9 Israel’s Strategic Calculus Ever since 2003, when the nature of Iran’s nuclear program was exposed to the world as military, the struggle against that program has been at the center of Israeli National Security Strategy. The policy of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was based on the premise that Israel should not be at the forefront of the struggle, but should instead let the US and other Western countries lead the campaign against Iran’s nuclear program. Arguing that Israel’s leading of the campaign would absolve other countries from taking full responsibility for frustrating Iran’s intentions, Sharon ordered the Mossad to commit itself to a clandestine campaign to delay and deny Iran’s developing progress in pursuit of nuclear military capability as much as possible. Prime Minister Olmert continued this approach. When Benjamin Netanyahu returned to the premier’s office in 2009, he adopted a different approach, placing Israel at the forefront of the effort against Iran’s nuclear program. He exposed the lack of Iranian cooperation with the IAEA inspection regime, which was confined only to “legitimate” enrichment activity. He argued that Iran had invested a great deal in the military layers of the program, including conducting research on weaponization, building a secret enrichment site at Fordow (the existence of which Iran only admitted after it had been exposed by intelligence means), and attempting to enrich uranium to a military grade of over 90 percent. The full magnitude of Iran’s duplicity toward the IAEA was exposed by Israel after the Mossad managed to take hold of Iran’s nuclear archive and bring it to Israel in 2018. In the years 2011-2012, Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak put the issue of a military operation against Iran’s nuclear facilities at the top of Israel’s security agenda. The matter was hotly debated by a select group of ministers, sometimes referred to as the “group of seven/eight”, together with the top leaders of Israel’s military and intelligence organizations. It was understood that Tehran’s reaction to an attack would lead to war with Iran, and probably with Hezbollah as well. At the same time, the supreme command of the IDF and the head of the Mossad argued that Israel’s ability to destroy Iran’s nuclear facilities by military means was quite limited. At most, Israel could cause substantial damage to Natanz, but in the final analysis, doing so would only delay Iran’s march towards a nuclear bomb for a limited period. When Benjamin Netanyahu returned to the premier’s office in 2009, he adopted a different approach, placing Israel at the forefront of the effort against Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, theyarguedthatwhilean Israeli attack would likely incur war with Iran or Hezbollah, it was doubtful whether the US under Barack Obama would be ready to back Israel in its defense against Iran. It was even more doubtful that it would assist Israel in direct military action in Iran. After a few months of debate and contemplation, the military and intelligence community prevailed, and Prime Minister Netanyahu decided not to place the issue on the table for a government decision. Israel continued to conduct awidespreaddiplomatic campaign to keep Iran’s intention to obtain a military nuclear capability on the agenda of the international community. PrimeMinisterNetanyahu repeatedly dedicated most of his time during public Mr. Ran Segev Senior Research Fellow at the BESA Center. He served for 31 years in senior positions within the Israeli security establishment, primarily in the fields of intelligence and national security.
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