Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

View Archive

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 marked not only a military but also an economic turning point in the international order. The mass withdrawal of multinational corporations (MNCs) from Russia demonstrated that geopolitical risk had begun to outweigh the benefits of global economic interdependence. But if corporate exit is one indicator of the beginning of a new “age of wars”, the gradual return of MNCs could be an indicator of its eventual end. Corporate return should not, however, be measured as a binary variable of returned/not returned. It is better understood as a sequence of increasingly costly and difficult-to-reverse commitments. This paper proposes a “corporate re-entry ladder” ranging from renewed institutional contacts and market reconnaissance to direct commercial presence and, ultimately, irreversible capital investment. The critical indicator of geopolitical normalization is therefore not the return of the first Western brand. It is the moment when MNCs once again become willing to risk capital on the assumption that political stability will endure for the next 10–20 years.
The longstanding assumption that six submarines are sufficient for the Israeli Navy is now obsolete. Threats to Israel’s natural gas assets and sea approaches have multiplied across the Mediterranean, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, and Turkey is developing its own undersea fleet in an assertive maritime expansion. An eight-submarine force would enable more effective simultaneous activity across all three theaters.
Photo: Jaber Jehad Badwan, via Wikimedia Commons, licensed under CC BY-SA 4.0. No changes made
The increased delay between updates is because the situation is more or less stagnant. Events occur, but they are largely repetitive and changes in the situation are small. All the participants have reduced the intensity of their efforts, with occasional brief and small escalations, and are playing the long game. However, tension remains as a new major escalation is anticipated—especially in the Iranian arena, but also in Lebanon and Gaza. Over the past few days, there have also been reports that the Israeli military is preparing for a possible escalation of Palestinian attacks in Judea and Samaria – perhaps even by the Palestinian Authority itself.
Documents recently declassified in Israel have disclosed the gravity of an arms deal that came into effect between Sri Lanka and Israel in the mid-1980s, a turbulent period during which Tamil militant separatism was severely threatening the short-lived political-economic prosperity of J.R Jayawardene’s government in Colombo. While the relationship between the two countries has long been complex, their defense collaboration has remained nearly constant.
The Mattei Plan and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) should not be treated as separate but overlapping corridors. Rather, they represent complementary layers of an emerging Indo-Mediterranean connectivity architecture. IMEC provides the east–west spine linking India, the Gulf, and Europe while the Mattei Plan extends European connectivity southward into Africa. Italy sits at the intersection of the two, leveraging its Mare Nostrum strategy to link the economic zones of the Indo-Pacific with those of the Euro-Atlantic by placing an EU leg in IMEC. Within this triangle, India provides technological scale and the eastern anchor, Israel brings a critical security and technological hinge in the Eastern Mediterranean, and Italy ensures a European institutional gateway and linkage to Africa through the Mattei Plan. As geopolitical realignments reshape global trade, connectivity, and data flows, IMEC is emerging as more than a network of ports, railways, and logistics infrastructure. The corridor’s long-term strategic significance will also depend on the digital architecture that underpins it: secure data networks, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, critical infrastructure protection, and resilient technological supply chains. The potential emergence of an India–Israel–Italy technology triangle is a critical component of IMEC’s future development.
The investigation into a suspected Hamas network operating across Cyprus, Greece, and several other countries highlights a dimension of the Hamas threat that deserves greater attention. Hamas has repeatedly demonstrated an ability to adapt its organizational structure to changing circumstances. As Israel continues to dismantle Hamas’s military infrastructure and weaken its territorial control in Gaza, the terrorist organization may become increasingly reliant on its external networks. For Israel, Greece, and Cyprus, this possibility requires closer attention to cross-border intelligence cooperation, terrorist financing, and the infrastructure that allows Hamas to regenerate beyond its traditional territorial base.
Israel’s failed 2006 war against Hezbollah spurred IDF doctrinal and force structure changes that were ultimately embodied in its Momentum Multiyear Plan of 2020. The resulting full spectrum multi-domain warfare strategy contributed to Israel’s 2024 military success against Iran’s strongest proxy. Jerusalem’s Northern Arrows campaign devastated Hezbollah’s military, unleashing forces that upended Iran’s “ring of fire” strategy and compromised the Islamic Republic’s survival.
Increasingly well-coordinated and deadly rebel assaults on Pakistani security forces in Balochistan have revealed the extreme vulnerability of the Pakistani military in the province. The enormity of the territory, lack of local support, inability to commit sufficient forces, and porous borders with Iran and Afghanistan render the Baloch challenge to the Pakistani army nearly impossible to counter. The violence is spilling into the Sistan and Balochistan province of Iran, which is experiencing its own Baloch insurgency.
In a coordinated offensive, cyber actors directly linked to the Iranian regime recently executed a series of targeted digital intrusions against water infrastructure in the US. This aggressive campaign focused on the operational technology networks of municipal drinking water and wastewater treatment facilities across seven to twelve states. Unlike traditional cyber espionage campaigns, this unconventional and widespread operation was explicitly designed for real-world physical sabotage of a vital civilian resource.
India’s emerging private space sector is often presented as a story of entrepreneurship and market liberalization, but there is more to it than that. It reflects a broader reorganization of national capability in which commercialization, security imperatives, industrial policy and status ambitions converge. India has evolved from Vikram Sarabhai’s development-oriented vision to an increasingly dual-use space strategy, shaped by China’s 2007 antisatellite test, Mission Shakti in 2019, and the institutional reforms introduced from 2020 onward. Private participation has responded to both ISRO’s capacity constraints and New Delhi’s pursuit of a more resilient and autonomous technological ecosystem, a transformation best understood as state-enabled commercialization: public institutions retain control over regulation, infrastructure, technology transfer and strategic priorities, while private firms assume greater responsibility for design, production, launch services and experimentation. Such a distributed architecture may strengthen redundancy, technological adaptability and resistance to foreign leverage while expanding India’s commercial and diplomatic reach. There are institutional lessons here for Israel, particularly in terms of regulation, shared infrastructure, government procurement and the state’s role as an anchor customer.

Accessibility Toolbar