Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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Israel has had the technological and industrial wherewithal to manufacture its own fighter-bombers since the early 1970s—yet ever since the mid-1980s, Jerusalem has repeatedly passed up this option in favor of continuing to rely on the United States to fulfill the IAF’s manned aircraft requirements. In light of current trends in both Israel and the United States, Jerusalem must urgently revisit this approach. Israel needs to design and build its own fighter-bomber—a Lavi 2.0.
For many years, the Armenian question has constituted one of the most sensitive issues in Israeli–Turkish relations. Although it was never at the core of the bilateral relationship, it repeatedly resurfaced whenever the question of recognizing the Armenian Genocide was raised, confronting Israel with a complex dilemma: how to balance its commitment to historical memory and the struggle against genocide denial with the strategic importance of its relations with Turkey. Over the years, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has regarded the issue primarily as a diplomatic matter with direct implications for relations with Ankara rather than merely as a historical or moral debate. Nor has this tension characterized Israeli policy alone. In recent years, Armenia itself has adopted a more pragmatic approach by advancing a process of normalization with Turkey without making Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide a precondition. The Armenian question therefore reflects a dynamic reality in which both Israel and Armenia are required to balance historical memory against changing strategic interests.
IDF spokesperson
Two issues have dominated the period since the last update: the escalation in skirmishes between the United States military and that of Iran on the one hand, and the declarations that an agreement has been reached between the United States and Iran on the other. However, the contours of the supposed agreement are unclear. Immediately after the two sides declared that they had come to terms, they offered completely contradictory descriptions of what was contained in the agreement. The reality of what was agreed to will become apparent on implementation. The agreement was supposed to be signed on 14 June, but at time of writing this has not yet happened.
The most recent—though highly unlikely to be the last—war between the US and Iran was fought by an American president whose irresolution allowed a critically weakened Iran to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. The fear of “boots on the ground”, unjustified though it was by the reality of the conflict, has emboldened America’s most committed and resolute enemy to double down on its catastrophic national and international policies.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a seminal connectivity initiative linking India, the Middle East, and Europe. For it to succeed, its infrastructure, routes, ports, and chokepoints must be effectively protected. This applies across the maritime space stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Eastern Mediterranean. Attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, persistent tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, and the growing vulnerability of undersea infrastructure have highlighted the security challenges facing contemporary trade networks. In the current security environment, Greece, Israel, and India occupy key positions along the corridor. Together, they form a maritime chain linking the Indo-Pacific to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean. The convergence of their strategic interests, geographic locations, and maritime capabilities lays the foundation for a new security architecture conducive to the wider objectives of the IMEC. Through naval cooperation, maritime domain awareness, critical infrastructure protection, and professional military education, these three countries have an opportunity to shape a more resilient East-West corridor extending from Mumbai to Souda Bay.
The scope of the signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran is very narrow. The MoU creates an interim state of deescalation between the United States and Iran within a rough, non-binding framework for future negotiations toward a permanent settlement. Despite its limitations, the MoU will serve as the primary strategic driver shaping the Middle East and beyond for at least the next six months. A net assessment of the MoU's implications reveals that while the United States successfully generated distinct advantages through the application of military force and agreed only to a temporary framework that does not forfeit its demands of Tehran, the manner in which the agreement was reached, along with its core content, represents a setback. It erodes Washington's substantive leverage over Iran, a development that will demand significant future American effort—including an increased probability of utilizing military force—to achieve a reasonable long-term arrangement. Regarding US-Israel relations, this is not the first time Washington has leveraged Israeli military achievements to serve its own interests. However, the overarching challenge lies in the future: Donald Trump will likely be Israel’s last unequivocally supportive president.
Any new Israeli government is now legally required to prepare a codified national security strategy within 150 days of its official formation. Though nuclear doctrine and strategy will likely be limited to the highest security-level classifications, nothing could have greater existential impact for Israel. Moreover, at a time when the principal threats to Israel are coming from a still pre-nuclear Iran and certain sub-state proxies, the National Security Council will have to consider wider and more explicit applications of nuclear deterrence. Israel’s decision-makers will need to undertake incremental but prompt shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Otherwise, Jerusalem will have to accept a strategic reality in which Iran and other adversaries continuously threaten Israel with non-nuclear but high-lethality ballistic missiles and/or chemical-biological (CBW) ordnance – an unsustainable reality of interminable war.
Israel has played a notable role in the political discourse of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan since October 7, 2023. Israel has served not merely as a target of criticism within Turkish foreign policy but also as a central instrument in shaping Turkey's domestic politics and regional vision. By portraying Israel as a threat to regional and global stability, Erdoğan seeks to position Turkey as the defender of the Palestinians and the leader of the Muslim world. The reasons behind his anti-Israel rhetoric lie beyond the conventional explanation of a need to divert public attention from domestic crises. It has become a permanent component of the political identity Erdoğan has constructed for himself and of the role he envisions for Turkey in the region.
The emergence of an “Age of Wars” is fundamentally reshaping venture capital. Technologies associated with security, resilience, strategic autonomy, and military effectiveness are increasingly replacing consumer-oriented innovation as the primary destinations for investment. As a result, venture capital is becoming progressively intertwined with national security, state policy, and geopolitical competition.
A recent law requires, for the first time, that any new Israeli government prepare a national security strategy within 150 days of its formation. As general elections are to be held no later than October 2026, Israel may soon approve its first official national security strategy. While this represents an opportunity to impose coherence on the country’s misaligned strategic orientation and security doctrine, it comes at a time of strategic and institutional drift following the multi-front wars that ensued in the wake of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. As the National Security Council is too weak to lead the complex effort to write a cohesive and robust national security strategy, a superficial strategy may instead result that squanders the opportunity provided by the new law. Steps must be taken to ensure that the new strategy is shaped in such a way as to ensure continuous reassessment and to foster constant learning and adaptation in the face of the ever-changing regional landscape.

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