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Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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THE GAZA TERROR OFFENSIVE: The Iranian and Lebanese Chapter
6 May – 14 June 2026

Two issues have dominated the period since the last update: the escalation in skirmishes between the United States military and that of Iran on the one hand, and the declarations that an agreement has been reached between the United States and Iran on the other. However, the contours of the supposed agreement are unclear. Immediately after the two sides declared that they had come to terms, they offered completely contradictory descriptions of what was contained in the agreement. The reality of what was agreed to will become apparent on implementation. The agreement was supposed to be signed on 14 June, but at time of writing this has not yet happened.

Venture Capital in the Age of Wars: Geopolitical Competition and the Transformation of Innovation

The emergence of an “Age of Wars” is fundamentally reshaping venture capital. Technologies associated with security, resilience, strategic autonomy, and military effectiveness are increasingly replacing consumer-oriented innovation as the primary destinations for investment. As a result, venture capital is becoming progressively intertwined with national security, state policy, and geopolitical competition.

The Challenge of Formulating Israel’s First Official National Security Strategy

A recent law requires, for the first time, that any new Israeli government prepare a national security strategy within 150 days of its formation. As general elections are to be held no later than October 2026, Israel may soon approve its first official national security strategy. While this represents an opportunity to impose coherence on the country’s misaligned strategic orientation and security doctrine, it comes at a time of strategic and institutional drift following the multi-front wars that ensued in the wake of the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023. As the National Security Council is too weak to lead the complex effort to write a cohesive and robust national security strategy, a superficial strategy may instead result that squanders the opportunity provided by the new law. Steps must be taken to ensure that the new strategy is shaped in such a way as to ensure continuous reassessment and to foster constant learning and adaptation in the face of the ever-changing regional landscape.

Mediation, Adaptation, and Survival: Pakistan in the West Asia Crisis

Pakistan is attempting to position itself as a mediator in the West Asia crisis during the conflict involving the United States, Israel, and Iran. This effort should be viewed not as a neutral peace initiative but as a calculated survival strategy. Islamabad seeks to convert its geopolitical relevance into economic, diplomatic, and security gains against a backdrop of economic fragility, high dependence on external actors, and persistent security threats on its borders. There are three primary motives behind Pakistan’s involvement: the need to curb economic shocks resulting from regional escalation; the fear of instability spreading to the domestic arena, particularly Balochistan; and the need to carefully manage relations with Saudi Arabia and Iran simultaneously. Pakistani mediation does not reflect surplus power or regional decisiveness. It is instead an effort to maintain maneuverability, accumulate legitimacy, and prevent a deterioration that would primarily harm Pakistan itself.

India-South Korea Relations in a Fragmented Strategic Order

The April 2026 meeting between South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi marks a shift in India-South Korea relations from economic engagement to strategic resilience amid a fragmenting international order. While the longstanding economic partnership, highlighted by the 2009 Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, laid the groundwork for cooperation, current geopolitical tensions, including the war in the Persian Gulf, emphasize the need for enhanced collaboration in energy security, advanced manufacturing, and maritime stability. Both nations recognize the importance of diversifying partnerships to mitigate strategic vulnerabilities. Ultimately, the success of this partnership will hinge on institutionalizing cooperation and converting strategic intent into tangible industrial and technological advancements.

Iran’s Strait of Hormuz Strategy: Leverage, Limits, and Regional Implications

Iran’s ongoing strategy of leveraging the Strait of Hormuz as a geopolitical pressure point is widely perceived as a source of strategic advantage. However, this assessment overlooks a fundamental reality: Iran is structurally more vulnerable to sustained disruption of the strait than are its regional adversaries. With the overwhelming majority of its oil exports and trade dependent on this corridor, any prolonged closure would inflict severe economic damage on Iran itself, exacerbating internal instability and limiting its strategic endurance.

The Other Iranian Energy Crisis: How Israeli Gas Disruptions Will Reshape East Mediterranean Energy Infrastructure

The global oil shock created by Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz obscured a second energy crisis that unfolded much closer to Israel’s borders. The month-long shutdown of Israel’s Leviathan and Karish gas fields, caused by repeated Iranian and Hezbollah missile attacks, was the longest gas export disruption since Israel began supplying gas to Jordan and Egypt. This interruption, the third in the past two years, exposed how dependent Israel’s neighbors have become on Israeli gas for electricity generation, and reinforced a broader strategic lesson for them. Viewing Israeli supplies as unreliable, Jordan, Egypt and even Syria are now more likely to deepen hedging strategies by expanding renewables, maintaining costly backup fuels, increasing LNG flexibility, and looking for alternative regional transport and energy corridors. The bright side is that this shift may strengthen the case for IMEC by reframing it less as a Europe-oriented transit initiative and more as a domestic infrastructure project for ensuring intra-regional energy security.

Avoiding the Knife Fight: Defeating Iran’s Strait Strategy

Iran has long prepared to close the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a major conflict with the United States, hoping to trigger an energy shock, draw US naval forces into a confined battlespace, and impose enough cost to weaken Washington's will. The US has been fully cognizant of Tehran's intent for decades and planned accordingly. In the recent conflict, rather than accept a direct fight inside the Strait on Iranian terms, Washington and Jerusalem widened the campaign, degraded Iran's command structure, air defenses, naval forces, missile infrastructure, and supporting systems, and only then turned more directly to the Strait itself. Even so, reopening the waterway has proved difficult. The IRGC’s naval capacity, though significantly diminished, is still sufficient to threaten shipping through mines, small craft, and shore-based systems. As a result, the United States has shifted to a broader indirect approach that combines limited military operations in and around the Strait with strikes and threats of further strikes on vital targets, economic coercion, blockade measures, and a diplomatic alternative. Thus far, that approach appears to be working. Iran's Strait strategy has not forced the United States into the kind of fight Tehran had spent decades anticipating.
IDF spokesperson

What is my country: Striving for power or Fleeing weakness?

The Epic Fury/Roaring Lion War is a litmus test for the power index of many countries. For the purposes of this paper, power resides in a country’s security and economic posture. In between the pole of the global main power (the United States) and the pole of many weak countries (Spain as a new member) the other countries exist on a continuum between two types: those that strive for power and those that flee from weakness. Based on a preliminary and qualitative perspective, it can be said that the United States, China, and Russia grew stronger as a result of the war; Iran has returned to fleeing from weakness. France and Britain established themselves on the side of fleeing from weakness, while Germany took another step toward achieving power. Saudi Arabia's pursuit of power has been undermined, as has the other Gulf states, fle from weakness. Israel advanced in its pursuit of power, but that power is unbalanced. Further in-depth power analysis is required as the 'dust settles', and it should be used to advance significant opportunities and hedge risks.

Why Did Trump Go to War with Iran? It Wasn’t Just Bibi

The popular premise that Donald Trump decided to go to war with Iran because Benjamin Netanyahu asked him to is a misleading distortion. Trump’s decision was the product of a 40-year personal grudge, a hard lesson learned from Kim Jong-un's nuclear immunity in Hanoi, and a cold-eyed calculation about China's cheap Iranian oil lifeline. Trump saw an opportunity to shatter the Iran-Russia-China-North Korea axis in a single blow and to remind the world that American power is by no means in decline. Netanyahu gave the door a push, but it was already wide open.

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