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In the first days of the war that broke out following the October 7 massacre conducted by Hamas, Turkey employed a relatively balanced discourse about it. But after the bombing of Al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza on October 17, Ankara hardened its stance and bluntly condemned Israel. This change in Erdoğan’s rhetoric reflects a long pattern of anti-Israel sentiment. Erdoğan's support for Hamas in the wake of the massacre pulls Turkey, a NATO member, further away from the West. As long as Turkey pays no price for its anti-Israeli rhetoric, it will continue, and the resulting distance between Turkey and the West could have serious consequences.
Turkey is approaching the centenary of its founding, a significant date not only for its past but also for its future. With the May 14 election approaching, polls and commentators are beginning to discuss the post-Erdoğan era. The upcoming elections are critical and may bring about a historic change in Turkish politics. As things currently stand, no electoral outcome is likely to result in a return to the “golden age” of relations between Israel and Turkey.
In July 2021, Israel expressed full support to the Republic of Cyprus in the wake of the unilateral reopening of the Varosha coastline by Turkey. Last year, it also showed solidarity with Athens during Greek-Turkish tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. While the tripartite partnership is progressing, Ankara is seeking to expand its footprint in the region and is pursuing a two-state solution in Cyprus. It is also applying a new foreign policy methodology to Greece while remaining adamant in its demands.
Revelations on YouTube by Turkish mob boss and Erdoğan ally Sedat Peker are rattling the Turkish government. Peker’s disclosures involve murder, rape, corruption, bribery, political assassination, drug smuggling, arms shipments to jihadists, and torture and violence committed on the government’s behalf to silence the opposition. Through Peker’s revelations, the Turkish people are witnessing the extent to which the Islamist “deep state” has exponentially flourished under Erdoğan’s rule.
US and Canadian embargoes are threatening Turkey’s attack helicopter and drone sales to third-party countries. Ankara has come up with a corporate legal solution to this problem, but it might fail to overcome the political impetus behind the export restrictions.
Iran, Turkey, and Russia are building a new model of bilateral ties. Unshackled by formal alliances, the trio is showing it can work together to limit Western influence while avoiding an overreliance on one another. This mixture of correlating and contradictory interests, which characterizes the new Eurasianist model of bilateral relations, is a product of the changing global order.
President Joe Biden’s use of the word “genocide” on Armenian Remembrance Day was not a game-changer in US-Turkish relations, which are plagued by more fundamental problems. But it enhances Turkey’s political isolation, weakens its arguments on whether a genocide did or did not occur in 1915-24, and further destabilizes whatever is left of Ankara’s soft power.
Turkey’s official COVID-19 numbers reveal the government’s efforts to combat the pandemic as worthy of a commedia all’Italiana. As of mid-April, Turkey was the second-worst performer in the world, with 710.46 cases per million people. This is despite the country’s possession of a strong health infrastructure.

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