11 nuclear activity, found indications in late 2024 and especially from January 2025 onwards that Iran was moving from threshold status towards nuclear breakout, with the aimof obtaining a nuclear device that could be exploded and tested as a bomb within a few months. In January 2025, Israelimilitary intelligence reported that Iran’s “weapon group”, which included highly skilled scientists, had been reassembled and was working earnestly under tight secretive cover to master the technology needed to initiate the “chain reaction” – i.e., the explosion process of an atomic bomb. The weapon group’s work made substantial advancements and improved Iran’s ability to move fast towards the possession of reliable detonation technology. The strategic dilemma facing Israel at that pointwas this. Because the time frame from Iran’s movement from threshold to capacity had been shortened, the threat of nuclear breakout had become more imminent. It was incumbent on Israel to preempt that threat by direct military means before the Iranians attained the bomb. As the threat continued to loom, the decision was taken in late 2024 to attack Iran as soon as the strategic situation was ripe, but no later than the first half of 2025. The first plans to launch a widespread air campaign against Iranwerefinalizedby the IDF in January2025. The earliest date for attack was to be in April 2025. Political considerations, mainly regarding Israel’s strategic cooperation with the US, determined the date to be June 13, one day after the expiration of the 60-day period President Trump had presented to Iran as the deadline for a negotiated agreement on its nuclear program. By June, the Israeli Air Force was ready, and the order was given after it was approved by the Israeli cabinet. The question of the role of the US in the military campaign against Iran loomed large in the discussions and preparations ahead of the war. Donald Trump had been reelected to the US presidency in November 2024. It was clear in Israel that from a political, strategic and military standpoint, American support was a vital factor in Israeli consideration of a war with Iran. The Israeli decision to wage war on Iran was presented to President Trump by Prime Minister Netanyahu in February 2025 at their first meeting of Trump’s second term. From that meeting onwards, there was close and continuous coordination between Israel and the US From the Israeli point of view, active US participation would make an enormous contribution towards minimizing the cost of the war. The military operation against Iran that began on June 13 signified a complete change in Israel’s strategy towards Iran’s nuclear program The operational capabilities of the US as a military superpower far surpassed those of Israel, especially with regard to the challenge of dismantling Fordow. But in Israeli eyes, the strategic continuation of US involvement in the war was no less important. Israel planned a short war, to last between 7 and 13 days, and hoped it would be able to conclude a ceasefire with Iran after the operational goals of the air campaign had been achieved. It was estimated in Israel that active American participation would be instrumental in forcing Iran to concede that it was too risky to continue the war and to accept the offer of a ceasefire.
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