Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

View Archive

Documents recently declassified in Israel have disclosed the gravity of an arms deal that came into effect between Sri Lanka and Israel in the mid-1980s, a turbulent period during which Tamil militant separatism was severely threatening the short-lived political-economic prosperity of J.R Jayawardene’s government in Colombo. While the relationship between the two countries has long been complex, their defense collaboration has remained nearly constant.
The Mattei Plan and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) should not be treated as separate but overlapping corridors. Rather, they represent complementary layers of an emerging Indo-Mediterranean connectivity architecture. IMEC provides the east–west spine linking India, the Gulf, and Europe while the Mattei Plan extends European connectivity southward into Africa. Italy sits at the intersection of the two, leveraging its Mare Nostrum strategy to link the economic zones of the Indo-Pacific with those of the Euro-Atlantic by placing an EU leg in IMEC. Within this triangle, India provides technological scale and the eastern anchor, Israel brings a critical security and technological hinge in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Italy ensures a European institutional gateway and linkage to Africa through the Mattei Plan. As geopolitical realignments reshape global trade, connectivity, and data flows, IMEC is emerging as more than a network of ports, railways, and logistics infrastructure. The corridor’s long-term strategic significance will also depend on the digital architecture that underpins it: secure data networks, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, critical infrastructure protection, and resilient technological supply chains. The potential emergence of an India–Israel–Italy technology triangle is a critical component of IMEC’s future development.
The investigation into a suspected Hamas network operating across Cyprus, Greece, and several other countries highlights a dimension of the Hamas threat that deserves greater attention. Hamas has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to adapt its organizational structure to changing circumstances. As Israel continues to dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure and weaken its territorial control in Gaza, the terrorist organization may become increasingly reliant on its external networks. For Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, this possibility requires closer attention to cross-border intelligence cooperation, terrorist financing, and the infrastructure that allows Hamas to regenerate beyond its traditional territorial base.
Israel’s failed 2006 war against Hezbollah spurred IDF doctrinal and force structure changes that were ultimately embodied in its Momentum Multiyear Plan of 2020. The resulting full spectrum multi-domain warfare strategy contributed to Israel’s 2024 military success against Iran’s strongest proxy. Jerusalem’s Northern Arrows campaign devastated Hezbollah’s military, unleashing forces that upended Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy and compromised the Islamic Republic’s survival.
Increasingly well-coordinated and deadly rebel assaults on Pakistani security forces in Balochistan have revealed the extreme vulnerability of the Pakistani military in the province. The enormity of the territory, lack of local support, inability to commit sufficient forces, and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan render the Baloch challenge to the Pakistani army nearly impossible to counter. The violence is spilling into the Sistan and Balochistan province of Iran, which is experiencing its own Baloch insurgency.
In a coordinated offensive, cyber actors directly linked to the Iranian regime recently executed a series of targeted digital intrusions against water infrastructure in the US. This aggressive campaign focused on the operational technology networks of municipal drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities across seven to twelve states. Unlike traditional cyber espionage campaigns, this unconventional and widespread operation was explicitly designed for real-world physical sabotage of a vital civilian resource.
India’s emerging private space sector is often presented as a story of entrepreneurship and market liberalization, but there is more to it than that. It reflects a broader reorganization of national capability in which commercialization, security imperatives, industrial policy and status ambitions converge. India has evolved from Vikram Sarabhai’s development-oriented vision to an increasingly dual-use space strategy, shaped by China’s 2007 antisatellite test, Mission Shakti in 2019, and the institutional reforms introduced from 2020 onward. Private participation has responded to both ISRO’s capacity constraints and New Delhi’s pursuit of a more resilient and autonomous technological ecosystem, a transformation best understood as state-enabled commercialization: public institutions retain control over regulation, infrastructure, technology transfer and strategic priorities, while private firms assume greater responsibility for design, production, launch services and experimentation. Such a distributed architecture may strengthen redundancy, technological adaptability and resistance to foreign leverage while expanding India’s commercial and diplomatic reach. There are institutional lessons here for Israel, particularly in terms of regulation, shared infrastructure, government procurement and the state’s role as an anchor customer.
The success of Israel's 2023–2026 campaigns against Iran, its proxies, and its allies should not be judged by simplistic measures of targets destroyed or by the continuing existence or otherwise of the Iranian regime, but by whether or not Iran's grand strategy has been disrupted. Rather than viewing Iran's nuclear program in isolation, we interpret it as one pillar of an integrated strategy that also included the "Ring of Fire" proxy network and long-range missile forces. Following the degradation of much of this regional architecture after October 7, 2023, Iran accelerated its nuclear and missile programs in an effort to restore its strategic position. The Israeli campaigns against Iran itself are therefore best understood as efforts to prevent Iran from reconstructing this integrated military architecture rather than as attempts to achieve either regime change or a decisive military victory. Israel's success should be measured by assessing whether this goal was achieved and by calculating how long it will take Iran to once again pose an existential threat to Israel.
Kargil,Vijay-illustration,Of,Abstract,Concept,For,Kargil,Vijay,Diwas,,Banner
The Kargil War is remembered in India as a military victory, but its legacy extends far beyond the recapture of positions seized by Pakistani forces in 1999. It was an early test of India's ability to employ conventional military force under the shadow of nuclear deterrence and a turning point in its relations with both Israel and the United States. Israel continued an established pattern of assisting India during times of crisis, but in this instance, it evolved from a discreet supplier into a reliable operational partner, helping adapt precision-strike capabilities in real time according to the campaign's requirements. The United States, for its part, provided diplomatic significance to India's restraint and pressed Pakistan to withdraw. The Kargil War demonstrated that strategic autonomy does not require isolation: India can rely on external partners, integrate technologies from multiple sources, and still retain full authority over how and when to employ military force.
Following the October 7 war and the documentation of the atrocities committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, the limited political legitimacy the organization had retained within the Palestinian political system eroded dramatically. The Palestinian elections scheduled for 2026 are being held in a framework of institutional reform intended to align the Palestinian Authority with international requirements as it seeks international recognition of a future Palestinian state. One of the reform's defining features is the deliberate exclusion of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad from the democratic process because of their status as terrorist organizations. The upcoming Palestinian elections are thus a mechanism by which to create a new source of legitimacy for the Palestinian political system—one that no longer rests on Hamas's victory in the 2006 elections but instead on an institutional framework from which the movement is excluded. Despite the public support Hamas continues to enjoy for its October 7 attack, its absence from the forthcoming elections indicates that in practical terms, the organization has lost its status as a legitimate political actor within the Palestinian arena following the war and has been relegated primarily to the role of a militant military organization operating outside the institutional political system.

Accessibility Toolbar