with concrete benefits, as it faced smaller salvos of missiles than expected and a malfunctioning Iranian air defense system. The lesson might be that centralized forces, particularly those that stress loyalty to the regime and thus have the same people serving in key positions for very long periods, are more sensitive to decapitation than previously assessed. 6. Elimination of know-how. Another original element of Israel’s approach to war was the effort to eliminate Iranian know-how in the nuclear, missiles and weapons fields. Israel continued its
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