The Israel–Iran War: Israel’s New Strategic Opening

42 Moscow’s narrative is that Russia claims it initiated hostilities against Ukraine because of a “potential existential threat”, which is allegedly “similar” to the reasoning behind the Israeli and American strikes against the Iranian threat. All these disparate lines of reaction could not be combined into the same narrative. Therefore, an information effort was formed, more spontaneous than organized, in which each actor played the role assigned to him. The Russian Foreign Affairs Ministry, which, four months before, on February 17, 2025, had submitted the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the Russian Federation and Iran to Putin for signing and presented it as a great victory, immediately and predictably engaged in a rhetorical campaign in support of the Ayatollah’s regime, both in Moscow and at the UN. In one of its earliest statements, the Foreign Ministry “strongly condemned” the US strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities, calling them “irresponsible decisions”. However, there was something unusual there, the phrase “...whatever arguments were used...”, which had many interpretations in analytical circles. This was, in fact, the first time Moscow acknowledged, albeit indirectly, the validity of the reasons for the IsraeliAmerican operation. It was an unconditional gesture towards the White House that analysts on both sides of the Atlantic did not miss. The second fact that drewattention is thatMoscow obviously did not help Tehran with information about the upcoming Israeli and US strikes. According to Russian sources, Moscow might have had some information about the attack but preferred not to share it with Tehran. If this is true – and there are reasons not to believe it – a sort of self-exclusion from the Israeli/American-Iran clash could be the second layer of the Kremlin’s policy on this conflict. The current conflict in the region is beneficial in some ways for Russia. Oil prices are rising, and the West has temporarily shifted its attention from Ukraine to the Middle East (see PSCRPBESA Report No 140 from July 9, 2025). Moscow understands that because the ideology of complete rejection of Israel is still being promoted in Tehran and the conflict is not over, military operations may resume. President Putin has stated that Russia is ready to mediate the conflict between Israel and Iran. Although Jerusalemmight consider this, it should consider that Tehran now harbors a distrust of Moscow. Iran believes Moscow shared information with Israel about Iranian generals in Syria and supports the UAE position on the disputed islands in the Strait of Hormuz. President Putin met with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi the day after the American attack. Words about “unprovoked aggression” were said, Photo: Shutterstock

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