THIS ARTICLE WILL BE REGULARLY UPDATED.
THE MOST RECENT UPDATES WILL BE AT THE TOP.
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 2,215, June 16, 2026
“We cannot always prevent the murder of workers in an orchard or sleeping families, but we can set a high price for our blood. A price too high for the Arab settlement, the Arab army and the Arab government to pay. … [Retaliation operations] are not for vengeance. It is an act of punishment and warning, that if that state does not control its population and does not prevent them attacking us – the Israeli forces will cause havoc in its land.“
IDF Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan,
Lecture to IDF officers: “Retaliation Operations as a Means of Ensuring Peace”, July 1955
(Published in IDF monthly journal Skira Hodsheet, August 1955).
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6 May – 14 June 2026
Two issues have dominated the period since the last update: the escalation in skirmishes between the United States military and that of Iran on the one hand, and the declarations that an agreement has been reached between the United States and Iran on the other. However, the contours of the supposed agreement are unclear. Immediately after the two sides declared that they had come to terms, they offered completely contradictory descriptions of what was contained in the agreement. The reality of what was agreed to will become apparent on implementation. The agreement was supposed to be signed on 14 June, but at time of writing this has not yet happened.
Meanwhile, in Lebanon, the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah, dubbed “the Ceasefire War” by an Israeli comedian, has escalated. Hezbollah increased its attacks into Israel and Israel responded by increasing airstrikes on Hezbollah positions, including two attacks on the Dakhya Quarter in southern Beirut, where Hezbollah’s main headquarters are located. Israel also ordered the re-evacuation of all cities, towns and villages of south Lebanon up to the Zaharani River so as to enable it to strike Hezbollah without harming civilians. Hundreds of thousands of Lebanese civilians have once again moved north. Israeli ground forces also resumed their advance into Lebanese territory, capturing several dominating ridges from which fire was being conducted into Israel. After the first Israeli strike on Beirut (7 June), Iran fired more than 20 missiles at Israel, to which Israel responded with two waves of airstrikes on Iran. On 13 and 14 June, Hezbollah fired once again into Israeli territory, and Israel responded with further strikes in the Dakhya Quarter. Iran declared that it will fire at Israel again (though it has not yet done so at time of writing).
It is very unlikely that Hezbollah fired into Israel without Iranian involvement in the decision. This can accordingly be viewed as an Iranian attempt to challenge the American version of the agreement, which does not connect Lebanon to the situation in the Gulf. The question for Israel is this: If Iran fires at Israel, will the United States prevent Israel from retaliating against Iran or not?
Iran:
In theory, there is finally an agreement between the United States and Iran. However, whereas the United States describes the conditions of the agreement as meeting its demands (the removal of the approximately 450 kilograms of partially enriched uranium from Iran, the opening of free passage through the Hormuz Strait, and no reduction in sanctions on Iran or release of frozen Iranian assets until these are achieved), the Iranians describe an agreement that is completely opposite in every particular (Iran only delays, rather than ceases, the further enrichment of uranium; the Hormuz Strait is to be controlled by Iran and Oman, who are to receive payment for passage therein; frozen assets will be freed; and an international fund will be established to repair the damage inflicted on Iran during the war – in other words, the United States and the Arab oil states will pay to rebuild Iran).
Initially, the United States claimed the agreement would be signed by delegations from each country and began seeking a venue. The Iranians responded that they would not send a delegation and the signing ceremony would be conducted remotely by video conference.
Is there an actual agreement? If so, what are its terms? Will the signatories bother to implement it? The issue is still up in the air. Experience suggests that the Iranians will do all they can to obfuscate and cheat. They are playing for time, apparently assessing that President Trump’s repeated threats to attack without doing so signal that he is unwilling to renew the war and can therefore be “played”. This Iranian view was strengthened by Trump’s criticism of Israel for responding to attacks on its civilians with strikes on Hezbollah’s headquarters in Beirut.
Since the ceasefire began, the Iranians have attacked 16 to 19 merchant ships (the frequency of such incidents has gone down since the last report). Most of these ships were attacked while transiting the Hormuz Strait and a few while anchored near ports along the coast between the Strait at the southern edge of the Gulf and Kuwait at the northern edge. There have been multiple reports of attempts by combat boats of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to approach ships, but these ended without attacks as American warships approached the areas.
Meanwhile, the American Navy has turned back approximately 125 ships sailing to or from Iran. Most turned back immediately when ordered to do so, but a few tried to run the blockade. Of these, three to five were seized and six were hit by American ship guns or aircraft. Of the six ships hit by American fire, one or two were also seized (thus counted in both lists) and the others turned back.
The Iranians claim that a couple of hundred ships have sailed through the Strait on the Iranian side, with Iran’s permission and after their owners paid a passage tax to Iran. These are not ships from Iranian ports that the Americans are blocking. They are ships from ports on the Arab side of the Gulf whose owners prefer to pay rather than risk attack or delay. However, the true number is not clear, as the Iranians tend to invent numbers to suit their propaganda.
On 4 May, the American Navy sent ships to escort merchant ships crossing the Strait near the Emirati and Omani coasts. This precipitated a skirmish with the Iranians who fired on the merchant ships and probably also on the American ships. The Iranians also fired at civilian targets in Oman and the Emirates. The escort program was officially cancelled the following day, but seems to have been quietly renewed at some later date. It appears that about 100 merchant ships have since transited the Strait safely.
This greatly weakened Iran’s bargaining position, especially since the American blockade was continuing successfully. Since the official halting of the operation, there have been four or five incidents in which American naval vessels engaged Iranian forces attempting to enforce the closure of the Strait, so the operation is apparently continuing even if not in the manner of American ships sailing as direct escorts of merchant ships. During these incidents, several Iranian combat boats were sunk, a radar installation was destroyed, and one or two Iranian missile or exploding drone launch sites were hit. In at least one case, the Iranians attempted a direct attack on American ships but failed to hit them. They claim to have shot down an American drone. After each incident, the Iranians also fired missiles and exploding drones at Kuwait and the Arab Emirates. The Iranians claim that they target only the American bases in those countries, but they also fired at civilian targets, such as Kuwait’s international airport, and have inflicted civilian casualties (one dead; several wounded). Five American soldiers were wounded.
Over the past week, the Iranians renewed their attempts to intercept merchant ships. American warships shot down Iranian missiles and exploding drones and fired on Iranian speedboats. American aircraft retaliated by destroying relevant Iranian installations on islands and near the shore (radars, missile launchers, and exploding drone launchers). On 8 June, an American attack helicopter was shot down (the crew was rescued) in the Hormuz Strait. On the nights of 9-10 and 10-11 June, the Americans increased the number of strikes and apparently also bombed targets further inland. A third wave of strikes was planned for the night of 11-12 June but was cancelled by President Trump who declared that an agreement had been reached with Iran to be signed within a few days. Each night, Iran retaliated to the American strikes by firing surface-to-surface missiles and exploding drones at American bases in Jordan, Bahrain and Kuwait.
The escalated American strikes came on the heels of two waves of Israeli airstrikes. On 7 June, Israel conducted an airstrike on a Hezbollah post in Beirut. Iran retaliated by firing three salvos of missiles at Israel (22-25 missiles; the exact number is unclear). They were intercepted by Israeli anti-missile batteries. No Israelis were hurt directly by the missiles, though a few were injured while rushing to shelters. Minor damage was caused to residential buildings by falling debris from intercepted missiles. One missile shard fell on a hangar housing utility vehicles (forklifts?) at an Israeli air force base. The first salvo was directed at northern Israel, the second at central Israel, and the third at southern Israel. The Iranians claim they were targeting Israeli air force bases, but even if some of their missiles were aimed at those bases, the others were undoubtedly aimed at civilian areas. The Yemenite Houthis joined in and fired two missiles towards “occupied Jaffa” (i.e., Tel Aviv). Both were intercepted, but the Houthis of course claim to have hit their targets “precisely”.
Israel retaliated with two waves of airstrikes, each involving a few dozen aircraft. The targets in the first strike were air defense installations (radars and anti-aircraft missile launchers) and surface-to-surface missile installations the Iranians had been repairing during the ceasefire. The second strike hit a petrochemical plant that was manufacturing ingredients for surface-to-surface missiles. (That was the cryptic way in which it was reported. The Israelis are probably referring to ingredients for the manufacture of solid fuel for missiles.) The second strike also hit the aerospace university of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Tehran and a drone manufacturing plant. According to Iran, two Iranian soldiers were killed and 15 wounded in the Israeli strikes.
Israel was ready to launch a third wave of strikes when President Trump demanded a cessation of the exchange. To quote Vice President J.D. Vance, American and Israeli interests had diverged. The United States preferred to achieve an agreement with no more fighting on the belief that it could achieve the fundamental goal of the war, the elimination of Iran’s nuclear weapons program, through diplomatic means. Iran agreed to cease missile fire, claiming it had achieved its goal of proving that it was defending Hezbollah and Lebanon from Israeli aggression. If, before the exchange, Iran had stated that any Israeli attacks on Hezbollah in Beirut would be met by an Iranian response, it now added that it would respond to Israeli attacks in southern Lebanon as well. Israel ignored the Iranian ultimatum, continued striking southern Lebanon (with no Iranian response), and stated that in the event of further Hezbollah attacks on northern Israel, it would, as it had before the current exchange, respond by attacking Beirut. And despite Vance’s statement, the United States itself conducted strikes inside Iran, as described above.
The Iranian government is working hard to strengthen its image vis-à-vis the Iranian population. In addition to initiating and funding demonstrations in support of the regime, it is selling its military successes in the war both by understating the damage and casualties it has suffered and by inflating the casualties and damage it has inflicted on the United States and Israel. In a television interview, a regime representative claimed that during the war the Iranians have killed more than 1,000 American soldiers and 2,000 Israelis, and that the numbers are so low because Iran held itself back. The true numbers, even including the killed of all the other countries targeted by the Iranians, are of course much lower: 13 Americans, 21 Israelis, and 74 from the Arab peninsula states, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and the Palestinian Authority. The Iranian government is airing programs on television explaining the use of rifles and has conducted weapons training at some of the pro-regime demonstrations.
Another front of the war is financial operations. The US Department of the Treasury has targeted Iranian international money transfers. The Iranians bypassed some of the sanctions by using cryptocurrency and through the assistance of Turkey and Pakistan. The United States has managed to confiscate a billion dollars’ worth of cryptocurrency.
Throughout the period, the Iranians have continued to sporadically fire missiles and exploding drones at Iranian Kurdish anti-regime forces based in Iraq.
Lebanon:
The United States hosted negotiations between Israel and Lebanon to achieve a political agreement. However, when a ceasefire between the two countries was declared, it was quickly proven empty, because the Lebanese government has no control over Hezbollah. The Lebanese government is, in fact, threatened by Hezbollah. (On 24 May, the General Secretary of Hezbollah stated outright that the negotiations were a betrayal and cause for rebellion against the government.) The Lebanese army is not able to fight Hezbollah, and parts of it are in fact Hezbollah proxies. The talks were for show and effectively irrelevant.
Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has escalated since the last update. All together, since the beginning of the so-called ceasefire in mid-April, Hezbollah has conducted approximately 1,000 attacks, of which about a quarter were into Israel and the rest at Israeli troops in south Lebanon. In most attacks, more than one munition was fired, so there have in fact been thousands of exploding drones of various sizes (approximately 55% of all attacks), rockets and mortar bombs (approximately 33% of all attacks), and anti-tank missiles fired by Hezbollah as well as many bombs placed in houses and roadsides. Exploding drones are the cause of most of the Israeli casualties. Since the beginning of the ceasefire in mid-April, 12 more Israeli soldiers have been killed since the last update and 68 wounded (46 since the last update), and another Israeli soldier was killed in an accident. Four Israeli civilians have been wounded. As of 31 May, Hezbollah increased the distance into Israel it was firing rockets, reaching the towns of Acre, Karmiel, Safad and Tiberias – a depth of 17 to 30 kilometers inside Israel.
Hezbollah’s anti-aircraft defenses are weak, but they have made more than 30 attempts to shoot down Israeli aircraft. So far they have managed to shoot down one medium-sized drone, perhaps two.
Israel has responded by ordering the population of south Lebanon to evacuate, at first from villages near the Israeli front line but gradually encompassing the entire area up to the Zaharani River. So far, this excludes the city of Sidon but includes the towns of Tyre and Nabatiya and many dozens of villages in an area originally populated by several hundred thousand people.
As the population left, the Israelis escalated their airstrikes, using combat aircraft to bomb detected Hezbollah positions and armed drones to strike individual Hezbollah personnel sighted in the open, as well as rocket launchers and other weapons. Approximately 3,500 targets were hit in total. In many cases, because the IDF waited for the civilians to evacuate, only materiel was hit, as Hezbollah personnel exploited the warnings to civilians to evacuate too. However, once the evacuations became permanent and Hezbollah wanted to continue fighting, it found itself without civilian cover. The attacks on individual Hezbollah personnel have focused on commanders. Over the past month, the divisional commander of Hezbollah’s Nasser division (they have three static regional divisions in south Lebanon) and his deputy were both killed, as well as the deputy’s replacement a few days later. At least half a dozen brigade and battalion commanders have also been killed.
Quadcopter with attached warhead guided via optic-fiber communication
Israel initially responded to the attacks on its civilians solely through attacks in south Lebanon during which it hunted the rocket launchers. But on 7 June, it conducted an attack on a small Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut, killing several mid-level personnel and wounding more. This attack was Iran’s excuse to fire missiles at Israel.
Towards the end of May, Israeli troops gradually began advancing deeper into Lebanon to capture all remaining hill crests in eastern south Lebanon from which there is a direct line of sight to northern Israeli villages. At time of writing, about 600 square kilometers of south Lebanon are held by Israel. Behind the front line, Israeli troops scour the land in pursuit of Hezbollah weapons caches, tunnels, command posts, and so on. These are scattered both inside and underneath residential and public buildings, as well as at many sites hidden in forests and scrub between built-up areas.
In an attempt to halt the Israeli advance, Hezbollah apparently attempted to breach the Qaroun Dam to release its water into the Litani River ravine. Israeli aircraft attacked the Hezbollah team working on this project, halting it.
Since the beginning of the ceasefire, the Israelis have killed at least 900 Hezbollah personnel (700 since the last update) and wounded many hundreds more (there is no information on how many exactly). The majority were killed by air and drone strikes, though a portion were also killed during close-range ground combat with Israeli infantry and tanks. There are reports in the Lebanese media that the accumulating casualties are causing a morale crisis in Hezbollah. Since they joined the war against Israel on 8 October 2023 (a day after the Hamas offensive), they have lost at least 6,000 killed, perhaps as many as 6,500, and at least that many wounded (one report claimed the wounded are double the number of killed). These numbers mean that at least 20%, perhaps as many as 33%, of Hezbollah’s prewar manpower have become casualties (though probably many of the wounded have recovered). One report states that this has caused incidents of refusal by lower ranks to obey orders considered too risky and an attempt to mobilize teenagers from Hezbollah’s youth movement to replace casualties and insubordinate troops.
Many feel the leadership is operating to serve Iran’s interests, not the interests of local Lebanese Shiites. The repeated evacuations of civilians from their homes, many of whom will have no home to return to as the Israelis are destroying every building in which Hezbollah has stored weapons or from which it fights, is also causing a gradual loss of support among the Shiite population. However, these reports should be regarded with caution, as it is difficult to check the credibility of the sources.
On 6 June, the IDF destroyed a vehicle moving near Hezbollah positions in an area whose civilians had been evacuated. The vehicle was driving in the direction of Israeli troops positioned further along the road. However, the occupants were not Hezbollah, but a Lebanese Army brigadier-general, a captain and a soldier. It is not clear what they were doing in that area given that it was a combat zone between Israel and Hezbollah; nor is it known why were they moving towards the Israeli forces without prior coordination via the military liaison committee.
Hezbollah has also targeted some Christian villages in south Lebanon, as well as UNIFIL positions.
Letter found by IDF soldiers in an evacuated Christian village in south Lebanon (“Yellow” refers to Hezbollah, whose flag is yellow)
The Lebanese government reported that approximately 3,666 people have been killed and approximately 11,321 wounded during the fighting from 2 March 2026 till the ceasefire. However, it did not provide separate numbers for military and civilian casualties. According to Israel, more than 2,600 (perhaps as many as 3,100) of the killed are Hezbollah personnel. In addition to Hezbollah fatalities, the killed include several dozen each from the Lebanese army, Amal militia, Palestinian militias, and an Iranian proxy militia.
Yemen:
During the exchange between Iran and Israel on 7-8 June, the Houthis fired two surface-to-surface missiles that were intercepted. They also declared that they were reimposing the blockade on Israeli ships sailing through the Bab al-Mandeb Straits.
On 9 June, after the Iranian-Israeli exchange ended, the Houthis launched an exploding drone that was shot down before reaching Israeli territory.
At time of writing, Israel has not responded.
Gaza:
The situation in Gaza has not changed. There too, the ceasefire is on paper only. There are daily skirmishes along the Yellow Line between Israeli forces manning the line and Hamas and other organizations attempting to attack their positions or infiltrate the line.
In response, in addition to defensive actions, Israel is gradually ramping up pressure on Hamas. Occasionally, Israel conducts airstrikes inside the Hamas-controlled area on specific commanders or combat teams of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In a series of strikes beginning on 16 May, the Israelis killed the supreme military commander of Hamas in Gaza (the third killed by Israel since 7 October) and then, 10 days later, killed his replacement. With the death of the latter, Israel has killed all the senior political, administrative and military leaders of Hamas who were in office on 7 October. Since the last update, they have also killed a number of other Hamas commanders, including a brigade commander and various senior staff officers. They have also killed several senior commanders of Palestinian Islamic Jihad.
Anti-Hamas Palestinian groups have conducted raids against Hamas personnel leading to skirmishes with casualties on both sides. Hamas claims these groups received support from the Israeli military.
The Israelis are gradually pushing the Yellow Line further into Hamas-controlled territory. After their withdrawal to the Yellow Line, the Israelis held about 56% of Gaza, but over the past month they have gradually increased that to approximately 60%. Behind the Yellow Line they continue to discover and destroy tunnels and above-ground weapons storage sites.
Israel:
Two terrorist attacks were conducted by Israeli Arabs.
In the Galilee, an Israeli Arab armed with a knife attacked a policeman. The attack failed and the perpetrator was captured.
In central Israel, an Israeli Arab conducted a series of shooting attacks with an improvised submachine gun at the entrance to three Israeli villages. One Israeli guard was killed and another wounded. At the third village, the attacker attempted to enter but was driven off by a guard returning fire. Meanwhile, police and military arrived, chased the attacker and killed him. Two suspected assistants of the attacker were captured.
Attacks such as these by Israeli Arabs are extremely rare.
Judea and Samaria:
Israel’s escalated operations against terrorist attacks continue to drastically reduce the number of such attacks committed by Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. The average over the past few months was approximately 310-350 attacks per month, of which 60-80 were with weapons (improvised bombs, knives, petrol bombs, firearms, cars for ramming attacks, and other implements) and approximately 230-280 were stone-throwing incidents. Average Israeli casualties per month are 8-10 wounded. The last fatality was in March in a car-ramming attack.
Israeli security forces have reported an increase in the number of attacks by Israeli civilians on Palestinians or (in most cases) on Palestinian property. The total numbers have reached proportions similar to those of the Palestinians, though with many fewer incidents in which weapons are used or people are directly attacked. Furthermore, in some of the incidents it is not clear who started the fighting. Thus, for example, in one case, Palestinians stole sheep and were chased by the Israeli shepherd, who called his friends for assistance. Israeli security forces are called in each case to separate the sides. A number of Israelis have been arrested for involvement in these incidents. In at least two cases, the Israelis involved also attacked the Israeli soldiers and police with stones.
Turkey:
President Erdoğan and other senior Turkish leaders have continued and perhaps even escalated their verbal attacks on Israel, hinting that sooner or later, Turkey will resort to military force against it. Given Turkey’s economic situation, most analysts think this is mostly political grandstanding for Erdoğan’s religious supporters. However, Turkey’s deep involvement with the new regime in Syria could create problematic situations if Israel has to operate against that regime. It has already had to do so several times over the past 18 months, both to push back radical Islamists trying to attack Israel from Syrian territory and to protect the Druze minority when they were attacked by the regime.
WHAT NEXT?
The main questions are: Is there an agreement between the US and Iran? What are its actual terms? And will it be implemented? Is this really a more powerful agreement, or merely a repeat of the useless Obama agreement under a new name?
Another question is the success or failure of Iran’s attempt to tie Israel’s hands against Hezbollah by making its agreement with the United States contingent on Israel’s stopping its operations against that organization. If Iran succeeds in this, Hezbollah will be able to recover after the defeats and heavy casualties it has suffered. The Americans’ attempts to mediate an agreement between Israel and Lebanon have no true bearing because the Lebanese government has no control over Hezbollah, so any agreement it signs is irrelevant; an agreement can serve solely to limit Israel’s ability to defend itself without having any effect on Hezbollah.
It is very unlikely that Hezbollah renewed its fire into Israel without Iran’s having been involved in the decision. Indeed, it may even have ordered it. Israel’s response in Beirut was something the Iranians wanted to happen so they could test Israel’s resolve and, even more so, the Americans’ resolve. Iran has declared that it will fire missiles into Israel (to quote: “tonight the skies over the Jews will rain missiles”).
Will President Trump demand that Israel refrain from reacting to Iranian attacks on it, as President Biden did in the past? Trump has already criticized Israel for responding to Hezbollah’s attacks on its territory by striking Hezbollah headquarters in Beirut. In so doing, he essentially signaled to Hezbollah that it has a safe haven and is immune to attack.
Trump is also signaling to the Iranians that he is desperate to achieve a deal, good or bad, at any cost. They are sure to attempt to capitalize on this.
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30 March – 5 May 2026
In theory, there has been a ceasefire in place since 8 April in the war of the United States and Israel versus Iran and of Iran’s allies in Iraq versus the United States and Kuwait. There has also purportedly been a ceasefire in place since 17 April in the war of Israel versus Iran’s ally in Lebanon, Hezbollah. In fact, these are typical Middle Eastern ceasefires, meaning that fire has not ceased; it has merely reduced in volume.
Iran has continued to attack merchant ships trying to pass through the Hormuz Strait without its permission. The United States has been responding since 13 April by blockading Iranian ships exiting the Strait towards the Indian Ocean. On 4 May, the United States Navy escorted two oil tankers through the Hormuz Strait. Iranian attempts to prevent their passage by using missiles and small armed boats were foiled with fire. Iran then attacked the Emirates and Oman, inflicting damage and casualties.
There are reports claiming that some Arab states are requesting that the United States end the ceasefire and renew the offensive on Iran.
In Lebanon, fighting has continued since the ceasefire was declared, at a reduced intensity but higher than that occurring in the Hormuz Strait. There have been dozens of casualties on both sides, though Hezbollah casualties are much higher than Israeli. IDF troops continue to scour captured territory and are finding and destroying weapons caches, tunnels, and all buildings in which military equipment has been found. (Nearly all buildings in the area, both public and private, have rooms or cellars containing weapons caches or entrances to Hezbollah tunnels.) Hezbollah continues to fire exploding drones and rockets at Israeli forces in Lebanon and also at civilian targets inside Israel. This fire is being met with Israeli airstrikes on Hezbollah personnel, positions, command posts, and other sites north of the area captured by Israel, though the Israelis have ceased attacking targets in the depths of Lebanon. Lebanese villagers who reside within the area up to approximately 15 kilometers from the front line have been ordered to evacuate so as not to risk their lives by being adjacent to Hezbollah positions.
In Iraq, the fighting has almost completely subsided, but Iranian proxies occasionally fire exploding drones at American bases or into Kuwait and Iran has fired surface-to-surface missiles and exploding drones at anti-Iranian organizations based in Iraqi Kurdistan (northern Iraq).
Meanwhile, all the parties have been exploiting the ceasefire to rearm.
Iran:
On 8 April (Middle Eastern time), a ceasefire was declared by President Trump. During the ceasefire, the United States and Iran have conducted negotiations, mediated by Pakistan, on a permanent agreement. These talks have achieved nothing, as the parties’ basic “red lines” are far apart. Trump demands at a minimum that all existing partially enriched uranium and any enriching equipment that still exists be removed from Iran. Iran refuses to comply and demands instead that it be allowed to maintain its enriching capabilities.
The Iranians have added further demands that are totally unacceptable to Trump. They want compensation for all the damage caused to them during the war; they want any ship transiting the Hormuz Strait to receive permission from Iran to do so; and they want payment for that passage, as though the Strait were sovereign Iranian territory.
After the Iranians attacked ships transiting the Strait during the ceasefire, shooting at some and capturing others (10-12 ships have been fired upon, seized or harassed and compelled to turn back), the United States imposed a blockade on all ships entering or exiting Iranian ports. According to United States Central Command, more than 45 merchant vessels, almost all of them oil tankers, have been compelled to return to Iran’s ports. The inability to export its oil is costing Iran billions of dollars (the ships turned back are estimated to have been carrying $6 billion worth of oil).
Iran’s storage sites are almost full, so they are refurbishing non-sailworthy tankers to be used as temporary storage sites. Iran will also likely have to reduce oil extraction, which could be costly in and of itself. After a certain level of stoppage, damage can occur to extraction infrastructure, because destructive natural processes begin when oil extraction is stopped. Some of that damage can be very expensive to repair, a cost Iran will have to incur depending on when the blockade is lifted.
Furthermore, at least a quarter – some sources claim a third – of Iran’s economic sector is directly owned by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, and some of the Israeli and American airstrikes during the war were focused on destroying key industrial sites and financial institutions owned by the IRGC. Those strikes caused not only a cessation of work at those sites but also a ripple effect whereby the activities of other plants and institutions that are dependent on supplies from the destroyed industries have slowed down or halted completely.
The result is that Iran’s economy, which was already extremely bad before the war and was one of the main triggers for the anti-regime protests that began in December 2025, is now even worse and will deteriorate further. The real price of dollars and euros in Iran (as opposed to the government-mandated price) jumped 10% over the previous week to reach all-time peaks, and unemployment is peaking (though it is difficult to ascertain the exact numbers).
The Iranian regime is paying people to come to pro-regime demonstrations. An opposition group published a price list: $6 to appear at a demonstration and receive food, $9-10 to appear without receiving food, $25-38 to come with a car. The average salary in Iran is about $150 per month.
On 5 May, the United States Navy initiated an operation to escort and protect vessels as they transit through the Hormuz Strait. An Iranian attempt to block this movement with fire was beaten back. A South Korean ship not involved in the passage was hit. The Iranians also fired missiles and exploding drones at an Emirate port that enables the loading of ships with oil without entering the Hormuz Strait. One missile hit an oil storage tank and wounded two workers from India. The others were shot down with the participation of an Israeli Iron Dome unit that had been transferred to the Emirates together with an Israeli crew.
In Israel, 21 civilians have been killed (including non-Israelis working in Israel) and approximately 7,000 wounded. The vast majority of the wounded and a few of the killed were not hit directly by missiles but were injured rushing to cover – falling down stairs, tripping, or, in a few cases, getting hit by cars while hurriedly crossing roads without checking for traffic.
Thirteen American soldiers have been killed (including six in an accidental collision between two aircraft) and 401 wounded by hostile action, and a few dozen have been wounded through accidents.
In Kuwait, the Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman, 45 people have been killed and 520 wounded. (Some of the fatalities and wounded in the previous report were mistakenly attributed to these countries but were actually from other Arab states.)
Some of the missiles fired at Israel fell short in Syria (killing five and wounding 15), Jordan (29 wounded), and the Palestinian Authority (four killed, seven wounded).
Twenty Kurd members of an anti-Iranian regime organization were killed and 121 wounded in northern Iraq.
One French soldier was killed and six were wounded in Iraq.
Four Azerbaijanis were wounded.
Iran reported that about 3,468 Iranians have been killed and 26,500 wounded. The number of killed is obviously deliberately understated. They did not provide a breakdown between military personnel and civilians. Israel estimates the casualties among Iranian military and internal security personnel to be more than 6,000 killed and approximately 15,000 wounded.
Lebanon:
The final acts of the war prior to the ceasefire saw the Israeli air force, released from missions against Iran, focusing its efforts in Lebanon. In a single simultaneous strike on dozens of Hezbollah positions and bases across Lebanon, more than 300 Hezbollah personnel were killed and many more wounded. Israeli ground forces advanced to a line approximately 10 kilometers north of the Israeli border, taking and clearing dozens of villages.
The ultimate battle was in the town of Bint Jbeyl in central south Lebanon. Israeli forces surrounded the town, trapping a few hundred Hezbollah personnel inside. The town’s civilian population had evacuated in the first week of the war, giving the Israelis freedom of action. The Israelis bombed, bombarded and cleared the town house by house. Most of the Hezbollah personnel were killed, a few were captured, and some probably managed to exfiltrate.
Up to 1.2 million Lebanese civilians living in southern Lebanon and the Shiite quarters of Beirut evacuated areas designated by the IDF as danger zones. This amounts to approximately 70% of the pre-war residents of these areas. These internal refugees, almost all of them Shiites, are being treated with hostility in areas inhabited by Sunnis, Christians, and Druze, who blame them for initiating the war. Christians and Druze living in southern Lebanon were allowed to remain in their villages and towns on condition that they not allow any Hezbollah presence. The ceasefire enabled many Shiites to return to their homes, but some areas were so devastated that their homes no longer existed or were uninhabitable.
When the ceasefire began, the IDF created a defensive line of small posts about 10 km north of Israel’s border. These posts consist of mixed forces of infantry, tanks, and combat engineers. The positions of the posts along this line were chosen to prevent direct line of sight from Lebanese territory into Israel. This is the de facto ceasefire line, and it has been named the Yellow Line (as in Gaza). The area between this line and the Israeli border is dubbed the Yellow Zone. Attempts by Hezbollah to infiltrate the Yellow Zone are being met with fire. Several such attempts have been made that failed, but it is likely that some Hezbollah operatives have gotten through and are now in hiding. Israeli forces are combing the area repeatedly to find them, as well as any others who may have stayed behind during the Israeli advance prior to the ceasefire.
The Israelis are also combing the area to find Hezbollah hideouts, weapons caches, command posts, etc., and are destroying them and any buildings in which they are found. In one case, the Israelis found two tunnels with a combined length of two kilometers. The tunnels had large rooms for personnel to reside in with amenities, weapons storage, and command posts complete with communications equipment. These were destroyed with a few hundred tons of explosives, briefly setting off earthquake warning seismographs in the region.
Each Shiite village contains numerous Hezbollah sites inside residential houses, shops (one command post was found under a clothing shop), public buildings (including medical clinics, mosques, and schools), and in small warrens of tunnels underneath them. These are all being destroyed.
Hezbollah uses ambulances to transport troops and weapons.
Below: a captured ambulance containing weapons.
From the left: outside view, side-door view, rear-door view
Multi-barrel rocket launcher placed in a residential home to be fired through a window. The house was bombed a few seconds after this photograph was taken.
Weapons discovered by Israeli troops in a hospital in Tibnin (South Lebanon).
Following a series of Hezbollah attacks on IDF positions from the area adjacent and to the north of the Yellow Line, the IDF ordered Lebanese civilians living within 15 kilometers north of the Yellow Line to evacuate further north (many who had evacuated during the war had returned shortly after the ceasefire was declared) so as to be able to respond without harming civilians. This area has been dubbed the Red Zone.
Most Hezbollah attacks are conducted using First Person View (FPV) quadcopters controlled via fiber-optic cables. These weapons are immune to the jamming that was effective against previous models controlled by radio. They have to be detected and shot down with firearms, which is much more difficult than radio jamming. The success rate of these attacks has accordingly gone up, inflicting more casualties on Israeli forces – though the numbers, in relative terms, are not large. Of the 18 Israeli soldiers killed and approximately 265 wounded since 2 March, perhaps about 15% were caused by FPV drones. Evacuating civilians from possible launch areas (the Red Zone) will enable a more aggressive hunt for Hezbollah launch teams. A day or two after the first Israeli evacuation notice, the Israeli air force escalated the number of airstrikes against targets in that zone.
Despite the ceasefire, Hezbollah continues to launch rockets and exploding drones into Israel from areas beyond the deployment of the IDF, though at a much reduced rate than before the ceasefire. Given the range of many of these weapons, preventing this would require the IDF to conquer almost all of Lebanon. So Israel’s response, in addition to defensive interception of these rockets and exploding drones (preferably, when possible, over Lebanese territory) and sending the population of the targeted areas away (extrapolating the flight path into Israel), has been to conduct counterstrikes. Some have been conducted against the launchers themselves. Either they are discovered and hit before they fire, or they are located after firing, when they are destroyed to prevent reuse. Strikes are also being conducted against Hezbollah bases across southern Lebanon. At President Trump’s request, Israel has not resumed bombing Shiite neighborhoods in southern Beirut and other Hezbollah facilities across central and northern Lebanon. However, after reducing the frequency of airstrikes in the Red Zone area for a couple of weeks, Israel has increased their frequency over the past week. Israeli drone operators are hunting Hezbollah personnel and either calling in airstrikes or striking them themselves with their drones.
The Lebanese government has agreed to negotiate a peace treaty with Israel and is publicly criticizing Hezbollah for renewing the war. Hezbollah responds by calling the Lebanese president and government traitors for talking to the enemy. Israel has made clear that it is willing to sign a peace treaty and withdraw from Lebanon, but the prerequisite is the disarming of Hezbollah and permanent banishment of its personnel from southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government is currently incapable of doing this, so while the talks continue, they are going nowhere.
Since Hezbollah joined the war on 2 March 2026, three Israeli civilians have been killed (one accidentally by Israeli artillery that was aimed incorrectly and fell in an Israeli village instead of across the border) and approximately 1,500 civilians were wounded, the vast majority in accidents while rushing to cover. (The warning times for munitions launched by Hezbollah are much shorter than for munitions launched by Iran because the distance to be covered is much shorter.) Eighteen Israeli soldiers have been killed (four after the ceasefire was declared on 17 April) and approximately 265 wounded (35-40 after the ceasefire began).
The Lebanese government has reported that approximately 2,550 people have been killed and approximately 7,800 wounded during the fighting from 2 March 2026 until the ceasefire. However, it has not provided separate numbers for military and civilian casualties. According to Israel, at least 1,800 of the killed were Hezbollah personnel (some pro-Hezbollah bloggers and media sources inside Lebanon claim the actual number is about 2,000, but their credibility is not clear). Also killed were a few Lebanese army soldiers, a few Amal militia personnel, and a few members of the Imam Hussein Division (a mercenary group recruited by Iran and operating in Lebanon), including its commander and deputy commander. Some members of the Hamas contingent of the Palestinian refugee neighborhoods in Lebanon (officially called “camps”, though they are in fact urban residential neighborhoods with housing similar to that of the Lebanese neighborhoods around them) have also been killed.
During the ceasefire, another approximately 150 people were reported killed (120 of them Hezbollah) and approximately 300 wounded (how many of them were Hezbollah was not reported) in exchanges of fire between the IDF and Hezbollah.
UNIFIL casualties: six killed (two French and four Indonesians) and an undisclosed number wounded (three French, perhaps four more Indonesians, and an unspecified number of Ghanaians). Two of the Indonesians were killed by a misaimed tank shell. The other fatalities and all the wounded were caused by either deliberate (two French killed and three wounded) or possibly accidental attacks by Hezbollah (at least three Indonesians were wounded when hit by an IED booby-trap) to prevent their interfering with its operations.
Iraq:
The frequency of shooting incidents between Americans and local pro-Iranian militias, not high to begin with, continues at an even lower rate after the ceasefire. Iranian proxies in Iraq have launched exploding drones into Kuwait since the ceasefire began, also at a reduced frequency.
Syria:
There have been several incidents in Syria, including the detection of a multi-barreled rocket launcher near the northern Golan Heights area. According to Syrian newspapers, the launcher was placed there by Hezbollah infiltrators from Lebanon and captured by the Syrian army. The new regime in Syria regards Hezbollah as an enemy, as it supported and fought for the previous Syrian regime against the rebels. There are occasional skirmishes along the Lebanese-Syrian border between the two.
The Jordanian air force bombed what it alleges are drug-manufacturing sites in southern Syria. The drugs produced at these sites are smuggled into Jordan, mostly for local use, while some continue on to other countries. This was one of the Assad regime’s main sources of income when it was in power in Syria. This is not the first time the Jordanians have used military force to attempt to halt the drug trade into their country.
Yemen:
The Houthis fired a few missiles and exploding drones towards Israel during the fighting with Iran, but ceased as soon as the ceasefire with Iran was declared. Israel did not respond.
Gaza:
The situation in Gaza has not changed.
There are daily skirmishes along the Yellow Line as Hamas and other organizations attempt to attack Israeli positions or infiltrate the line. The Israeli forces manning the line respond to these attempts.
In response, Israel is gradually ramping up pressure on Hamas. Israel occasionally conducts airstrikes inside the Hamas-controlled area on specific commanders or combat teams of Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. On at least one occasion, the target was a rocket launcher detected to be aimed towards Israel. Also, in a number of areas, the Israelis have pushed the Yellow Line forward into areas previously controlled by Hamas, taking ground away from it.
Palestinian anti-Hamas groups have conducted several raids against Hamas personnel leading to skirmishes that incurred casualties on both sides.
A new flotilla of 58 boats sailed to Gaza purporting to be carrying humanitarian aid. They were intercepted by the Israeli navy west of Crete. Twenty of the boats were captured and the others turned back, at least temporarily. The people on the captured boats were landed at a port in Crete to return home except for two taken in for questioning in Israel because they are suspected of having ties to terrorist organizations. In any case, this is nothing more than a publicity stunt. The size of the participating vessels is such that all of them put together can carry no more than can be carried by a single one of the hundreds of trucks entering Gaza from Israel every day.
WHAT NEXT
The fighting in Lebanon will continue and will probably escalate somewhat as Israel increases its response to Hezbollah attacks.
The situation in Iran awaits a decision by President Trump. Will he maintain the current status quo in the hope that the naval blockade will ramp up pressure on Iran’s faltering economy, or will he at some point order the resumption of the military offensive, this time aiming to deprive Iran of some of its main economic assets as well as continuing to degrade its military? The decision to use American naval vessels to escort merchant ships through the Hormuz Strait has the potential to escalate into a full-fledged battle. The Iranians claim to have fired on the American ships and even to have hit one. The Americans refute the claim of a hit, but have not refuted the claim that such an attempt was made.
The other possibility – that Trump will back down from his fundamental demand that Iran hand over all its partially enriched uranium and dismantle all enriching equipment and other equipment required to manufacture nuclear weapons – is not very likely, at least at the moment.
There are reports that the Arabian peninsula states prefer a return to full-scale war. They are said to be unwilling to live with the current situation, which is damaging their economies, and are unwilling to let Iran recover its military capabilities to threaten them again in the future. The danger from Iran has been reduced, but it can still pose a major threat.
As noted in previous updates, any result that does not end with the overthrow of the Iranian regime means it will gradually recover its military potential, or enough of it, to become a major threat once again, to both the region in general and to Israel in particular. The considerable success achieved during the war has pushed the Iranians back but cannot do more than delay them from rebuilding their capabilities. The two most threatening are Iran’s nuclear weapons program and its surface-to-surface missile program.
However, as previously noted, overthrowing the regime is a long-term task. The American blockade, with its disastrous consequences for Iran’s economy, is as much a tool to achieve that overthrow as a negotiation lever for coercing Iran to allow freedom of navigation through the Hormuz Strait. Furthermore, if the American navy succeeds, with its combat ship escorts, in increasing the traverse of more ships per day while maintaining the blockade on Iran, Iran’s bargaining power will be reduced even further. In principle, the United States can decide at any time to renew the full-scale offensive, or perhaps conduct a smaller, more focused offensive that can be occasionally repeated. Iran cannot impose limits on this. It is a decision entirely out of its hands and in those of the United States.
****
12 – 29 March 2026
Iran:
The exchange of blows continues between Iran and its proxies on one side and the United States and Israel on the other. In the background, meanwhile, diplomatic negotiations have taken place in which the United States and Iran each declared conditions for ending the war that are totally incompatible and unacceptable to the other – essentially, each side has demanded the other’s total surrender. The signals reaching the media from within the United States government are mixed, probably testifying to an internal debate as to whether to continue, increase the pressure on Iran, or make do with the physical results already achieved (reductions of Iran’s nuclear weapon and missile industries) and reach an accommodation with Iran. The Iranian regime apparently demanded a full ceasefire during which negotiations would be conducted, but President Trump refused, presumably for the reason that the ceasefire would be used by Iran to obfuscate, delay, and recover some of their capabilities.
The Arabian Peninsula states, despite their threats to respond offensively to Iran’s attacks on them, continue to participate only defensively. However, though the Iranians are inflicting major damage on them (more than on Israel), the Emirates and Saudi Arabia both want the war to continue until Iran is on its knees. They understand that any result short of that will rebound on them in the end, leaving them to fend with the Iranian threat alone. To them, the danger lies in a future American president who will deal with Iran not like President Trump but like President Obama. This fear makes it worth almost any cost to achieve the desired result in the current war. To quote a senior Emirati official, the Emirates believes a permanent, not a temporary, solution is needed to avoid future instability.
A major issue is the Iranian blocking of the Hormuz Straits, which has caused a rise in the prices of oil and gas as well as a wide variety of derivative products. Some of that rise is real, as countries that did not prepare reserves are competing to purchase the reduced amount that is able to exit the Gulf. Some reflects exploitation of the situation by vendors to increase profits even where price rises are not warranted. The blocking of the Straits is a deliberate strategy by Iran to inflict suffering on Americans and the external allied states by causing economic damage resulting from the price increases (a higher cost of living, reduced public services such as electricity, and reduced industrial production). The object is to prompt increased pressure on the United States government to stop the war.
The United States government has taken steps to slow the rise in prices, but it has not halted completely. These include releasing oil reserves and reducing or annulling sanctions on the sale of Russian and Iranian oil. President Trump threatened that if Iran does not desist from blocking the Straits, he will order the destruction of Iran’s oil and gas industries – but when Iran refused to comply, he pushed back the date of the ultimatum by two weeks.
Some countries have received permission from Iran to sail their ships through the Straits provided they stay close to the Iranian shore. These include Russia and China, who are Iran’s allies; India, in return for the release of three seized Iranian contraband ships; and apparently Pakistan as well. Others are apparently negotiating for permission too, probably in return for payment of a passage fee. Meanwhile, the number of ships attacked by the Iranians has grown to 23, of which 17 were damaged. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates have increased the flow of oil and gas to their ports outside the Gulf, but those ports cannot handle the quantities that can flow through the Gulf Coast ports.
By 29 March, the Americans and Israelis had reported hitting more than 20,000 targets in Iran. No category breakdown has been provided, and it is difficult to assess progress towards the war’s goals from the published information.
The objectives of the war have not changed.
The minimum objective is: Destruction of Iran’s nuclear and long-range missile industries in the full knowledge that if the regime does not fall, it will have those industries up and running again within an unknown number of years. The more complete the destruction, the longer it will take the regime to rebuild.
The medium objective is: Achieve the minimum but cause so much damage to everything the regime holds dear and to its ability to function that its capacity to recover its nuclear and missile industries is dramatically diminished. In other words, to put the regime into such dire straits that it has no choice but to postpone its nuclear and missile efforts as it will need the scarce resources at its disposal for other, more vital things. With this in mind, Israel and the United States are attacking Iran’s military industry and any other industry that supports it across the board, and they are attacking any military capability than enables Iran to threaten its neighbors.
The maximum objective is: That the regime falls and is replaced with one that is less aggressive and that does not seek nuclear weapons. This is the only permanent solution that can ensure no future recovery of Iran’s nuclear and long-range missile capabilities. It is also considered the least likely to be fulfilled. It would require the longest amount of time and the greatest effort and is totally dependent on the Iranian population. The United States and Israel can make things easier for them, but they cannot effect regime change on their behalf. The official formulation in Israel’s list of objectives is: “Create the conditions for the Iranian people to overthrow the current regime.” Decapitation is part of that process but not enough in and of itself. The desire to assist the Iranian people in this effort is why Israel is attacking not only senior figures but also the lower ranks, down to soldiers deployed in the streets, police, Basij stations, and so on.
As the war develops, resources are allocated and shifted as targets are destroyed and new ones are discovered. Some resources are focused on destroying Iranian air defenses to improve access (thus, over the past two weeks, Iranian air defenses were degraded sufficiently to allow the United States to begin employing B1 and B52 bombers that would otherwise have been vulnerable to such defenses). Also, resources continue to be allocated to attacking missile launchers and storage sites to reduce the number of missiles the Iranians can fire towards the surrounding countries. Resources are also being used against the Iranian forces, especially the navy, that are enforcing the blockade of the Hormuz Straits.
Attacking the nuclear weapons and missile industries: After an initial focus on bombing targets belonging to this category, reports on such attacks have diminished. Now that the main components of these industries have been destroyed, the targets are supportive components like scientific research institutions and personnel (three scientists working in the nuclear weapons program have been reported killed), factories manufacturing raw materials for these programs (a uranium dust processing plant, a heavy water production plant, and others), and components hidden by the Iranians during the war that have since been discovered.
Attacking other military and industrial targets: The major Iranian naval fleet has been decimated in both the Arabian/Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. However, Iran still has a large fleet of small armed motorboats that can harass military and civilian shipping in the Gulf and the Hormuz Straits. Most of the attacks conducted by Iran on merchant ships are by remotely piloted explosive aerial drones or remotely piloted explosive boats. Given their small size and ease of concealment, these are harder to find and destroy before launch. This mission might be one of the objectives behind the employment of American ground forces. Two Marine battalions and a Paratrooper brigade are currently being transferred to the Middle East, and more may be on the way.
Among the bombed half-military/half-civilian industries are steel production factories partially owned by the Revolutionary Guards, fuel storage sites used by the military, electricity production, and more.
Attacking Iran’s leadership: After the initial strike that killed about 40 senior political and military leaders, Israel has continued to hunt down and kill more. They are attempting to hide, so the frequency of kills has diminished. After the killing of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, his son, Mojtaba, was chosen to replace him. He is essentially a figurehead for the Revolutionary Guards. The person who became the de facto leader of Iran on Khamenei’s death was not Mojtaba but Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. The Israelis killed Larijani on 17 March, and his replacement has not yet been publicly announced. Other senior military officers (the commander of the Revolutionary Guard navy and some of his senior staff, several senior intelligence officers, and others) and a handful of other political leaders have also been killed or wounded since the last update. A senior Pakistani official (Pakistan is the lead mediator in the current negotiations) stated that Israel has agreed at least temporarily to refrain from hunting down and killing Iran’s foreign minister and the chairman of the Iranian parliament, who are conducting the negotiations for Iran.
One Iranian response has been to scatter their command organization. They no longer convene at their known headquarters and meet instead at small caravan and tent sites. Israel and the United States are hunting these sites as well. One especially successful strike was against the Basij command hierarchy. They had convened at a desert location far from any of their official bases, but the Israelis found the location and bombed the gathering. Iranian dissidents claim that some 300 Basij commanders were killed in that strike, but this cannot be verified, and similar mass-casualty reports from them have been greatly exaggerated. The commander and his deputy were definitely killed, however. Even if the dissidents exaggerated the extent of the strike, it is clear that a number of province and district commanders and members of the organization’s command staff were killed or wounded.
The Iranians have also taken the step of devolving more authority to lower-ranking officials and commanders. They are now able to conduct actions according to general pre-given instructions even when they are cut off from communication with senior commanders and staff.
Attacking internal security forces: Beginning on 11 March, after bombing many internal security force headquarters and bases, Israel began bombing those forces in the streets as well – especially Basij roadblocks and patrols that are positioned to ensure that the Iranian population does not resume demonstrations against the regime. This has occurred mostly in Tehran, but there are reports of such attacks in one or two other cities as well. At least several dozen Basij personnel have been killed or wounded, but there are no credible reports on the numbers. Some dissident sources report hundreds of dead and wounded, but these figures are not verifiable. The locations are either discovered by drone operators via their video feeds or, according to one source, provided by Iranian citizens who send the locations to a site set up by the Israeli Mossad. This too is not verifiable, but it is known that the Mossad is reaching out via social media to the population of Iran to request such information. In some areas, the Basij have moved their positions to tunnels or roofed sites to hide from aerial surveillance.
Iranian air defense: Decimated but not completely eliminated. The Iranians are using what they have left to continue to harass American and Israeli aircraft flying over Iran. They hide, come out to ambush aircraft, and flee back to cover. They claim to have shot down more than 200 American and Israeli aircraft, some of them purportedly manned but most of them remotely piloted surveillance and strike drones. This is a gross exaggeration. Not a single manned American or Israeli aircraft has been shot down, though one American F35 was reportedly damaged before landing safely. Others have been forced on occasion to take evasive action, but none has been hit. A couple of dozen remotely piloted aircraft (drones) have been shot down, perhaps more, but the Iranians have provided video evidence of only a handful. Medium-sized and large drones are much more vulnerable to anti-aircraft fire than manned aircraft because they are less responsive and agile. If targeted, they cannot evade.
American aircraft have been destroyed or damaged, but not by Iranian air defenses. Three F15 fighter bombers were shot down accidentally by a Kuwaiti fighter after being misidentified as Iranian when returning from bombing targets in Iran. An aerial refueling aircraft crashed after a mid-air collision with another such aircraft which, though damaged, managed to land safely. Five or six refueling aircraft were damaged or destroyed while parked at a Saudi airbase when they were hit by an Iranian surface-to-surface missile. One aerial early warning and control aircraft (a kind of aircraft that carries a large radar which, when airborne, provides a very long-range aerial view) parked at the same base seems to have been destroyed too.
Iranian attacks: Iran has fired a total of 1,800-1,900 missiles of various types and ranges and approximately 4,400-4,800 exploding drones at targets across the Middle East (there are discrepancies among reports). About 90% were intercepted by anti-missile and anti-drone defenses. The rate of fire per day has varied. Days with low, thick cloud cover that makes visual surveillance harder enabled the Iranians to expose more missile launchers with less risk, so they fired more on those days. Even then, however, their rate of fire has been very low compared with their pre-war capability and even compared to their theoretical capability in terms of surviving launchers and missile stocks. Here too, surviving and maintaining capability for the long term seems more important to the Iranians than creating massed salvos.
Of the armaments fired, approximately 570 missiles and nearly 765 exploding drones were fired at Israel. The others – almost 1,200 missiles and approximately 4,000 exploding drones – were almost all fired at the Arabian Peninsula states. The Emirates was hardest hit, followed by Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and then the others. Another important target is Iranian Kurdish opposition forces based in the Iraqi Kurdish autonomy in northern Iraq. Three missiles were fired by Iran into Turkey at the American air base located there.
Most Iranian attacks into Arab states have been aimed at American bases in those countries, but many missiles and exploding drones have also been fired at civilian airports, oil and gas fields, and industrial sites. This is apparently a bid to convince those governments that the economic damage their countries will suffer outweighs any gains they might achieve if the war is continued. Some of the damage to energy production facilities will take years to repair. For the time being, it seems the political result is the opposite of what Iran is trying to achieve. The Saudis, Emiratis and Kuwaitis appear to have concluded that stopping now will leave them vulnerable in the future when Iran recovers.
The Iranians have also targeted regional military bases of France, Britain and Italy even though none of those countries is participating in the war. The object, presumably, is to prompt them to put pressure on the United States to halt.
The Iranians have also attempted to hit American ships with shore-to-ship missiles, exploding drones, and perhaps also boats. These attempts failed.
An interesting event was the firing of two Iranian missiles at the American base in the British-controlled Diego Garcia islands at the southern end of the Indian Ocean, some 4,000 kilometers from Iran. One fell into the sea due to mechanical failure and the other was shot down. Before the war, the Iranian foreign minister denied that Iran has the capability to fire missiles more than 2,000 kilometers. Thus, one more regime lie has been exposed. This range enables Iran to bombard western Europe as far as southern Britain, including all of France and eastern Spain. After the event, the Iranians denied it was they who had fired the missiles, though the launches and ballistic tracks were visible on American anti-missile radars. Firing missiles and then lying about it is a regular Iranian tactic. Iran denied firing into Turkey, Oman and Azerbaijan, too.
Russia has apparently provided Iran with targeting intelligence in retaliation for the Americans providing targeting intelligence to Ukraine during its war with Russia. According to one report, the Russians offered to cease providing this intelligence if the United States ceased providing intelligence to Ukraine, but the United States refused. Some sources claim the Russians supplied military equipment (especially exploding drones) to Iran. An Israeli attack on the Iranian naval base in the Caspian Sea, which sank some military ships, also targeted this equipment.
An interesting Iranian decision was to target Jerusalem, despite its religious significance to Muslims and the inaccuracy of their weapons. Aiming at Jewish Jerusalem inevitably entails the possibility of hitting Arab neighborhoods or the Old City. One small bomb from a multiple bomb warhead fell 350 meters away from the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City. Of course, had it hit the mosque, Iran would have claimed it was not their bomb but an Israeli deception operation seeking to falsely discredit them. Fragments from another missile, which was intercepted, fell on the Church of the Holy Sepulchre.
The Iranians are reporting daily arrests of “traitors” and “foreign agents”. A few hundred such arrests have occurred so far, and some have reportedly been executed.
Another interesting event was the attack by Iran on a Ukrainian base in the Emirates. Saudi Arabia and the Emirates requested assistance from Ukraine in combating Iranian exploding drones. The Iranian Shahed drone is the model used by Russia (the Iranians sold them the production rights) against Ukraine. The Ukrainians apparently sent an anti-drone unit to the Emirates, and this is what was targeted by the Iranians. The result of this strike is not known.
Iran is also conducting acts of psychological warfare. They have been bombarding Israelis with threatening messages on social media platforms – not just general texts, but messages sent directly to individuals. An academic colleague received the following text message to his phone (names withheld): “Mr. X, according to studies conducted by our research institute, the state of Israel will not survive the coming years. There is evidence from this lengthy war that your life is in danger. It is not in your best interest to stay in Palestine. Save the lives of [the names of his children].”
Casualties:
Twenty-four Israeli civilians have been killed and almost 6,200 wounded. The majority of the wounded and a few of the killed were not hit by missiles but fell down staircases or tripped while trying to reach shelter. One teenager attempting to cross a street to get to a shelter was killed by a drunk driver who ignored the alarm. Following the missile that hit a synagogue (nine dead and approximately 50 wounded), the most devastating strikes occurred in a Bedouin Arab village in northern Israel (about 60 wounded) and two Jewish towns in southern Israel (Arad, 115 wounded; and Dimona, 60 wounded). The Iranians have been mixing warhead types in their strikes: full warhead missiles (450 kilogram or 900 kilogram warheads) and multiple bomb warheads of at least three models (10, 20 or 80 bombs).
An Iranian multiple-warhead missile seconds after dispersing its sub-munitions.
The larger light is the main missile and the smaller ones underneath are the sub-munitions.
The heavier warhead missiles are easier to intercept, but if they get through, they cause the most damage and casualties (all four incidents mentioned above involving dozens of casualties were caused by such warheads). Multiple bomb warhead missiles, if they are not intercepted before they scatter their payload, generally achieve many more hits on the ground, but as each bomb is lighter, they tend to cause fewer casualties (bomb shelters are impervious to anything less than a direct hit by a heavier warhead) and much less damage (they are not capable of collapsing a concrete-block building, though a direct hit can wreck an apartment; people in the apartment’s shelter will likely not be harmed). The vast majority of casualties directly caused by missile strikes were not in shelters when they were killed or wounded. Either they did not reach a shelter in time or they ignored the warnings and stayed outside.
Thirteen American soldiers have been killed and approximately 315 wounded (most only lightly, with more than 270 returning to duty after treatment). Of the killed, six died in an aerial accident in which two refueling tankers collided over western Iraq. One managed to land safely at an Israeli air base, but the other crashed in the desert.
Across the Arabian Peninsula states, 72 people have been killed and 855 wounded.
Some of the missiles fired at Israel fell short and landed in Syria (five killed, 15 wounded), Jordan (29 wounded), and the Palestinian Authority (four killed, seven wounded).
One French soldier was killed and six wounded in Iraq.
Iran reports about 1,950 killed and 24,800 wounded. The number of killed is of course deliberately understated. Israel estimates the death toll of Iranian military and internal security personnel to be at least 5,000 and probably closer to 6,000.
Lebanon:
Hezbollah has fired more than 3,500 rockets, missiles, exploding drones and mortar bombs towards Israel. Most are aimed at Israeli ground forces operating in Lebanon, so the number falling inside Israel per day has gone down relative to the number before Israel began its ground operation in southern Lebanon. Thus, for example, on 28 March, Hezbollah fired 250 rockets, but only 23 crossed the border into Israel; all the others were aimed at Israeli ground forces.
Israel has bombed some 2,100 targets, including individual commanders, storage sites, combat positions, bridges, banks, and petrol stations owned by Hezbollah.
Israel instructed the Shiite population of southern Lebanon, up to the Zaharani River (approximately 40 kilometers north of Israel) and in southern Beirut, to evacuate their neighborhoods, towns and villages to prevent their being hurt when Israel bombed Hezbollah facilities located among them. These residential areas contain command and storage sites, and many of the launches of rockets and exploding drones are being conducted from within them. (About 120 rockets were launched from Tyre alone.) It is currently estimated that up to 1.2 million Lebanese have gradually moved away from the designated areas, or approximately 70% of the areas’ pre-war residents. These internal refugees, almost all of whom are Shiite, are being met with hostility in areas inhabited by Sunnis, Christians and Druze, who blame them for initiating the war.
Large Israeli ground forces have entered Lebanon and are gradually fighting northwards. According to reports by Hezbollah, they have apparently reached 10 kilometers into Lebanon. They are moving from village to village, clearing them and searching for stored weapons. In one school they found a large cache of weapons (rocket launchers, mortars, small arms, etc.) and ammunition. In a church in a Christian village they found a smaller cache and an entrance to a storage tunnel. Dozens of caches have been found in residential homes.
A weapons cache discovered by Israeli troops in a private home.
After waiting for the population to evacuate northwards, over the past few days the Israelis have bombed several bridges over the Litani River, located roughly parallel to the border and about 10-20 kilometers north of it. They apparently intend to bomb all or at least most of the bridges over the coming days in order to prevent Hezbollah from reinforcing its troops south of the river.
Attempts to mediate a ceasefire between the Lebanese government and Israel are failing. In the year following the November 2026 ceasefire, the Lebanese army was supposed to disarm Hezbollah, prevent it from renewing the fighting, and stop it from moving troops from central Lebanon to southern Lebanon. It did none of these things. The army’s commanders fear that in a direct confrontation, Hezbollah still holds an advantage. According to an unverified report, Lebanese President Aoun was shocked by the number of rockets launched from areas in southern Lebanon that were reported by the army to have been cleared of Hezbollah arms caches, proving that the army lied to him.
One Israeli civilian was killed accidentally by Israeli artillery that was aimed incorrectly and that fell in an Israeli village instead of across the border. A few dozen civilians have been wounded by Hezbollah fire. Five Israeli soldiers have been killed and 68 wounded in the fighting inside Lebanon.
The Lebanese government has reported that 1,189 people have been killed and 3,427 wounded, but has not provided a breakdown between military and civilians. According to Israel, at least 850 of the killed are Hezbollah personnel. Also killed were a few Lebanese army soldiers, a few Amal militia personnel, and a few members of the Imam Hussein Division (a mercenary group recruited by Iran and operating in Lebanon), including its commander and deputy commander.
Syria:
Several rockets were fired at Israeli troops in Syria and into Israel from Syria. No casualties were incurred.
In a separate set of incidents, regime forces began once again to attack the Druze enclave. Seven Druze were killed, four wounded and 19 kidnapped. Israel responded with an aerial bombing of Syrian military bases. Israeli aircraft are also conducting low deterrence flights over certain areas around the Druze enclave.
In northern Syria, Christians were attacked by pro-regime militias. No human casualties were reported, only damage to property.
Iraq:
Iranian missiles and exploding drones have been launched at a number of American bases in Iraq.
Also, pro-Iranian Iraqi militias continue to bombard American bases in Iraq and occasionally launch exploding drones towards Israel. It is not clear how many Americans and Israelis have been harmed by the Iraqi attacks, as the numbers are not provided separately from the general casualty figures of the war.
The Americans and Israelis each responded with airstrikes on these organizations. According to an unconfirmed Iraqi-Kurdish report, the Americans also conducted a few commando raids on one of the organizations to capture some leaders.
A few dozen personnel of pro-Iran Iraqi militias (including some senior personnel) have been reported killed and dozens wounded in these exchanges.
Hundreds of Iranian missiles and exploding drones been launched at Iranian-Kurdish anti-regime forces based in Iraq. The damage and casualties inflicted are not known.
The Iraqi government has demanded that the United States cease operations in Iraq and has said it will support the pro-Iranian militias.
Yemen:
After a month of threats, the Houthis finally entered the war by firing a ballistic missile, a cruise missile and an exploding drone at Israel. All were shot down with no casualties or damage to Israel.
A Yemeni analyst claims that the Houthis do not want to be involved, but were pressured by Iran – their main source of weapons – to join in. The Israeli and American attacks on the Houthis in response to their previous attacks on shipping in the Red Sea and on Israel inflicted heavy casualties, including most of their senior political and military leaders, and caused significant economic damage. According to the analyst, those results made the Houthis reluctant to arouse any further American and Israeli response.
A senior Israeli officer said Israel was not surprised by the Houthi action but considers them a distraction that Israel will ignore for the time being while it is focused on Iran.
WHAT’S NEXT
The current assessment is not different from the previous one except for the issue of the negotiations, which are currently unclear, and the addition of American ground troops arriving in the region.
As things stand, without a negotiated end or change in strategy, the war will continue in the same manner for several more weeks at least. This is not a surprise; it was known in advance and stated by Israeli and American political and military leaders. Given the relative strengths of the rivals and their political objectives, this is a long-duration war between the American and Israeli strategy of physical attrition of Iran’s military capabilities and the Iranian strategy of psychological fatigue designed to induce the United States to cease its attacks on Iran’s terms.
As to the maximalist goal of the war – toppling the Iranian regime – no signs have been seen so far to suggest that the regime is losing control. This too is not a surprise at this stage of the war. The damage caused to the regime has not reached the critical levels needed for loss of internal control. Casualties and damage are exerting pressure, but at the rate they are being inflicted, it will take time for them to accumulate to a level that can break the regime.
Possible changes in the situation are dependent on one of the rivals breaking psychologically – a situation that, based on the current available information, does not seem likely, given that the costs inflicted have not reached critical levels to either side. President Trump seems to be facing increased resistance to continuing the war in the United States, but at least some of his staff, the Arab states, and Israel are all determined to see it through.
For the Iranian regime, this war is existential, so they are willing to pay a very high price to survive. Regime stability is notoriously difficult to estimate. Fissures invisible from the outside sometimes exist that cause a seemingly stable structure to collapse rapidly under pressure it should have been expected to withstand (see: the USSR in 1991 and Egypt in 2011). Sometimes, weak regimes that everyone assumes will quickly collapse manage to hang on for reasons that are difficult to assess (see: the Assad regime from 2011 till 2024). Iran’s regime is strong and has support from a large segment of its population. The internal opposition is divided and disorganized, and the relative size of its supporter faction versus the opposition factions (plural, which is one of the reasons why they pose a lesser threat) is not clear.
With this in mind, the United States and Israel are focusing on drastically diminishing Iran’s physical ability to threaten Iran’s neighbors. Toppling the regime is a desired result but not currently the main goal. It is clear, however, that if the regime survives, it will rebuild its capabilities sooner or later. Following the June 2025 war, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that the Iranian nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs had been halted by the Israeli and American bombardment of key installations. However, he added, they could be rebuilt, and if Israel saw efforts being made to rebuild them, it would attack again. If the current war ends with the regime still in power, there will eventually be another war.
The arrival of American ground forces could presage a change in strategy. Up to now, the attack on Iran has been by bombardment alone. From the size of the ground forces being sent so far, it is clear that the United States government is not planning to conduct an all-out invasion of Iran. It could, however, conduct raids that can garner intelligence that aircraft cannot and perhaps take and hold locations that have strategic or operational significance. One possible example: rather than destroying an oil processing plant, the loss of which would cause irreparable damage to Iran’s economy and inflict suffering on the Iranian population and perhaps a new regime, capturing it instead so it can be returned later while denying its profits to the current regime.
The United States is also sending another aircraft carrier group to the Middle East, though it is not clear whether this is to reinforce or replace one of the two already there. One of the aircraft carriers in the area had to cease operations for repairs after an accidental fire broke out on board, causing damage.
****
6 – 11 March 2026
Iran:
The exchange of blows continues between Iran on one side and the United States and Israel on the other. A number of commentators in the United States, Israel and elsewhere are suggesting that the American and Israeli political and military leaders did not expect this to last so long. In fact, in Israel, it has been stated clearly from the start that this will be a long war, because achieving the required results will take time. Israel has also understood from the start that this will be a two-way war – i.e., Israel will suffer casualties and damage too. Public statements by the Americans have been more complicated, but a careful reading shows they did not expect a short war either; nor did they expect this to be a one-way war.
The American and Israeli strategy is attrition: they are working down a list of targets and have struck thousands so far.
The word “target” has multiple meanings, which can make it difficult to understand the strategic significance of a particular strike. Some targets are individuals, but others might include hundreds of people as a single target. Some targets are individual weapons systems (missile launchers, ships), while others are storage sites containing multiple weapons systems. Some targets are individual buildings; others are facilities with several dozen buildings.
These differences mean the types and numbers of munitions required per target vary greatly, as does the level of damage inflicted. The Americans and the Israelis also have different methods of reporting. United States Central Command reports strikes on 5,000 targets, whereas the Israeli military usually only reports the number of munitions dropped without specifying how many munitions were expended per target (except in a few cases such as the attack on the underground complex beneath the Iranian Supreme Leader’s palace, which was attacked with 100 bombs, and the destroying of missile launchers, which usually require only one munition). The Israelis reported dropping approximately 10,000 munitions by the end of 10 March; the last Israeli “target quantity” report on 7 March mentioned striking 3,500 targets with 7,500 munitions, and many more targets have been attacked since. With a few exceptions, neither the American nor the Israeli militaries specify the exact targets struck. All this makes it impossible to accurately assess the significance of what has been attacked so far and what will be required as the war progresses.
Targets include sites the regime needs to govern, senior individuals in both civilian and military authorities, the many locations where weapons and other equipment are manufactured and stored, military units – especially air defenses, missile launchers and missiles and exploding drones – both individually and collectively at storage sites (many of which are underground, so the attacks are aimed at burying them long-term by destroying tunnel access to them), and internal security units, meaning the Revolutionary Guards, the Basij and the police.
The Israelis have also attacked parts of the Revolutionary Guards’ funding system (they own many factories that produce a wide variety of products, not all of them military, that fund their activities) and fuel storage sites (the media have inaccurately portrayed these strikes as attacks on Iran’s oil production and export capabilities).
While over the first few days, the Israelis and Americans coordinated their attacks geographically, with the Israelis focused on the north and the Americans on the south, they now appear to be attacking targets in each other’s areas. This suggests that the quality of coordination has improved with practice, enabling them to fly into each other’s preserves without conflict. The incident in which a Kuwaiti fighter shot down American planes is an example of what can happen when coordination is deficient.
The United States is still inconclusive in its public statements on whether it is pursuing regime change or will make do with “comfortable” personnel changes in the current regime (as in Venezuela). Official US statements on this issue seem to contradict each other, possibly reflecting an unresolved internal debate.
Israel, on the other hand, is stating unequivocally that it wants to create the conditions for total regime change, though the nature of that change will be up to the people of Iran. Israel can kill many of the regime’s leaders and supporting infrastructure, but it cannot set up a new regime. That is the rationale behind its attacks on the internal security forces and their funding.
Either the United States or Israel has attacked the Iranian internet blocking company, Sahab Pardaz, to enable better communications by anti-regime elements.
The minimum objective definitely agreed to by Israel and the United States is the total destruction of Iran’s nuclear industry, surface-to-surface missile industry and exploding drone industry.
Beyond that, they are both gradually destroying Iran’s other military assets. The United States is focusing on Iran’s naval capabilities, which threaten international maritime trade, especially but not exclusively through the Hormuz Strait. So far, more than 60 ships of various types have been destroyed, from small patrol boats and minelayers to destroyers and a drone carrier. Destroying the ships is not enough. The Iranians, like the Houthis from 2023 till 2025, have many shore-to-ship weapons: missiles, exploding aerial drones, and apparently also some exploding ship drones. It is critical to destroy not only their existing arsenal but also the industry that develops and manufactures those weapons. This can explain the Americans’ relatively slow progress at destroying Iranian military shipping. It is a useful but not crucial mission, and the size of their effort is tailored accordingly.
Iran has reported that the offensive against them has killed approximately 1,350 people and wounded approximately 17,000. They do not break this down into civilians and military personnel. The IDF spokesperson has reported that the Iranians are hiding their casualties and that at least 1,900 Iranian military personnel have been verified as killed with many thousands more wounded. Other sources claim the number of killed Iranian military personnel is probably closer to 4,000, though they have not provided verification.
Over the first few days, following the initial strike on Iran’s political and military leadership, the focus was on reducing Iran’s air defenses and offensive missile capability. These seem to have been drastically reduced, though they are not yet completely destroyed.
Iranian air defenses continue to occasionally shoot down Israeli and American surveillance and strike drones, though the numbers reported by the Iranians – in the dozens – are exaggerations. Manned aircraft are also occasionally forced to conduct evasive maneuvers to avoid being hit; none has been hit so far.
For all the hype over drones replacing manned aircraft, the current technology does not enable that. They have certain advantages, the most significant of which is of course that their use does not risk the loss of a pilot. The other important factor in Iran is the duration of their sojourn in the sky over the target, which is much longer than that of a manned aircraft.
However, drones are also more vulnerable to being shot down, and they are not able to carry the heavier bombs manned aircraft can carry. This means the mix of drones and manned aircraft currently in use is the correct solution. The drones maintain a constant presence, seeking out new targets and enemy forces and striking those that can be destroyed with their smaller munitions. The manned aircraft strike static preplanned targets that require heavy bombs or join the drones at relatively short notice to strike newly discovered targets.
Manned aircraft come in two major categories: medium-sized fighter bombers that can conduct complex aerobatics to evade anti-aircraft fire and fight enemy aircraft, and large bombers that can carry much heavier bomb loads but have limited defensive capabilities against missiles launched from the ground or from enemy aircraft. The Israelis have only medium-sized fighter bombers while the Americans have large bombers as well.
In the first few days, the large bombers were used sparingly to avoid putting them at undue risk. Gradually, as Iran’s air defenses have been eroded by the cumulative destruction of their radars and missile launchers, the Americans have been increasingly employing these bombers. Each B-1, B-2 and B-52 bomber is individually capable of dropping a number of munitions equivalent to that of several fighter bombers, and the B-2s are also capable of carrying bombs heavy enough to penetrate tens of meters into the ground before exploding to hit tunnels. This accelerates the destruction of several target types that require an extended effort.
Meanwhile, Iran’s strategy seems to be primarily psychological. They understand they are incapable of inflicting the level of damage on Israel, the United States and the neighboring countries that they themselves are suffering. They hope that by constantly harassing these countries – Israel via civilian casualties, the United States via military casualties, the Arabian Peninsula states by harming their economies, and, by extension, the economies of Europe and Asia – they will cause sufficient political pressure to be placed on the United States and Israel to bring about a cessation of the offensive on Iran with the regime still intact.
The division of attacks shows the primary focus not on Israel but on the Arab Emirates, which Iran has hit with more than 270 surface-to-surface missiles and more than 1,475 exploding drones.
The second major target is Kuwait, which has been struck by almost 215 surface-to-surface missiles and more than 400 exploding drones.
The third major target is Israel, which has been hit by 225-230 surface-to-surface missiles and fewer than 150 exploding drones. About half the missiles fired at Israel carry multiple bombs (20 to 80 each). The Israeli defense establishment had prepared to face 150 missiles per day. The actual number on the hardest day was 60, and it has gradually dropped to 10-15 per day.
It’s useful to compare this war to the 12-day conflict in June 2025. At that time, Iran fired approximately 590 missiles and more than 1,000 exploding drones at Israel. Of those weapons, only about 80 missiles and one exploding drone penetrated Israel’s defenses.
This time, the rate of missile fire is about half that of June 2025 and the number of exploding drones less than 15%. This cannot be attributed solely to Iran’s firing of missiles at other states. The types of missiles fired at the Arabian Peninsula have ranges that cannot reach Israel. The diversion of the drones is probably because of their complete failure in June 2025. The relative numbers suggest the success of the Israeli and American anti surface-to-surface missile operations and the residual effects of what the Israelis achieved in June 2025 in terms of reducing Iran’s arsenal and manufacturing capabilities.
Iran’s fourth target in the current conflict is Bahrain, which it has hit with more than 100 surface-to-surface missiles and more than 170 exploding drones.
The fifth is Qatar, which it has attacked with more than 135 surface-to-surface missiles and approximately 60 exploding drones.
Sixth, Jordan: more than 60 surface-to-surface missiles and approximately 60 exploding drones.
Approximately 90% of the missiles and exploding drones fired at the Arabian Peninsula were shot down. However, the Arab states are reported to be facing a shortage of interceptor missiles. If they are not replenished, the efficiency of their defenses will be reduced.
The attacks on Israel show a definite decrease in quantity, averaging about 10 salvos per day since the fourth day of the war (compared to 44 on the first day, 55 on the second and 16 on the third). On the first day, the salvos were scattered with one or two missiles each. On the second day each salvo was bigger, with a few concentrating 10 to 20 missiles each. On the third day the salvos were still mostly concentrated but much fewer in number. Ever since the fourth day, each Iranian salvo against Israel has contained only one or two missiles each, with a few exceptions of three or four. However, Hezbollah joined the fighting on the third day, which added to the weight of fire on Israel. (As will be discussed below, the exact number of rockets and exploding drones fired by Hezbollah in approximately 250 salvos is not clear.)
The reduction in Iranian salvos is being caused by the Israelis chasing the launchers (some strike videos show them hitting launchers that are in the process of being set up to fire) and bombing storage sites to destroy or bury both launchers and missiles. The Iranians have fewer and fewer available launchers, and the launch teams are trying to set up, fire and run for cover as fast as they can when they think there is no Israeli or American surveillance overhead. These constraints make it much more difficult to coordinate larger salvos. This adds another dynamic: attempts by the Iranians to conserve launchers and missiles for later use by hiding them or not using them.
Fourteen Israelis have been killed and approximately 2,700 wounded in the Iranian attacks. Three of the killed and approximately 75% of the wounded suffered their injuries in accidents that occurred while they were rushing to shelters (falling down stairs, tripping over objects, etc.). About 85 are still hospitalized.
As they are not succeeding at causing mass casualties and are having trouble concentrating their salvos, the Iranians have apparently opted instead for a larger number of small salvos per day, preferably during the night. This builds tension and pressure among Israel’s civilian population, who are repeatedly awakened and must to run for shelter (indirectly causing more casualties, even if their injuries are only minor). The increased use of cluster warheads serves the same purpose. The chance that such a bomb will penetrate shelters or destroy an ordinary building is virtually nil, but the amount of booms heard during each strike and the spread of the bombs over a wide area creates a greater psychological effect. About a third of Israel’s population lives in older buildings with either inferior shelters or no shelters at all, requiring residents to run to public shelters; this too adds to the psychological pressure on civilians. Some families with small children who do not have shelters in their apartments are opting to sleep in the underground shelters rather than have to gather the children and run to them repeatedly in the middle of the night. So far, the strategy of wearing down the civilian population has not achieved what the Iranians hope for – pressure from the people on the Israeli government to halt the war.
Another Iranian psychological ploy is phone calls and texts sent to Israelis to threaten them directly.
There have also been attempts by Iran to instigate attacks on Jews and Israelis abroad. For the most part, these have either been thwarted or failed to inflict casualties so far. Two Israelis were overheard speaking Hebrew outside a restaurant in San Jose, California and beaten unconscious by assailants shouting “Hands off Iran”, but it is unclear if this assault was at Iran’s direct instigation.
The Iranians are doing their best to reduce the capabilities of American anti-missile defenses by repeatedly targeting their early warning radars. So far, they have managed to severely damage one and perhaps two of these radars, which are very expensive and limited in number. This has slightly shortened the average warning time for Israel, but as it has its own independent capabilities, the result is not extensive. The US radars are less effective at shortening warning time for the Arabian Peninsula states because they are much closer to Iran.
Most of the missiles and exploding drones fired into the Arabian Peninsula states are aimed at American bases and installations. Seven American soldiers have been killed and 140 wounded (including casualties in Iraq inflicted by the Iranian proxies there; the information does not delineate where casualties were inflicted).
Beyond their focus on American bases, the Iranians are also firing at economic targets of the Arabian Peninsula states. These are primarily oil and gas fields and tourist centers (hotels and similar locations), but also include airports, computer data centers, an aluminum smelting plant and port facilities. So far, 28 civilians in Arab states have been killed and approximately 480 wounded. Note that the Iranians justify striking hotels in Arab countries on the grounds that American military personnel live there. In at least some cases, this is probably true.
In principle, it appears that other than their offensive strategy of harassment, the Iranian regime’s overall strategy is defensive – to survive by dispersing and concealing its new leadership and what’s left of its military capabilities. They have also mobilized and dispersed their internal security personnel to ensure readiness to react to any attempt at renewing the anti-government activities that were bloodily suppressed in mid-January. Internal security commanders have stated clearly on public media that any such attempt will be met with fire.
Khamanei’s son Mojtaba, who is not considered a leading religious figure, was voted in as his father’s replacement as Supreme Leader. Mojtaba’s main qualification for office is his closeness to the leading figures of the Revolutionary Guard. In principle, his election means the IRGC is now in control of the state. Iran has thus moved from a theocratic semi-democratic republic to a military dictatorship. This was not the goal of Israel and the United States, but at least for the short term, it was the expected result. It underscores the need for a long-term campaign to continue to hunt the new political leaders and those of the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij, as well as to attack their command hierarchy, from the top down to the lower ranks.
Lebanon:
Fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has gradually escalated.
The Lebanese government, which is either unable or unwilling to rein in Hezbollah, has attempted to pressure Israel to reduce its operations. It has, among other actions, requested French intervention. President Macron obliged with public and diplomatic messages to Israel, including a direct telephone conversation with Israel’s prime minister, Netanyahu, in which he demanded that Israel stop operations in Lebanon. Israel has ignored these requests.
There are unofficial statements from the United States that it views the wars in Iran and in Lebanon as separate affairs and that even if the war in Iran ends, the United States will not demand that Israel cease its offensive against Hezbollah, given that Hezbollah has not been disarmed as stipulated in the autumn 2024 ceasefire agreement and renewed firing on Israel on 2 March 2026.
Hezbollah has stated that it has two objectives in this round of fighting: to support Iran and to prevent Israel from continuing to attack Hezbollah sites, which it has done consistently in response to Hezbollah’s continued violations of the official ceasefire in 2024. According to the conditions of the ceasefire, Hezbollah was supposed to disarm, but it has refused to do so, and the Lebanese government and military have been reluctant to use force to compel them to comply. Israel’s response has been to monitor all Hezbollah sites and strike any site or individual conducting military activities. Over the 15 months since the ceasefire, about 500 Hezbollah personnel have been killed (according to Hezbollah statements) and dozens of sites bombed (command posts, training bases, storage facilities, etc.). Essentially, what Hezbollah wants is to be allowed to recuperate and rebuild its military capability, which is still strong enough to induce fear in the Lebanese government and army. Hezbollah personnel have been ordered to shoot any Lebanese army personnel who attempt to interfere with their operations or enter their positions.
This situation has caused a rift in Lebanon between some Lebanese political leaders and the military. The politicians are furious at Hezbollah for restarting the war with Israel, and at least a few of them want to employ the army against Hezbollah. The Lebanese army commander refuses to do so. The Lebanese military has blocked some roads and confiscated some weapons, but has largely refrained from interfering with Hezbollah operations. According to the ceasefire agreement of autumn 2024, the Lebanese army was supposed to confiscate all of Hezbollah’s weapons and other military equipment within a year. In practice, it has not done much, and the little it has done is mostly in southern Lebanon where Hezbollah’s presence was weak because of Israel’s operations against it. In some cases, the Lebanese army and UNIFIL have even gone so far as to try to hamper Israeli actions against Hezbollah positions and facilities in southern Lebanon.
Following Israel’s orders to the Lebanese population to move from combat areas, at least 500,000 people (perhaps as many as 650,000) are reported to have moved. These areas are inhabited almost exclusively by Shiites, and the evacuees are not being warmly received in non-Shiite residential areas. The non-Shiites blame the Shiites for what they consider an unnecessary war.
Hezbollah has reported that since the joining the war, it has fired approximately 250 total salvos of rockets (about 160) and exploding drones (about 90) into Israel. Salvos vary in terms of number of rockets and drones, from one or two per salvo to approximately 10 to 15. The total number of individual rockets and exploding drones is not being reported.
Hezbollah’s strategy has been to attempt to induce a repeat of the mass evacuation of Israeli civilians from the villages and towns near the border with Lebanon, similar to what occurred in 2023. This has failed so far because the rate of attacks and the damage caused are low, as is the threat of ground incursions by Hezbollah given the size of Israeli forces deployed along the border and inside Lebanon.
One long-range rocket hit a civilian satellite-communications center in central Israel. Hezbollah and Iran claim it was a military site, but it was in fact a reception center for international television broadcasts owned by a European company, Société Européenne des Satellites (SES), which is based in Luxembourg and which has similar stations across the globe.
Israeli aircraft have conducted approximately 700 strikes on Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure across Lebanon. The Israeli navy has also conducted strikes along the coast.
The Lebanese government has reported that nearly 634 people have been killed and 1,586 wounded, but it has not provided a breakdown between military and civilians. According to Israel, at least 300 of these are confirmed Hezbollah personnel as of two days ago. More have been killed since, but the numbers have not been released.
A few Israeli strikes were conducted at Iranian support personnel assisting Hezbollah. The Iranians claim they are diplomats. Most of their diplomats (approximately 150 people, including their families) left Lebanon following Israeli warnings to do so. Among the killed are Iranian officers providing intelligence and funds to Hezbollah and the commander of Iran’s Lebanon support organization. Israel’s targets in Lebanon have included personnel and equipment (including 16 transport aircraft) of the Quds organization responsible for supplying Hezbollah.
More Israeli ground forces have entered southern Lebanon and are fighting to push Hezbollah forces away from the border with Israel. Two Israeli soldiers have been killed and 14 wounded. The number of Hezbollah casualties in these skirmishes is not clear as these casualty reports are not provided separately from their casualty reports from Israeli airstrikes.
On the night of 6-7 March, an Israeli commando force was landed by helicopters in a Lebanese village near the border with Syria. They exhumed bodies from graves to check if they were Ron Arad, the navigator/weapons officer of an Israeli aircraft that crashed in Lebanon in 1986. The pilot was rescued, but Arad was captured and disappeared. He apparently died in captivity and the Israelis have been searching for his remains ever since. The raid was conducted to check new intelligence that he may have been buried in this village. After completing the checks, which proved negative, the Israelis flew back to Israel. During the engagement or shortly afterwards, several mortar bombs fired by Hezbollah apparently landed in Syria.
The Lebanese government claimed that in this skirmish alone, approximately 40 Lebanese were killed (including a few Lebanese army personnel) and 40 wounded. How many of the casualties were Hezbollah is not clear; nor is it clear if the numbers are true or false. Hezbollah claimed to have engaged the Israelis, shot down a helicopter, and killed and captured a number of Israeli soldiers, but failed to show proof. Israel reported that no Israeli casualties were incurred.
Among the sites targeted by Israel’s airstrikes are 30 branches of Hezbollah’s bank to drastically reduce its cash flow.
Two or three (reports differ) UNIFIL soldiers from Ghana were wounded. The Lebanese claim they were hit by Israeli fire, but UNIFIL has not said who was responsible.
Syria:
Syrian troops reinforced the border with Lebanon, claiming that Hezbollah had fired mortar bombs into Syria near a Syrian army outpost. There does not seem to have been a reason for Hezbollah to conduct this fire. Given the location, it may have been accidental spillover from a skirmish between Hezbollah and Israeli heliborne troops that were operating in a Lebanese village not far from the border.
Some 80,000 Syrians residing in Lebanon have returned to Syria.
Though it has reinforced its troops facing Israel and the Druze autonomous enclave in southern Syria, the Syrian regime has not attempted to operate against either.
Iraq:
Iranian missiles and exploding drones have been launched at several American bases in Iraq.
Also, pro-Iranian Iraqi organizations continue to bombard American bases in Iraq and to launch occasional exploding drones towards Israel. It is not clear how many Americans and Israelis have been harmed specifically by the Iraqi attacks.
The Americans and Israelis have responded with airstrikes on these organizations. According to an unconfirmed Iraqi-Kurdish report, the Americans also conducted a few commando raids on one of the organizations to capture some leaders.
Fifteen Iraqis (including some senior personnel of these organizations) have been reported killed and dozens wounded in these exchanges.
Iranian missiles and exploding drones continue to be launched at Iranian-Kurdish anti-regime forces based in Iraq. The damage and casualties are not clear.
An unidentified Israeli source reportedly stated that Israel was supplying weapons to the Kurdish forces in Iraq for use against Iran. However, the Kurds do not feel they can trust the Americans to provide steady support for their continued operations against Iran and are unwilling to commit themselves. What the Kurds see as the American abandonment of their brethren in Syria serves as a dire warning.
The majority of Kurds are divided among four states: Turkiye (the new official spelling of the country’s name), Syria, Iraq and Iran. Each state contains irredentist movements that have no support from any Western state, as such support would upset Turkiye, a NATO member, and would redraw the regional borders “approved” by the West after the First World War. The Kurds’ demand for an independent Kurdish state is not helped by the fact that the level of internal Kurdish support for each of these irredentist movements is unclear.
Yemen:
So far, other than bluster and threats, the Houthis have not joined in the war.
Others:
Azerbaijan – After several exploding drones were fired by Iran into Azerbaijan and a group of would-be saboteurs was captured by Azeri security forces, Azerbaijan warned Iran that it will respond to fire with fire, recalled its diplomats from Iran, and reinforced its military presence along their shared border. After this initial posturing, nothing else has occurred so far.
The saboteurs were apparently planning to cut the oil pipeline through which Azerbaijan exports its oil. Forty percent of Israel’s oil imports are from Azerbaijan, but its clients include several European states – Italy, the Czech Republic, Germany, Croatia, Romania, Portugal, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and Greece, as well as Thailand, an Asian state.
Turkiye – After Iran officially denied firing a missile over Turkiye, a second was fired, which Iran also denied. The missile trajectory showed it was launched in Iran towards the American base at Incerlik in Turkiye.
Cyprus – The British base in Greek Cyprus has been the target of 10 exploding drones. The perpetrator is Hezbollah from Lebanon in its function as an Iranian proxy. Greece and several other European countries have sent ships, aircraft and other equipment to support Greek Cyprus and the British. Simultaneously, Turkiye has sent at least six combat aircraft to Turkish Cyprus to bolster its defense in the event of attacks by Hezbollah there too.
Gaza:
The fighting in Gaza continues at the same pace as before the war with Iran, with sporadic daily skirmishes as Hamas fighters attempt to snipe or raid Israeli positions. At least a dozen Hamas personnel have been killed in these skirmishes since 28 February, but no Israelis have been hurt.
On one occasion, Israeli intelligence spotted a Hamas rocket launcher being prepared to fire into Israel. The Israeli air force destroyed it before it fired.
Israeli forces continue to scour the territory they control to find, collect or destroy weapons caches and to find, study and destroy tunnels.
Judea and Samaria:
The rate of attacks by Palestinians against Israelis continues to be a couple of dozen per week, though this is still significantly less than what was occurring prior to 7 October 2023 and during the first six months of the war.
Israeli counterterrorist operations continue across Judea and Samaria with dozens of arrests being made of suspected terrorists. They are interrogated and if cleared, they are released.
Sporadic attacks are still being committed by Israeli civilians against Palestinians. In some cases, it is not clear who initiated the clashes, while in others it is clear that the Israelis are responsible. A number of Israelis have been arrested and are facing charges for these actions.
Oil prices:
After an artificial increase in oil prices, which exploited the alarm caused by the stopping of supplies through the Hormuz Strait, prices have gone down again, though not yet to the level immediately before the war.
Since the war began, 14 ships have been hit by missiles or exploding drones, of which six were oil tankers. The rest were bulk carriers, container ships and a tugboat.
There have been reports of ships creeping through the Strait close to the shore of the Arabian Peninsula with their identity beacons shut down. These ships run the risk of running aground, and are still detectable by the Iranians with their surveillance drones. The Iranians themselves are sneaking ships through the Strait close to their own shore. According to unconfirmed reports, about a third of the usual export levels continues to pass in this way through the Hormuz Strait.
There is no shortage of oil and gas as yet, and most countries hold large enough reserves to operate for a while. Saudi Arabia is working to divert a large portion of its exports from its Arabian/Persian Gulf ports to its Red Sea ports, thus evading the Hormuz Strait threat. If the Houthis join the war, they could threaten those ports as well, but not to the same degree as a closure of the Strait.
WHAT NEXT?
As things stand, the war will continue in the same manner for several more weeks at least. This is not a surprise; it was known in advance and has been stated by Israeli and American political and military leaders. Given the relative strengths of the rivals and their political objectives, this is likely to be a long-duration war of the American and Israeli strategy of physical attrition versus the Iranian strategy of psychological fatigue.
There are not yet any signs that the Iranian regime is losing control, though that is not a surprise at this stage of the war. The damage the regime has sustained has not yet reached levels that would trigger a loss of internal control.
Changes in the situation depend on one of the rivals breaking psychologically. In view of the available information, this does not seem likely.
THE EXPLODING DRONE PROBLEM
One of the surprises of the war is the relative success of Iranian exploding drones at striking targets in the Arabian Peninsula states. This is surprising because the same exploding drones failed during the June 2025 war against Israel (when the Americans participated in shooting them down). They have also had only limited success against Ukraine.
There are apparently three reasons for their relative success this time around:
- First, the flight distance between Iran and the Arab peninsula states (200-300 kilometers) is much shorter than it is between Iran and Israel or between Russia and the major targets in Ukraine (800-1,300 kilometers). This means there is considerably less time to detect and intercept the drones.
- Second, the American air force has to balance the allocation of aircraft between offensive and defensive missions, which reduces their availability for conducting interceptions.
- Third, the number of exploding drones being fired in a very short period is such that even 10% penetration amounts to a few hundred exploding drones hitting their targets.
****
28 February – 5 March 2026
Iran:
Is this war, Epic Rage/Lion’s Roar, part of the Hamas Terror Offensive or a separate event?
The answer is BOTH.
Hamas and Iran are separate entities, each of which is hostile to Israel on its own account. Furthermore, they are ideologically opposed on some key issues. Hamas is part of the Sunni Jihadi movement (a chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood), which is ideologically hostile to the Shiite Jihadi movement led by Iran. (Sunni-Shiite hostility began approximately 1,300 years ago over the question of who is the true heir of the prophet Muhammad.)
Over the past 25 years, Iran and Hamas put aside their differences to ally against their common enemy, Israel. Iran provided funding, weapons, training and operational advice to Hamas. In 2012 there was a temporary break in this alliance when Hamas supported the Syrian rebels (led by the Sunni Jihadists who now rule Syria) against the Assad regime, while Iran supported the Assad regime. Iran suspended support for Hamas for a few years (2012-2014) and then gradually renewed support and aid after Hamas, which was in desperate straits after its defeat by Israel in summer 2014 (Operation Protective Edge), apologized.
Hamas’s plan to attack Israel from Gaza on 7 October 2023 was a version of a plan to attack Israel from Lebanon that had been developed by Hezbollah and the Iranian military starting in 2010. Hamas was taught the methods and concepts behind this plan and was aided in adapting it to the circumstances of Gaza.
Hamas differs from Hezbollah in one important aspect.
Hamas is an ALLY of Iran. It was established, grew, and operated independently. In order for it to jump from the status of a terrorist organization capable of conducting only low-intensity warfare to a larger, stronger organization capable of conducting medium- to high-intensity warfare, it needed Iran’s assistance. Yet throughout this transition, its leaders maintained, and continue to maintain, independent decision-making.
Conversely, Hezbollah is a PROXY of Iran. It was established by Iran in the early 1980s and was funded for many years exclusively by that country. Over the course of its existence, while it was being trained, organized, armed and operated by Iran, Hezbollah gradually created some limited independent capabilities (for example, it entered the drug trade between central America and the United States as a source of extra funding). Its leaders more or less obey Iran’s orders.
Iran’s interest in supporting ideological enemies like Hamas and other Palestinian organizations, as well as the Jordanian Sunni Jihadi Muslim Brotherhood movement, was their possession of a common enemy: Israel.
Iran developed a long-term plan to annihilate Israel. It stated this ambition explicitly, openly and often, and even provided a date by which it would occur (summer 2040). All the necessary components of the plan were supposed to be ready by the mid- to late 2030s. Iran’s object was to create what it termed “a ring of fire” around Israel: proxies, allies and Iranian forces in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan (the latter two with the addition of expeditionary forces of proxies from Iraq and probably also Yemen), as well as in Judea, Samaria and Gaza. Iran was to have an arsenal of tens of thousands of long-range surface-to-surface missiles able to hit Israel from Iran itself, as well as a nuclear weapons arsenal with which to deter Israel from employing its own nuclear arsenal (whether or not Israel in fact has one, Iran believes it does and acts accordingly). The offensive plan was to do to Israel what Hamas did on 7 October but on all Israel’s borders at once.
According to documents captured by the Israeli military during the war in Gaza, Hamas leader Yihya Sinwar had tried in June 2023 to convince the Iranians that because of the internal political rift in Israel, the offensive could occur immediately. Iran’s and Hezbollah’s leaders did not agree. They thought that even with a shortened timetable, the offensive still had to wait several more years. Sinwar decided to act alone, probably in the hope that Iran would feel compelled to order a general offensive in support. Iran decided not to. The Israeli mobilization on the Lebanese and Syrian fronts was too rapid to achieve the required ratio of forces at the front, and the readiness of Iran’s missile arsenals and of the other proxy forces was too low. Hezbollah, the most ready, had missed its opportunity to attack an almost defenseless border (roughly similar to the situation on Israel’s Gaza border on October 7) because of the rapid Israeli mobilization (three divisions in two days).
Sinwar’s impetuous hastiness and insufficient awareness of the actual situation fractured the Iranian plan. The October 7 attack allowed Israel to drastically reduce – albeit with difficulty – the threat from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Judea and Samaria, after which it was able to do the same (to a lesser extent) to Hezbollah in September-November 2024. The Israeli defeat of Hezbollah encouraged the rebels in Syria to exploit the Assad regime’s loss of allies to attack and destroy it, thus cutting Iran’s direct overland link to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Without that link, it was far more difficult for Iran to help Hezbollah recover, and the direct threat to Israel’s Syrian border was removed.
Because Israel no longer had to contend with Hezbollah or the Iranian proxies in Syria and Iraq, it attacked Iran in June 2025, striking its nuclear arsenal and surface-to-surface missile industries and arsenals. About a third of the nuclear arsenal was destroyed and the missile production rate was reduced by two-thirds. King Abdullah of Jordan, meanwhile, took the opportunity to pounce on the Muslim Brotherhood movement in his country and reduce the threat it was posing to the Kingdom.
In spring 2025, Iran frantically increased its efforts to manufacture nuclear weapons and long-range surface-to-surface missiles. Having lost its proxies, Iran’s leaders felt that the original timetable, developed according to the program to destroy Israel without creating a direct threat to Iran, was no longer viable. It needed these capabilities immediately to prevent a retaliatory attack on Iran.
This speeding up of weapons development, and the need to swiftly halt it, is what brought Israel to hurriedly implement the Rising Lion offensive. There was no mistaken belief that this would do any more than delay Iran’s programs. America’s contribution was essential because Israel does not have the technical capability to drop bombs big enough to reach Iran’s underground enrichment halls.
Ever since June 2025, Iran has been vigorously working to recover the capabilities it lost in those 12 days. The missile industry received new equipment from China, North Korea and perhaps also Russia with which to renew production. The nuclear industry was drastically curtailed and is harder to rebuild, but given time, Iran would have been able to do so. Iran had a store of 60% enriched uranium that could not be used to make exploding nuclear bombs (90% enrichment is required for that purpose), but which could either be used to make radiation contamination bombs (an ordinary explosion that would scatter deadly radioactive material over a wide area) or would wait until Iran rebuilt its enrichment machines, at which time the process would be completed to create exploding nuclear bombs. American negotiator Steve Witkoff has stated that the Iranians told him they had enough material for 11 bombs but did not state to which type of bombs they were referring.
The only way to completely halt the current Iranian regime’s pursuit of both these capabilities is to replace it with a regime that does not pursue the Shiite jihad ideology. Any lesser result merely delays their program, with the duration of the delay dependent on the level of damage inflicted. A nuclear Iran would undoubtedly precipitate a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, as Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have all indicated they will not be left behind.
Therefore, for Israel, this war is a continuation of the Iron Swords/Al Aqsa Flood War because the events leading up to it are an inseparable part of the events that led up to the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist offensive. While Israel was fighting Hamas, Iran and its proxies may not have jumped in as Sinwar wanted, but they did conduct combat operations against Israel at a lower level, requiring Israel to fight on seven fronts: Gaza, Judea and Samaria, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Iran. These fronts were technically separate but politically and, in some cases, militarily linked, with the main connection being Iran. Decisively defeating Iran, and if possible bringing about the collapse of the current regime, is therefore an important part of that war.
Israel cannot determine who will replace the current regime. It can only drastically weaken it so internal Iranian forces can attempt to take over governing the country. Hopefully, those forces will have a different agenda vis-à-vis Israel.
However, it is also a separate war focused on a common enemy: Iran. This war has metamorphosed to include other actors with their own conflicts with Iran and their own separate though coinciding agendas that require Iran’s decisive defeat. It is not only Israel that is pushing for regime change in Iran; so are most of the states of the Arabian Peninsula. They fear Iran’s plans for them too, as part of Iran’s Shiite jihadi ideology is to “export the Shiite revolution” to those states. This is one of the main reasons behind the sudden change in their policies vis-à-vis Israel. They have gone from hostility to both overt relations, as in the Abraham Accords (with the United Arab Emirates in the lead), and covert relations, as in Saudi Arabia’s tacit alliance with Israel. The Abraham Accords are no less an anti-Iranian alliance than they are a peace treaty with Israel. Some of the Arab states support Israel’s goal overtly and some covertly, each according to the outlook and political situation of their leadership. Much of their populations remain hostile to Israel (limiting, for example, Saudi Arabia’s willingness to publicly join the Accords).
Initially, the United States provided mixed signals as to whether it is pursuing regime change, and even made statements to the effect that if the regime eschews its nuclear and long-range missile programs then Washington is willing to accommodate it. However, it seems that the administration is gradually adopting this objective. President Trump said Iran wished to open negotiations but he had responded that it was too late. It is difficult to determine whether the Americans’ initial statements were merely for public consumption, with the US operating from the start to create the conditions for regime collapse, or whether it changed course on this issue.
The targets the American forces are focusing on (at least according to press releases) seem less about regime change than about military capability reduction, but with that said, the US did not press Israel to cease attacks on targets that are definitely designed to weaken the regime’s internal security. Israel opened the war for both allies by killing a large number of senior leaders of the regime, while the American follow-up operations were aimed at non-regime targets. However, the intelligence for the Israeli strike was acquired, according to media reports, through a combined Israeli-American effort, and the US congratulated Israel’s success. This suggests an agreed-upon division of labor, though we may see more American strikes on regime stability targets as well. A report in the Wall Street Journal claims that Trump has agreed to supply weapons to rebels against the Iranian regime.
The Arabian Peninsula states were content with Israel and the US conducting the offensive against Iran, and understood that Iran would retaliate against American bases on their territory and that they would assist in their defense. However, the Iranian response has gone beyond that. Iran is attacking the Arab states themselves, firing at oil and gas production facilities (the leading source of these states’ economic welfare) and at tourist centers (another major income source) and occasionally at random into residential areas. The regime is attacking not only states openly hostile to Iran, such as the Emirates and Saudi Arabia, but also Qatar and Oman – the two Arab states considered the most accommodating of Iran’s agendas, and which had attempted to prevent the American offensive by mediating between the US and Iran (Oman still says the war must end and negotiations resumed).
Iran has also attacked European (French, British and Italian) forces located in these Arab states, despite the fact that these nations had openly resisted the Americans’ aggressive policy against Iran. Another Iranian target was a British air base in Cyprus.
The Iranians’ strategic rationale with these strikes seems to be to create economic pressure on the Arab states so they pressure the United States to halt the war. They may also wish to stoke European fears that the war will drag them in and compel them to put diplomatic pressure on the US to stop. If that was their thinking, it hasn’t worked yet. The Arabian Peninsula states (not including Oman) are saying they will join offensive operations against Iran and the European states are making do with increased defensive operations, mostly around Cyprus. Britain and France have agreed to allow the Americans to use their bases, something they refused to do prior to the war. Especially important are the British bases in Diego Garcia(Indian Ocean) and Cyprus (Mediterranean), as these will allow the shortening of flight times of the heavier American bombers to Iran and thus enable an increase in the frequency of their strikes.
On 4 March an Iranian missile was shot down over Turkey, but the Iranians claimed the target was not in Turkey and apologized for violating Turkish airspace. But the next day, 5 March, Iranian exploding drones attacked targets in the Nakhchevan province of Azerbaijan, wounding two. Iran denied that it had launched the drones, but the Azeri government has declared its intention to respond.
Azeris are a Shiite Turkic nation. The majority (approximately 20 million) live in northwest Iran. Azerbaijan (pop.: approximately 10 million) is a moderately religious state with close ties with Turkey that is also very close to Israel (it supplies about 40% of Israel’s oil requirements and purchases much advanced Israeli weaponry, and the diplomatic relationship is very warm). Iran believes Azerbaijan has provided Israeli intelligence and military access to Iran’s border. Iran supported Armenia during its conflict with Azerbaijan and even briefly sent troops into southern Nagorno Karabakh during the war in autumn 2020, blocking the advance of Azeri forces. The troops were withdrawn without combat after a warning by the Azeris that they would be treated as active participants in the war. A constant anxiety of the Iranians is that the Iranian Azeris would adopt an irredentist agenda, assisted by Azerbaijan.
Summing up the physical data is more difficult. The numbers provided by the participants are fragmentary, deliberately obscure or late, and much Iranian reporting is false.
In the first five days of the war (28 February-4 March), Israel alone launched more than 5,000 munitions (for comparison, in the 12-day war in June 2025 it launched 3,700) on a long list of targets of which 220 were in Tehran. Some of the targets (for example, surface-to-surface missile launchers, of which the Israelis destroyed approximately 300) required only a single munition and some were extensive (camps, industrial sites, etc.) that required more. The United States hit more than 2,000 separate targets.
The initial focus, other than the senior leaders Israel attacked in three locations in the first strike, were air defense radars and missile batteries, surface-to-surface missile launchers and storage sites, in order to enable Israeli and American aircraft to operate more freely and reduce Iran’s ability to retaliate. The rate of missile fire from Iran has been reduced, either because of the effectiveness of the attacks reducing the number of available launchers and missiles or because the Iranians are conserving them for a war of long duration.
It appears that in order to reduce coordination problems, the United States and Israel have divided Iran into separate areas, with Israel responsible for the north and the United States for the south.
The initial stage was followed by attacks on other military targets, including the military industry (mostly missile- and nuclear weapon-associated plants). The Iranian navy was targeted by the United States (20 Iranian combat ships were sunk including one by submarine, though Iran still has a few hundred motorboats carrying light weapons or bombs for suicide attacks). Israel focused its attacks on Iran’s internal security organizations, especially in the Tehran area (police headquarters and stations, Revolutionary Guard bases, Basij stations, internal intelligence organization bases).
On the third day, Israel began attacking Revolutionary Guard units along the border between Iran and Iraq. This border separates the Iraqi Kurds from the Iranian Kurds. The Iraqi Kurds have an autonomy with an independent military capability, while in the Iranian Kurd areas there has been a low-key anti-regime guerrilla campaign. Opening the border will enable the Iraqi Kurds to provide assistance to their Iranian brethren. Iran appears to have sensed this threat and has bombarded an Iranian Kurdish militia with its base in the Kurdish Iraq area. On 5 March, the Iranians claimed to have defeated a nighttime attempt by Kurd guerrillas to infiltrate from Iraq to Iran.
There are reports that the US and Israel are in contact with Kurdish leaders and are promising them aid if they decide to attack into Iran. However, it must be made clear that the Kurds are not capable of overthrowing the regime on their own or even of making a deep and wide incursion into Iran. What they can do is increase the pressure on Iran’s security forces and perhaps provide encouragement to the majority of Iranians who wish to depose the current regime.
Other ethnic minorities in Iran also contain groups opposing the regime, including Sunni Arabs in southern Iran and Sunni Balochis in southeastern Iran (on the border with Pakistan, an area where strikes have occurred but details are not known). There are also Azeris in northwestern Iran. However, each of these ethnic minorities has supporters of the regime and it is difficult to know the ratio between them.
On the fourth through sixth days, 3-5 March, operations seem to have continued according to the same lines, with the Israelis and Americans working down the list of targets they had prepared before the war and discovering new ones. Israel also attacked a high-level political meeting in the city of Qom that had been convened to elect a replacement for Khamanei. At time of writing the result is not yet clear.
According to the Saudi national media service, Israel special forces are operating on the ground in Iran.
Iran is reporting approximately 1,230 killed and more than 6,000 wounded. Approximately 160 of the killed are claimed to be high school students at a school that was hit directly by an American bomb or missile (whether because of target misidentification or because of a technical malfunction). Israeli intelligence estimates actual fatalities to be in excess of 3,000, almost all security personnel (Revolutionary Guards, Basij, police, etc.) relevant to suppressing an internal revolt. At least 45 senior officials and senior military commanders were killed on the first day. This includes Ali Khamanei, supreme political and religious leader of Iran since the summer of 1989, and many senior generals.
By 1400 on 5 March, Iran had fired 220-225 missiles and 100 exploding drones at Israel. Thirteen Israelis have been killed (10 in a single incident in which a community was conducting a Purim celebration against safety instructions and the synagogue they were in took a direct hit) and 1,540 injured. On the first day, the salvos were frequent but in small numbers each time (one to five missiles each), totaling about 90 missiles. On the second day, the salvos were larger (approximately 10-20 missiles each) but less frequent, with long periods of quiet between them (approximately 60 missiles altogether). Iran also began to fire missiles with multiple warheads. The advantage of these weapons for Iran is that they are harder to intercept unless hit before the separation of the warheads. The disadvantage for Iran is that each one is smaller and causes significantly less damage. On 2-6 March, the size of the salvos decreased again without an increase in frequency – in other words, the number of missiles fired during the day went down (approximate totals per day: 2 March – 30, 3 March – 20, 4 March – 10).
During the first four days, Iran fired approximately 585 missiles and 1,520 exploding drones at American bases and embassies across the Middle East, at a wide range of military and civilian targets of Arab states, and at British, French and Italian bases in the area. Most of the missiles and drones were aimed at American targets, including military bases and embassies, and the rest at targets of the host countries. The largest number were fired at the United Arab Emirates (197 missiles and 940 exploding drones) and after it Kuwait (178 missiles and 384 exploding drones). The rest were scattered across the other Arab states. The Iranians also sent two Sukhoi-24 bombers to attack targets in Qatar, but they were shot down by the Qataris before reaching their targets.
Put together, Arab casualties from the Arab states hit by Iran (almost all civilians) number 13 killed and 132 wounded (assuming the reports are complete).
Six American soldiers were killed (apparently all in the same incident on the first day) and 18 seriously wounded plus an unreported number who suffered minor injuries. The Iranians of course claim the Americans are hiding fatalities numbering in the hundreds with many more wounded.
Among the damage Iran claims it has inflicted on American forces is at least one, perhaps two, extremely advanced radars. Satellite photographs have been disseminated purporting to show this damage, but they are not clear and could be fake or touched up. The Iranians also claim to have hit an American destroyer (they disseminated a very blurry photograph with what looks like a fire on the ship) and an American F15 combat aircraft. The United States says no F15s have been lost over Iran but has not commented on the destroyer. The United States did lose three F15s flying over Kuwait because of misidentification by Kuwaiti air defenses (they were either shot down by ground-based missiles or by a Kuwaiti F18 fighter). The Iranians claim to have shot down 25 Israeli and four American surveillance and strike drones but provided proof for only a handful. Based on experience, they are likely exaggerating. Israel has said a few of its drones were shot down while being aggressively used to hunt down missile launchers. In Israel’s view, the cost of losing a few drones was worth the return in terms of the number of destroyed launchers.
From the second day on, the Iranians seemed to focus more and more on striking targets of economic importance to the Arab states and their international clients – especially the oil and gas industries, but also tourist centers and an aluminum smelting plant. They have also threatened to attack any ship transiting the Hormuz Straits and have fired upon seven or eight ships so far, one of which sank. Most shipping companies have ordered their ships to cease transit through the Straits.
In normal times, 80 to 90 ships transit the Straits every day. Outgoing vessels carry about 20% of the world’s daily oil supply, the vast majority of which goes to Asia. The countries most affected are China (30% of its oil and 40% of its gas imports), Japan (80% of its oil and gas imports), India (40-53% of its oil and gas imports), and South Korea (68% of its oil and gas imports). Because these countries now have to find alternatives, the effect is being scattered across the globe and prices are increasing in Europe and other places. (For a more detailed assessment of the energy situation, see the appendix below written by a colleague.)
The Iranians are apparently also trying to conduct commando sabotage raids in the Arab states. Qatar announced the arrest of 10 Iranians operating on its territory to collect target intelligence and conduct sabotage.
Lebanon:
In direct contravention of the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hezbollah, which clearly and unequivocally stated that Hezbollah was to disarm and hand all its weapons to the Lebanese government, Hezbollah has been conducting operations to restore its capabilities (restoring damaged sites, procuring weapons, conducting training operations, enlisting new personnel, etc.). Israel has responded with repeated strikes on Hezbollah personnel active in these operations and sites at which the activities were being conducted. Hundreds of Hezbollah personnel have been killed or wounded over the approximately 15 months from the ceasefire until the initiation of the current war. In the weeks leading up to the offensive against Iran, Israel stepped up its strikes on Hezbollah, with the last one being conducted while the first Israeli aircraft were enroute to Iran.
Fearing an Israeli escalation, struggling to rebuild following the defeat of the Assad regime, which blocked its main supply route from Iran, and faced with the Lebanese government’s attempts to curtail its actions, Hezbollah preferred at first not to respond to Israel’s repeated strikes. However, on the night of 1-2 March, approximately 36 hours after Israel killed Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei, Hezbollah opened fire on Israel, probably on orders from Iran’s new leaders. According to one source, the Iranians threatened to cut funding for Hezbollah, which would have had a debilitating effect both militarily and politically on that organization. Hezbollah has had difficulty meeting its financial obligations since its defeat (salaries to personnel, stipends to families of the killed and wounded, funding civilian programs for Shiite refugees created by the war, as well as the education and health services it provided in the past to the Shiite community). Its other sources of funding, the drug trade from central America to the United States and various legal enterprises, provide for only a minor percentage of their requirements.
Up to noon on 5 March, Hezbollah had launched approximately 65 salvos of rockets and exploding drones into Israel. Most salvos included only a single munition, a few included more, but none had more than five. A few Israeli civilians were wounded, none seriously.
It is estimated that Hezbollah has approximately 25,000 rockets left from its prewar arsenal of 130,000-150,000. Most can only reach the northern quarter of Israel, but a few can reach central Israel and at least two were launched at Tel Aviv. In addition, they have an unknown number of exploding drones, probably a few hundred.
Israel ordered the inhabitants of approximately 100 villages in south Lebanon and the Shiite Dakhya quarter of Beirut to evacuate (it is estimated that at least 350,000 people began evacuating these areas). The movement of people from Shiite to non-Shiite areas of Lebanon is creating friction with the non-Shiites, who view the Shiites as responsible for the situation. In some cases they are turning on them, with people being refused transit or sojourn in many places.
Following the evacuation order, Israel began an aerial offensive that mixed massed airstrikes on Hezbollah sites with focused strikes on individual command personnel. By the morning of 5 March, it reported having struck more than 320 targets, including commanders, headquarters, storage sites, launch sites, etc.
In addition, Israeli ground troops entered Lebanon at several points where the terrain on the Lebanese side overlooks Israeli border villages in order to set up defensive positions to deny use of this advantage by Hezbollah. The Lebanese army, which had deployed along the border since autumn 2024, retreated rather than resist. Ground fighting has been sporadic so far. Hezbollah claims to have destroyed some Israeli tanks, but Israel has admitted damage (not destruction) to only one, with two soldiers wounded. Hezbollah videos purporting to show the hits actually show nothing of the kind. Israeli fire has killed or wounded a number of Hezbollah fighters.
The Lebanese government has severely criticized Hezbollah for attacking Israel and providing it with a pretext to strike Lebanon. It has deployed military units to prevent the movement of Hezbollah personnel and equipment to south Lebanon and claims to have arrested Hezbollah personnel involved in the shooting of rockets at Israel. It is not yet clear whether these are genuine indications of Lebanese military activity against Hezbollah or mere propaganda statements.
The Lebanese government reported that since Hezbollah opened fire on Israel, 102 Lebanese have been killed and 638 wounded, but did not separate Hezbollah personnel from civilians.
Syria:
The Syrian regime has reinforced its troops facing Israel and the autonomous Druze enclave in southern Syria. Israel passed on a message to the regime warning it not to try to exploit Israel’s fighting with Iran and Hezbollah to resume its past strikes on the Druze. Israel has reinforced its ground forces facing Syria.
Simultaneously, the Syrian regime has reinforced its troops along the Lebanese border to prevent transit between the two. It is probably worried that Hezbollah will attempt to use Syrian territory to circumvent Israeli troops on the Lebanese border. Furthermore, Hezbollah is an enemy of the new Syrian regime and an ally of the ousted former regime.
Iraq:
Pro-Iranian proxy militias conducted a barrage of exploding drones and missiles on American bases in Iraq.
Israel and the United States bombed several locations of these militias and killed a number of militiamen. There are also reports of at least one commando raid that captured a pro-Iranian Iraqi leader.
Yemen:
So far, apart from issuing threats and claiming they had shot down an American surveillance drone, the Houthis have not actively joined the war. They stopped firing missiles at Israel when the ceasefire in Gaza came into effect in mid-October 2025, following a series of Israeli strikes on their government and senior military headquarters that killed the Prime Minister and several other ministers and senior military officers including their senior military commander. Israeli had also attacked various economic targets, including airports, seaports, and oil storage facilities.
The Houthis, while Shiite and ideologically related to Iran, are not a proxy along the lines of Lebanese and Iraqi Hezbollah. They are more of an ally with a similar, though not completely overlapping, agenda.
WHAT NEXT?
The focus is still Iran, but the fighting has expanded to include some of Iran’s proxies – the Lebanese Hezbollah and Iraqi Hezbollah organizations. The Houthis have not joined in so far.
Though Iran’s missile supply and immediate launch capability continue to be a major objective, there are now two more major objectives gradually being addressed with greater intensity:
- The military industry. The question arises: How many of the factories are manufacturing equipment when bombed, and how many have had their equipment moved and hidden for future use?
- The regime’s stability. This seems to be a major focus for the Israelis, who are attacking the regime’s internal security forces, calling on the public to come out again, and looking for senior regime members to continue the success of the initial strike. The attack on the election of the new Supreme Leader was a blunt message. This appears to be the next point on the agenda of the American forces too.
As Iran’s ability to create major damage is gradually eroded and its military and nuclear industries are reduced, Israel and the United States will divert more attention to destabilizing the regime in order to convert the temporary, even if long-term, reduction in Iran’s weapons manufacturing capability into something permanent.
Regime stability is very difficult to estimate. As a matter of principle, it is expected that the Iranian regime is, though much weakened, not yet destabilized enough to be toppled by mass protests. Millions of Iranians support the regime for ideological and/or practical economic reasons (their livelihoods are dependent on its continued functioning). Therefore, destabilizing the regime, if it is possible, will require a lengthy and massive effort. Having said that, there have been cases in history where supposedly stable regimes turned out to be façades hiding deep internal cracks and they suddenly collapsed after much less pressure than was thought necessary.
There has been a fairly rapid reduction in the Iranians’ rate of fire. This is likely the result of the aggressive hunting by the Israelis and Americans of launchers and storage sites. However, it could also be a deliberate decision to conserve capability for the longer term – firing fewer weapons each day reduces daily casualties and damage to the enemy but also reduces exposure of the equipment. The Iranians have lost hundreds of launchers, but it is not clear how many they have left.
APPENDIX:
THE EFFECTS OF THE WAR ON THE INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS MARKET
by Dr. Elai Rettig, BESA Center for Strategic Studies
A few important points about the energy market following the announcement that Iran is blocking the Strait of Hormuz:
Despite the dramatic headlines, no physical oil shortage is expected for any country, even under more extreme scenarios. The market has been preparing for this risk for years and is effectively signaling (for now) to Israel and the United States that they can sustain the war in the near term.
In terms of oil supply, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have overland pipelines that can bypass Hormuz and move roughly 9-10 million barrels per day (of the ~20 million barrels per day that typically transit the Strait). OPEC+ has already announced production increases to offset potential disruptions.
Moreover, the market is awash in unsold crude. Tankers, many carrying Russian oil, have been anchored offshore for weeks because they cannot find buyers. In the short term, Russia benefits from any tightening narrative because it creates more buyers at higher prices, which is why Russian outlets have been among the first to amplify the most alarmist headlines.
In terms of oil demand, China is highly dependent on Gulf oil (especially from Iran), but it has been stockpiling for the past two months precisely to hedge this scenario, as have other Asian importers, drawing lessons from the previous war. Western countries also maintain strategic reserves designed to cover at least 90 days, and the US has substantial emergency stocks in the SPR that it can release when needed.
The blockade’s main impact is therefore less about physical availability and more about price. Prices are rising largely because traders are buying paper barrels to profit from volatility, not because the market is running out of oil. Over the past few weeks, prices climbed from roughly $60 to $70 per barrel in anticipation, so part of the risk premium was priced in even before the announcement.
Regarding rising LNG prices: Yes, European LNG prices reportedly jumped 35-45% after Qatar’s decision to halt LNG production, but in context, this move is modest. European LNG prices have been relatively low over the past year, so even a sharp percentage increase is far less dramatic than what Europe experienced in 2022-23.
More broadly, it is worth remembering that around 70% of global LNG is sold under long-term, fixed-price contracts. Headlines about “rising LNG prices” usually refer to spot-market prices (such as those in Europe), which represent only a portion of global LNG trade.
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1 February – 1 March 2026
The most significant event since the last update is the combined Israeli and American offensive against Iran, beginning on 28 February.
Iran:
During the month prior to the war, Iranian navy vessels harassed merchant ships sailing through the Hormuz straits, capturing a few. They attempted to capture an American ship that managed to flee until American naval helicopters arrived to support it.
The regime itself was also subjected to several attacks by resistance groups. The biggest was an attempt to strike the palace of Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei. Most attacks consisted of mysterious fires and explosions that occurred at factories and other Revolutionary Guard-affiliated sites.
On 28 February 2026, after weeks of inconclusive negotiations between the United States and Iran, the transfer of American aerial and naval forces to the Middle East, and the reduction of American forces in bases near Iran, Israel and the US initiated an offensive against Iran.
According to public reports, there are now approximately 250 American combat aircraft located around Iran. That is approximately the same number available to the Israeli air force.
The initiation of the attack was planned to coincide with a high-level meeting of Iran’s Supreme Leader with some of his senior civilian and military subordinates. The meeting was supposed to take place the evening of 28 February, but it was brought forward to the morning. The attack was accordingly brought forward as well. Israeli aircraft dropped 30 bombs onto Khamanei’s palace while simultaneously attacking two other senior headquarters. Khamanei and approximately 40 senior personnel were killed in these strikes.
The initial attack was immediately followed by a long series of strikes on a wide variety of other targets. By evening of the first day, the IDF reported having struck some 500 targets and United States Central Command reported having struck some 900, using both Tomahawk cruise missiles and aircraft. Targets included anti-aircraft defenses to open the way for aircraft and surface-to-surface missile launchers and storage sites, among others. Israel purportedly also attacked an Iraqi pro-Iranian militia, killing three of its leaders.
US and Israeli strikes continued through the night of 28 February and into the morning of 1 March. During that morning, Israeli strikes converged on regime and military targets in Tehran, including the headquarters of one of the forces responsible for suppressing the anti-government demonstrations in January. The American forces have been attacking similar military sites, with an added focus on the Iranian navy. As the first day progressed, beyond striking Khamanei’s palace and other such targets, the Israelis focused on destroying Iran’s air defenses and ballistic missile launchers and storage sites.
The Iranians responded with surface-to-surface missile and exploding-drone attacks on seven countries across the Middle East in addition to Israel: Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman. Some missiles fired by Iran at Israel fell in Syria, in one case killing four people in the Druze enclave south of the capital Damascus. Iran also fired two missiles in the direction of Cyprus that fell into the Mediterranean.
As expected, the Iranian response began with sporadic strikes in small numbers. As the first day progressed, the Iranian strikes gradually increased in frequency and size of salvo (the largest so far were approximately 30 to 40 missiles, but most were 10 to 20). It is difficult to estimate the total number of missiles and drones Iran has launched. In the evening of 28 February, an Iranian source claimed about 1,200 had been launched, and hundreds more have been launched since then.
In the Arab states along the Persian Gulf, Iran’s targets were mostly American bases, but quite a few of their attacks hit civilian areas, including civilian airports, hotels, and residential buildings. Most of these strikes were around the US bases, but some were further away. The percentage of attacks penetrating the Arab states seems so far to be higher than those penetrating Israel’s defenses. This is likely due to the fact that these states’ defenses against such weapons are less dense than those of Israel, and they are much more dependent on the systems brought in by US forces. It also likely reflects the fact that because these states are physically closer to Iran, they have a shorter alert time. With that said, the missiles Iran is firing at Israel are for the most part bigger and carrying larger warheads than those it is firing at the Arab states, so each penetration in Israel is potentially more damaging.
Iran threatened to attack merchant ships transiting the Hormuz Straits and proceeded to do so, firing a missile that hit one. Four were wounded, the crew abandoned ship, and the ship sank. This is creating a halt in transit that could have significant repercussions on all countries dependent on oil and gas from the Persian Gulf.
After Iran officially announced the death of Khamanei, pro-regime crowds gathered to chant their support, mourn his death and demand revenge. In Iraq and Pakistan there were attacks on US embassies. In Pakistan, embassy guards apparently had to open fire on rioters who penetrated the building.
Iran claims that by the evening of the first day, casualties included not only a list of senior officers and officials but also more than 200 killed and more than 700 wounded. True to form, they claim that almost all these people were civilians. Iran claims that many of the victims were teenagers whose school was bombed.
In Israel there have been 11 fatalities and at least 160 wounded (most with only slight injuries). The heaviest casualties occurred when two missiles directly hit buildings. In one case, nine were killed and more than 50 wounded by a missile that directly hit a synagogue in which a prayer service was being conducted against safety instructions. The synagogue was completely demolished. Apparently not all the casualties were in the shelter, and there are still people unaccounted for. In another direct hit, one person was killed and 27 wounded. Most of the Israeli casualties are caused by the rush to safety, with people falling down stairs or tripping. One woman died of a severe asthma attack while rushing to a shelter.
The US military reported three soldiers killed and five severely wounded. An undisclosed number suffered light wounds.
The Arab states’ reports on casualties have been fragmentary and it is not clear how many were inflicted. A high-rise building in Bahrain was hit and burst into flames that appear to have engulfed apartments along most of its height. It is likely that there were significant casualties there.
Trump has stated that the replacements for the killed Iranian leadership have requested negotiations and that he has agreed.
Lebanon:
Up to 27 February, Israel continued to attack Hezbollah personnel and sites almost daily, not only in southern Lebanon but also in central and northern Lebanon.
In January 2026, the number of attacks (87) was double the number in December 2025, and a similar number of targets were struck in February. The attack on 27 February involved the largest number of targets in a single strike. This was part of Israel’s preparation for the war against Iran: to ensure that Hezbollah would not join in, or if it did, would have fewer means at its disposal. Attacks targeted storage sites, training bases and headquarters.
In the last week of February, the Lebanese army deployed troops closer to the border and IDF positions in order to prevent the IDF from conducting ground raids into Lebanon. This was after several such raids destroyed buildings marked as Hezbollah-owned. In one case, Israel captured a terrorist leader of the Muslim Brotherhood who had placed himself in a village near the border with the intent to plan a raid into Israel.
One Israeli attack was aimed at a Hamas center in Lebanon.
Gaza:
Very little has changed during the period covered by this update.
Skirmishes continue daily along the Yellow Line. More Hamas personnel have attempted to exit tunnels inside Israeli-held areas and have been killed or captured.
Arguments over the exact details of Hamas’s disarmament continue. Israel demands complete disarmament while Hamas and the Arab mediators want to leave the group with small firearms (rifles and light machine guns).
Hamas continues to embed personnel into the administrative and police functions of the supposedly non-Hamas new technocratic governing body.
WHAT NEXT?
The focus is now on Iran. Will the United States and Israel maintain the intensity of operations sufficiently to weaken the Iranian regime so that another internal uprising can occur successfully? Barring a sudden unexpected event, this will require a long-term commitment, and even then it is not clear if it is achievable. Long term, for both Israel’s security and that of the Americans’ other allies in the region, the best solution is regime change, but this is the most difficult result to achieve. Any reduction in Iran’s physical capabilities without regime change will be merely temporary—though the duration of “temporary” can be short or long, depending on how much damage the offensive achieves and the level of support Iran receives from Russia, China, and North Korea after the war is over.
Iran’s new leaders have apparently signaled a willingness to negotiate and President Trump has declared he is willing to do so. Given Iran’s invariable behavior at the negotiating table, the purpose of these negotiations will be to play for time and find ways to cheat again, as they did in the JCPOA treaty signed in 2015. The damage inflicted in two days is not sufficient to create a long duration of recovery for Iran or create a threat to the stability of the regime. So the first question is, will President Trump fall for it? And the second question is, will the negotiations be conducted during continued offensive operations or will there be a ceasefire?
For Israel, other fronts are active but are currently secondary and low-intensity. Lebanon might flare up again on Iran’s urging, though it seems Hezbollah does not want to comply. Likewise Yemen. Gaza and Judea and Samaria seem stable, but the IDF has reinforced capabilities in those locations to ensure there are no attempts to escalate while Israel is preoccupied with Iran. The same is true for the Syrian front.
****
21 December 2025 – 31 January 2026
The two most significant events since the last update have been in Gaza (the transition to Phase 2 of the ceasefire agreement) and in Iran (the bloody suppression of mass protests against the regime and the possibility of an American offensive against that country in the near future). The prospect of an American strike on Iran, not yet begun at time of writing, has overshadowed almost all other events for the past few weeks and will continue to do so for the indefinite future. Until the offensive either begins or does not begin and the tension dissipates, and the extent of both the attack itself and the Iranian response is clear, it will be difficult to predict its effect on the general situation of the Middle East and Israel in particular.
Gaza:
The most significant event since the last update was the return of the body of Ran Gvili, the last Israeli kidnapped by the Palestinians on 7 October 2023. In response, Israel returned the bodies of 15 Hamas terrorists collected by the IDF following the recapture of territory it lost on 7 October and territory it captured inside Gaza. Israel is now set to reopen the Gaza-Egypt border crossing at Rafah for two-way traffic.
Gvili’s body was found by Israeli forces buried in a Palestinian cemetery. Though Hamas claims its assistance was critical to finding the body, it in fact did nothing whatsoever to assist. The body’s location was discovered by Israeli intelligence after it was determined that several members of Palestinian Islamic Jihad knew where it was, one of whom was captured in a special operation. The cemetery was adjacent to the Yellow Line separating Israeli-controlled territory and Hamas-controlled territory. Operating there required the Israelis to cross the Yellow Line (the line marking the separation between the Hamas-controlled area of Gaza and the Israeli-controlled area), and it took approximately one month to reach an agreement with Hamas to allow this to happen without fighting. Approximately 250 bodies were collected and checked before Israeli troops found the body of Gvili, an Israeli policeman. He was killed on 7 October 2023 while fighting to protect the Israeli community of Alumim near the Gaza border. He lived in a village in the central Negev, heard about the Hamas attack, and on his own initiative rushed to the nearby police station, armed himself, and drove to Alumim, where, despite being wounded shortly after his arrival, he fought the terrorists until he ran out of ammunition. He was captured and died of his wounds some days later in captivity.
Militarily speaking, very little has changed during the period covered by this update.
Skirmishes along the Yellow Line have continued daily. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad personnel constantly attempt to infiltrate into the Israeli-controlled area to scout, salvage weapons, or attack Israeli positions and patrols. A few Israeli soldiers have been wounded since the last report, and one who was severely wounded during such an incident a few months ago died from his wounds. A few dozen Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad personnel have been killed or wounded. Most incidents are brief exchanges of stand-off fire across the Yellow Line. In one case, six Hamas personnel dug a shaft from an undiscovered tunnel adjacent to an Israeli position and wounded two Israeli soldiers before being killed by Israeli return of fire. Given the soft soil composition in the area, digging new tunnels or new shafts from existing tunnels is a fairly quick process. In another case, a rocket was launched from Hamas-controlled territory, but it failed and fell inside Gaza. Israeli troops respond to stand-off fire in kind and shoot at infiltrators. After major incidents, Israel retaliates by striking specific Hamas or Palestinian Islamic Jihad commanders in Hamas-controlled territory.
Israeli forces continue to scour the territory in Israeli hands and almost every day find new caches of weapons hidden in buildings or other sites, as well as new tunnel entrance shafts and tunnels. The weapons are collected and the buildings and tunnels demolished.
Meanwhile, the flow of trucks carrying supplies into Gaza continues at approximately 800 per day, though a quarter of that is sufficient to meet the needs of the population. A large portion of these supplies continues to flow to Hamas itself. A video report by an anti-Hamas Palestinian showed a store of baby food that has been held back by Hamas rather than supplying it to the population. He claims the film was made during the period when Israel was falsely accused of deliberately starving Gaza’s population. A report published by the Fatah-controlled Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria did not go so far as that, but did state that Hamas controlled both the import and the dissemination of humanitarian assistance and used that control to fund itself at the population’s expense.
The wealth of supplies entering Gaza is enabling Hamas to continue to solidify its control over the population, enlist new troops, and build up its arsenal of weapons. Currently, this arsenal consists primarily of light weapons and explosives salvaged from destroyed storage sites and unexploded aerial bombs dropped by the Israelis during the war. The number of small explosive devices that can be created from a salvaged bomb depends on its size, ranging from a dozen to several dozen. There are probably a few hundred such unexploded aerial bombs scattered throughout the area controlled by Hamas. In addition, the Israelis have intercepted quadcopters carrying weapons from Egypt into Gaza. How many of these have already managed to get through is not known. In the past, Hamas has also smuggled in weapons by sea, exploiting the natural current directions to float waterproof barrels from Egyptian Sinai to Gaza. Israeli naval patrols have intercepted some but not all of these barrels. Since the beginning of the war and the increased presence of Israeli naval patrols, naval smuggling has been more difficult for Hamas to accomplish, but it might still be happening.
In Phase 2, Hamas is supposed to disarm, a technocratic government is to be established in Gaza, and an international force is meant to take over ‘peacekeeping’, enabling Israel to withdraw its forces closer to the border. Hamas continues to declare it will NOT disarm, and some of the mediators (Egypt, Qatar, and, according to a recent unverified report, the British government) are attempting to change this requirement. In theory, the technocratic government has been set up and is ready to begin work, but as long as Hamas remains armed, this government will be only a façade behind which Hamas will continue to control Gaza. This is especially true in view of the fact that most of the administrative personnel in this government previously worked for Hamas. This includes a 10,000-man armed police force that is meant to enforce the policies of the new government but that is actually manned almost entirely by Hamas personnel.
Furthermore, there is still no international force willing to replace the IDF in compelling Hamas’s disarmament. This means that if Phase 2 is in fact declared, the situation will remain the same. This could lead to a swift reigniting of the fighting.
Meanwhile, the IDF has completed preparations for at least one site on which to build a new tent/hut city for Gazans who will be transferred to live there, via security checkpoints to filter out Hamas personnel, and receive humanitarian support. More such sites are under discussion. If this works, it will reduce, possibly dramatically, the number of civilians living under Hamas authority. This would give the IDF a freer hand for operations against Hamas and the other organizations.
Hamas claims that approximately 71,700 Gazans have been killed and approximately 172,000 wounded since 7 October 2023. The increased number reflects its claim to have found more bodies under the rubble. In addition, Hamas claims that during the ceasefire more than 500 more Gazans have been killed (100-plus since the last update) and more than 1,260 wounded (approximately 200 since the last update). These include those killed by the IDF in the constant skirmishes along the Yellow Line and in its retaliatory strikes. Of course, Hamas claims that nearly all the killed and wounded were civilians. According to Israeli data, at least 25,000 of the killed were terrorists.
Hamas and its supporters have disseminated propaganda in the form of fake photographs and video footage of Gaza covered in snow and the population suffering in freezing temperatures. THERE IS NO SNOW IN GAZA. In fact, there is no snow anywhere in Israel except at the top of the Hermon mountain at the north-eastern tip of the country, some 230 kilometers away from and about 2,000 meters elevation above Gaza. Even there, the snow lasted only a few days. There were several days of heavy rain, as mentioned in the last update, which caused flooding in a few of the usually dry riverbeds, though photographs and videos of that problem exaggerated it. Much of the published footage has been proven to be AI-created fakes (people in the images have extra arms or feet, or similar anomalies). That is not to claim that all is well. The population is suffering from the winter, and more buildings have collapsed because of the rains since the last update. But as with all its previous claims, Hamas is deliberately exaggerating, and its lies are being supported and spread across both social and official media.
Israel continues to stiffen its regulations on the operations of international organizations that are supposed to provide humanitarian assistance but that often provide aid to Hamas itself in the form of provisions, funding, and salaried jobs to Hamas personnel. Israel has shut down all cooperation with the UN organization UNRWA, including closing its office in Jerusalem and demolishing it for use as a residential or commercial site. Israel has demanded that all international organizations hand over their staff rosters to be checked for Hamas or other terrorist personnel. Those that have not complied have lost their license to operate.
On the Israeli side of the border with Gaza, the rebuilding and return of the population forced to evacuate because of the 7 October 2023 attack and subsequent war has continued, with most of the Israeli refugees now returned to their homes. In the town of Sderot, seven kilometers from the border, there has been a large-scale operation to build new neighborhoods. In addition to nearly all the original residents having returned, at least 3,000 new residents have moved to Sderot from other parts of Israel. On 7 October 2023, the town was bombarded with rockets. Approximately an hour after the beginning of the Hamas offensive, teams of Hamas terrorists were driving through Sderot’s streets shooting pedestrians, capturing buildings, and holding them against responding Israeli security forces. Thirty-nine civilians, 11 police personnel, two firefighters and four soldiers (including a brigade commander) were killed in the battle. Thirty-nine terrorists were killed and two captured.
Iran:
Following the worsening economic crisis caused by the Iranian regime’s priorities in budget allocation and American economic sanctions, and the perception of a weakened regime because of its defeat by Israel in June 2025, many Iranians took to the streets to protest the regime’s economic policies. Gradually the protests gathered momentum and became a cry for regime change. At that point the regime’s response changed from containment to all-out suppression through military force and live fire. Reports of the number of protesters killed varies from approximately 5,000 to approximately 43,000, but it is impossible to verify any of the numbers. Many thousands more were wounded, but no one has provided any quotable figures.
Though the intensity of the protests has waned to almost nil, regime forces continue to hunt down anyone who may have been involved. They are arresting anyone, whether at home or in hospital with gunshot wounds.
The United States declared it would support the protesters if the Iranian regime continued to kill them, but did not immediately act despite the ongoing violence. The excuse was that there were too few American forces available in the region to do the minimum necessary. Since then, the US has been assembling a large aerial and naval force within striking distance of Iran. However, at time of writing, it remains unclear whether the US will strike or just posture in order to dictate an agreement on its own terms.
Even if the US does attack, the extent of the attack cannot be predicted. Nor is it known whether the regime’s opponents in Iran have the capability to exploit the attack to reignite the protests, let alone go even further and conduct a revolution.
It should be remembered that millions of the approximately 90 million Iranians have a vested interest in the survival of the regime, upon which their livelihoods depend. Many of the protesters could have been mollified by a change in the regime’s economic policies to improve their wellbeing at the expense of its aggressive foreign policy and military expenditures.
The Iranians say any attack will be responded to by massive strikes on American forces throughout the Middle East, Israel, and pro-American Arab states in the region. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have all publicly said they will not allow American use of their territories for the attack and prefer a diplomatic solution. They are closer to Iran than Israel and less well-defended against its missiles and exploding drones. Turkey too is attempting to prevent an American offensive on Iran, though for its own ideological reasons. Given the détente between them, Iran is very unlikely to attack Turkey.
According to rumors leaked by “senior American officials”, possible military objectives of the US offensive would include obstructing Iran’s attempts to repair its damaged nuclear and long-range missile industrial sites plus possible regime anchors, whether military or political. There may even be attempts to decapitate the regime’s political leadership. Obviously, no one outside Washington’s top political and military planning echelons knows what is being prepared or what the final decision will entail. Furthermore, even if the offensive begins, it could change direction midstream depending on the results of the initial strikes and the Iranian response. What is clear is that the American military is not preparing a ground invasion. At most there will be some small special operations in addition to the main effort, which would be an aerial and long-range missile bombardment.
Judea and Samaria:
In 2025, the total number of terrorist attacks on Israelis in or emanating from Judea and Samaria was approximately 1,400-1,450. This number reflects a reduction of the frequency of attacks back to pre-2020 levels resulting from the escalation of Israeli counter-terrorist operations after the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas from Gaza and its attempt to foment a further escalation in Judea and Samaria. The numbers had escalated to 2,135 in 2021 and 2,613 in 2022. Until 7 October 2023, the monthly average for 2023 was approximately 210-215 attacks. At that rate, there would have been approximately 2,600 attacks in 2023. After 7 October, there was an escalation of attacks, so in the last 3 months of 2023 alone there were approximately 880 attacks for a total of 3,436 that year. In 2024, the monthly numbers gradually decreased to the current level at around the middle of the year.
In the approximately six weeks since the last update, there have been about 120 armed attacks on Israelis (petrol bombs, car rammings, knife attacks, shootings, and attacks with explosives) and about 300 stone-throwing incidents. Two Israeli civilians were killed and seven wounded by a Palestinian from Samaria who infiltrated into Israel to find a job. After working a few days, he took his boss’s car and used it to deliberately run over two pedestrians, killing one and wounding the other. He then exited the car with a knife and stabbed a teenage girl to death. He was shot, wounded and captured by security forces.
At least seven Palestinian attackers were killed attempting to attack Israeli civilians or soldiers and others have been wounded. Dozens more have been arrested.
Lebanon:
Hezbollah continues to refuse the government’s demand that it relinquish all its weapons. Hezbollah and the other Shiite militia, Amal, have declared that any attempt to take their weapons will be resisted with armed force. Theoretically, Hezbollah is still more militarily capable than the Lebanese army, so the real issue is whether its lower ranks will obey an order to fight disarmament attempts. So far, the Lebanese government has not tried to test this. They talk about the need to disarm Hezbollah but have not done anything to carry it out.
In fact, according to Israeli intelligence, some Lebanese army personnel are working for Hezbollah and helping it to salvage weapons and hide new storage sites.
On 8 January 2026, the Lebanese army officially declared that it had cleared all Hezbollah weaponry out of southern Lebanon. Israel has refuted this claim.
Israel continues to attack Hezbollah personnel and sites almost daily, not only in southern Lebanon, but also in other areas. One such airstrike temporarily shut down four border crossings used to transfer weapons from Syria to Lebanon. An official briefing by IDF intelligence estimates that Hezbollah still has several hundred long-range missiles able to reach central Israel and up to 20% of its pre-war short-range rocket arsenal, which is capable of covering most of northern Israel (approximately a quarter of Israel’s population can be reached by the short-range rockets). Hezbollah personnel number some 40,000 regular troops and 30,000 reservists, similar to its numbers before the war.
Over the past year, since the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah went into effect, the IDF has killed approximately 400 Hezbollah personnel who were breaking the ceasefire stipulation that they not conduct any military activity related to salvaging or procuring weapons or manufacturing new ones.
French UNIFIL troops brought down an Israeli surveillance quadcopter observing activity in a south Lebanese village.
Syria:
Negotiations between Israel and Syria are stuck on the withdrawal, in exchange for security guarantees, of Israeli troops currently placed in the buffer zone taken by Israel last year. Israel views the new regime’s policies with suspicion. Educational activities conducted by the new regime refer to Israel as the next enemy to be destroyed after the destruction of the Assad regime. The new regime is allowing other anti-Israel activities to occur as well, including allowing Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to build infrastructure and concentrate personnel in Syria.
Around the Druze enclave in southern Syria, skirmishes continue between regime forces and the Druze militia. One point delaying an agreement between Israel and the new Syrian regime is that Israel demands that the regime desist from besieging and raiding the Druze and allow them autonomy.
The new regime, which purports to be inclusive and more liberal than the previous one, has been attacking minorities across Syria, especially in the north (far from Israel). There are reports that Druze enclaves in northern Syria, which are much smaller and weaker than the central concentration of Druze in southern Syria, have been attacked, and that many have been killed (some reports claim the number is in the thousands). Demonstrations by Alawites protesting their treatment by the new Syrian regime have been met with gunfire from regime troops.
In January, the regime’s forces launched a full-scale offensive against the Kurds in northeastern Syria. These Kurds were allies of the United States in the fight against ISIS, but the US did not assist them in return. The regime’s forces captured most of the territory formerly controlled by the Kurds, and there have been videos of the killing and mistreatment of the Kurdish population. A ceasefire agreement was reached with the Kurds after their defeat in which they agreed to integrate their remaining military forces into the official army of the new regime and accept the regime’s sovereignty in their territory. It remains to be seen if the regime will adhere to this agreement.
Yeni Şafak, a Turkish newspaper that represents Turkey’s ruling government’s party, has declared Israel to be the “Number One threat to Turkey”. A new Turkish radar was recently placed in Damascus with a range that covers northern Israel and Lebanon, providing Turkey with the ability to observe most Israeli aerial traffic in the region.
Yemen:
Shipping has increased through the Bab al-Mandeb Straits after several months of no attacks.
The Houthis have declared that if the United States attacks Iran, they will respond in support of Iran.
WHAT’S NEXT?
The war is not over. It may escalate from a typical Middle Eastern ceasefire (i.e., low intensity fire despite an official cessation of fire) to a higher intensity at any moment.
The transition to Phase 2 is supposed to include the disarmament of Hamas. If that does not happen willingly (and Hamas and the other organizations have made clear that it will not), the American and Israeli governments have stated that the civilian rehabilitation projects will be delayed and the disarmament will happen by force—in other words, fighting will escalate.
Meanwhile, Hamas is working to undermine the idea of a technocratic non-Hamas government by providing the administrative manpower of that government to ensure that in reality, it will be the one determining policy.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s heavily attrited forces are rebuilding. They are attempting to recover equipment buried in destroyed storage sites, smuggle new weapons into Lebanon, and recruit new personnel. All of this contradicts the ceasefire agreement, so Israel is conducting strikes almost daily against these activities. The Israelis are fully aware that this is only delaying the inevitable recovery of Hezbollah, not halting it. Hezbollah has not yet retaliated to these Israeli actions but has recently begun to state that it will do so. The Lebanese government, which claimed it could and would disarm Hezbollah, as stated in the agreement, is dragging its feet. Here, too, an escalation of fighting could happen.
In Iran, and indeed across the Middle East, everything depends on whether President Trump decides to attack Iran or not, and if he does, in what manner. Appearances of weakness notwithstanding, Iran’s regime is fairly stable because of the dependence of a large segment of the population on its existence. The willingness of the general population to rebel seems to have dissipated because of the extreme violence of its suppression. It seems the American offensive, if it comes at all, will be too late. However, regime stability is very difficult to gauge. Some seemingly stable regimes collapsed quickly (see the Soviet Union in 1991 and Mubarak in Egypt in 2011), while others that seemed fragile held on for an extended period (see Assad in Syria from 2011 till 2024).
****
17 November – 20 December 2025
Gaza:
Very little has changed in principle since the last update.
The bodies of two more kidnappees were returned (an Israeli and a Thai agricultural worker; the latter was the last of 31 Thai agricultural workers kidnapped on 7 October 2023), leaving the body of one more Israeli still to be returned. Israeli intelligence says the body is in the hands of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which claims it does not have it or know where it is. Hamas is conducting searches for the body in various areas, including Israeli-controlled areas, but while it has twice sent “findings” to Israel, neither was the missing Israeli. This raises the suspicion that they are deliberately digging in places that are not relevant and are using the excuse of the search for the missing Israeli to covertly recover their own weapons and equipment.
In response, Israel has refused to open the Rafah crossing between Gaza and Egypt, as it was supposed to do in Phase 1 of the ceasefire, and has refused to transition to Phase 2. It has, however, agreed to increase the flow of trucks carrying food and other supplies into the area of Gaza controlled by Hamas. The flow reached a rate of about 800 trucks per day in the period covered by the last update. In Phase 2, Hamas is supposed to disarm, a technocratic government is to be established, and an international force is supposed to take over ‘peacekeeping’ in Gaza, enabling Israel to withdraw its forces closer to the border. Hamas continues to state that it will not disarm under any circumstances, notwithstanding the requirements of the ceasefire agreement.
Hamas continues to solidify its domination of the population in the area it controls (virtually all the population of Gaza in approximately 45% of the area), using intimidation, violence, control over the distribution of supplies, the collecting of taxes, and the enlisting of new personnel (according to one report, at least 3,000 have enlisted in Hamas since the ceasefire began).
There are reports that Hamas is collecting weapons and other military material in ‘friendly’ states (Yemen and African states) and preparing to smuggle it into Gaza. It has also been reported that Hamas is smuggling weapons into Gaza from Egypt using quadcopters. These actions are consistent with Hamas’s stated policy of refusing to comply with the disarmament demand in the ceasefire agreement.
The ceasefire itself is a typical Middle Eastern ceasefire, with Hamas personnel constantly testing Israeli troop awareness. They regularly attempt to infiltrate across the Yellow Line (the line marking the separation between Hamas-held territory and Israeli-held territory) and fire at Israeli troops. The line is marked with concrete blocks painted yellow every 200 meters to prevent accidental crossings. In one case, five Israeli soldiers were wounded by a Hamas operation. One Israeli patrol along the Yellow Line discovered a multiple-rocket launcher, loaded and ready to fire into Israel. Because of these constant breaches and threats, Israeli forces shoot at anyone who crosses the Yellow Line.
In response to these repeated Hamas actions, Israel has conducted strikes on senior Hamas personnel in the Hamas-held area, killing, among others, the latest Hamas military’s second in command, who had been charged with rebuilding Hamas’s weapons manufacturing and smuggling capabilities.
The Israeli hunt for Hamas terrorists still hiding inside tunnels in Israeli-controlled territory is almost over. The majority have been killed, some have surrendered, and a few have managed to exfiltrate to Hamas-controlled territory. Among the killed were the Hamas battalion commander and his deputy in charge of this area.
The debates about the international force continue but have not yet achieved a result. Again, the main point is that the countries willing to send forces all demand that they not have to fight Hamas, only oversee the ceasefire. Israel refuses to accept any force from Turkey or Qatar, as these would be more likely to help Hamas recover than ensure that it does not.
Hamas claims that approximately 70,660 Gazans have been killed and 171,140 wounded since 7 October 2023. The increased number reflects its claims to have found bodies under the rubble. In addition, it claims that more than 390 more Gazans have been killed during the ceasefire and more than 1,060 wounded. This figure includes those killed by the IDF in the above-mentioned retaliatory strikes and constant skirmishes along the Yellow Line, where there are near-daily exchanges of fire between Hamas teams attempting to infiltrate the line or snipe across it and Israeli troops. Hamas of course claims that nearly all the killed and wounded were innocent civilians.
Winter arrived late this year to Israel and its surrounding area, but the rainfall within the few days it fell was equivalent to almost an entire year’s average, especially in the south. This caused severe flooding in both southern Israel and Gaza, especially along the dry riverbeds. Inside Gaza, many tents and other facilities located in the usually dry areas along the shallow riverbeds were washed away. In addition, many buildings collapsed as they were undermined by the rains. This occurs every year in Gaza due to the way many Gazan builders take shortcuts when building foundations. But this year, because of the extensive damage caused during the fighting and particularly because of the destruction of tunnels that had been deliberately constructed underneath residential areas, the number of collapses has been higher than usual. As always, the numbers have become a propaganda issue, so it is difficult to determine what they really are, but at least a few dozen buildings have collapsed (the highest claim is 95). Some of them were occupied at the time of their collapse, leading to the deaths and injuries of residents.
Meanwhile, Israel has begun ground clearance operations to build a large tent city in southern Gaza in the area it controls. The idea is that once the infrastructure is ready, a large part of the population of the Hamas-controlled area will move there through filtration points (to check that none are terrorist-affiliated). This city is to be controlled and managed by an international body that will supply the population’s needs.
Another 18,000 Gazans have received medical permits to leave Gaza for treatment and will begin exiting Gaza through Israel during the coming weeks. This is in addition to 40,000 who have left Gaza over the past two years. Another 4,000 are waiting for their permits to be approved. The process requires them to first receive approval from Hamas medical authorities and then to be vetted by Israeli security.
Judea and Samaria:
Since the last update there have been approximately 90 armed attacks (petrol-bombs, car-rammings, knife attacks, shootings, and bomb attacks) on Israelis and about 230 stone-throwing incidents. One Israeli was killed and six wounded.
At least five Palestinian attackers were killed attempting to attack Israeli civilians or soldiers and others have been wounded. Dozens more have been arrested.
The escalation of Israeli civilian attacks on Palestinians has continued and the IDF and police have intervened and made more arrests. Most of the attacks are conducted by a group of Israeli young people usually referred to as the Hilltop Youth. Most are high school dropouts who have rallied around charismatic religious leaders considered by most Israelis to be extremists. The Hilltop Youth number about 400-500 people in total. Some have been prosecuted and jailed in the past. Following the escalation in their violent activities, mostly attacks on Palestinians but also against the Israeli military and police, it has been decided to set up a special police task force to deal with them.
Lebanon:
Hezbollah continues to refuse the demand of the Lebanese government that it relinquish its weapons. Hezbollah and the other Shiite militia, Amal, have declared that any attempt to take their weapons will be resisted with armed force. Theoretically, Hezbollah is still militarily more capable than the Lebanese army, so the real issue is whether its lower ranks will obey an order to fight attempts at disarmament. The Lebanese government has not yet put this to the test. They talk about the need to disarm Hezbollah but have not done anything to carry it out.
In southern Lebanon, there have been multiple incidents in which UNIFIL and Lebanese army teams coming to clear Hezbollah weapons storage sites have had their way blocked by villagers. In one incident, the Lebanese army warned Hezbollah in advance of the objective and then, after searching the building, declared it empty.
Over the past year, since the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, the IDF has killed at least 390 Hezbollah personnel who were breaking the ceasefire stipulation that they not conduct military activity in southern Lebanon. The killed included the senior military commander of Hezbollah (the number 2 in the organization after the senior political leader). The US had a $5 million prize on his head for his participation in attacks on Americans.
The Israeli air force also bombed a Hamas training facility in Lebanon. Thirteen Hamas personnel were killed and more wounded. Hamas is concentrating personnel and equipment in Lebanon and coordinating activities and training with Hezbollah.
Syria:
Negotiations are stuck between Israel and Syria on the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the buffer zone taken by Israel last year in return for security guarantees. Israel is viewing the new regime’s policies with suspicion. Educational activities conducted by the regime refer to Israel as the next enemy to be destroyed after the destruction of the Assad regime, and the regime is allowing other anti-Israeli activities to occur. Thus, for example, Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad are building infrastructure and placing personnel in Syria.
The following are the words of a song sung by a Syrian youth choir during a ceremony commemorating the defeat of the Assad regime last year:
I am coming to you, my enemy.
Our blood is the ammunition.
From your blood we will create rivers.
Gaza is the slogan.
Jerusalem is ours.
An Israeli operation to arrest Muslim Brotherhood terrorists in the Syrian village of Beyt Jan became a skirmish. The initial arrest went quietly and successfully, but on the way out of the village, the Israeli vehicles were attacked by armed men. Six Israeli soldiers were wounded. According to Syrian media, at least 13 ambushers were killed and 25 wounded.
Around the Druze enclave in southern Syria, skirmishes continue between the forces of the new regime and the Druze militia. One of the points delaying an agreement between Israel and the new Syrian regime is that Israel demands that the regime desist from its siege and raids against the Druze and allow them autonomy.
Three Americans were killed by a soldier from the new regime’s army with whom they were conducting a common patrol. The US responded with airstrikes on ISIS locations in Syria. The Jordanian air force participated in this operation.
A series of demonstrations by Alawites protesting their treatment by the new Syrian regime was met with gunfire from regime troops.
Iran:
Iran, with the help of North Korea and Russia, has resumed manufacture of long-range surface-to-surface missiles. The exact details are not known, but they are probably receiving parts they can no longer manufacture themselves after several missile manufacture-related factories were destroyed by Israel in June 2025.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard navy released the ship it hijacked last month. It has hijacked another oil tanker leaving the Arab Emirates and bound for Singapore. Again, their excuse is that they had information that it was carrying contraband.
Thousands of Israelis, meanwhile, received the following SMS text message:
Yemen:
Shipping has increased through the Bab al-Mandeb straits after several months without attacks. However, one ship reported being fired upon, though no damage was incurred.
WHAT NEXT?
Not much has changed, so the assessment given in the last update still holds true. The war is not yet over and may escalate any day from the typical Middle Eastern ceasefire (low intensity fire despite an official cessation of fire) to a higher intensity.
Hamas still has one hostage body to return and claims not to know where it is. There are daily skirmishes along the official ceasefire line (the Yellow Line). Hamas has repeatedly said it will not disarm, convincing many of the states who are proposing to send peacekeeping forces that they might have to fight Hamas and prompting them to back out of their commitments. Not only is Hamas failing to disarm, but it is working diligently to rebuild its capabilities – though they would still be considerably less than they were two years ago. Israel is preparing for the possibility that it will have to renew offensive operations against Hamas.
In Lebanon, a rebuilding of Hezbollah’s heavily attrited forces is underway. This includes the recovery of equipment buried in destroyed storage sites, the smuggling of new weapons into Lebanon, and the taking on of new personnel. As all of this contradicts the ceasefire agreement, Israel is conducting strikes almost daily on these activities, but the Israelis are fully aware that while this will delay the inevitable recovery of Hezbollah, it will not halt it. Hezbollah has not yet retaliated against these Israeli actions but has begun to say it will do so. The Lebanese government, which claimed it could and would disarm Hezbollah as stipulated in the agreement, is dragging its feet. Here, too, an escalation of fighting could occur.
Iran is rebuilding its missile forces to enable it to fire a considerable number against Israel. There are fears that Israel will attempt to reduce them once again, or perhaps even attempt a more ambitious offensive to create the conditions for the overthrow of the regime by its internal rivals.
****
15 October – 16 November 2025
Gaza:
According to the ceasefire agreement, Hamas was supposed to return all living hostages and the bodies of all dead hostages within a few days of the signing of the agreement. On 13 October, they returned all the living kidnappees (who have been gradually released from the hospital over the past couple of weeks, though most still need medical support), but only four of the dead. Hamas claimed this was because it needed time to locate the bodies of the others. Israel responded that it had intelligence that the locations of all the other 24, except for a few, were known to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and they were deliberately delaying their return.
In one case, an Israeli drone filmed Hamas carrying a body from a building, burying it in the sand, and then calling in Red Cross representatives to observe them “discovering” the body. In another case, they handed over the body of a Palestinian instead of a hostage, and in a third case they handed over partial remains from a body that had already been returned. Over the past month, since the last update, another 21 bodies have been returned in ones and twos. For each body returned, Israel returned the bodies of 15 terrorists killed inside Israel on 7 October 2023 or in the fighting inside Gaza since then. At time of writing, there are still three bodies of kidnappees in Gaza. One is a Thai agricultural worker who had been living and working in one of the Israeli villages attacked on 7 October 2023 and the other two are Israelis.
Part of the ceasefire agreement was to increase the flow of aid into Gaza and open the Rafah border crossing from Gaza to Egypt. Because Hamas did not return all the bodies as agreed, Israel did not allow these to occur. As more bodies were returned, Israel gradually allowed an increase in the number of trucks entering Gaza every day from approximately 300 prior to the agreement to 800 in the past few days. It has not yet opened the Rafah crossing.
Hamas’s delay in handing over all the bodies is intentional. The object is to gain time for other activities that will delay and, ideally from Hamas’s perspective, negate the beginning of the next phase of the agreement: the disarmament of Hamas and the transfer of government to an authority outside Hamas’s control. A senior Hamas official stated that Hamas is interested only in a truce (hoodna) lasting three to five years in order to recover its capabilities. He did not say what would happen after the truce. Similar statements, without a specific timeline, have been made by other Hamas officials in interviews in the Arab media.
After losing some 20,000 men killed, an undetermined number wounded beyond their ability to return to service, and the hiring of thousands more, Hamas is estimated to currently have up to 20,000 active men on its payroll (non-active includes the wounded who cannot return to service but receive salaries). As Hamas recovers, especially financially with the aid entering Gaza, it will probably take on more personnel. It has lost most if not all its weapons manufacturing facilities and used up or lost approximately 90% of its pre-war rocket arsenal. The other terrorist organizations (Palestinian Islamic Jihad is the next largest, though it was only about a quarter the size of Hamas on 7 October 2023) lost several thousands of killed and wounded personnel and have been recruiting as well. Opening the Rafah crossing will provide more opportunity for these groups to smuggle weapons into Gaza through Egypt.
Over the past month, Qatar and Egypt, mediators on Hamas’s behalf in the negotiations, have been trying to reduce the disarmament requirement with a variety of suggestions, none of which are acceptable to Israel. These suggestions include that Hamas should only hand over all its heavy weapons (rockets, anti-tank weapons, etc.) but be allowed to keep its small firearms (rifles and machine guns), or that it should hand over its small firearms to be held for safekeeping by the Egyptians in Gaza, etc. Senior Hamas officials have declared in interviews that they have no intention of relinquishing their weapons despite the group’s having agreed to do so in the ceasefire agreement.
So far, the official American position is that full disarmament is an unconditional requirement of maintaining the ceasefire agreement and that if Hamas refuses to comply, the United States will support a renewed Israeli offensive in Gaza to compel it to do so.
Another requirement of the agreement that Hamas is undermining is that of a non-Hamas technocratic government. With the help of Qatar and Egypt, Hamas is choosing the “accepted” members of this government, so essentially it will remain in control from behind the scenes.
Meanwhile, Hamas is rebuilding its de facto control over the area it is holding (roughly 45% of the Gaza Strip). It is continuing its attacks on possible rivals – though, following the criticism and threats of intervention that occurred after it conducted open military assaults on two of the tribes that were disobedient to it, it has reverted to more covert operations. It is no longer conducting large-scale attacks or public executions, and is instead covertly kidnapping individuals and killing them in secret. It is also imposing taxes on all imported goods (40% tax on cigarettes and tobacco) and residences (3,000 shekels from Gazans living in tents near the coast and eviction notices from the al-Qarara area there).
Hamas has been videoed grabbing aid trucks and unloading their cargo for its own use, whether to supply its own personnel or sell the merchandise on the open market. The aid was of course intended by the donors to be handed out for free. Hamas naturally denies this. However, much of the cargo arriving on the aid trucks has been later photographed as available for sale, like tents and food packages. Furthermore, though there has been a huge increase in the amount of food going into Gaza, especially food that is supposed to be free, market prices have not gone down as they did during the ceasefire last year. This is a sign of what is actually being done with that food. Furthermore, there are complaints on Gaza social media that food and tents are being held in storage rather than handed out to the population.
The ceasefire itself is a typical Middle Eastern ceasefire, with Hamas personnel constantly testing Israeli troop awareness. Hamas is regularly attempting to infiltrate across the Yellow Line (the line marking the separation between Hamas-held territory and Israeli-held territory) and occasionally sniping at Israeli troops. The line is marked with yellow concrete blocks every 200 meters to prevent accidental crossings. Israeli forces shoot at anyone who crosses the Yellow Line.
Some of the infiltration attempts were to gather intelligence on Israeli troop locations and activities, some were to snipe, and some were to collect weapons from caches left behind in territory held by Israel or to emplace terrorists in hideouts (tunnels and buildings) inside Israeli-held territory. In one brash attempt, Hamas sent a civilian car containing six unarmed men, supposedly innocent civilians, into Israeli-held territory. The car was followed by an Israeli surveillance drone, the operator of which called up an interception force that surrounded and halted the car. The occupants were questioned and revealed they had come to arm themselves at a cache hidden inside a mosque. They led the Israeli troops to the mosque and revealed the cache.
Armed Hamas personnel videoed approaching the Yellow Line
Two of the Yellow Line markers emplaced by the IDF to prevent accidental crossing of the line by either side or civilians
Some of the bodies of kidnapped Israelis were located in Israeli-held territory. As the locations were not known to the IDF, Hamas parties who had information on their whereabouts were allowed to enter the areas to recover them. These Hamas search parties used the opportunity to recover weapons hidden in the vicinity of the bodies for which they were “searching”.
Three groups of Hamas terrorists (different sources provide different total numbers, ranging from 100 to 200) are still hiding in tunnels inside Israeli territory and there are attempts by Hamas, Qatar and Egypt to negotiate them to safety. It is not clear to what extent these terrorists have contact with each other or with Hamas command, but given their behavior, it can be assumed that they have some communications capability. They have conducted a number of coordinated attacks on Israeli troops. The Israelis have been hunting them, above ground and underground, and some have been killed, but the Israelis have refrained from exploding whole sections of tunnels in which they might be hiding because there is information that the body or bodies of kidnappees might be located in those areas. Following the return of the body of an IDF officer killed and then kidnapped during an Operation Protective Edge ceasefire in 2014 (a Hamas party was allowed into Israeli territory to recover the body), the section of tunnels in which he was thought to have been hidden was immediately destroyed.
Most Hamas attacks fail to cause casualties, but in two separate attacks they have managed to kill three Israeli soldiers and wound a few more. Israel responded to these incidents with airstrikes on Hamas command posts, combat positions and logistical sites inside Hamas-controlled territory, killing approximately 130 Hamas personnel, including about 25 mid-level commanders (two battalion commanders, at least two battalion deputy commanders, and about 20 company commanders). Two more Israeli soldiers were wounded in another incident, but it is not clear if the booby-trap bomb that injured them was new or one that had been emplaced before the ceasefire. Due to that uncertainty, Israel chose not to respond.
Meanwhile, the IDF continues to comb the area under Israeli control for Hamas tunnels and infrastructure. It explodes them when there is no threat to the finding of hostage bodies. In some cases, where entering the tunnels to place explosives by hand is deemed too risky, Israeli aircraft drop bombs along the path of the tunnel. It is possible that in some of these strikes, Hamas terrorists hiding in the tunnels have been killed.
One provision of the ceasefire agreement is that an international force will be set up to ensure the demilitarization of Gaza. As this force takes over, the IDF will gradually withdraw from all Gazan territory except a one kilometer-deep perimeter along the Israel-Gaza border. However, though a number of states initially agreed to provide troops, some have since stated they are not comfortable doing so. The statement by King Abdullah of Jordan is typical. He said that if Gaza is indeed demilitarized (i.e., that Hamas and the other terrorist organizations are truly disarmed) and the mission is one of peace-keeping, he will send a contingent of troops; however, if the mission is one of peace-enforcing (i.e., the international force will have to conduct the disarmament of Hamas by force), he will not do so. Currently, the most willing participants are Turkey and Indonesia. Israel does not trust Turkey because of its deep hostility to Israel and is not willing to allow it to place troops inside Gaza. The Turks will definitely not work against Hamas—quite the opposite; they will likely assist it. Hamas and the current Turkish government are allies of the Muslim Brotherhood, a movement that is only one step less radical than al-Qaeda and that deems Israel’s existence a slur against Islam. Indonesia has said it is preparing a 20,000-man force for this mission. Its interest in involvement is currently unexplained.
On 7 October 2023, there were 5,200 Palestinian terrorists held in Israeli jails. During the war, approximately 6,000 more were captured in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria. Approximately 2,000 were released in exchange for the living kidnappees, so today there are approximately 9,100 still incarcerated. Of the 2,000 released, a few hundred were required to depart for other countries; i.e. not Gaza or Judea and Samaria. The Palestinians are complaining that Arab countries are not willing to accept them. Several dozen have been received in Turkey and Malaysia, but the others are stuck in Egypt, which was supposed to be only a transit point.
Approximately 40,000 Gazans have left Gaza over the past two years. Initially, most left via Egypt, but after the IDF took control of the Egypt-Gaza border, the Egyptians refused to allow any more Gazans to transit through there. The rest have left via Israel. Just this week, a commercial aircraft carrying Gazan civilians landed in South Africa. Local authorities initially refused to let them in (despite South Africa’s vociferous support for the Palestinian cause), but public pressure forced them to provide temporary visas. Some are apparently continuing on to Indonesia. According to the passengers, they boarded the aircraft at Ramon airfield in southern Israel. Leaving Hamas-controlled areas requires permission from Hamas and transit through Israel requires Israeli permission. The excuse is usually a health issue that requires treatment abroad, and the individual is usually allowed to take his or her family along. Another method is to apply to study in a foreign university. Several dozen such students have already arrived in Europe.
Hamas claims that approximately 70,000 Gazans have been killed and 171,000 wounded since 7 October 2023. The increased number reflects its claim to have found bodies under the rubble. In addition, it claims that during the ceasefire more than 230 more Gazans have been killed and more than 600 wounded, including those killed by the IDF in retaliatory strikes and the constant skirmishes along the Yellow Line (see above), where there are almost daily exchanges of fire between Hamas teams attempting to infiltrate the line or snipe across it and Israeli troops. Hamas of course claims that almost all the killed and wounded were civilians.
A study published in the journal Social Science & Medicine by two Palestinian academics at Nablus University (in the Palestinian Authority) claims that pregnant women in Gaza sold their urine to non-pregnant women so they could provide proof of pregnancy to humanitarian aid organizations and claim larger food rations. The study is based on interviews with women living in Gaza.
Judea and Samaria:
Terrorist attacks on Israelis emanating from Judea and Samaria have continued at the reduced frequency of approximately 90 armed attacks per month (petrol bombs, car-rammings, knife attacks, shootings, and explosive bombs) and about 280 to 310 stone-throwing incidents per month. Israeli military and armed police units regularly enter Palestinian towns and villages to conduct arrests of terrorists located by Israeli intelligence. Offensive operations include both overt raids and covert raids in which Israeli soldiers or police, disguised as Palestinian civilians, capture a specific person. In most cases, these operations face only light resistance if any, so Israeli offensive combat operations have gradually been reduced in size and aggressiveness, but not in frequency. Defensive operations include patrols and checkpoints on the roads in areas outside the Palestinian Authority’s control. The IDF is also conducting ambushes in areas frequented by Palestinian attackers, either while they are in transit to attack positions or in their preferred attack positions (vantage points providing observation or fields of fire to Israeli villages or roads frequented by Israelis).
No Israelis have been killed and only about half a dozen have been wounded since my last update. It should be remembered that low casualties are often a matter of luck. One successful attack can inflict heavy casualties, such as the attack two months ago on an Israeli bus in Jerusalem that killed six and wounded 11 (8 September 2025).
Since the last update, five Palestinian attackers have been killed attempting to attack Israeli civilians or soldiers. Dozens more have been arrested in the Israeli raids mentioned above.
In one raid, a group of Palestinians manufacturing rockets was captured and their workshop destroyed.
In another raid, the offices of a charity organization actually providing funding for terrorist operations was raided. Among the materials, money and equipment found there were multiple copies of Adolf Hitler’s book, Mein Kampf, translated into Arabic. In this book, Hitler elaborated his political theories, including his opinions on the Jews and what should be done to them. The book is printed and sold across the Arab-speaking world, with the greatest number printed in Egypt.
Over the past month, there has been a surge of attacks initiated by Israeli civilians on Palestinians in Judea and Samaria. The IDF sent forces to these incidents to arrest the civilians. In some cases, the IDF forces were themselves attacked by the Israeli civilians. Among the Israelis arrested was a local rabbi, considered a leading figure.
The results of a new Palestinian public opinion survey have just been released by the PCPSR (a Palestinian polling firm). Here are some of the key takeaways:
- Overall, 53% of Palestinians say the decision by Hamas to launch the 7 October 2023 attack was correct.
- Overall satisfaction with Hamas’s performance is 60% (66% in the West Bank; 51% in the Gaza Strip).
- When asked which political party people support: 35% said Hamas, 24% said Fatah, and 32% said they either support none or don’t know.
- If legislative elections were held today (with all forces participating), among likely voters: 44% would vote for Hamas, 30% for Fatah, 10% other, 16% undecided.
- In a hypothetical presidential race between Khalid Mishal (Hamas’s political chief) and Abbas, the Hamas candidate draws 63% versus Abbas at 27%.
- The poll finds that over the past two years, support for Hamas has increased (19% said their support increased a lot; 17% a little) rather than decreased.
As with all polls, the exact figures should be treated with caution, but the trend is clear. Support for Hamas and its aggressive policies vis-à-vis Israel remains strong, though less than what it was prior to the 7 October offensive.
Lebanon:
Hezbollah continues to refuse the Lebanese government’s demand that it relinquish all its weapons. Hezbollah and the other Shiite militia, Amal, have declared that any attempt to take their weapons will be resisted with armed force. Theoretically, Hezbollah is still militarily more capable than the Lebanese army, so the real issue is whether its lower ranks will obey an order to fight against disarmament attempts. So far, the Lebanese government has not tried to test this. They talk about the need to disarm Hezbollah but have not done anything to carry it out.
Over the past year, since the ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, the IDF has killed at least 340 (according to one source, perhaps as many as 350) Hezbollah personnel who were breaking the ceasefire stipulation that they not conduct military activity in southern Lebanon. In my last update, a month ago, I wrote that approximately 270 had been killed. The 70 added to this number is mostly new information about the previous incidents plus about 30 killed over the past month. During the Israeli strikes on Hezbollah, 40 civilians were killed accidentally. Some strikes were targeted directly at individual officers and personnel of Hezbollah conducting operations (hitting their cars or motorcycles as they drove in or on them). Others were killed when the IDF bombed newly revealed storage sites or other infrastructure or when Hezbollah operatives attempted to restore sites previously hit during the war.
Hezbollah chief Naim Kassem recently threatened that Hezbollah will begin retaliating for Israeli attacks, but it has not done so as yet. Hezbollah has, however, accelerated its rebuilding activities and Israel has responded with a slight acceleration in its attacks as well.
United States envoy to Lebanon Tom Barrack stated that if the Lebanese government does not fulfill its obligation to disarm Hezbollah, the United States will support a renewed Israel offensive against the organization.
Meanwhile, the Lebanese government and UNIFIL have begun taking a more aggressive stance towards Israeli actions against Hezbollah. In one instance, UNIFIL forces shot down an Israeli surveillance quadcopter. UNIFIL is completely failing at its UN-mandated mission of preventing the return of Hezbollah to southern Lebanon in contravention of the ceasefire agreement. Instead, it is trying to interfere with the IDF’s attempts to do so. The Lebanese army has been ordered to prevent IDF incursions too, but so far has not done so.
On 16 November, a UNIFIL patrol entered an area near the border, but because of the winter weather (rain, fog, etc.), they were not recognized as UNIFIL. An IDF unit fired at them to warn them to leave the area. No one was hurt.
A report in a Saudi newspaper claims that dozens of Hezbollah commanders have been undergoing face-changing plastic surgery to evade Israeli intelligence. The veracity of this report is not clear.
Syria:
Negotiations on a renewed security agreement between Israel and Syria are being conducted with American mediators. The basic idea is that Israel withdraws its troops back to the pre-December 2024 line agreed upon in May 1974. Israel demands that in return, the areas it leaves will become demilitarized. The Syrian government has not yet agreed to this condition, arguing that sovereignty means the liberty to place military forces in the area. One suggestion has been to redeploy Russian troops as an observer force, as existed during the final years of the previous regime. Neither Israel nor Russia has accepted this proposal so far.
Meanwhile, Turkey continues to help the regime rebuild the Syrian armed forces. Videos have surfaced of exercises involving the use of Soviet-made tanks and armored infantry combat vehicles and helicopters in offensive maneuvers. This equipment is remnants from the army of the previous regime.
Skirmishes continue between the Druze militia of Jabal Druze and regime forces along the border of the Druze-inhabited area. It has been reported that Israel has provided weapons to the Druze to defend themselves against a repeat of the attack several months ago in which a couple of thousand Druze civilians were massacred and hundreds more kidnapped. The fate of the kidnapped remains unknown, though it is probably grim. Druze living in northern Syria, in smaller enclaves that could not fend for themselves, were also attacked, but the details are unknown.
Israel demands that any future agreement with the Syrian regime ensure the safety of the Druze, an issue that seems to be completely ignored by the United States and Europe – at least in public – in their haste to accept the new regime. The Druze themselves are demanding full autonomy and the right to maintain direct relations with Israel. A delegation of Syrian Druze visited Israel, officially to participate in Druze religious celebrations but also to conduct negotiations with the Israeli Druze leaders who represent them to the Israeli government.
An unknown party fired several rockets into Damascus in the direction of the Presidential Palace. The immediate suspects are ISIS, but no information has yet been released on the identity of the perpetrators.
The President of Syria al-Julan talks of a “new Syria” and claims to have distanced himself from his al-Qaeda roots, but his Ministry of Culture invites the public to a concert celebrating the Hamas’s 7 October 2023 massacre of Jews… (on the left the original in Arabic, on the right translated to English – ‘Flood of Al-Aqsa’ was the Hamas name for its offensive). So what is his true agenda?
Iran:
According to satellite imagery and international communications traffic, Iran is working feverishly to repair the damage done to its nuclear facilities and missile factories during the war with Israel in June 2025.
Repair work is underway at most of the sites bombed by Israel and the United States. Iran is also purchasing equipment and parts it can no longer manufacture from China and North Korea.
They are also on a massive hunt for spies and saboteurs across Iran. Thousands have been arrested, though it is not clear how many are being interrogated and released and how many are being incarcerated.
There are repeated statements by the Iranian leadership that they are preparing for another imminent round of fighting with Israel. It is not clear how much of this is merely bellicose statements and how much is inspired by fear that Israel and the United States will attack again, given Iran’s attempts to rebuild its capabilities, refusal to conduct negotiations with the United States on dismantling its remaining nuclear enrichment program, and refusal to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to oversee its supposedly peaceful nuclear program to check that it is not enriching to military grade.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Navy captured an oil tanker leaving the Arab Emirates and bound for Singapore. Their excuse was that they had information it was carrying contraband.
Yemen:
Since the ceasefire in Gaza, the Houthis have ceased launching missiles at Israel and attacking ships passing by Yemen, though they threaten to renew these operations if fighting in Gaza is resumed.
They too are busy recovering from Israel’s attacks, which killed a large proportion of their civilian and military leadership, severely damaged their main airport and seaports, and destroyed other capabilities.
They have been conducting a purge to uncover and capture spies working for Israel and the United States (at least this is what they claim). This has included capturing dozens of United Nations humanitarian aid workers and threatening to put 43 of them on trial as spies.
In a speech, the Houthi leader claimed they had attacked 228 merchant ships sailing through the Bab al-Mandeb Straits, shot down 22 American combat drones, and absorbed some 3,000 Israeli and American airstrikes that failed to prevent the Houthis’ operations.
Egypt:
Egypt’s Foreign Minister said the Houthi blockade of the Bab al-Mandeb Straits has cost Egypt $9 billion in lost revenues from ships not using the Suez Canal but instead sailing around Africa to avoid the Straits.
There has been an increase in the smuggling of weapons from Egypt into Israel using quadcopters. Israel has reinforced the border with Egypt and is increasingly shooting down these weapons shipments, which are smuggled overland through the Negev desert to Palestinian terrorists in Judea and Samaria. The smugglers inside Israel are mostly Israeli Bedouin. A similar situation is developing on the Jordanian border with Israel.
Austria:
Austria’s security service discovered a Hamas-owned cache of weapons that was intended to be used in attacks by Hamas on Israelis and Jews in Europe.
Israel:
Israel’s prosecution service has requested that the court confiscate as state property about 50 of the ships used in the pro-Hamas Gaza flotilla from Europe and North Africa. They state that after checking the ownership of the ships, most belong to Hamas. By international law, in cases of deliberate attempts to break a declared maritime blockade, the blockading state has the right to confiscate the ships involved. Any ship belonging to Hamas would in any case be forfeit as belonging to the enemy belligerent irrespective of its activity.
This issue also points to the true background behind the ‘neutral’ persons sailing to protest the humanitarian issue of Gaza. All in all, the 70 or so ships involved carried a total of about five tons of aid – only a quarter of the amount carried by each one of the hundreds of trucks (each carrying 20 tons) entering Gaza from Israel every day. Also, much of the materials (food and medical supplies) in those five tons were after their expiration date.
WHAT NEXT?
Not much has changed, so the assessment in the last update still holds true. The war is not yet over and may escalate from the typical Middle Eastern ceasefire (i.e., very low intensity fire despite an official cessation of fire) to a higher intensity any day.
Hamas still has three hostage bodies to return and claims not to know where they are. Negotiations are underway over the future of the Hamas personnel stuck behind the Israeli front line, and the Israelis are hunting for them at the same time. There are daily skirmishes along the official ceasefire line (the Yellow Line). Hamas has repeatedly said it will not disarm, convincing some of the states who are proposing to send peacekeeping forces that they might have to fight Hamas and resulting in their backing out of their commitments. Not only is Hamas not disarming, but it is working diligently to rebuild its capabilities, though these would still be considerably less than they were two years ago. Israel is preparing for the possibility that it will have to renew offensive operations against Hamas.
In Lebanon, Hezbollah’s forces are working hard at rebuilding. This includes attempting to recover equipment buried in destroyed storage sites, smuggling new weapons into Lebanon, and taking on new personnel. All of this contradicts the ceasefire agreement, so Israel is conducting strikes almost daily on these activities. The Israelis are fully aware that this is delaying Hezbollah’s inevitable recovery, not halting it. Hezbollah has not yet retaliated against these Israeli actions, but has recently begun to state that it will do so. The Lebanese government, which claimed it could and would disarm Hezbollah, as stipulated in the agreement, is dragging its feet. Here, too, an escalation of fighting could happen.
Iran is rebuilding its missile forces to enable it to fire a considerable number against Israel. There are fears that Israel will attempt to reduce them again or, perhaps, attempt a more ambitious offensive to create the conditions for the overthrow of the regime by its internal rivals.
****
9 September – 14 October 2025
Gaza:
The most important event is the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, which was hammered out with US mediation. A few days later, on 13 October 2025, Hamas returned all 20 living hostages it was still holding and the bodies of four dead hostages. According to the agreement, it was supposed to return all 28 dead hostages, not just four. Following the release of the 20 living hostages, Israel released approximately 1,950 Palestinian terrorists it had captured in Gaza and in Judea and Samaria. This leaves approximately 5,500 terrorists in Israeli jails. It also returned the bodies of 45 killed Palestinian terrorists. More will be returned at a rate of 15 Palestinian bodies to every Israeli body returned.
The agreement, termed the Trump 20-point plan, contains a number of phases:
- The first phase involves the release of the last Israeli hostages still held by Hamas, both living and dead, in return for the release of terrorists and the withdrawal of Israeli forces to a line that still leaves slightly more than half the Gaza Strip in IDF hands, but enables free travel throughout the areas it does not control (Israeli ground operations had cut off Khan Yunis and Gaza City from the rest of the Strip).
- The second phase involves setting up an interim, non-Hamas, technocratic Palestinian government (overseen by an international ‘board’) and security forces that will replace Hamas as the administrative body of the Gaza Strip to manage the rebuilding of the Strip and the disarmament of Hamas. This will enable Israel to gradually withdraw from most of the territory it still controls to a perimeter approximately 1 to 2 kilometers in depth inside Gaza along its border with Israel. There is no time frame in the agreement for this phase; it is to be determined in ongoing negotiations and as the process continues of setting up the replacement administration and disarming Hamas. Hamas personnel who wish to do so will be allowed to leave the Gaza Strip.
- In the third phase, the security perimeter will remain in Israeli hands for an undetermined period of time.
The points in the second phase were all refused by Hamas in all the previous rounds of negotiation. This raises two questions:
- Why did they suddenly agree to these demands?
- Why did they agree to release all the living hostages in one go instead of dragging out their release, as they had demanded in all previous rounds of negotiations?
In answer to the second question, a senior Hamas official claimed that the group no longer needed the hostages because it had received other guarantees, but he did not specify what those guarantees are.
Hamas has not provided an answer to the first question. However, the reasons can be assessed as follows:
- The increasing Israeli military pressure on Hamas was beginning to affect its ability to function. Its casualties were mounting and it was finding it increasingly difficult to replace them. It was also in the process of losing the northern third of Gaza, including Gaza City.
On 15 September, the IDF reported that senior Hamas leaders in Gaza had requested safe passage for them and their families to leave Gaza. Some were allowed to leave and some were refused, depending on their position in Hamas.
Over the past month since the last update, from 9 September to 10 October, Israeli ground forces reached the sea in the Netzarim Corridor (1 October), cutting all of northern Gaza off from the rest of the Strip. The IDF then gradually captured the territory of Gaza City, taking about two-thirds of it by 10 October. Three Israeli combined arms divisions were employed in this offensive. They faced the equivalent in combat strength of one combined Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad infantry “division”, though it was not organized as such and was less well equipped than a typical infantry division. Furthermore, given their need to replace casualties with hastily trained new recruits, their forces were less tactically competent.
The Israeli offensive began with over 1,000 airstrikes aimed at Hamas positions ensconced in buildings – first, high-rise buildings with surveillance positions on the higher floors and combat positions on the lower floors; then, lower multi-storey buildings with combat positions and weapons caches above ground and tunnel entrances in the cellars. The strikes were conducted over several days and each was preceded by warnings to the civilians who might still be in the area to evacuate. In addition to airstrikes, several Hamas positions were hit with ground emplaced bombs carried to them by remote-controlled M113 Armored Personnel Carriers. These were directed to the targets, unloaded their bombs, and were then directed back. On 16 September, Israeli troops began to advance slowly through the built-up areas to comb the buildings, find tunnel entrances and destroy them. The main threats were explosive booby traps and remote-controlled bombs, terrorists firing from buildings through windows or gaps, and occasional raids by terrorists on Israeli troops resting between actions.
Fighting in southern Gaza continued as mopping-up operations rather than an Israeli offensive.
Israeli casualties in this period numbered nine killed and several dozen wounded. Hamas casualties were not reported in detail, but from anecdotal information they can be estimated at a few hundred.
On 4 October, Trump threatened Hamas that if it did not accept his plan, he would agree to Israel escalating its offensive across Gaza.
- Internal pressure by the Gazan population against Hamas was growing, especially as its ability to assert its dominance was slipping.
The increasing alternative supplies of food were weakening Hamas’s ability to control the population as it no longer controlled “the faucet”. In an attempt to regain control, they attacked some of those alternatives. On 20 September, Hamas fired on a team of UN workers preparing a separate road for supply truck movement and stole their vehicles. On 3 October, they fired rockets at one of the Gaza Humanitarian Fund’s food distribution sites.
The re-evacuation of almost 1 million people from northern Gaza back to central and southern Gaza after they had returned there last January increased the hostility of the population towards Hamas.
A poll conducted by a Palestinian polling firm found that only about one-third of the population still supported Hamas policies. This was expressed in both civil disobedience (the raiding of food supplies on trucks coming into Gaza and at storehouses inside Gaza) and increasing incidences of local tribal militias turning their weapons on Hamas itself. They were responding to Hamas personnel who had beat or shot their members by conducting retaliation raids and killing Hamas personnel. Some tribes even declared that they were willing to maintain a ceasefire in their areas with Israel.
- The Israeli airstrike on the Hamas leadership in Qatar (9 September), though it failed to kill its targets as they had left the residence shortly before the strike, signaled a clear message both to them and to the Qatari leadership, who have supported Hamas for decades, that Israel’s patience is wearing thin and it is now willing to break “accepted rules”.
The attack was declared to be a direct response to a Hamas-instigated attack on a civilian bus in Jerusalem by a number of Hamas members from Samaria, which killed six Israeli civilians and wounded more. It was also, however, timed to coincide with a number of articles published in Israel stating that the Hamas leadership in Qatar, especially Khalil al-Khaya (formerly Sinwar’s deputy in Gaza and currently the official head of Hamas in Gaza, though located outside it), was refusing the agreement, whereas the Hamas leadership remaining in Gaza (after the senior members had been decimated by Israel) was more flexible.
Both Qatar and Egypt, the other main Arab mediator, were worried that this act signaled a willingness by Israel to escalate its war with Hamas beyond the borders of Gaza. They accordingly applied increased pressure on Hamas to surrender.
On 10 October, following Hamas’s official agreement to the Trump plan (after first saying no, then waffling between yes and no, and finally saying “Yes, but…”), Israeli forces ceased offensive operations and withdrew to the agreed line for the first phase.
The new deployment of the IDF in Gaza after withdrawing to the first phase line
On 13 October, all 20 living Israeli hostages were returned. They are now undergoing hospital treatment to recover from the wounds, ailments and starvation they suffered during their two years of captivity. However, in contravention of the agreement, only four of the 28 dead were returned. Israel returned the bodies of 45 Hamas terrorists of the several hundred it holds (there is no official number). Most of these terrorists were from 7 October 2023.
On 14 October, a group of terrorists attempted to approach an Israeli position. They ignored both verbal warnings and warning shots, upon which they were fired upon. Hamas claims five were killed.
Meanwhile, Hamas has exploited the ceasefire to concentrate forces to attack rebellious tribes in areas outside Israeli control. They cannot attack the tribes that agreed to a ceasefire with Israel because these are mostly behind Israel’s current front lines. Reports in Gazan social media state that many dozens of people have been killed in these battles between Hamas and the tribes. On Hamas’s side, this includes the son of a senior Hamas official and one of Hamas’s leading propaganda bloggers. Hamas has also conducted a number of public executions of captured members of what it terms “criminal gangs” and “traitors who support Israel“. These are tribal members captured in the abovementioned skirmishes. For each public execution, Hamas brought in onlookers to cheer them on. In addition to the public executions, there are unverified reports of massacres conducted inside the neighborhoods of the tribes by Hamas terrorist forces.
This all begs the question of whether Hamas has any intention of following through with the second phase of Trump’s plan and handing over administrative control over Gaza as well as its weapons, or is merely trying to exploit the ceasefire to recover its authority and strength. If the latter, it is banking on the US and internal Israeli resistance to prevent Israel from renewing its offensive. Statements by Hamas leaders over the past few days, Hamas’s failure to return the bodies it was supposed to return, the attempt by Hamas operatives to approach Israeli forces, and the group’s attacks on rebellious tribes all suggest that Hamas has no intention of keeping its side of the agreement.
The Israeli government is now considering the option of halting several actions it was supposed to conduct once the living and dead hostages had been returned. Those options include not opening the Rafah crossing with Egypt and reducing the number of supply trucks entering Gaza from the 600 per day dictated in the agreement to the 300 per day that were entering prior to the agreement.
Hamas claims the aggregate number of Gazans killed since the beginning of the war in October 2023 is approximately 67,682 (approximately 3,000 more since the last update) and more than 170,000 wounded (approximately 8,000 more since the last update). It claims these are not the final numbers as some people are buried under rubble and in tunnels (obviously not civilians). Hamas numbers, which have been parroted by the United Nations throughout the war as if credible, have NEVER been credible, but since late May 2025 and Hamas’s repeated invention of massacres that did not occur and fake famine victims, their credibility has dropped even lower.
At sea, a convoy of ships manned by pro-Hamas activists (most of whom were Arabs, Turks and Muslims from the Far East) launched from Europe and North Africa and sailed toward Gaza to “break the siege”. The convoy purported to consist of approximately 70 ships of varying sizes, from small yachts to small fishing trawler equivalents. The first wave of approximately 40 ships, carrying approximately 400 activists, reached about 200 kilometers from the Gaza/Israel coast on the eve of the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur (1 October). They were intercepted by the Israeli Navy, captured, and taken to the Israeli port of Ashdod. The activists claimed they were carrying humanitarian supplies for the population of Gaza. In fact, on all the ships put together, there were fewer than two tons of such supplies. This is less than one-tenth the amount carried by a single truck of the approximately 300 that were entering Gaza from Israel every day.
After being expelled from Israel over the following few days, some of the activists appeared on television broadcasts claiming to have been physically abused and tortured by Israeli soldiers. These were, in short, the usual false claims.
A second wave of nine ships approached the area on 8 October. They too were intercepted by the Israeli Navy, with 150 more activists taken to port in Israel.
Iran:
Since my last update, one more Israeli civilian who was wounded during the war with Iran in June died of his wounds, raising the death toll in Israel to 33—all civilians. The total number of wounded is 3,508, almost all civilians.
Judea and Samaria:
The fighting in Judea and Samaria continues. A few hundred more suspected terrorists have been apprehended, some detained and some released after interrogation. Weapons caches and explosive manufacturing sites have been taken and destroyed.
A new phenomenon is the discovery (and subsequent destruction by the IDF) of rocket-manufacturing workshops in the Samaria city of Tulkarem as well as in Ramallah, the capital city of the Palestinian Authority. If the Palestinians begin to manufacture and fire rockets from Judea and Samaria, that will mark a new stage in the war. The range from these areas to the majority of Israel’s population centers extends from 10 to 25 kilometers at most.
Terrorist attacks have continued, though at a lower frequency (approximately 90 attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers since the last update). The majority were thwarted without Israeli casualties, but three Israeli soldiers were killed and three wounded and nine civilians were wounded.
The most successful terrorist attack occurred on 18 September, when a Jordanian truck driver, driving humanitarian aid from Jordan through Israel to Gaza, opened fire on two Israeli soldiers at the border crossing between Jordan and Israel. The two soldiers, a 68-year-old reservist and a 20-year-old conscript, were both killed. Security guards shot and killed the Jordanian. Israel closed the crossing from Jordan for several days to reorganize it against the recurrence of such events.
The above attack raises the number of Israelis killed in Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 to 32 soldiers and 46 civilians. In the same period, about 1,014 Palestinians were killed, almost all of them terrorists in the midst of committing attacks or fighting during Israeli raids on terrorist preparations.
Israeli border forces are constantly active to prevent the smuggling of weapons from Jordan into Judea and Samaria. These weapons are sent by Iran and smuggled through Iraq as well as Jordan. Over the past month, a number of such smuggling attempts were thwarted.
Syria:
The ceasefire between the new Syrian regime and the Druze minority has been maintained, with occasional violations.
Negotiations are ongoing between Israel and the new regime to bring order to the security situation between them. Israel counts the protection of the Druze as one of its conditions for withdrawing from the Syrian territory it captured after the fall of the Assad regime. Another Israeli condition is access to the Druze area for the purpose of supplying it with humanitarian aid.
Meanwhile, Turkey and Syria are deepening their military connections. This involves Turkish weapons and equipment being sent to the new Syrian army, which is based on the former rebel militias, as well as increased training of the Syrian army and planning of its organization and combat doctrine.
Lebanon:
Hezbollah continues to refuse the government’s demand to relinquish all its weapons. Hezbollah and the other Shiite militia, Amal, have declared that any attempt to take their weapons will be resisted with armed force. Theoretically, Hezbollah is still militarily more capable than the Lebanese army, so the real issue is whether the lower ranks will obey the order to fight.
On 11 October, Hezbollah conducted a mass assembly at which it showed off its current strength as well as its future: 74,000 children and teenagers in its youth movement, the Imam Mahdi Scouts. These young people are indoctrinated to become the future manpower of Hezbollah’s military forces.
Meanwhile, Israel continues to attack Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure on an almost daily basis. It is conducting airstrikes via both manned and remotely piloted aircraft that are focused on killing particular commanders or troops involved in activities banned by the ceasefire agreement. Israel also occasionally conducts larger air raids on storage sites to destroy weapons and other equipment. The IDF has also conducted a number of small ground raids into villages near the border where activity indicated the revival of a Hezbollah presence. After each such raid, Israel drops leaflets warning the local civilians not to allow Hezbollah back into their villages. All together, since the beginning of the ceasefire in November 2024, Israeli attacks have killed approximately 270 Hezbollah personnel (approximately 10 more than in the previous update).
In addition to killing personnel, Israeli forces conduct occasional airstrikes on newly discovered Hezbollah storage sites and on mechanical earth-moving vehicles (bulldozers, backhoes, etc.) in southern Lebanon. In a recent attack, more than 800 such vehicles (according to a Lebanese government minister; other sources report only 300) were destroyed or damaged at a single parking site. The message is clear: as long as Hezbollah is not disarmed, Israel will not allow southern Lebanon to rebuild. Another Israeli action is occasional ground raids to check or destroy certain sites inside villages. Here, too, Israel drops warning leaflets.
Hezbollah has not retaliated so far, only stating that it will do so at the proper time. It continues to attempt to recover equipment from storage sites (this activity usually prompts Israeli airstrikes on the locations and on the personnel conducting it) and to reorganize and retrain its personnel. In a speech by Hezbollah leader Naim Kassem on 5 August 2025, he stated that the total casualties suffered by Hezbollah since 7 October 2023 amount to 5,000 killed and 13,000 wounded. This constitutes approximately one-quarter to one-third of Hezbollah’s military manpower before the war, and is one likely explanation why the organization currently does not want to renew the fighting.
Yemen:
After a brief pause, the Houthis resumed their launching of missiles and exploding drones at Israel. In most cases, the salvos included only one or two missiles and one or two exploding drones per day. On many days there were none. In a few cases, the salvos were larger reaching up to five exploding drones. Approximately half the missiles launched and some of the exploding drones crashed enroute (in the Saudi desert, the Red Sea or Sinai desert) because of mechanical failure. All the others, except for one exploding drone, were shot down by Israel’s defense system. The drone that managed to penetrate hit the town of Eilat in southern Israel, injuring 15 people (one seriously) but killing no one.
Israel responded by bombing military, economic (Hoodayda port) and energy (oil and electricity) targets in Yemen on 10, 16 and 26 September. Prior to the strikes on Hoodayda port, the IDF spokesperson called for the population working and living in the area to evacuate. According to the Houthis, these strikes killed more than 60 people and wounded at least 350.
On 23 September, a missile fired by the Houthis narrowly missed a Dutch ship in the Red Sea. Five days later, the same ship was hit by another Houthi missile. Two of its 19 crew members were wounded, and one subsequently died. The crew evacuated the ship and it sank.
In addition to 11 UN humanitarian aid workers who were reported to have been kidnapped by the Houthis in August, another eight were kidnapped that month and nine more in September. According to the UN, 53 of its personnel have been kidnapped by the Houthis since 2021 and still remain in their hands.
Following the ceasefire in Gaza, the Houthis declared they would cease fire too. A Houthi government report states that since 7 October 2023, the attacks by the United States, Israel, and the United Kingdom (initially) killed 319 people in Yemen and wounded 1,357. They did not distinguish between combatants and civilians.
Egypt:
On the Israel-Egypt border as well, there has been an escalation in attempts to smuggle weapons from Egypt into Israel. The majority of these attempts use drones to evade Israeli patrols, flying them from a safe distance inside Egypt to a safe distance inside Israel away from the border defenses. A number of such attempts have been detected and the drones shot down, but it is not known how many have gotten through. These drones are very small and fly very low, so the usual defensive systems cannot detect them or shoot them down.
One attacker phoned the police himself and declared his allegiance to the Islamic State.
United Kingdom:
In Manchester, a Syrian-born immigrant to Britain attacked a Jewish synagogue during Yom Kippur prayers. He drove his car into a group of worshippers outside the synagogue, then exited the car and began attacking with a knife. He killed one Jewish worshipper and wounded two more. Police responded and shot and killed the attacker, but also accidentally killed one of the Jewish worshippers and wounded another.
Israeli relations with Arab states:
A Washington Post article stated that despite the war in Gaza, Israel’s relationship with several Arab states improved during the war. This included increased military cooperation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Qatar, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. The article did not mention the cooperation with Morocco.
So while Western states who are supposedly Israel’s friends imposed embargoes and other restrictions on Israel, Israel’s Arab neighbors increased cooperation with it.
WHAT NEXT?
There is a ceasefire in Gaza right now, but the war is not over. Hamas has made clear that it does not intend either to relinquish control over Gaza or disarm. This is one of the agreement’s central requirements and an inherent part of the second phase of the Trump plan. Israel is responding with both sanctions (not carrying out some of the requirements it was supposed to meet) and diplomacy (requesting that the US and the Arab mediators pressure Hamas to do what it technically agreed to do as part of the agreement).
The question now is how long Israel and President Trump will wait to enforce the second phase of the agreement with military force.
While Israel and the US consider this, Hamas is aggressively working to recover its authority over the recalcitrant tribes and rebuild its combat capabilities.
In Lebanon, the government declared that Hezbollah must disarm, but it is not doing anything to enforce that decision in practice. Hezbollah has refused to comply and is threatening a civil war if the government attempts to carry out the decision. Meanwhile, Israel continues to attack Hezbollah, killing and wounding its personnel, destroying newly located storage sites, and stopping Hezbollah personnel from accessing damaged sites to salvage their equipment. It is also applying diplomatic pressure on the Lebanese government via the US and conducting limited military actions that damage Lebanese government interests (see the above-mentioned incident of destruction of earth-moving equipment).
Negotiations between Israel and Syria continue, but it is not clear when or how they will end. For now, the area taken by Israel from Syria last year is quiet, though Israeli forces continue to conduct operations to locate and destroy weapons caches and arrest personnel of armed groups. Israel has made clear that if attacks are renewed against the Syrian Druze community, it will respond with force. It also conducts occasional strikes on sites across Syria—not only in the south near its border—where certain types of weapons are located, such as long-range missiles.
****
21 June – 28 July 2025
Gaza:
Fighting in Gaza continues. Most of it is taking place in and around Beit Hanoun in northeastern Gaza, Khan Yunis in southern Gaza, and the Nusayrat area of Gaza. Eastern Khan Yunis, Abasan al-Kabir and Beyt Hanoun are now surrounded by Israeli-controlled territory.
The fighting amounts to a deadly game of hide-and-seek. In order to clear the areas and reduce the ability of the terrorists to hide, IDF tactics now include much more vigorous destruction of buildings than previously.
The terrorists, Hamas and others, are using the buildings as fighting posts. They shoot from a building, move to another, shoot from that one, then move again, while placing remote-controlled bombs and booby-traps inside any building they believe the IDF will enter. Conversely, they pop out of a building, try to place an explosive on a vehicle standing near it, then run back to cover. They usually fail in these small attacks, but occasionally catch an insufficiently aware Israeli force (all it takes is half a minute of someone being insufficiently observant because of fatigue or something diverting their attention). Many buildings contain weapons caches, allowing individuals to move between them unarmed, enter a building, pick up weapons, use them, then return them before moving on to another location. Many buildings also feature tunnel shafts built into their lowest floors, which allow the terrorists to move between them without exposing themselves on street level and to replenish stocks of weapons, ammunition and explosives in these caches. Even when a building has been entered and cleared by the IDF, terrorists often return after the Israelis have exited to plant bombs or hide inside and shoot out at them. A significant proportion of IDF casualties occur during building clearing operations.
Buildings damaged by the fighting are also hazardous. In at least two instances, damaged but seemingly stable buildings have collapsed on IDF units resting inside them, leading to the death and injury of soldiers. The collapses occurred long after the buildings had been damaged due to the gradual failure of the foundations.
Destruction of tunnels often also damages the buildings above or adjacent to them, especially the foundations, making them unstable even if they seem undamaged above ground. Given the extent of the tunnels in Gaza, huge hazardous zones have been created above them. The underground system consists of 500-700 kilometers of tunnels (data is partial, so the exact extent is not known) that crisscross the ground underneath residential areas. For comparison, the London Underground is about 400 kilometers of tunnels and the underground portions of the New York City subway are about 700 kilometers. The urban areas of Gaza, under which Hamas deliberately concentrated its tunnel system, cover less than half the Strip’s territory and are approximately a tenth the size of urban London and an eighth the size of New York City.
Because so many of the buildings are unstable, the safest tactical choice for the IDF is to completely demolish most of them as it advances through the urban areas. It is also safer for returning civilians that these structures be entirely demolished, as damaged buildings pose a serious risk of collapse (particularly when the winter rains begin). Because this takes a lot of time and effort and is not always feasible under fire, offensive operations are very slow.
There is nothing inherently new or different about demolishing buildings in combat. See, for example, the areas of Mosul or Raqqa flattened by American aerial bombing during their reconquest from ISIS—though the tactical threat posed by ISIS was smaller, as they were much fewer in numbers and less well equipped than Hamas, and their underground system was much less developed and less connected to the buildings above them. The difference is that the IDF is using ground forces with explosives and mechanical engineering equipment rather than air-dropped bombs to do the clearing.
As to legality, all IDF activity is vetted by the IDF’s legal advisors. There is nothing inherently unlawful here. It is legal to target any civilian site used for combat operations; there is no obligation to check every room of a building for signs of military use, especially once civilians have been evacuated. There are sites protected by law, such as hospitals, mosques, and similar locations – but these also lose their protection if used for military purposes (though hospitals still require special treatment, which the IDF employs).
Hamas is deliberately doing using protected sites for military purposes. The IDF has discovered numerous weapons caches, command posts, and combat positions in supposedly protected sites. For example, at Shifa Hospital, we captured hundreds of terrorists, including high-ranking individuals, along with weapons caches hidden in medical equipment. Muhammad Sinwar, who replaced his brother Yihya as head of Hamas when the former was killed, was later killed in a tunnel located underneath a hospital.
There are still 20 living Israeli kidnappees and the bodies of 30 dead (two more bodies have been found by the IDF) in the hands of the Palestinians. Not all are in the hands of Hamas, as some are held by other factions. Hamas leadership has given an order to kill any living kidnappee if Israeli forces approach their location.
Since my last update on 20 June, 27 Israeli soldiers and one Israeli civilian contractor (operating an engineering machine) have been killed. The number of wounded has not been reported. Hamas claims the number of Gazans killed is approximately 59,500 and more than 141,000 wounded, an increase since mid-May of more than 4,500 killed and 24,000 wounded. Hamas numbers, which have been parroted by the United Nations as if credible, have in fact never been credible—but since late May, and the repeated invention of massacres that have not occurred, their credibility has dropped even lower. The IDF has not provided an update on the number of terrorists it has killed or wounded over the past few months.
Negotiations for a ceasefire continue. Hamas ostensibly agrees to each proposal, then adds qualifications that in essence mean they have not changed their original demands: they continue to want a total ceasefire, a dragging out of the return of the kidnappees, a total Israeli withdrawal, the rebuilding of Gaza at foreign expense, and their continued rule. In other words, they demand the ability to rebuild their military capability and renew their attacks at a later date. Israel and the United States are not willing to accept these terms, so the negotiations are stalled.
A new demand added by Hamas is that the Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF), a food supply organization established in late May that is not under Hamas control, cease to function. From the start of its operations on 26 May through 28 July, this organization has supplied food equivalent to approximately 95 million meals. Beginning slowly, the average rate of meals supplied per day over the past few weeks varies from approximately 2 million to 2.3 million. These numbers highlight the failure of the various Hamas-controlled organizations, including the United Nations and the World Kitchen. These continue to claim that Israel is preventing the population from gaining access to food and limiting the entry of truckloads of food into Gaza. In fact, dozens of truckloads have entered and are waiting to be picked up. Recently, 70 truckloads of food had to be destroyed because they had not been picked up and passed their expiration date.
In an attempt to halt the operations of this organization, Hamas has been publishing fake reports of massacres conducted by the IDF on people coming to receive the food. These invented reports continue to be trumpeted as fact by the UN and in the western media. Hamas itself has shot at crowds walking in the designated safe route, and two Americans working for GHF were wounded by Hamas. In a recent case, armed Hamas personnel attempted to infiltrate a food distribution site from within the crowd. They were spotted by GHF security personnel (not Israelis). The Hamas personnel opened fire inside the crowd, causing a panicked stampede that killed approximately 20 people. On 23 July, Hamas fired a rocket at one of the food distribution sites; it fell approximately 250 meters from the site’s perimeter. A number of cases have also been reported of Hamas personnel stealing packages of food from people who had received them at GHF sites.
Photographs from a GHF site of Gazans picking up food packages. The armed guard in the second photograph is not an Israeli – he works for the GHF.
A second propaganda campaign initiated by Hamas and trumpeted by United Nations personnel, western media and western politicians, is that the population of Gaza is starving to death because Israel will not allow food to enter. Just like all the fake massacres allegedly perpetrated by the IDF, this too is fake. There is sufficient food in Gaza for the population. The problem is distribution by Hamas and the various humanitarian organizations (including the UN’s branch). Hamas does not hand food out freely. It uses food distribution to control the population, supply its own personnel, hoard supplies, and sell them on the open market to generate funds for its operations. There have been claims that there is no corroboration that Hamas steals food, but this is a play on words. Hamas does not need to steal the food; it is given it. The UN and other humanitarian organizations are controlled by Hamas, either out of fear of retaliation or because their administrative personnel are Hamas members (locals) or sympathizers (foreigners).
This phenomenon is not unique to Gaza. In virtually every war zone in which international organizations provide food, much of it is supplied directly to the controlling warring parties rather than to the civilians. The main reason Hamas wants the GHF dismantled is that it undermines Hamas control of food distribution. The main reason the UN administration supports this demand is that the GHF’s success proves the UN’s failure.
The Hamas propaganda campaign provides false photographs of supposedly starving people. See the following example published in an Italian newspaper:
“They eat earth and stones, irreversible damage even for those who survive.” In fact, this child is suffering not from malnutrition but from cystic fibrosis. He is in an Italian hospital after being transferred from Gaza via Israel. AI-doctored fakes are being circulated as well.
This campaign reminds one of the blood libel campaigns of the past against Jews: that Jews transmit disease to the Christian population of Europe, beginning with the Black Death; that they slaughter Christian children to use their blood for religious rituals, and so on.
Inside Gaza, several events have occurred that suggest that Hamas is losing control over the population, including firefights between Hamas and tribal militias. In one case, Hamas personnel killed a member of a tribe, and in retaliation, the tribal militia chased them into a hospital in Khan Yunis. This event included shooting inside the hospital and damage to equipment.
Still photo from a video by Palestinian journalist Hamza al-Masri of a group of men on their way home from a GHF food distribution site who were accosted by armed Hamas personnel who stole both the food and their clothes:
Still photo from a video of Gazans unloading a supply truck several dozen meters from an Israeli position (the video was by one of the soldiers). After unloading, they shouted thanks to the Israel soldiers:
Videos of UN supply trucks being ransacked are numerous on Gaza social media:
Note that the truck is one of those driven into Gaza by the UN or one of the other organizations working there (not the GHF). It is being ransacked by Gazans before reaching its designated unloading point. The Gazans claim Hamas does not allow the food to reach them, so they jump the trucks before they reach Hamas territory.
From the Twitter of the US Ambassador to Israel:
Here are photos of UN trucks & enough food to feed all of Gaza but it sits rotting! UN is a tool of Hamas! US based GHF is actually delivering food FOR FREE and SAFELY. UN food is either looted by Hamas or rots in the sun! Photos from yesterday.
[The tweet was on 24 July, so the photographs are from 23 July].
Over the past two days, supply drops of food by aircraft from Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, flying through Israel, have been conducted. Already, food from these drops, which was supposed to be handed out for free, has been photographed in market stalls being sold for exorbitant prices.
Iran:
The operation initiated by Israel against Iran’s nuclear and long-range missile development and production facilities began the night of 12–13 June and ended on the morning of 24 June.
According to the IDF, its air force conducted approximately 1,400 strikes with manned aircraft and approximately 500 with remotely piloted aircraft. Mossad and IDF special forces units infiltrated Iran and conducted more strikes with guided anti-tank missiles and quadcopters carrying small bombs. The latter seem to have preceded the airstrikes by attacking Iran’s aerial defenses to ‘open the skies’ for Israeli aircraft. They also participated in attacks on Iranian senior commanders and officials and in locating and destroying long-range surface-to-surface missile (SSM) and exploding-drone launchers.
Distribution of Israeli attacks (source: Iranian Human Rights Agency)
In addition to targeting three nuclear weapons program facilities, 35 SSM production facilities, and an undisclosed number of SSM storage facilities, the Israelis targeted active SSM launchers (200 to 250 destroyed; the higher number probably includes decoys), 70 anti-aircraft radars, 80 anti-aircraft missile launchers, seven combat aircraft, and eight attack helicopters, as well as aerial refueling aircraft. Lastly, the Israelis targeted specific individuals: 30 senior military and internal security forces commanders and 13 key personnel in the nuclear weapons program. Reported casualty numbers are from 1,060 to 1,190 killed and from 4,296 to 4,475 wounded.
Contrary to Iranian claims that they shot down several manned and a number of remotely piloted aircraft, no manned Israeli aircraft were shot down and probably no more than three multiple-use remotely piloted vehicles were shot down. (There is much confusion between multiple use RPVs and those that essentially fly bombs for a single use. The latter explode on the target, so shooting them down is like shooting down a missile. The former are used, like manned aircraft, to surveil and to drop munitions, so shooting them down is tantamount to shooting down a manned aircraft without harming the pilot.)
Hackers (Israeli and probably also Iranian dissidents) attacked Iran’s financial institutions and on one occasion hacked Iran’s regime television company to air anti-regime themes, such as videos from the anti-hijab demonstrations in 2017. Another propaganda operation was a bomb strike at the Iranian government’s prison for dissidents. This was then trumpeted and photographs were disseminated that showed damage supposedly greater than what was actually caused.
On 22 June, the United States Air Force conducted Operation Midnight Hammer, in which it bombed three facilities of the Iranian nuclear weapons program. These facilities were underground at a depth beyond the reach of the weapons available to the Israeli air force. Sixteen of the special bombs were dropped at two of the sites. Another 75 bombs and missiles were expended on targets enroute to the sites (anti-aircraft equipment) and buildings above ground at the sites.
Because the damage caused underground is out of sight, there is controversy about whether the results were extensive or superficial. There is no way of knowing without entering the bombed underground halls. Since that is possible only for the Iranians, the final word depends on the intelligence they collect if and when they get assessment teams into the halls. That in and of itself is not a simple feat given the collapse of the entry tunnels, which have to be cleared first, and the danger of more collapses over time because of instabilities created by the bombings. The number of bombs dropped and the exact locations of each strike were the result of several years of research. They are believed to have been sufficient to massively destroy the Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges hidden in the underground sites.
Another open issue is whether the Iranians managed to transfer some or all of their previously enriched uranium to another safe site, or whether it was still at the sites when they were hit. The known quantity of uranium enriched to 60% is 408 kilograms. To be used for a nuclear explosion, enrichment must be at least 90%. The amount of enriched uranium needed for a bomb varies with the type of bomb and size of intended explosion. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima had about 64 kilograms to achieve a blast equivalent to about 15,000 tons of TNT. More advanced versions can reduce the amount of enriched uranium required and still achieve that level of power. If all the centrifuges were destroyed (they are quite sensitive, and even a hit that does not destroy them but that warps their alignment can render them unusable) then the Iranians will have manufacture new ones to continue enrichment. It is likely that manufacturing facilities were attacked too.
Given all the damage and the types of targets destroyed and personnel killed, the Iranians are stuck, at least for the near future. But it is impossible to estimate for how long without much more information that will not be forthcoming for quite a while.
Iranian security forces have arrested at least 700 individuals for allegedly aiding Israel in its operations. It is not clear how many of these were indeed Israeli agents and how many were arrested for different reasons, with their alleged aid to Israel being used as a deception.
Iran responded to Israel’s offensive with a bombardment by approximately 590 long-range SSMs and 1,050 exploding drones. Another approximately 500 missiles and 950 drones were destroyed by Israeli attacks before they could be launched. Counting the exact number of missiles that penetrated Israel’s anti-missile defenses (assisted by an American anti-missile battery and ships) is difficult because some of the missiles carried multiple bombs. Thus, 590 launched missiles is equivalent to many more bombs, but how many is not clear. How many of the fired missiles carried multiple bombs? How many bombs were in each of these missiles? The entire computation is altered depending on whether a missile carrying multiple bombs is destroyed before the bombs are released or after. How many of these separate bombs were individually intercepted? What is clear is that the multiple bombs were not accurate and scattered over a large area.
There were 35 hits in residential areas and a few more inside Israeli military installations. About 30 impacts occurred in open areas that were not protected. The Israeli system computes the route of the missile and its expected hit-site. It does not launch interceptors against those that are expected to land in uninhabited areas. However, some missiles might have the ability to change direction, complicating the issue. Thirty civilians in Israel (some were foreign nationals visiting or working in Israel) were killed and 3,500 civilians wounded. Fewer than ten Israeli soldiers were wounded and none were killed. Approximately 15,000 Israelis lost their homes and have been moved to hotels or other lodgings at the government’s expense. Damage to military installations was minimal. Attempts by civilian media to use civilian satellite imagery to bypass Israeli refusal to provide details can at best find impact marks and damaged buildings, but they cannot know what was inside the building or whether it was in use or empty.
Billboard in Tehran, put up after the end of the war
The Iranians also conducted a symbolic counterattack on American forces, firing a number of missiles at a US base in Qatar. There were no casualties. According to President Trump, the Iranians even provided early warning to ensure they would not cause casualties that would require an American reprisal.
President Trump ordered a ceasefire on 24 June. When the Iranians fired two more missiles after the ceasefire, he apparently demanded Israel not respond. Since then, the exchange of missiles and airstrikes has ceased. However, inside Iran, there are mysterious explosions at government sites and in the homes of senior officials almost every day. In the first instances the Iranian government tried to explain them as accidents (gas explosions, etc.). However, over the past couple of weeks, they have been blaming Israeli saboteurs. Whether these are indeed Israeli operations or those of emboldened Iranian dissidents is not clear. Also, according to Iranian dissident organizations, there have incidents in which Iranian anti-aircraft units opened fire on unknown targets. One obvious NON-Israeli operation was an attack by three gunmen on an Iranian court that killed or wounded several judges and other court officials. Who was behind it is not clear. Claims by a radical Sunni group could be a false flag for one of the dissident groups.
Judea and Samaria:
The fighting in Judea and Samaria continues, but at a reduced intensity. The number of terrorist attacks since mid-June is about 100, and almost all failed.
Since the last update, one Israeli security guard at a shopping mall and seven terrorists have been killed. The number of wounded on both sides is not clear – it includes approximately 20 Israelis, half soldiers and the rest civilians, and an unreported number of Palestinians. Israeli forces have also arrested several dozen terrorists since the last update (the latest official report states approximately 200 in three months without providing details).
On this front, too, reports abroad of events are often skewed.
Thus, for example, a report claiming that a local church had been set on fire by Israelis was quickly published worldwide. An investigation proved this to have been a fake story. There was a fire in an open field some distance from the church, which was not touched by it or even threatened by it. It is not clear who ignited the fire, but the first report of the fire was by an Israeli shepherd. One theory is that it was Palestinians who wanted to prevent the herding of sheep by Israelis in that field. Videos of the event showed Israelis rushing to the fire to extinguish it. As usual, this fake event was reported across western media as having occurred without anyone bothering to check the facts.
There are often reports of Israeli civilians attacking Palestinian property. In some cases this is true, while in other cases, the altercations begin with Palestinians attacking Israeli civilians driving by with stones and petrol bombs, after which the Israeli civilians retaliate. One of the most heavily reported altercations, which was much larger, longer and more violent than usual, began in this manner. Stones and petrol bombs were thrown at Israelis who called friends for assistance and charged towards the village from which the assailants had come. Israeli forces were rushed to the location to separate the two groups. A number of people were injured on both sides and two Palestinians were killed, one of them an American citizen (his family claims he was beaten to death by the Israelis).
Each case is investigated by the Israeli police. When Israelis are found to have been the initiators, they are prosecuted.
Syria:
On 13 July, the new Syrian regime attacked the Druze enclave in southern Syria (about 60 kilometers from the border with Israel). Regime forces and local Bedouin militias attacked Druze residents of the city of A-Suwayda and several Druze villages.
On 15 July, Israel responded to the attacks and requests by the Druze for assistance with airstrikes on Syrian regime forces. These included strikes on the headquarters of the army in Damascus, forces in the field, and other military camps. Israel simultaneously negotiated with the new Syrian regime to halt its operations and withdraw its forces and Bedouin militias from the Druze areas or face a greater response. Supported by Israeli airstrikes, the Druze counterattacked on the ground and retook some of the areas they had lost in the initial attacks. Israel also provided humanitarian support and operates a military field hospital near the border for Syrian civilians needing treatment (temporarily transferred during the 12-day war with Iran, it has since been returned to the Syrian border). Many Druze casualties from the fighting were transferred to this hospital using back roads to evade regime military forces.
On 21 July a ceasefire went into effect. Regime forces and Bedouin militias withdrew, as the Syrian Druze and Israel demanded.
As usual, the western political response was muted, with much of it directed against Israeli interference in Syria’s internal affairs. They prefer to maintain the pretense that the new regime is not ideologically committed to radical Sunni Islam.
The Syrian Druze as a whole supported the Assad regime during the civil war – not because they were enamored with Assad (there were many complaints and protests over his policies) but because they understood that his fall would enable the radical Sunnis to control Syria. During the civil war, the non-Druze population of southern and southwestern Syria was divided among those supporting the local branch of al-Qaeda, those supporting the local branch of ISIS, and a minority who favored neither but were forced to profess allegiance to one or the other. Along Israel’s border with Syria, the territory was divided between Druze supporting Assad in the north, rebels supporting al-Qaeda in the center, and rebels supporting ISIS in the south.
The Druze in Syria are divided into enclaves. Those adjacent to the border with Israel have the direct protection of Israeli army units that have been holding a buffer zone several kilometers inside Syria since the fall of Assad. The Druze who were attacked in July are located in and around the Jabal Druze area (as noted, the closest are about 60 kilometers from Israel). A third group is located in northern Syria. There were reports of attacks on them too, but the information is spotty and unreliable.
A soldier in the new Syrian army – note the ISIS patch on his combat vest.
He is not an exception. This symbol appears in many videos and photographs of personnel or units of the new Syrian army and the militias supporting them.
The numbers reported by sources in Syria should be regarded with care as to their credibility. According to the Druze, they suffered approximately 590 fatalities including both fighters and civilians (some of whom were massacred in their homes or in the streets and some in a Syrian hospital). Another 760 Druze civilians were captured, and the fate of some of them is not known; regime forces and Bedouin militias have published videos of the deliberate maltreatment of some of them. On the other side, the regime’s official casualties are 438 soldiers killed and dozens of tanks and armored personnel carriers, as well as other major equipment, destroyed by the Israeli airstrikes. The Bedouins reportedly lost some 300 killed (including civilians reportedly massacred by Druze in retaliation for the massacre of Druze civilians), 200 wounded and some 5,000 captured by Druze (the Bedouins claim most of them are women and children). However, after the ceasefire, only about 1,500 were reported as having been released, which may suggest that the original figure of 5,000 was exaggerated.
During the fighting, Israeli Druze demonstrated at the border of Israel and Syria in support of their brethren. Perhaps a thousand crossed the border into Syria and had to be brought back by IDF units.
Lebanon:
In Lebanon, Hezbollah continues to refuse to comply with the government’s demand that it relinquish all its weapons.
Meanwhile, Israel continues to attack Hezbollah personnel and infrastructure on a daily basis; one to three Hezbollah personnel are reportedly killed almost every day. Israel occasionally conducts larger air raids on storage sites to destroy weapons and other equipment. The IDF has also conducted some small ground raids into villages near the border where activity indicated a revived Hezbollah presence. After each such raid they leave leaflets warning returning civilians not to allow Hezbollah personnel to join them.
So far, Hezbollah has not retaliated except by stating it will do so at the proper time. It continues to attempt to recover equipment from storage sites (this activity is usually what prompts Israeli air strikes on these locations and on the personnel conducting it) and to reorganize and retrain its personnel.
Yemen:
After a brief pause, the Houthis resumed their launching of missiles and exploding drones at Israel. None has caused serious damage. They have all been intercepted and at most, some fragments have fallen inside Israel.
Israeli bombed Hodeyda port again, dropping 50 bombs. One target was the ship Galaxy Leader, which was captured by the Houthis in November 2023. The Houthis had mounted a radar on the ship to monitor ships traveling through the Bab al-Mandeb Straits.
Two ships were sunk by the Houthis, who claimed that they were involved with trade with Israel. One was transporting fertilizer from China to Egypt and the other was sailing neither to nor from Israel. In a change of tactics, the Houthis fired at the merchant ships, sent boats to accost them, exchanged fire with the ships’ security teams, and then boarded them. They then planted explosives and scuttled the ships. The crew of one ship escaped, but most of the crew of the other were apparently captured. Several crew members from each ship were killed or wounded.
The Houthis have declared that they intend to escalate their operations. Now any ship that has ever been used to transport goods to or from Israel will be targeted even if its current voyage is not connected to Israel.
WHAT NEXT
Assuming the negotiations between Israel and Hamas continue to go in circles, the current trends in fighting in Gaza will likely continue.
Iran and Hezbollah did not want to participate in this war, which they thought was initiated before they were ready. They have paid a heavy price for being dragged into it. It is highly likely that they will focus on recovering and rebuilding for the foreseeable future (which, in the Middle East, is never very far away).
****
14 – 22 June 2025
Iran:
Khamenei’s statement was made during the JCPOA negotiations that Iran, the United States and a number of European states signed in 2015.
Iran’s original plan was to develop a ‘circle of fire’ around Israel – Lebanese Hizbullah, Iranian forces and Iraqi Hizbullah in Syria, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza, Judea and Samaria and lastly to topple the Jordanian regime and replace it with the local Moslem Brotherhood. They expected it would take till the 2030s before they entire program would be ready. The nuclear weapons program was to be used as a backing force to deter Israel from using its alleged nuclear weapons to defend itself against the planned regular warfare offensive (see 7th October 2023, but on all Israel’s borders, except perhaps Egypt, simultaneously). That is one of the reasons they were not in a hurry to complete the nuclear weapons program and that they had no problem signing the JCPOA IN 2015. That agreement would end in December 2030… and in the meantime they would cheat at a pace they could hide from the supervision operations. Meanwhile Iran received assets previously frozen and a reprieve on sanctions that would supply it with several hundreds of billions of dollars to fund its activities (funding the proxies and allies, funding its own general weapons manufacturing and the nuclear program itself). In other words, waiting the 15 years would have been irrelevant to their progress and the gains were tangible.
Hamas leader Sinwar ‘jumped the gun’. According to documents captured by the Israelis during the war, he believed Israel was already ripe to fall and did not want to wait. He therefore initiated the 7th October 2023 attack, being fairly certain that this would compel the other members of the alliance against Israel would join him. The opposite happened – the Iranians and their other proxies held back, believing he was wrong. Israel recovered its balance and initiated a counter-offensive that gradually, over the past 20 months gradually destroyed Iran’s entire program except its nuclear component. One point should be made clear – the program was destroyed, but most of the various military components still exist:
- Iran’s presence and capabilities in Syria have been lost in totality. A few storage sites remain hidden but so far all known attempts to access them and send the weapons and equipment stored in them to Lebanon have failed. Of course, we cannot know if there were also successful attempts that evaded Israel’s intelligence and the that of the new regime.
- Lebanese Hizbullah was severely degraded but is still has a strong military capability. It is currently dealing with an internal Lebanese political ‘offensive’ to compel it to completely disarm and is thus less ready to face Israel Ever since the ceasefire Israel has continued to conduct daily attacks on Hizbullah attempts to restore its capabilities and has killed more than 210 Hizbullah personnel and destroyed more storage sites and a few weapons manufacturing sites that Hizbullah attempted to reactivate. Hizbullah has not responded – probably fearing an all-out Israeli offensive as well as one by the Lebanese army. During the current Israeli offensive on Iran Hizbullah’s leaders have made statements of encouragement but have so far refrained from taking actual action. The loss of access to Syrian territory and all the assets there has severely degraded Iran’s ability to help Hizbullah recuperate.
- Iraqi Hizbullah has not been scratched and is still capable of conducting all the operations it was designed for. It has however conducted only a very few exploding-drone attacks in support of Iran, though a few were also fired at the American bases in Iraq.
- The Houthis stated they are participating in the Iranian counter-offensive against Israel, but in fact the number of Houthi attacks against Israel has diminished. One possible reason is that Israel bombed a meeting of senior officers headed by the Houthi supreme military commander. He was wounded and others were killed or wounded too. Either they have decided that the cost of continuing is too high or the loss of these senior personnel has disrupted their ability to make decisions. This after the United States and Israel bombed and diminished their storage sites and the ports necessary for transporting new supplies from Iran to the Houthis. There has also been a stream of reports over the past couple of months of preparations by the other Yemenite factions to conduct a ground offensive, so perhaps they are focused on preparing to face that threat.
- In Jordan the current regime declared the Moslem Brotherhood an illegal organization and conducted mass arrests of its leadership as well as locating and dismantling various weapons stores belonging to the organization.
- In two exchanges of strikes by Israel and Iran, in spring 2024 and summer 2024, Israel first proved it could conduct air strikes in Iran despite Iran’s anti-aircraft defenses and also hit part of the missile fuel production industry
One of the Iranian responses was to speed up its nuclear weapons development program as well as its surface-to-surface missile manufacturing program – on the eve of the Israeli offensive they had approximately 2,500 missiles in their arsenals. It also began constructing more sites to increase and disperse its manufacturing base in order to make it harder to destroy.
President Trump gave Iran a 2 week deadline to surrender unconditionally, creating the deception that the United States would not intervene in the war until the end of June at the earliest. In fact, during the night of 21st-22nd June, the Americans dropped a number of the huge ground penetrating bombs only they have on the site of Fordow and on the site of Natanz. 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles were also fired, but these have no ground penetrating capabilities, so they were aimed at above-ground infrastructure. At time of writing the final damage assessment is still not completed. Furthermore, about half a ton of 60% enriched material was transferred from the known sites to hidden sites. This is not enough to create nuclear bombs (though they could be used to create ‘dirty bombs – i.e., ordinary explosive bombs that scatter fatally radioactive dust in the target area), but requires fewer centrifuges to survive to complete the process. So if there are any surviving centrifuges and the material is not destroyed too that would shorten the recovery time for the Iranians.
So far, the Israelis have hit approximately 1,200 different targets, most from the air, but some with Mossad special forces operating on the ground inside Iran. The targets include nuclear program sites, surface-to-surface missile manufacturing sites, missile launchers and missile storage sites, as well as anti-aircraft radars and missile launchers. Additional targets include senior military personnel and, more importantly, senior scientists and administrators of the nuclear program. All these personnel are replaceable in principle (especially the military – most of which have already had replacements named and at least two of these replacements have already been killed too), but only by personnel less experienced (most of the killed have been in office for many years, some for a few decades) and perhaps also less qualified.
Iranians claim Khamanei’s political adviser, the supreme administrator of the nuclear weapons program, who had been reported to have been killed on the first night, was only wounded and is alive in hospital. They published a photograph to prove the point, but quick research by bloggers showed the photograph to be an old one – taken when he underwent a medical procedure in March 2024. He has since published a number of written posts, but not been seen in public, so it is not clear if it is he that is writing them or someone is doing so in his name to hide his demise or serious injury.
The Iranians had approximately 360 surface-to-surface missile launchers before the Israeli offensive and about 240 have been destroyed. Various pro-Iranian elements are claiming that some were decoys and others were ordinary civilian trucks. Possibly a handful more may have been manufactured. In any case the daily rate of Iran’s missile fire at Israel has decreased (see below).
At least 80 anti-aircraft defense radars and missile-launchers have been destroyed. So that large areas of Iran are devoid of them, allowing Israeli aircraft to roam freely and perhaps even to conduct aerial refueling over Iran (at least 2 of the targets were hit 2,300 kilometers from Israel). The Iranians have attempted to move radars and launchers from quiet areas to the targeted areas, but so far all have been destroyed enroute or just as they have arrived at their new sites.
Israel has also attacked some economic targets – gas and oil stores and refining and processing plants.
Since the morning 15th June Israel has ordered the evacuation of various areas in Tehran in which the Iranian military industry sites are located. Adding new areas every day. From afternoon 15th June photographs and video clips of traffic jams on the roads exiting Tehran began appearing on Iranian social media. Tehran (population approximately 9 million of Iran’s approximately 86 million), in addition to being the political capital it is also the economic and industrial hub of Iran. Thus, the exodus, if it continues, could achieve a partial freeze of administrative and economic activity in Iran. The last time such an exodus occurred was in spring 1988, when Iraq fired a couple of hundred surface-to-surface missiles into the city. It compelled the Iranian leadership to request a ceasefire in the latest round of what was called ‘the war of the cities’ – Iranians and Iraqis firing missiles into each other’s cities, sub-chapter in the ongoing Iran-Iraq war of the time.
The Iranians claim that 5 hand-placed or vehicle-mounted bombs exploded in Tehran. They have not stated what the targets were or what the results were. No mention has been made by the IDF of such attacks. Attacks by internal anti-regime groups have occurred quite often over the years and these could also be one of these groups exploiting the situation.
The Iranians claim Israel attacked a hospital and showed photographs of damage to it. Iranian opposition bloggers refuted the claim, saying the hospital was not hit by Israeli bombs or damaged by them, but rather by secondary explosions of an Iranian ammunition arsenal located a few blocks distant from the hospital. Apparently the Iranians did not bother to maintain a safe distance between the two – the arsenal was located in an industrial zone a couple of blocks from the hospital and adjacent to a residential area.
The Iranian opposition response downloaded by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express
Since then, following the direct hit of an Iranian missile on an Israeli hospital, the Iranians have claimed that five hospitals have been deliberately targeted by Israel.
This issue of false information backed by fake photography has sky-rocketed (pun intended) during this war – lots of photographs from past and even non-Middle-Eastern wars are being changed with advanced computer programs to fit the narrative of the distributor of the photograph or video. This includes photographs and videos purporting to show damage in Israel, a number of destroyed Israeli aircraft and an Israeli female pilot captured by the Iranians after her plane was shot down… Some of the photographs of damage in Israel occurred in other events and some is not from Israel, no manned Israeli aircraft has been reported lost yet (only one remotely-piloted aircraft) and the supposedly captured female pilot is Chilean the photograph is from some years ago, she is definitely not in Iran…
Israel ordered the evacuation of a government television and radio station then bombed it. The damage was focused, though a fire broke out and increased the damaged area. The IDF spokesperson stated that the part of the station hit was cover for a Pasdaran military site. The strike occurred mid-broadcast and the recording studio and the people inside were shaken but not harmed. The female broadcaster, caught in the middle of an anti-Israel rant, has since had posters of her published and put in the streets as a symbol of Iranian resilience.
The Iranian cyber directorate claims that an Israeli cyber attack shut down all the automatic bank tellers in Iran. An Iranian opposition source claimed that in fact the shut down was conducted by order of the government fearing a rush that could empty the banks’ reserves. A cyber-attack, claimed to have been perpetrated by a pro-Israeli hacker group, ‘The Predatory Sparrow’, has severely damaged the Iranian Crypto-currency exchange, Nobitex. One report claims that approximately 1.7 billion dollar worth of the 1.8 billion dollar worth holdings of the currency were erased.
The Iranian government has also almost completely shutdown access to the internet in Iran. They have apparently also begun to disrupt the navigation systems of the shipping crossing through the Hormuz straits.
The number of Iranians reported killed so far is approximately 640 and the number of wounded is approximately three times more (there are a wide variety of very different competing numbers so this data should be treated with caution). These include at least 11 nuclear scientists (perhaps 15) and at least 25 senior commanders. Some of the commanders killed are the replacements of those killed on the first night. As per form the Iranians are claiming that most of the casualties are civilians, however, even if that is technically correct – civilians working on military projects (weapons manufacture for example) are legitimate targets. Israeli strikes are on specific targets. The cases when perhaps ordinary civilians are killed or wounded are perhaps collateral damage from strikes on the residences of the senior commanders and nuclear scientists. However, those strikes deliberately used small munitions so that damage was virtually only inside their apartments.
On 20th June IDF claimed that approximately two-thirds of Iran’s long range surface-to-surface missile launchers had been destroyed.
By noon of 22nd June the Iranians had fired approximately 600 surface-to-surface missiles (500 kilogram warheads) of their initial store of approximately 2,500 (several hundreds more have been destroyed by the Israeli strikes) and more than 1,100 exploding-drones (approximately 50 kilogram warheads).
The missile fire is conducted in three or four salvos per day, initially only at night, but over the past few days there were also a few salvos in daylight. Though the number of salvos remains the same, the number of missiles per salvo has dropped. The immediate response of the Iranian high command on the first night of the war failed to generate any missile fire as all the launchers had been targeted. On the second night they fired approximately 150 missiles in three 50-missile salvos, then on the third night about 120 missiles in three 40-missile salvos, over the next few nights the salvos became smaller and inconsistent – each night one big salvo of 20 to 30 missiles and the others only 5 to 10 missiles each, and finally over the past couple of nights the small salvos were only 1 to 5 missiles each. In at least once case, they prepared 5 launchers, but 4 were destroyed just before they launched. To explain this reduction an Iranian official told CNN that they had decided to change tactics – instead of firing a lot of missiles they would fire superior models of missiles that can penetrate the Israeli defences and hit their targets more precisely. However, this supposed change has not been seen in the statistics of penetrations and targets hit.
Except for the first night in which approximately 100 exploding-drones were fired in a single salvo, all the drone attacks are scattered throughout the day and night in small numbers from one to a dozen.
So far, approximately 60 missiles penetrated Israel’s anti-missile defenses but only a handful of the exploding-drones penetrated and hit any target – most were intercepted outside Israel’s territory and some within Israel. About half the missiles and exploding-drones that penetrated landed hit something – almost all of them civilian residences, but also a hospital and other public sites (an oil refining iste, shopping centers etc). A handful caused some damage to military sites. The others landed in open ground causing no damage or superficial damage to infrastructure only. Some of the missiles and drones fell enroute because of technical malfunctions causing a few casualties in Iraq, Syria and Jordan. The Jordanian air force is participating in the drone-hunt when these enter eastern Jordan from Iraq and the Israeli air force is conducting its hunt also in Jordan (coordinated with the Jordanians) and in Syria (without asking for permission – Syria’s air defenses were almost completely destroyed during the civil war and what was left was destroyed by the Israelis during the months following the collapse of the Assad regime).
So far 26 civilians have been killed in Israel – 21 Israelis and 5 members of a family of Ukrainian refugees who came to Israel to provide medical treatment for the daughter (leukemia). About 2,700 civilians have been wounded, though only a few suffered serious wounds. 24 of the 26 killed and almost all the wounded were people who did not reach shelter in time. One shelter suffered a direct hit and the wall was penetrated killing two people inside. A handful of soldiers have also been wounded. Iranian missiles strikes have been focused on the greater Tel-Aviv metropolis, the Haifa and Haifa bay metropolis and the southern town of Beer-Sheva. About 10,630 Israelis have lost their homes. The hit on the hospital in Beer-Sheva was fortunately on a wing that had been evacuated the previous day. The Iranians then invented the ludicrous story that the hospital was attacked because there is a tank unit parking site underneath it… later they changed their story to state they had attacked a military wing of the hospital that catered to IDF wounded… (there is no ‘military wing’ in any Israeli hospital, soldiers are treated like and with everyone else).
The Palestinian front:
Fighting on this front, in Gaza, Judea and Samaria continues as before the Israeli offensive on Iran began.
There are still 20 living Israeli kidnappees and the bodies of 33 dead in the hands of the Palestinians – not all are in the hands of Hamas, some are in the hands of other factions. The Hamas leadership gave an order to kill any living kidnappee if Israeli forces approach their location.
Intensely worried by the success of the new organization, Gaza Humanitarian Fund (GHF), providing food to the Gazans from behind Israeli forces, Hamas continues to report fake massacres by the IDF on the people coming to receive the food and these reports continue to receive credence from the UN and various western media (the latter sometimes are compelled to retract the reports, however, Wikipedia forinstance states them as if factual without even a qualification). It itself conducted some shooting at the crowds walking in the designated safe-route and ambushed a bus carrying Gaza employees of the NGO. Initial procedural problems in the managing of the food distribution by GHF are gradually being worked out, enabling it to increase its flow. The system is that a number of distribution sites have been located in areas controlled by the IDF. Gazan civilians are allowed to reach these sites on specifically designated routes – first they reach a security-filtration point to ensure none are armed, then allowed to continue to the sites themselves, where they receive boxes of products. Each box is enough for a number of people for a few days. If on the first days the number of meals distributed in this manner was a few hundred thousand per day, on 19th June they reported supplying more than 2.8 million meals in three sites and all together about 33.4 million meals since they began operations on 26th May 2025.
After Israel halted the ship carrying pro-Hamas protesters heading to Gaza, a land convoy set off from Algeria, traveling through Tunisia and Libya till it reached the border with Egypt. The goal was to cross also Egypt to reach Egypt’s border with Gaza and ‘break the siege’ of Gaza. The Egyptian authorities refused to allow the convoy to enter. A smaller group flew to Egypt with tourist visas, but were halted in the airport and sent back on the next flights to the countries of their origin. A number of similar attempts to use tourist visas to enter Israel by air or from Jordan were halted by Israeli authorities and the people involved sent back too.
WHAT NEXT
After the successful first strike, Israel’s Prime Minister Nethanyahu and IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, stated that this was only the opening round and that the war would take a few weeks at best and would include also “difficult and painful days”. This is indeed what has been happening. The IDF and Mossad are working gradually through the list of targets collected over the past years. There are still quite a few relevant targets (the nuclear program and the missile program) to destroy. These are the main targets, but only a small proportion of the attacks are conducted at them – the others are aimed at enabling the attacks on the targets by destroying air defenses and Iranian attempts to resurrect them and a larger proportion of the attacks are aimed at Iran’s missile capabilities in order to reduce the damage being caused to Israel itself by the Iranian attacks.
Currently the overall trend of the war is positive for Israel, despite, indeed bad and painful events too. There is currently no indication that Israel wants or needs to desist – though a variety of people are repeatedly describing the weakening of Israel’s interceptor arsenal that is supposedly threatening to become critical. Originally Israel’s Prime Minister and IDF Chief of Staff stated the war would last a number of weeks at least, so it is clear that this factor was taken into account and we are not yet nearing the end of Israel’s operations. The American strike assists by destroying specifically difficult sites that need the use of specific weapons only the Untied States has, but it has not changed the general calculus of what Israel still needs to destroy before the operation can be deemed over: a list of nuclear sites that do not require American assistance to destroy, a list of military industry sites (especially the long-range surface-to-surface missiles production sites) and existing missile launchers and missile stores.
It should be remembered that the rate of depletion of that arsenal depends very much on the intensity of Iranian attacks and these are less than they were in the first few days. A large part of Israel’s offensive operations is aimed at depleting the Iranian ability to launch missiles and this is reducing the rate of depletion of interceptor missiles.
Following the American intervention in the war there are two major issues to be resolved:
- What was the level of success of the first strike and if it is deemed insufficient will the Americans strike again?
In theory this is only a technical issue – there is no doubt the Americans can do it again if they wish to. In fact it is also a political question – whether President Trump, facing a mix of internal and external opposition versus support for his action, feels politically capable of doing it again.
Acquiring the results could take time. Furthermore there is the issue of the already enriched material apparently removed in advance from the enrichment sites to another hidden location. This material is currently not ready for arming a bomb (at least as far as is currently known), but will shorten the time needed for Iran to recover its bomb making capability in the future. Therefore finding it and destroying it is a priority.
- How will Iran and its allies respond to the American attack?
A major response could hit both American and Arab gulf state targets. These are closer to Iran and therefore increase the size of the Iranian arsenal of missiles able to reach them, well beyond the number able to reach Israel. The Iranians can also attempt to block the Hormuz straits through which about 20% of the world’s oil supplies are shipped.
A different response could be terrorist attacks across the globe on American interests and targets.
In any case completely stopping the program, as opposed to merely delaying it for X years (how many years depends on the success of the Israeli and American offensive), requires changing the regime in Iran. Many are fearful of such a commitment, citing the Iraq and Afghanistan debacles. However, toppling a regime and trying to impose a new one are two different things. The former can be done with less physical presence of forces in the country in question, the latter requires a major insertion of ground forces. Toppling the regime in Iran is sufficient – what happens afterwards can be left to the Iranians themselves to sort out.
****
14 – 15 June 2025
Iran:
Despite repeated reports in the media about Trump being against an Israeli attack, his response has been to support it and at least one US anti-missile defense ship has been sent closer to Israel to assist in its defense. Apparently the “rift” reported between Trump and Nethanyahu was part of a deception plan. That being said, the American Administration is taking pains to make clear it is not directly involved in this war except to aid Israel’s anti-missile defence. However, it adds that if Americans are targeted, the United States will join the offensive, adding an order of magnitude greater strength and intensity to the attack on Iran.
Trump has called the Iranians to continue negotiations and reminded them that he had given them a 60 day window to accept his demand that they dismantle their entire uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons programs or it would be taken from them by force – the Israeli offensive began at the end of that ultimatum’s timeline.
According to all the more credible reports (there is of course also a lot of propaganda) Israel’s offensive against Iran’s nuclear capabilities included three separate forces working in coordination:
- A cyber-offensive which has not been published explicitly but has been alluded to in various reports, which was used to disrupt various Iranian defensive capabilities.
- A Mossad special operation which over the past months gradually infiltrated and stored a variety of shorter-ranged guided weapons into Iran. These included both advanced guided anti-tank missiles and explosive-carrying quadcopters. The anti-tank missiles carry more powerful warheads than the quadcopters but are bulkier and are less maneuverable than the quadcopters. These were used to attack a variety of Iranian air defense capabilities, thus opening the way for the Israeli aircraft conducting the main strike and against Iranian surface-to-surface missile launchers waiting in readiness to retaliate. They were also used in precision strikes against the commanders and nuclear scientists, thus reducing collateral damage.
- 200 combat aircraft (of 250 to 285 available according different publications) attacked approximately 100 targets with 330 bombs and missiles. These focused on the moveable targets, completing destruction of air defences in the areas to be attacked and began the process of destroying the nuclear enrichment and nuclear weapons development facilities, as well as more surface-to-surface missile launchers and underground storage sites, and finally various headquarters and command posts.
The initial results of Israel’s offensive against Iran’s nuclear capabilities:
At least 20 Iranian senior officers killed:
- A political advisor to the Iranian Supreme Leader Khamanei – formerly a navy officer and secretary of the Iranian National Security Council) and the person in charge of the nuclear program.
- Iran has two parallel military organizations – the Artesh (Regular Army) and the Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard). They are equivalent except that the latter is also responsible for Iran’s surface-to-surface missile forces and international operations and the nuclear weapons program. The killed senior officers include:
- Pasdaran: the Pasdaran overall commander / the Air force commander plus a number of his senior staff were killed while meeting in a headquarters bunker / the Surface to Surface Missile Force commander / the Anti-Aircraft Defense Force commander / the Quds Force (international covert and military aid operations) commander / the Navy commander / the Ground Forces commander / the Emergency Operations Headquarters commander / the Basij (militia) commander / perhaps also the commander and deputy of the intelligence service plus a number of the senior staff. There were more that have not yet been named.
- Artesh: the Artesh overall commander / the Navy commander, the Ground Forces commander, the Air force commander / Chief of Intelligence / Deputy Chief of Operations. There were more that have not yet been named.
- (One report claims the Pasdaran Air Force commanders were lured to stay in their headquarters bunker by providing them with false information to debate), thus giving the Israelis time to launch their attack.
- 9 (possibly up to 14) leading scientists from the nuclear weapons program.
When asked if Israel would attempt to kill Iran’s supreme leader, Khamanei, the IDF spokesperson refused to answer. Meanwhile, Reuters published a report claiming that President Trump had ordered Israel not to kill him, to which Israeli Prime Minister Nethanyahu responded – that this was incorrect. At least officially, Israel has not yet attempted to kill Khamanei – whether this is being considered or the reports are merely psychological warfare waits to be seen.
As of afternoon 15th June the Iranians have stated that their casualties number 406 killed and 654 wounded.
Immediately after the attack began Israel’s civilian and military leadership stated that the attack was not a one-off act, but only the beginning of what is expected to be a long war lasting weeks at least. They also warned Israel’s population that there were going to be difficult and painful days ahead, it would not be a one-sided war.
Since the first strike the Israeli Air force and the Mossad have continued attacking targets across Iran, repeat attacks on the nuclear weapons facilities (the claim that a nuclear reactor was bombed causing radiation to spread is Iranian propaganda), military air fields and surface-to-surface missile launchers and storage sites to reduce the Iranian ability to fire at Israel (though of course reaching a zero capability will take time). On 14th June, in addition to purely military targets the Israelis began to attack also economic targets – the gas and oil fields that are the basis of Iran’s economy. The furtherst target, near the city of Mashad in eastern Iran, is approximately 2,300 kilometers in a straight line from Israel.
Israeli aircraft are flying over Syria, Jordan and Iraq to reach Iran. Israeli refueling aircraft are operating freely over Syria, because over the past half year they have completely destroyed the former regime’s anti-aircraft system and if anything is left from it the new regime does not want to insert itself into the war – especially not to support Iran, which supported the previous, Assad, regime, against them.
The Iranian first response was supposed to include about 1,000 surface-to-surface missiles and exploding-drones. These had been prepared and were standing at the ready over the past months as the ‘war of words’ escalated. That missile salvo did not occur and only approximately 100 exploding-drones were launched. All were shot down over the eastern desert of Jordan by Israeli and Jordanian combat aircraft.
During the night following the Israeli attack (13th – 14th June) the Iranians recovered enough to fire about 150 missiles in three salvos. About ten managed to penetrate Israel’s anti-missile defenses. These are not the Iron Dome – that system is designed against small shorter ranged and slower rockets. Intercepting long-range ballistic missiles requires completely different capabilities and is more difficult because of the altitude and speed these missiles fly at. The Israeli system designed to face them is called Arrow. The Americans are assisting with a THAADS unit (their equivalent to Arrow) stationed in Israel and US Navy ships using equivalent missiles.
The Iranian ballistic missiles carry much larger warheads than the rockets and missiles used by Hizbullah and Hamas, so each missile that manages to hit causes much more damage and casualties. Since the first Iranian response, they have fired another 100 plus missiles spread out over a number of salvos, none of which included more than a few dozen missiles. So far all missile attacks have been at night. Iranian officials have stated publicly that they are preparing a salvo of 2,000 missiles – though according to some sources this is more or less their entire inventory, so perhaps they do not mean in a single salvo. In between the missile salvos they have continued firing small numbers of exploding-drones, none of which (correct to afternoon 15th June) managed to penetrate. In one case it seems the drone attack was timed with a missile salvo, perhaps to engage Israel’s defences so as to clear the way for the missiles (a tactics used by Russia in Ukraine) – though Israel’s layered defences treat each threat separately with different responses, so this has very little effect (in Ukraine the Russians are sending low flying missiles, so this tactic is more useful). The most successful Iranian attacks occurred on the night of 14th-15th June – one landed in an Israeli Arab village, demolishing a house and killing 4 women living there and wounding the other family members; two more landed inside the greater Tel-Aviv area (Bat-Yam and Rehovot), one completely demolishing one high-rise building and damaging an adjacent one killing six and wounding approximately 180 people.
The latest salvo was fired during the afternoon of 15th June. No missiles penetrated.
At time of writing (afternoon 15th June), all the Iranian attacks together have killed 13 Israeli civilians and wounded approximately 310 (including 3 foreign diplomats and 7 soldiers), there are still 3 persons missing (either they are still buried in the demolished buildings or were taken to hospitals and have not yet been identified or were not at home and have not yet been contacted). One thing is clear – none of the fatalities or major injuries occurred to people who were inside the bomb shelters. Among the few who were injured while in bomb-shelters – the injuries are light only. Unfortunately, buildings from before 1995 do not have bomb shelters on each floor, only in the basement which means it takes time and effort to reach them, and buildings from the mid-1950s or older do not have any shelters at all. However, part of the problem is also the behaviour of people who ignore the alerts, banking only on the low probability their location would be hit. The Israeli Home Defence sends alerts via cellular phones, radio and television (keeping these open can be done on a quiet channel for those who do not want to see or hear programs).
Exploding drones were launched also from Iraqi territory by local militias working for Iran. A few of them were aimed at American bases (apparently all were shot down), but the majority were fired towards Israel.
The Iranians claim to have shot down at least one Israeli aircraft. However, the video they showed of a Russian aircraft (perhaps from Ukraine) reworked with AI to seem to be Israeli. Israel has denied any of its aircraft have been shot down so far. Also, a drone that they showed to have been shot-down claiming it is Israeli, is probably an Iranian drone.
The Iranians also claim to have captured a number of Mossad agents, vehicles and locating one of the Mossad hide-outs that were used prior to the attack.
Yemen:
The Houthis have stated that they are firing missiles towards Israel in coordination with the Iranian missile salvos.
On 14th June the Israeli air force bombed a meeting of senior Houthi officers, including their chief of staff. The exact number and identity of the casualties is not yet known.
Other fronts:
The escalation with Iran has not abated the fighting on all the other fronts, but there have been no major changes there either, so I will not write about them in this update.
****
19 May – 13 June 2025
Iran:
Negotiations between Iran and the United States reached an impasse – the United States demands that no nuclear material enrichment remain in Iran whereas Iran categorically refuses to this demand.
Meanwhile, over the past few weeks, reports of the advancement of Iran’s nuclear weapons program have peaked. Essentially the gist is that the Iranians are rushing to complete the program, they already have enough fissile material to create 15 small bombs and have conducted simulation tests for these bombs. They are apparently hoping that they could stretch the negotiations to the point when they already had bombs available.
Israel’s intelligence reported these developments to the government and late at night of 12th – 13th June the Israeli air force launched a massed attack on Iran’s nuclear industry as well as dozens of other targets relevant to this program – missile storage sites etc. Also attacked were a number of anti-aircraft defence systems, to enable freer access in the next waves. Another target were surface-to-surface missile batteries – reducing their ability to fire at Israel. A second wave of strikes was indeed reported early in the morning. One target was the residential area of the Iranian military high command and there are reports that a number of the most senior commanders, including the supreme commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (the organization that controls the nuclear program and the surface-to-surface missile forces) and the Chief of Staff of the Iranian army are among those killed as a are a senior adviser to the Supreme Leader Khamanei (he himself was not targeted) and a number of the leading nuclear scientists working on the weapons program.
The first Israeli missiles and bombs began dropping on their targets shortly after 02:30 AM and at approximately 02:55 AM Israel’s Home-Front published an all country warning to Israel’s population to be prepared to absorb the probable Iranian missile and exploding-drone counter-attack. Sirens were sounded across the entire country and warnings were also sent to mobile phones (text messages with loud siren sounds and flashing the phone lights – you don’t have to open the message to receive them, the phone begins blaring and flashing automatically). All public activities have been ordered to stop and the population was told to remain near bomb-shelters (most Israeli houses have building-shelters and those built since the mid-90s have a bomb-shelter room in each apartment). Public shelters have been opened by the municipalities.
The Prime Minister, Defence Minister and IDF Spokesperson published general details of the initial strike and its goals, stated that the public must be prepared for at least several days of Iranian missile bombardments, as well as resumption of fighting with Hizbullah and an escalation of the Houthi bombardment.
Thousands of reservists of the Air Force, the Home Front Command and border defence units facing Lebanon have received emergency call-up notices. Also an alert has been raised in case the Palestinians in Judea and Samaria re-escalate their attacks.
The United States government has officially stated that it is not participating in the Israeli offensive. However, they have been preparing for it for several days – ordering non-essential personnel in various Arab countries around Iran to leave and more or less emptying the American embassy in Iraq (Iran has a large proxy army, organized in a number of separate militias, of approximately 100,000 Iraqi Shiites in its service in Iraq). At approximately the same time the Israeli attack began, the American ambassador to Israel published a tweet stating that it was monitoring the situation and that everyone should “…Pray for the peace of Jerusalem!” So clearly Israel informed the United States government of its intention.
Shortly after 09:30 on 13th June the first Iranian response began – a wave of exploding-drones was reported to be flying towards Israel. Given the distance these should arrive towards noon. In Jordan, located between Israel and Iran, sirens warned the population to begin taking cover. Jordan is not as well prepared as Israeli to absorb strikes (significant lack of bomb shelters and relevant defensive weapons) so they need more time for the population to take cover. Jordan is not the target, but past experience is that some of the drones and missiles flying to Israel fell short in Iraq and Jordan. At approximately 10:00 AM the first drones reached eastern Jordan and Israeli and Jordanian combat aircraft began to hunt them in order to shoot them down.
Gaza:
Since the last update negotiations continued with no result – Hamas is refusing to relinquish its hold on Gaza and demanding that a ceasefire include its continued governance, the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and the rebuilding of Gaza at the expense of the international community. Israel is demanding the return of all the remaining kidnappees, alive (currently estimated at 20) and dead (currently estimated at 32 – the bodies of 3 dead kidnappees were recovered by the IDF over the past few days, two Israeli civilians and one Thai civilian who was working as an agricultural labourer in one of the villages near the border), the removal of Hamas from Gaza and the complete demilitarization of the area. The Israelis offered a partial agreement which Hamas refused.
Since the last update Israeli forces have continued to gradually take and clear more territory inside Gaza. Before entering each area the population is ordered to evacuate to areas the IDF has not yet entered.
Behind the IDF security the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation (GHF) has gradually set up a number of food distribution sites. The GHF is an American run foundation organized and operating with consent of Israel. Its method of operation is to bring packages of food, each package with enough food for a family for a few days, to the distribution sites. The population is then told to send representatives to pick up packages. In first couple of weeks of its operation it has already handed out more than 2 million meals.
Hamas and the United Nations are against this operation. Hamas fears that it will lose control over the humanitarian supplies and therefore over the population. The United Nations backs Hamas and has its failure in distribution of supplies during the war highlighted.
To prevent this program Hamas at first conducted propaganda against surrendering to the Zionist plot, then when despite this tens of thousands of Gazans went to pick up the packages, Hamas published claims that the IDF was conducting massacres among those people and when that too failed (the claims were, as usual, trumpeted in the international media, but the locals realized the lies) began shooting at the procession of people heading to the sites and on 12th June ambushed a bus carrying locals employed by the GHF enroute to the sites before it reached the IDF forward security positions – so far at least 10 perhaps 15 Gazans have been killed by Hamas in these attacks. The IDF has fired on a number of Hamas personnel operating near the procession – whether planning to attack it or to exploit it to infiltrate through the IDF security. The sites themselves have no Israelis in them – only the foreign organizers and local population employed by them.
Another interesting development is the establishment of a local anti-Hamas militia based on the Bedouin Tarbin tribe living in southern Gaza, mostly in the area already taken by the IDF. The same tribe has a larger presence in Sinai and there is helping the Egyptian army in its fight against the local ISIS organization.
The final goal is for the IDF to take and clear enough territory to set up humanitarian tent cities behind its lines and then invite the population now in Hamas controlled territory to cross through filtration points to live in these tent cities which will be administered directly by them and the humanitarian organization with the IDF handling security with a minimal presence near the civilians (to prevent Hamas following them there).
Gaza civilians ransacked Hamas warehouses where supplies provided during the ceasefire in February were hoarded instead of being distributed. In addition dozens of trucks entering Gaza via the usual UN/NGO operations were also ransacked by crowds of Gazans.
The Hamas Ministry of Health latest update of casualties (17 May) is approximately 55,150 killed and 127,000 wounded. It still does not separate combatants from non-combatants. According to the IDF in January 2025 these included a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. Since resumption of fighting in March at least 500 more terrorists have been killed, perhaps as many as 1,000 – however the information is sketchy. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably at least similar to the number killed.
The body of Mahmood Sinyar, who replaced his brother as the Hamas political leader and Muhammad Def as the military commander in Gaza, plus the bodies of ten other senior officers and assistants were found by the IDF in a tunnel complex in which he had been hiding and was meeting a number of subordinates including the commander of Hamas’ Rafah brigade (originally it was thought that another brigade commander had been killed too, but apparently he survived) under the European hospital. Hamas continued to deny his death from an IDF air strike till the IDF found the body.
The tunnels under the European Hospital
Hamas is emplaced in and under most of the hospitals, schools and mosques using them to shield itself from IDF operations. However, the IDF has learned to gradually locate them precisely (down to the room they have co-opted for their use) and strike them with various types of munitions and methods.
10 Israeli soldiers and one Israeli civilian contractor (operating heavy mechanical equipment) have been killed in the fighting in Gaza since the last update and more have been wounded but the exact numbers have not been published.
On the propaganda front two anti-Israel/pro-Hamas operations were initiated during this period:
- A ship with protesters coming to breach the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza. The ship included a number of celebrities including the Swede Greta Thunberg and a European Parliament member. The ship was captured by the Israeli navy, towed to Israel’s Ashdod port and most of the people on board sent home by airplanes. A few refused to leave and have been incarcerated in Israeli prisons till a judge orders them to be sent abroad.
- A convoy of buses coming from Tunisia through Libya and Egypt in order to cross the border from Egypt into Gaza. In addition to the convoy which is still in Libya, some dozens of people from Europe and Turkey and other Arab countries flew to Egypt to join it when it arrived there. However, the latter were all taken by the Egyptian police, mounted on buses and ordered to fly back home. A senior Egyptian official stated that entering Egypt required certain bureaucratic paperwork which the people in the convoy had not conducted and therefore would not be allowed to cross the border from Libya.
Greta Thunberg receiving a sandwich from an Israel soldier
The Propaganda Competition:
As a rule I do not mention the Israeli political debate. However, this debate has now reached a level of toxicity that led a number of anti-government leaders to make irresponsible false statements that played to Hamas and international anti-Israeli propaganda: a former Prime-Minister, a number of former generals and one former general who is now a politician, made public statements that Israel was operating in contravention of international law. So I have no choice but to respond – they are talking nonsense. Israel is acting scrupulously in accordance with international law, and in many cases it is acting well above and beyond the requirements of international law. Other politicians also opposed to the current government have criticized these false and irresponsible statements. This does not mean that here or there some individual does not behave according to the accepted norms of the IDF, but these are a miniscule number of cases. They are reviewed and investigated by the military police and if necessary they face court proceedings.
The claims of famine in Gaza because Israel is preventing the entry of food are fabrications – the problem is not the amount of food entering Gaza but rather the deliberate hoarding of this food by Hamas instead of distributing it. Hamas uses the food to maintain control of the population – giving it first to its people and using it as a tool to gain new recruits for its military forces, reward loyalty and selling it in the market to acquire funds for its operations. The UN and international NGOs who are supposed to distribute the food are slow in collecting it from the border crossings – often dozens to hundreds of trucks authorized entry by Israel wait for days before being collected and often, after they have been collected the food waits for long periods in storehouses inside Gaza. Israel’s new policy of organizing a new method of distributing the food to the population, still in its first steps, is anathema to Hamas, the UN and the international NGOs because within days of beginning to operate, and despite various teething problems, it has already proved more effective than the UN and NGOs and is threatening Hamas’ control over the population – so much so that Hamas has added another condition for a ceasefire: that this new organization be dismantled and all food distribution be conducted by the UN and existing NGOs, which it dominates and essentially controls. The Hamas tactic of fake deprivation is not new, they have being doing it for years with fake electricity blackouts, stories of famished families, photographs of “dead” children, etc.
The repeated claims that Israeli forces are massacring civilians and committing genocide are also complete nonsense. Time and time again international media quote massacre stories invented by Hamas without bothering to check the facts and time and time again when refuted they provide a muted withdrawal of the original story. The fact is that in comparison to wars conducted in similar circumstances Israel’s achievements in reducing the total number of civilians killed and especially reducing the ratio between civilians and combatants killed are among the best ever achieved. The claim of genocide is even more ludicrous when compared to real genocides – for example: in Rwanda in 1994 some 500,000 (perhaps more) civilians were killed in 3.5 months with machetes, knives and axes – currently Hamas claims 55,000 Gazans killed in 18.5 months, so that even if all were civilians (and at least 23,000 were not) the discrepancy is enormous. Either the Israelis are extremely incompetent in conducting genocides or they are trying very hard to not conduct one.
Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):
Israeli offensive operations continue, though the intensity has been reduced. Resistance to Israeli operations is also diminishing – more are preferring to surrender rather than to fight. Those killed are usually commanders who refuse to surrender or those attempting attacks against the Israeli soldiers and civilians when killed.
Since the beginning of the operation on 21st January 2025 approximately 130 terrorists have been killed (approximately 20 more since my last update) and almost approximately 2,000 captured (approximately 500 more since my last update though some were released after questioning). Among the killed and captured are persons who were released from incarceration in return for kidnappees in Gaza during previous ceasefires and exchanges and resumed terrorist activities.
The Fatah controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have also continued their operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas the Israelis are not operating. They arrested several hundred of them.
Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7th October 2023 are 42 Israeli civilians killed (0 more since my last update) and 31 soldiers/police killed (0 more since my last update) and 515 wounded (6 more since my last update) – most of the wounded are civilians.
Total Palestinian fatalities in Judea and Samaria since 7th October 2023 are about 1,000 (numerical information is sketchy) and more than 7,300 have been arrested (but hundreds were released in the exchange with Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known. The Palestinians claim that more than 17,000 Palestinians were arrested during this period, however they are counting also persons temporarily detained for questioning and released immediately after.
Syria:
Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. In addition to holding various key points they are also conducting patrols and searching for local weapons’ stores. The majority of the local population prefers to not interfere with the IDF’s activities and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.
Following the incidents with the Druze and the Israeli response, the Syrian government agreed to conduct indirect negotiations with Israel. The attacks on the Druze were also halted.
A number of Israeli air strikes hit various Hizbullah weapons stores still in Syria. Also the Syrian regime attacked and destroyed a couple of attempts by Hizbullah to smuggle weapons from Syrian territory to Lebanon.
The Syrian regime also ordered Palestinian armed groups to hand over their weapons and deported some of their leaders. During the Syrian civil war some Palestinian factions supported the Assad regime whereas others (Hamas included) supported the rebels.
An unknown group, presumed to be Palestinians, fired 3 rockets from Syria into Israel. The IDF conducted a raid into a Syrian village outside the buffer zone and captured a number of Hamas personnel stationed there. One was killed in the initial firefight before the others surrendered.
Lebanon:
Israel continues to attack Hizbullah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon and along the border with Syria (weapons smuggling operations) at an average rate of two or three air strikes per day – mostly with drones dropping small precise bombs, occasionally with manned aircraft dropping large bombs when the target is a large infrastructure site – usually underground. On some days the number of strikes increases considerably. On 6th June, about 12 hours after the IDF published a warning to the population in Beirut to move away from a number of buildings, the Israeli air force attacked a number of underground sites beneath these buildings. The sites were being used to manufacture military drones and quadcopters.
In addition IDF ground forces have conducted a number of armed patrols into villages near the border. The patrols often leave flyers warning the locals not to let Hizbullah return and use their houses or they will have to leave their villages again as the IDF will destroy any house used for military purposes.
Hizbullah has not responded to these attacks despite the hundreds of casualties it has suffered (at least 220 killed – at least 20 since my last update, probably more, and at least a similar number wounded) and repeated threats it would respond. The primary reason for this is probably that Hizbullah’s political situation in Lebanon is currently weak, both in general versus the government and other ethnic groups and also among its own population base (the Shiites) and it fears a massive Israeli response. Because of the change in Syria to a hostile regime, they will not be able to receive support from Iran, their patron, and perhaps feel that their biggest threat currently is not Israel but losing their standing among the Shiites and being attacked by the other Lebanese factions and the official army. Hizbullah’s political rivals in Lebanon are repeatedly making public statements demanding it relinquish all its weapons and cease provoking Israel and refusing to sanction welfare relief for the Shiites who lost their homes and livelihoods until Hizbullah obeys.
The other reason is that Hizbullah has been focusing on trying to salvage weapons and equipment that were not damaged from bombed storage sites or those that the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. In southern Lebanon they are also trying to infiltrate personnel to the border areas, especially Lebanese villages near the border which were the locations of their main positions to attack Israel, to conduct both salvage and intelligence operations. All these activities are against the ceasefire agreement which requires Hizbullah to disarm – giving Israel the right to act.
Given the Israeli attack on Iran it is very likely that Hizbullah will attempt to support its patron by conducting some sort of fire operations against Israel.
Yemen:
The dribble of missiles and exploding drones from Yemen continues – usually one per day, sometimes two per day. However,
Israeli has responded by twice attacking the Houthi international air port and a few more times various ports and their facilities. The last attack on a port was conducted by ships firing long range missiles instead of by aircraft.
Jordan:
In my last update I reported the Jordanian crackdown on the Moslem Brotherhood movement in Jordan for planning a coup against the king. Apparently this activity was funded by Iran as part of its plan to surround Israel with proxy forces in preparation for a future offensive to destroy the “Zionist entity”.
Israeli Casualties:
The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 06:30 on 7th October 2023, is now 1,020 civilians (4 more since my last update – this because of updated information of the killed on 7th October 2023) and 866 soldiers and 1 civilian contractor (11 killed in Gaza since my last update). Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 16,500 soldiers have been wounded (including 7,000 psychiatric casualties). There are still 53 Israelis held captive in Gaza – 20 alive (4 previously thought to be alive were confirmed to be dead) and 33 dead.
WHAT NEXT?
The current escalation with Iran will not be a brief one as were the previous ones. Israel still has more targets to hit and given the damage inflicted on them the Iranians will not make do with a single retaliation salvo.
The big question is whether the Iranians will keep their promise to attack American and Sunni Arab states friendly to Israel, especially the Emirates and Saudia. If so the war could escalate to another level – adding American numbers to Israel’s would massively increase the size of the attacks on Iran.
Meanwhile, in Gaza the fighting will continue as before. However, Israel is preparing for a resumption of fire from Lebanon by Hizbullah and perhaps an arousal of fervour in Judea and Samaria.
One thing should be clear: Israel’s military capabilities cannot achieve an all-out defeat of Iran, the goal is limited – destroy sufficient infrastructure and resources to set back Iran’s military nuclear program by many years. The only way to achieve a total halt of the program would be to overthrow the current regime. That cannot be done by Israel alone, it can, perhaps, be done by the Iranians themselves if Israel creates a perception of sufficient weakness of the regime to arouse its internal enemies. Even if Israel begins killing the leaders of the current regime, it is robust enough to replace them. Barring that, the regime will attempt to rebuild what it has lost and the situation will return in a few years time – how many years depends on the extent of the damage Israel succeeds to inflict.
****
12 April – 18 May 2025
Gaza:
Negotiations have continued since the last update with no result. Hamas is still refusing to relinquish its hold on Gaza and demanding that a ceasefire include its continued governance, the total withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza, and the rebuilding of Gaza at the expense of the international community. Israel is demanding the return of all the remaining kidnappees, both alive (currently estimated at 23) and dead (currently estimated at 35), the removal of Hamas from Gaza, and the complete demilitarization of the area. The Israelis offered a partial agreement that Hamas refused.
In a gesture to President Trump, Hamas released a kidnappee who has dual American and Israeli citizenship.
On 18 May, after several weeks of gradually taking more ground and intensifying aerial operations against Hamas and other terrorist personnel, especially commanders, in areas where its ground forces were not operating, Israel declared the beginning of a new escalated ground operation. Five divisions are now simultaneously attacking different localities in Gaza. The official objective is to capture most if not all the territory of Gaza.
Detonation of a tunnel: The red line emphasizes its route – the red plumes are from ventilation shafts
In the run-up to the ground operation, the Israeli air force intensified its airstrikes on commanders, command centers and Hamas fighting positions. Many of these strikes required pinpoint accuracy, with small bombs or missiles sent into specific rooms Hamas had commandeered inside hospitals and schools. Others required heavier bombs to penetrate underground facilities. Among the targets was the current Hamas chief, Mahmoud Sinwar (who replaced his brother Yahya Sinwar, killed in October 2024), and one, perhaps two, Hamas brigade commanders (those of the Rafah and Khan Yunis brigades) and several of Sinwar’s staff. It is unclear whether or not they were killed. A Saudi report claims that the bodies of Sinwar and at least 10 of his assistants were recovered, but Hamas has not officially admitted this.
Publicized details of the IDF’s new offensive show a different approach from previous operations. This time, there will be a simultaneous offensive throughout Gaza rather than a sequential one. The territory taken will be held and cleared.
Also, a different approach is planned for managing the civilian population. Previously, civilians were ordered to evacuate each area where the Israelis were operating and told to stay outside that area until the Israelis had withdrawn. This time, the plan is to set up humanitarian enclaves in areas taken by the Israeli forces, and supplies entering Gaza will be sent exclusively to those locations. The population will then be instructed to move to those enclaves via filtration points to ensure that Hamas and other terrorist personnel do not join them. The civilian and humanitarian management of the enclaves will be in the hands of a new international organization, the US-based Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, set up specifically for this purpose. The UN, UNRWA and other pro-Hamas NGOs will not be involved. To no one’s surprise, the UN establishment is criticizing this approach.
The situation in Gaza prior to the new Israeli offensive
The location of an attacked Hamas post (marked in red) inside the compound of al-Ahali hospital (the white boundary)
More and more people in Gaza are allowing themselves to openly criticize Hamas, though the wave of public demonstrations appears to have abated after several participants were killed by Hamas. There have also been many more posts by Gazans who say they would leave Gaza permanently if they were allowed to do so. While the number of such posts is increasing, it is still relatively small, and we don’t know how deep this sentiment is – are these people exceptions, or do they represent a much larger portion of the population? On several occasions, crowds have broken into storage sites where Hamas has been hoarding humanitarian aid. In one case, a local merchant’s warehouse was ransacked after it was published that he was hoarding food rather than selling it in anticipation of higher prices.
The Hamas Ministry of Health’s latest casualty update (17 May) claims approximately 54,000 killed and 120,000 wounded. Hamas still does not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. According to the IDF, in January 2025 these included a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. Since the resumption of fighting in March, many more terrorists have been killed, but no specific number has been provided. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably at least similar to the number killed.
Nine Israeli soldiers have been killed in the fighting in Gaza since the last update and more have been wounded, but the exact numbers have not been published.
Location of a tunnel (red) under the European Hospital (white boundary)
Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):
Israeli offensive operations continue, though their intensity has diminished. Resistance to Israeli operations is also waning, with more preferring to surrender rather than fight. Those killed are usually commanders who refuse to surrender or who are in the middle of conducting attacks on the Israelis.
Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but with virtually no response so far. In fact, the frequency of terrorist attacks against Israelis has gone down considerably. Since the last update, it has reached one of its lowest levels in many years.
Since the beginning of the operation on 21 January 2025, approximately 110 terrorists have been killed (seven more since my last update) and approximately 1,500 captured (approximately 300 more since my last update). Among the killed and captured are people who were released from incarceration in return for kidnappees in Gaza and resumed terrorist activities.
The Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have continued their operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas where the Israelis are not operating. They have arrested several hundred.
Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 42 Israeli civilians killed (one more since my last update), 31 soldiers/police killed (0 more since my last update), and 509 wounded (six more since my last update). Most of the wounded are civilians.
Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are about 1,000 and more than 7,000 have been arrested (with hundreds subsequently released in exchanges for Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known. The Palestinians claim that more than 17,000 Palestinians were arrested during this period, but they count people temporarily detained for questioning and immediately released.
Israel:
A wave of brush and forest fires, including one of the largest if not the largest ever in Israel, swept through broad areas of the country, mostly around Jerusalem. A number of villages were evacuated until the fires were put out. Most of the fires seem to have begun accidentally, but at least a few appear to have been deliberate arson attacks by Palestinians or Israeli-Arabs.
This is a particularly dry period in the region. Within every ten years in Israel, there are about four years of drought. Israel solved its fresh water problem by building a large desalination industry that covers its entire consumption and even enables the refilling of depleted natural reservoirs, as well as the provision of large amounts of fresh water to the neighboring water-parched Arab state of Jordan. The peace agreement signed with Jordan in 1994 requires Israel to provide Jordan with a certain amount of water per year. Since completing its desalination program, Israel has more than doubled that supply.
However, Israel’s ability to provide desalinated sea water to homes, industry and agriculture does not protect natural vegetation in parks and other open areas from the threat of fire. Whenever there are years of little rain, these areas are prone to ignite. This vulnerability is sometimes exploited through deliberate arson attacks, another form of terrorism.
Syria:
Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. In addition to holding several key points, they are also conducting patrols and searching for local weapons stores. Most of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.
In the last week of April, the Druze minority were attacked by radical Sunni groups affiliated with the new regime. Israel responded by attacking regime positions, including a site only 400 meters from the presidential palace. At least 100 Druze were killed before the attacks were halted by the regime. In the biggest single incident, a convoy of Druze from the southern villages of Jabal Druze who were driving to support their compatriots near Damascus were ambushed by Sunni Bedouins who killed 25 to 30 of them. A few months ago, more than a thousand members of the Alawite minority (some sources even claim a few thousand, though there is no proof of these numbers) were massacred in similar attacks.
Israel continues to supply humanitarian aid to the Druze, including the evacuation of dozens of wounded Druze to Israeli hospitals. Also, a delegation of Syrian Druze religious leaders were brought to Israel to participate in the ceremonies of the Nabi Shooayb – the original prophet of the Druze religion – at his purported grave site in northern Israel.
Following the incidents with the Druze and the Israeli response, the Syrian government agreed to conduct indirect negotiations with Israel.
In a covert operation, the Mossad, Israel’s foreign intelligence agency, found and recovered the body of an Israeli soldier killed in combat with the Syrian army in Lebanon in 1982. The body had been taken and buried in Syria but no details were provided by the Syrians as to its location. New intelligence, acquired over recent weeks, enabled locating the body and sending a covert team to recover it. The exact location was not specified, only that it was “deep in Syria” (in other words, not in the area of the buffer zone), so a covert special forces operation was required to recover the body.
Lebanon:
Israel continues to attack Hezbollah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon as well as weapons smuggling operations along the border with Syria at an average rate of two or three attacks per day. On some days the number of strikes increases considerably. On 8 May, for example, the Lebanese media reported 30 Israeli airstrikes.
Though it has repeatedly threatened to retaliate, Hezbollah has not responded to these attacks despite suffering hundreds of casualties (at least 200 have been killed, perhaps more, and at least a similar number wounded). This is probably because Hezbollah’s political situation in Lebanon is now quite weak, both in general vis-à-vis the government and other ethnic groups and among its own Shiite population base. This weak position increases Hezbollah’s fears of a massive Israeli response. Because of the change in Syria to a hostile regime, Hezbollah can no longer receive support from its Iranian patron through Syrian territory.
The biggest threat currently facing Hezbollah may be not Israel but its loss of standing among the Shiites and attacks from other Lebanese factions and the official army. Hezbollah’s political rivals in Lebanon make public statements regularly demanding that it relinquish all its weapons and cease provoking Israel. They are refusing to sanction welfare relief for Lebanese Shiites who have lost their homes and livelihoods until Hezbollah obeys these commands.
Hezbollah’s activities are still focused on salvaging undamaged weapons and equipment from bombed storage sites or sites the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. The group is also trying to infiltrate personnel into southern Lebanon, especially villages close to the border that were Hezbollah’s main positions from which to attack Israel, to conduct salvage and intelligence operations. All these activities violate the ceasefire agreement, which requires Hezbollah to disarm. The violations give Israel the right to act.
The Lebanese army, aided by UNIFIL forces, has gradually taken over almost all the territory of southern Lebanon and has conducted intensive clearing operations of 225 Hezbollah weapons storage sites.
As noted in the last update, on 22 March six rockets were fired from Lebanon at the Israeli border village of Metulla. There were no casualties. In late April, the Lebanese army arrested a number of Palestinians it claims were the perpetrators of this attack. In northern Lebanon, the Lebanese army confiscated 800 rockets from a Palestinian storage site. It is apparently conducting sweeps of Palestinian residential areas and military camps.
Yemen:
The US halted its aerial offensive against the Houthis after about a month during which it bombed more than 1,000 targets and killed a few hundred military Houthi personnel. Officially it was stated that the Houthis had promised to desist from their attacks on merchant shipping traveling through the Bab al-Mandab Straits and the Red Sea, thus reopening the shorter and more economical route through the Red Sea to the Suez Canal to international shipping. Before the Houthis began attacking passing vessels in late 2023, about 20,000 ships used the route every year. In 2024, the number dropped to about 7,000 (the Chinese, Russians, Iranians and a few others reached immunity agreements with the Houthis). If the Houthis do indeed stop their attacks on ships, the operation (notwithstanding American media attempts to denigrate it) will have achieved its goal.
The American-Houthi ceasefire does not include Israel, so the drizzle of missiles from Yemen to Israel continues at an average rate of one per day. The Houthis temporarily shifted their targets from central to northern Israel and then back again. So far, since the end of the ceasefire in Gaza, about 35 missiles and exploding drones have been launched, with only one reaching Israeli territory. About a third crashed enroute and the others were intercepted before reaching Israel. No Israelis have been killed, though some have been injured by tripping while rushing to shelters.
The missile that managed to penetrate Israel’s defenses landed in an open field within the boundaries of Israel’s Ben Gurion International Airport, prompting a series of international airlines to suspend travel to Israel. Israel responded to this Houthi success by bombing the international airport at Saana and several industrial sites, including a concrete manufacturing plant and electricity generation plants. Flights into and out of Saana halted for a month for repairs.
Following the cessation of American attacks on the Houthis, Israel responded to the continued firing of missiles towards it by attacking two Houthi sea ports and warning that it would attack a third.
Iran:
Negotiations continue between Iran and the US. The Iranians say their red line is they must be allowed to continue the low-grade enrichment of uranium that is not enough to create nuclear weapons. However, any ability to enrich to even at a low grade means they will be able to enrich to a high grade if they choose to do so.
Over the past month, several Iranian military industries have suffered explosions and fires. Each time, the authorities claimed the cause was accidental. Opposition groups say they were actually deliberate attacks by unnamed parties. The incidents began with a huge explosion at the main Iranian port of Bandar Abbas. The explosion was preceded by small fires that reached and detonated an improperly stored concentration of raw materials used for rocket fuel. At least 35 people were killed and 1,130 injured in this incident alone.
The Iranians also reported thwarting a “massive” cyber-attack – allegedly one of the widest and most complex ever conducted against them.
Egypt and Jordan:
The Israelis thwarted a number of attempts to smuggle weapons to the Palestinians via Egypt and Jordan. These attempts included ground infiltrations and drones carrying weapons that were shot down. It is not known how many such attempts were successful.
The Jordanians discovered “activity threatening the well-being of the kingdom and its citizens” by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and initiated a crackdown on all people and organizations affiliated with that movement, of which Hamas is the Palestinian branch. This is considered a major shift in official policy.
Israeli casualties:
The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 06:30 on 7 October 2023 is now 1,016 civilians (one more since my last update) and 856 soldiers (nine killed in Gaza since my last update). Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 16,500 soldiers have been wounded (this number is an update that includes 7,000 psychiatric casualties). There are still 58 Israelis held captive in Gaza – 23 alive and 35 dead.
WHAT NEXT?
Israel is renewing its major ground operations in Gaza under the name “Gideon’s Chariots”. However, the door is still open to an agreement if Hamas agrees to Israel’s basic terms: returning all the kidnappees, handing over governance of Gaza to somebody else, and either disarming or leaving Gaza. According to statements by Israel’s political and military leaders, the object this time is to occupy all the territory of Gaza, separate the population from Hamas, and complete the organization’s defeat. Hamas continues to fight, but it is focused more on survival than anything else. It still hopes to defeat Israel at the negotiating table by playing the kidnappee card and exploiting propaganda about the suffering of the civilian population (suffering that is largely created by Hamas itself, which does not allow the complete and free distribution of humanitarian aid that enters Gaza).
The issue of Iran is still not finished either. Negotiations between Iran and the US have begun, but there are no results so far. Meanwhile, following the ceasefire with the Houthis, the US is reducing its military forces in the Middle East. This means that at least for the immediate future, military action by American forces – though purportedly still on the table – is not likely.
Small-scale exchanges between Israel and the Houthis will likely continue. The Houthis say they will stop firing at Israel only after the war in Gaza is over. Israel can inflict significant damage on the Houthis, but not enough to compel them to cease fire. They will do so only if they decide the cost is not worth continuing the exchange.
****
19 March – 11 April 2025
Gaza:
While the fighting in Gaza has been renewed, diplomatic efforts to end the war have not abated. The Egyptians and the Emiratis in particular are trying to work out options for ending the war. The Emirati direction is closer to that taken by President Trump and Israel (the removal of Hamas from Gaza plus the evacuation of a portion of the Gaza population, at least temporarily), while the Egyptians are attempting to find a solution that is closer (though not identical) to the demands of Hamas (a non-Hamas government, but with Hamas remaining present in the Strip). The first Egyptian proposal was apparently dismissed out of hand by the US.
The official Hamas red line is its disarmament. Whether it directly governs Gaza or controls it from behind a front of supposedly independent technocrats seems, at present, to be less important to the group.
Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired 20-25 rockets at southern Tel Aviv, Ashkelon and Beersheva from locations across the Gaza Strip (the exact number of rockets is not clear because there were some false alarms). At least one rocket fell inside the Strip. One salvo of 10 rockets aimed at Ashkelon injured nine people. Put together, the salvos wounded about 30 people, almost all through falls they suffered while rushing to shelter.
The rockets were fired from different areas. In one case, the launchers were placed right next to a humanitarian safe zone in Beyt Lahia. After each launch, the population of the area from which the rockets were launched received orders from the IDF (leaflets, social media messages, etc.) to evacuate. The messages included maps showing which areas to leave and where to go. This was in addition to evacuation orders from areas the IDF ground forces were reentering. UNRWA claims that about 400,000 Palestinians have evacuated the areas as ordered by the IDF.
Example of evacuation map sent by the IDF to the local population
This map shows the northern portion of the city of Khan Yunis
Israeli airstrikes on identified targets and Hamas senior and mid-level officials and military commanders continue, with more than a dozen killed so far. Among those killed were the Hamas prime minister (he was hiding in a hospital, and a small guided munition was fired into the room) and Hamas’s equivalent of a defense minister.
Israeli ground troops entered the Strip in various locations, increasing the depth of the 1-kilometer perimeter Israel has held since withdrawing during the ceasefire to several kilometers:
- From the northern border, Israeli forces are moving closer to Gaza City, especially along the coast (the same direction they originally entered Gaza in late October 2023)
- South of the city of Gaza, the IDF returned to the Netzarim Corridor, which separates northern and central Gaza. The IDF has not yet completely blocked the corridor. The coastal area is still open for travel
- In the south, the IDF moved back into two areas around the city of Rafah from which it had withdrawn. Another force advanced north along the coast, closer to the al-Muwasi humanitarian area declared by the IDF last year
- A new corridor, called Morag, is being taken north of Rafah, separating it from the rest of the Gaza Strip
The Hamas Ministry of Health, which had published numbers of killed including the missing, has gone back to its previous pattern of not including the missing. Its latest casualty update (24 March) is 50,810 killed and 115,700 wounded. Hamas still does not differentiate between combatants and non-combatants. According to the IDF, the killed include a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably at least similar to the number killed.
Whereas most western countries have denounced Israel’s renewed offensive, the US government has declared unqualified support.
The humanitarian issue is again being trumpeted by Hamas, which claims that the stopping of supply convoys is threatening the population of Gaza with starvation and a lack of medical supplies. Israel responded that about 25,000 truckloads (enough for 50 days) entered Gaza during the ceasefire and Hamas is hoarding most of their contents – including supplies that arrived prior to the ceasefire – in its own warehouses and is selling them to the population at exorbitant prices to fund its activities.
An Egyptian aid worker giving an aid box to a local Gazan (downloaded from a Gazan newsperson’s social media by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express)
In Gaza there have been increasing protests demanding that Hamas surrender and leave the Strip and complaining about Hamas not distributing the supplies that have arrived. These protests have been small in scale so far, but the number of participants is gradually increasing as is the spread. Initially, the protests were occurring only in northern Gaza, but they have taken place in central Gaza as well and have recently spread to southern Gaza.
It is still too early to tell if these protests are harbingers of change or just the expressions of a small minority. At first, Hamas did not respond with violence, instead trying to pass off the protests as directed against Israel. Hamas media and Al-Jazeera ignored the statements being made against Hamas and quoted only the demands that the ceasefire be renewed. But after a few days, Hamas began to capture and even kill some of the protesters. This diminished the number of protests but did not halt them entirely. In one case, the clan of a protester killed by Hamas security forces retaliated by killing the Hamas police officer who had shot their family member. There have been a few other skirmishes between clans and Hamas security forces.
There have also been many more posts on social media by Gazans saying they would leave Gaza permanently if only they were allowed to do so. While these posts are increasing in number, they are still relatively rare, and we cannot know how deep this sentiment really is – are they exceptions, or do they represent the feelings of a much larger proportion of the population?
Anti-Hamas protest (from Palestinian social media by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express)
Late at night on 23 March 2025, a Red Cross convoy of paramedics was fired on by Israeli soldiers in southern Gaza. The Israelis were lying in ambush along a road used by Hamas. They had engaged a group of Hamas terrorists in a firefight shortly beforehand, killing one and capturing two. Soon after the firefight, the troops was informed that a convoy of vehicles was driving in their direction. The convoy stopped near the site of the previous skirmish and the occupants rapidly dismounted. The soldiers assumed that this was another Hamas force coming to reinforce the previous group and opened fire. Fifteen were killed.
The soldiers reported that they did not see the ambulance’s emergency lights flashing, but a video from the telephone of one of the killed shows the convoy driving with flashing lights. Hamas often uses ambulances and other supposedly innocent and protected vehicles to transport personnel and military equipment, so whether or not the soldiers saw the lights is less relevant (though it still requires an answer). The way the convoy sped into the area next to the soldiers and quickly dismounted in the same place where a skirmish had just occurred created the perception of a threat. A list of the killed showed that six of them were indeed Hamas personnel.
The bodies were buried on the spot. This was reported as an attempted cover-up, but it is standard procedure. The IDF does not collect bodies. They are buried on site (to prevent animals approaching them) and the UN is informed where to pick them up.
There were also claims that the soldiers had captured, bound, and then executed the paramedics. This is denied by the IDF. The soldiers approached the bodies only after the shooting had ended in order to bury them.
Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):
In Judea and Samaria, Israel’s Operation Iron Wall continues. Israeli forces are gradually operating in new areas.
Since the beginning of the operation, more than 100 terrorists have been killed and approximately 1,200 captured. In each area of the operation, the local population is first told to move to other towns or villages. All buildings where weapons stores or weapons manufacturing equipment is found are demolished. These number in the hundreds.
The Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have also conducted operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas where the IDF is not operating. They have arrested several hundred terrorists.
Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but so far with virtually no response. In fact, the frequency of terrorist attacks against Israelis has gone down considerably. During the first three months of 2024 there were approximately 535 terrorist attacks in or from Judea and Samaria. In the last three months of 2024 there were approximately 420, and in the first three months of 2025 the total is approximately 320.
Conversely, there has been an escalation over the past month in attacks by Israeli civilians on Palestinian villages. Each such incident involves mutual accusations of who started it. The Palestinians claim that the actions are initiated by the Israeli civilians without provocation, while the Israelis claim they are immediate retaliations for attacks by Palestinians on Israeli civilians passing or working near the villages. The Palestinian attacks usually involve the throwing of stones (not included in the above figures on attacks on Israelis; there are usually 300-500 stoning incidents per month) or petrol bombs thrown at passing cars. In one case, an attempt was made to steal a flock of sheep from an Israeli herder who phoned for help. Each time these clashes occur, the IDF and the Israeli police are called in to separate the belligerents.
Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 41 Israeli civilians killed (one more since my last update), 31 soldiers/police killed (no more since my last update during Operation Iron Wall), and 503 wounded (six more since my last update). Most are civilians.
Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are about 1,000 and more than 7,000 have been arrested (though hundreds were subsequently released in exchanges for Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known. The Palestinians claim that more than 15,000 Palestinians were arrested during this period, but they are counting persons temporarily detained for questioning and released immediately after.
Syria:
Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. In addition to holding various key points, they are conducting patrols and searching for local weapons stores. The majority of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF’s activities and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.
There has been a third incident in which Israeli troops were fired upon (no Israeli casualties) by several dozen armed men when they approached a village in the southern area of the Syrian Golan Heights. During the civil war, this area was dominated by ISIS supporters, which might explain the aggressiveness against Israel. Israeli forces returned fire with tanks and an armed drone, killing nine of the attackers and wounding 20. The rest of the attackers retreated. Subsequently, fearing a larger Israeli reaction, the population of the village began to evacuate. The Israelis continued their patrol and did not conduct any more retaliatory actions. It is not clear if the population has returned. Over the following week, several factions of Islamist organizations said they would send fighters to southern Syria to attack Israel. Since then there have been no more reports of similar incidents or threats.
Meanwhile, Israel’s relations with the Syrian Druze community are developing positively. The Israelis are supplying the Druze with humanitarian aid and have said they will assist them militarily if the new radical Sunni regime, which sees the Druze as heretics, attacks them.
Israel continues to occasionally bomb Syrian army bases containing weapons and equipment belonging to the former regime to prevent their being incorporated into the army of the new regime.
Turkey and the new Syrian regime are signing a mutual defense pact. The new regime is also permitting the Turks to convert two Syrian air bases, one in northern Syria and one near the border with Iraq. The latter base was used by the Iranians and Iraqi militias serving Iran over the past decade. They withdrew from it after the fall of the Assad regime.
A couple of days after it was reported that Syria intended to hand the base over to the Turks, the Israeli air force bombed it to destroy its equipment and facilities. It should be noted that Turkey is a major supporter of Hamas, which maintains a political and military/terrorist presence there, and the Erdogan regime has been publicly threatening military action against Israel for a decade. Erdogan’s threatening rhetoric has increased over the past year.
An Arab internet news site has reported that Turkey and Israel are negotiating a means of preventing direct confrontation during their military operations in Syria. Over the past decade, Israel and Russia had a similar agreement that enabled them to conduct military operations in Syria without confronting one another.
Lebanon:
Hezbollah’s activities are still focused on trying to salvage undamaged weapons and equipment from bombed storage sites or from sites the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. In southern Lebanon they are trying to infiltrate personnel into the border areas, especially the villages near the Israeli border that were its main locations from which to attack Israel, to conduct both salvage and intelligence operations. These activities violate the ceasefire agreement, giving Israel the right to retaliate.
Israel continues to attack Hezbollah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon and along the border with Syria (weapons smuggling operations) at an average rate of two or three strikes per day. In one case, Israel responded with a strike in the Dahya quarter of Beirut after warning the population to evacuate. The target was a drone storage site Hezbollah was trying to rebuild. This was the first Israeli attack in Beirut since the beginning of the ceasefire. A second strike in the Dahya killed a Hamas commander in an apartment building with a small warhead fired into his room.
There have been at least two Israeli ground raids into Lebanese villages from which it had withdrawn. In at least one raid, the Israeli troops left a letter stating that the raid had been conducted because of Hezbollah activity and telling local residents to not risk their lives and property by allowing Hezbollah access to their homes.
Despite repeatedly threatening to respond, Hezbollah has not done so except perhaps on one occasion (see below).
Now that the land route from Iran through Syria and the direct aerial route to Lebanon are blocked for transfer of supplies and money to Hezbollah (the land route by the new Syrian regime and the aerial route by the new Lebanese government and Israel), Iran is trying to send equipment and funds to Hezbollah by the much longer maritime route on supposedly innocent merchant ships.
On 22 March, six rockets were fired from Lebanon at the Israeli border village of Metulla. There were no casualties. It is not known who fired the rockets. Hezbollah denied responsibility, and there are at least a dozen other groups in Lebanon, including Hamas and other Palestinian groups, who may be the culprits. Regardless of Hezbollah’s denial, Israel responded with artillery fire and airstrikes on 50 Hezbollah targets all over Lebanon, including along the border with Syria. This was the first major incident since the ceasefire began.
Over the past decade, Hezbollah has occasionally allowed other groups to fire at Israel so it could deny involvement. Two more rocket attacks have occurred since the 22 March attack, but these do not appear to have been by Hezbollah. They were probably committed by Palestinian organizations in Lebanon, with or without the assistance and approval of Hezbollah.
The Lebanese government has ordered its army to increase activities in southern Lebanon to ensure that this kind of action is not repeated. The object is to prevent Israel from being provoked into a major retaliation. The Lebanese army also arrested several people in connection with the aforementioned rocket launches.
Skirmishes on the border between Lebanon and Syria have continued intermittently but seem to have diminished with the help of mediation by Saudi Arabia.
Hezbollah’s political rivals in Lebanon are repeatedly making public statements demanding that it relinquish all its weapons and cease provoking Israel.
Yemen:
The drizzle of missiles from Yemen to Israel continues at a rate of one or two per day. About 20 missiles and exploding drones have been launched so far. None has reached Israeli territory, about half crashed enroute, and the others were intercepted before reaching Israel, though in two cases debris had enough momentum to land inside Israel. The issue of debris is why Israelis are told to stay in shelters for about ten minutes after the missiles are intercepted.
The Houthis say they are targeting Israel’s international airport in an attempt to blockade Israel’s international air traffic, similar to the blockade on Israel’s Red Sea port of Eilat. In each attack, Israeli air traffic controllers tell incoming aircraft to circle temporarily before allowing them to land a few minutes after the incoming missile is intercepted.
In every case, the Houthis claim their attacks were successful.
Several Israelis have been wounded in falls as they rush to shelter. These have all been superficial or light injuries up to this point.
It was reported that the US has asked Israel not to respond to the attacks from Yemen, as the US is taking responsibility for that front.
American airstrikes continue on Houthi targets in Yemen. Targets include larger radar, command and launcher sites in towns as well as other Houthi sites. The Americans also seem to be hunting down Houthi senior officers and officials. These moves contrast with those of the previous White House, which limited its strikes to isolated rural facilities that were usually small weapons depots or minor command and sensor nodes. Over the past month, there have been more US strikes on the Houthis than over the previous year and a half. At least 150 Houthi personnel have been killed and an undisclosed number wounded. These include a number of senior personnel. The US is not disclosing exact details of the attacks.
The Houthis claim to be retaliating by firing missiles at US ships, especially the aircraft carrier from which the American aircraft are launched. How real these counter-strikes are is not clear, but apparently none have hit. The Houthis also claim to have shot down some American drones.
Meanwhile, another American aircraft carrier has arrived in the region as well as B2 heavy bombers deploying to the American Diego Garcia base in the southern Indian Ocean. From that location, they can reach Yemen and Iran with a full bomb-load. The bombers have already conducted strikes in Yemen.
President Trump has stated that the attacks on the Houthis will not cease until they are eradicated and has demanded that Iran cease supplying them with weapons. The Houthis receive Iranian weaponry via three routes: by air, through Sana’a International Airport; by sea, through the Port of Hodeidah or nearby smaller ports; and by land, through the sparsely populated desert routes via Oman and eastern Yemen (the Houthis control northwestern Yemen). The aerial route is the easiest to block but the least important of the three. To halt the use of the ports requires either a full blockade or complete destruction of the port facilities. Either method would also halt entry of food and medical supplies into the Houthi-controlled areas and is therefore considered politically problematic. Cutting the overland route would require convincing the Omani government to cooperate – not easy, as Oman has a longstanding relationship with the Houthis because of its bitter history with the southern Yemenis (who supported a communist rebellion against the Omani regime). Oman has a good relationship with the US and has been used by the Americans as an intermediary, but it is continuing to support the Houthis.
Iran:
It was reported that President Trump has given Iran an ultimatum to reach a no-nuclear weapons agreement by the end of April or the beginning of May.
Iran immediately responded by refusing to negotiate, showing off its military might and threatening retaliation if attacked. The military display included a televised visit to an underground missile storage facility. The tunnel’s width was equivalent to a four-lane highway and it was taller than it was wide. Trucks parked on either side of the tunnel stood loaded with missiles, leaving room for two lanes of trucks to drive between them. The commander of Iran’s air defenses said Iran has fully recovered from Israel’s airstrikes of last summer and now has new systems available.
The Iranians threatened that any attack on them would prompt a retaliation on American and British military personnel in the Middle East and Indian Ocean. Their statement said there are approximately 50,000 such personnel within reach of their missiles. The commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Navy said they would attack Israel’s maritime commerce and turn the sea into a “hell for Israel”. They also threatened that any Arab state allowing military activity against Iran from its territory would suffer retaliation.
After a few weeks of threats, the Iranians then said they are willing to conduct indirect negotiations. The general consensus among Iran analysts is that the Iranians are playing for time. This may be a response to the reinforcement of American forces in the region. This consists of anti-missile batteries, another aircraft carrier, B2 bombers, and more. The B2 bombers can carry large ground-penetrating bombs (the biggest non-nuclear bombs in the world) that can presumably be used in an attack on Iran’s underground nuclear weapons industry.
An Iranian opposition news site (funded by Saudi Arabia) reported that the Iranians have asked their Iraqi proxies not to provoke Israel by attacking it in retaliation for Israel’s new offensive in Gaza and continued attacks on Hezbollah. Given the source, this should be viewed with caution, but these proxy organizations have not in fact attacked Israel and some have even approached the Iraqi government to negotiate a rapprochement.
Israeli casualties:
The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 6:30 am on 7 October 2023 is now 1,015 civilians (one more since my last update – killed by an Israeli Arab terrorist inside Israel) and 847 soldiers (update of one for a soldier recently confirmed to have been killed on 7 October 2023). Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 15,000 soldiers have been wounded (this includes physical and psychiatric casualties). There are still 60 Israelis held captive in Gaza, some of whom (approximately 30, perhaps more) are dead. This figure includes the body of an Israeli soldier killed in 2014.
Wikipedia:
A large part of the current conflict is occurring online and in the media, and a number of studies have revealed bias against Israel in many media organizations. A recent study of Wikipedia’s editorial activity revealed that some editors have exploited their position to deliberately distort entries to make them anti-Israeli. Examples of two such studies can be found at:
This of course raises the question of the degree to which Wikipedia and similar organizations can be trusted as information sources on any controversial topic.
Thailand:
On a completely different note, an Israeli rescue team was sent to Thailand, following an earthquake there, to assist in rescue operations.
The International Happiness Index:
See: https://worldpopulationreview.com
Another interesting issue is an international poll purporting to measure the happiness of the world’s population by country. The poll studies quality of life and asks questions about respondents’ lives and what they expect in the future. Israel has usually placed in the top 10 countries in this poll, showing it to have an optimistic outlook. Despite the war, Israel’s score has dipped only slightly. In other words, most of the Israeli respondents still see the future optimistically despite the casualties, economic damage, and other costs inflicted on Israel during this war.
WHAT NEXT?
In my last update I asked two questions that remained to be answered about the Israeli operations in Gaza: 1) are they just a pressure tactic or do they indicate a change in strategy? and 2) will the operations remain aerial only, or will ground forces also be used? Since then, Israeli ground forces have reentered Gaza. The goal is apparently to gradually increase pressure on Hamas by taking ground and re-cutting the Gaza Strip into separate areas with travel between them controlled by the IDF. Ultimately, some of these areas will likely have their entire civilian populations completely evacuated to enable maximum freedom of action of the Israeli military.
The next question needing an answer is whether the Israeli military will continue the gradual reconquest of specific areas or will at some point maximize the number of units in Gaza (there are currently only three divisions operating there, each at only partial strength) and conduct a simultaneous multi-sector attack to take the majority of the territory.
The issue of Iran also remains open. Iran is likely considering, or perhaps already implementing, an escalated pace of development of nuclear weapons. Both Israel and the current American administration have declared that they will not allow this to happen. Negotiations are supposed to begin between the US and Iran on this issue, but many Iran analysts see the Iranians as merely stalling. Meanwhile, the American buildup of forces in the Middle East is continuing and has already reached a fairly strong concentration. It seems that the Americans will be ready for a military operation against Iran towards the end of April. At that point, it will be a matter of whether President Trump decides to initiate it and when.
In Judea and Samaria, Israel’s Operation Iron Wall will likely continue to evolve, with the IDF conducting operations against concentrations of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in more towns and villages.
In Syria, after the new regime’s massacre of Alawite civilians in response to skirmishes with Alawite militias, resistance to the new regime seems to have diminished considerably in that area of Syria. It should be noted that historically, ever since they split from Islam in the 9th century, the Alawite minority (about 10% of Syria’s population) has been persecuted by the Sunni majority – except for the past nearly 60 years, during which the Assad family (who are themselves Alawite) ruled Syria. Syria is likely to become somewhat more confrontational in the Israeli buffer zone, but the new regime is unlikely to want to test Israeli resolve in the near future even with Turkish backing. The regime has not yet completed its takeover of power and has not fully stabilized (as shown by the events in the Alawite areas, the skirmishes with Hezbollah on the border with Lebanon, and other less publicized events elsewhere in Syria). The new regime (and its Turkish backers) need time to organize, stabilize their authority, and build their economic and military strength. An escalation of fighting in the near future with Israel would threaten all of that.
In Lebanon, pressure is mounting on Hezbollah to disarm. It is unlikely that Israel will desist from its continued campaign of attacking Hezbollah military activity anywhere in Lebanon, as such activity is contrary to the ceasefire agreement even when it does not include a direct attack on Israel. The agreement states that Lebanon is required to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which ended the Second Lebanon War in the summer of 2006 but was never implemented. This resolution mandates “full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of July 27, 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.”
There are more and more demands from non-Shiite Lebanese leaders to compel Hezbollah’s disarmament. Hezbollah is still the strongest military force in Lebanon, but losses among its leadership, personnel and equipment and the constraints placed on its recovery through the loss of direct contact with Iran and constant Israeli attacks have made it much more vulnerable when facing the official Lebanese army. It is also grappling with the problem that its promise to rebuild the damage to its own population is impossible because of its loss of funding.
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16 February – 18 March 2025
ESCALATION
My last update began with the subhead “Winding down but not yet done”. This report begins with an escalation in the fighting, though it is not yet anywhere near the intensity of the fighting that occurred during the peak months in Gaza or Lebanon.
Over the past month, President Donald Trump revoked all the weapons supply delays that had been imposed on Israel by the Biden administration. These include large supplies of bombs (the first shipment contained at least 1,800 900-kilogram bombs). Other equipment, including armored bulldozers, has also been released for delivery.
Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank):
In Judea and Samaria, Israel’s Operation Iron Wall continues with a widened scope. The operation has involved several dozen airstrikes, mostly with small bombs, against teams of terrorists on foot or in vehicles, as well as ground raids of various sizes and methods (large forces in armored vehicles or on foot conducting large area sweeps, or covert operations by camouflaged teams infiltrating to capture or kill specific terrorists). For the first time in two decades, tanks are being used in these operations.
Since the beginning of the operation, more than 100 terrorists have been killed and close to 1,000 captured. In each area during the operation, the local population is told ahead of time to move to other towns or villages. All buildings where weapons stores or weapons manufacturing equipment are found are demolished. These number in the hundreds.
The Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority have also conducted operations against their Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad rivals in areas where the Israelis are not operating. They have arrested several hundred of them.
Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but so far there has been almost no response.
In mid-February, bombs exploded on three Israeli buses parked at a terminal. A quick analysis showed that the bombs had been mistimed – they were supposed to explode not in the evening when they were empty, but at 9:00 am the following morning, when they would have been full. The individual who prepared the bombs mistakenly set the time to 9:00 pm instead.
After the explosions, buses at terminals across all of central Israel were checked, and more bombs were found in several of them that were set to explode at the correct time. Had the bombs exploded the following morning as intended, the number of casualties on the commuter-packed buses would have numbered in the hundreds.
Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 40 Israeli civilians killed (four more since my last update) and 31 soldiers/police killed (four more since my last update during Operation Iron Wall), and approximately 497 wounded (57 more since my last update). Most of these casualties were civilians.
Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are about 1,000, and more than 7,000 have been arrested (though hundreds were released in exchange for Israeli kidnappees). The number of wounded is not known.
Gaza:
In the first phase of the ceasefire, 25 living Israelis and eight bodies of Israelis were returned by Hamas in return for the release by Israel of 1,777 prisoners. This left 59 Israeli kidnappees (about half of them dead) in Gaza and about 9,500 Palestinian terrorists incarcerated in Israel.
Negotiations on the second phase of the ceasefire, which was to have involved further exchanges of kidnapped Israelis for Palestinian terrorists incarcerated in Israel, have failed. Hamas has continued to demand that Israel withdraw completely from the Philadephi Corridor separating Gaza from Egypt as well as the 1 kilometer-deep security perimeter along the Israeli border – demands which, if agreed to, would permit Hamas to continue ruling Gaza with open borders and thus enable it to recover. Israel refused and continues to demand an end to Hamas governance and armed presence in Gaza.
Since the war began, Hamas has inducted thousands of new personnel and is now estimated to have 20,000 troops. It has been busy training the new recruits and planning for new operations, both defensive and offensive, against Israel. Hamas has also attempted to smuggle more weapons into Gaza from Egyptian Sinai via small drones. It is not clear how many of these drones have gotten through, but at least three were intercepted by Israel. In two cases, the Israelis let the drones fly into Gaza and then bombed the people collecting them.
It is likely that at least some of the humanitarian supplies sent into Gaza have contained hidden weapons or parts. Some such attempts have been intercepted in the past, and there is no reason to suppose that all were intercepted. However, it is unlikely that they have included major weapons systems, given the small size of the pieces into which they would need to be broken up in order to smuggle them in successfully.
With that said, it is likely that Hamas has managed to restore to operation some of the local rocket manufacturing machines that the IDF did not locate and destroy prior to the ceasefire. Hamas has also been collecting explosives from aerial bombs and artillery shells fired by the Israelis that did not explode. A single unexploded aerial bomb can provide enough material for dozens of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Also, at least some of the Hamas personnel released by Israel in exchange for Israelis held by Hamas have rejoined the group’s combat ranks.
On 2 March, Israel reclosed the borders to the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza, and a week later shut down electricity and water transfers from Israel to Gaza (Israel provides about half the electricity used in Gaza and a large proportion of the fresh water). Hamas claims these actions have caused shortages, but given the amounts of food and other materials that entered Gaza during the ceasefire – which was, per day, double to treble the amounts that entered prior to the ceasefire – this claim is almost certainly false, as stocks have grown considerably. As it was, the average amount entering Gaza prior to the ceasefire was more than enough, had it been distributed properly – but large amounts were appropriated by Hamas and stockpiled, either for its own use or for resale to the population for whom it was originally intended.
Over the same period, Israel has also gradually increased its aggressive response to Hamas’s intelligence probing of Israeli positions, attempts to emplace bombs near Israeli positions, and attempts to rebuild its forces. Every day, one to three Israeli airstrikes have been conducted on such activity, and ground forces have fired at Hamas personnel approaching them on occasion. In some cases, Hamas personnel have attempted to disguise themselves as journalists or other “innocent” civilians. At least one of those killed had just been released from detention in Israel in exchange for Israeli kidnappees.
On 17 March, there were Palestinian reports of Israeli tanks and naval ships firing at various targets.
At about 2:00 am on 18 March, the Israeli air force launched a large-scale airstrike that killed at least eight senior Hamas officials and perhaps one senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad official. According to Hamas reports, the strike killed at least 340 and wounded more than 500. The attacks were aimed at particular individuals, command posts, combat posts, and weapons storage sites.
The IDF spokesperson in Arabic told the population of Gaza to move towards the seashore, and the IDF dropped leaflets with maps explaining where to evacuate.
The Hamas Ministry of Health has updated the number of Palestinian casualties since the beginning of the war to 62,200, including 13,600 it claims are still missing under the rubble, and nearly 112,400 wounded. Even if these figures are close to accurate, according to the IDF they include a verified total of more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably similar to the number killed.
Syria:
Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. There has been a second incident in which they were fired at (no casualties) and a few small non-violent protests, but the majority of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF’s activities and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.
Israel continues to occasionally bomb army bases containing weapons and equipment belonging to the former regime’s army to prevent their being incorporated into the army of the new regime.
After several ambushes were conducted by resisters of the new regime forces in Alawite-populated areas in northwest Syria, the regime retaliated with a series of massacres. Low estimates are that at least 1,000 Alawites were rounded up and shot. Many more were arrested and mistreated (beatings in public, perhaps worse in prisons).
Meanwhile, in southern Syria, the Druze population, some of whom live adjacent to the border with Israel and some about 60-100 kilometers from the border, have declared that they will not allow the new regime access to their areas. They have been conducting talks with Israel, and Israel’s prime minister has declared that any attack on them will be responded to by Israel. Israel has sent trucks loaded with humanitarian aid to these areas.
Lebanon:
Israeli forces withdrew from almost all Lebanese territory except five points near the border where the Lebanese side overlooks Israeli villages at short range. Lebanese army forces have moved into the areas Israeli forces evacuated.
In addition to the five points it is holding, Israel has built ground obstacles along the border at a number of sites several hundred meters inside Lebanon. These obstacles are deep ditches backed by earth berms to prevent vehicles approaching the border. They were placed in the eastern section of the border – a seven kilometer-wide valley – rather than in the hilly terrain along most of the border.
Hezbollah’s activities are now focused on trying to salvage undamaged weapons and equipment from bombed storage sites and sites the Israelis did not know to bomb all over Lebanon. They are also trying to infiltrate personnel to the border areas in southern Lebanon – especially Lebanese villages near the border that contained Hezbollah’s main positions from which to attack Israel – to conduct both salvage and intelligence operations. In addition, they are trying to learn lessons from the war in order to understand how the Israelis managed to locate all the sites they attacked.
Israeli airstrikes continue on Hezbollah storage sites and personnel in Lebanon and along the border with Syria (weapons smuggling operations). Despite repeatedly making threats, Hezbollah has not responded. During Nasrallah’s funeral in Beirut, Israeli jets flew over the site at a fairly low altitude in a show of force. On the same day, several Hezbollah sites were attacked across southern Lebanon.
Among other Hezbollah activities was the sending of five reconnaissance drones towards Israel. Israel responded by killing a senior officer of Hezbollah’s drone force.
Over the past week, Israeli ground forces have conducted two raids into Lebanese villages from which they had earlier withdrawn to prevent Hezbollah from returning.
Lebanese anti-Hezbollah politicians (mostly Christians and Sunnis) are making more and more statements against Hezbollah activities. Lebanon closed its airspace to direct flights from Iran to prevent the Iranians from smuggling weapons and funds to Hezbollah.
Fighting has erupted between Hezbollah and the new Syrian regime along the common border, and there have been a few dozen casualties on both sides. The Lebanese army sent units to the border and according to one report even attacked a Syrian rocket launcher with an aircraft. If true, this would be the first use of aircraft in combat by the Lebanese military in decades.
Yemen:
On 12 March, a Houthi aerial surveillance radar was bombed, probably by the Americans.
During the night of 15-16 March, the US conducted dozens of airstrikes against the Houthis (47 separate strikes, according to the Houthis). Casualties numbered in the low hundreds, and as usual, the Houthis claimed that many were civilians. Several high-ranking Houthi officials were among those killed. Since this major strike, there have been more strikes of lesser intensity. President Trump stated that any Houthi response will be met by a larger attack and that because Iran is behind the Houthis, it too should expect to pay a price. Three more US aircraft carriers are now sailing to the Middle East. The US also has aerial bases across the Middle East, but there have been no reports to date of their being reinforced.
The Houthis responded by launching missiles at American naval ships, including an aircraft carrier, but none hit. The Houthi leadership answered Trump’s and other American senior officials’ statements by saying it would continue to fight for Gaza. One of them stated, in Hebrew, that “Trump and Netanyahu are digging a grave for the Zionists.”
On 17 March there was a report of a Houthi missile flying into Sinai, but it is not clear what the target was. In the past, some Houthi exploding drones launched against Israel have flown through Sinai. On 18 March the Houthis fired a ballistic missile towards southern Israel that was intercepted by Israel’s anti-missile defenses. The Houthis announced that they would continue to fire at Israel.
President Sisi of Egypt stated that the Houthi blockade of the Bab al-Mandeb Straits is costing Egypt $800 million per month because of the reduction in traffic through the Suez Canal. The rerouting of ships around southern Africa probably costs the merchant shipping companies and their clients much more.
Iran:
Iran claimed that an American drone attempted to enter Iranian air space but withdrew after Iranian jets flew towards it.
UN report slandering Israel:
The United Nations Human Rights Commission published a report attacking Israel that would make Nazi Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels proud. It contains the usual baseless nonsense about Israel conducting deliberate sexual abuse of Palestinians, preventing births to conduct genocide, etc. The report closely resembles Nazi propaganda about Jews defiling pure Aryan women.
From 2006 to the end of 2024, the United Nations Human Rights Commission condemned Israel 108 times, compared with 44 times against Syria, 15 against Iran, eight against Russia and three against Venezuela, plus a few more against others.
Up to the end of 2024, the General Assembly had adopted 164 resolutions criticizing Israel. Over the same period, it passed 84 resolutions against all other countries put together.
Saudi Arabia, China, Lebanon, Turkey, Venezuela and Qatar, which have poor human rights records or have been involved in regional conflicts, were not criticized in any resolutions.
Israeli casualties:
The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 6:30 am on 7 October 2023 is now 1,014 civilians and 846 soldiers. Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 15,000 soldiers have been wounded (this includes both physical and psychiatric casualties). There are still 59 kidnappees in Gaza, approximately 30 and perhaps more of whom are dead, as well as the body of an Israeli soldier killed in 2014.
WHAT NEXT?
My last update began with the subhead “the war is winding down but is not yet done”. This one begins with the subhead “escalation”. Following ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza, Israel has escalated its operations in Judea and Samaria and responded aggressively with fire to every infringement of the ceasefire agreements. On the whole, however, the intensity of fighting across the board is less than it was earlier in the war.
Over the past few days, a new phase has apparently begun:
- First, the US initiated an aggressive aerial campaign against the Houthis in Yemen and warned Iran that it might be next; and then
- Israel began an aerial campaign in Gaza.
If the statements by the US president, secretary of defense and secretary of state are indicators, the operation against the Houthis is likely to continue and even escalate as more US forces arrive in the Middle East.
Two questions need answering vis-à-vis Israel’s operation in Gaza:
- Is it a change of strategy or merely an operation to pressure Hamas in the negotiations?
- Will Israel make do with an aerial campaign or will it also attack on the ground? If it does attack on the ground, will it be a major operation to retake territory or raids along the lines of those conducted before the ceasefire?
The issue of Iran is still open as well. Iran is likely considering, or perhaps already implementing, an escalated pace of development of nuclear weapons. Both Israel and the current American administration have declared they will not allow this to happen. Since it is unlikely that Iran will back down willingly from its pursuit of these weapons – especially now, with the defeat of virtually all its other tools – it is highly likely that Israel, with or without American participation, will attempt to physically reduce Iran’s nuclear program with an aerial campaign. (At least in public statements, the US leadership is saying it prefers diplomacy but will act militarily against Iran if necessary.) An aerial campaign on its own will not be sufficient to completely eradicate the Iranian nuclear program, but could push it back for years. If the US participates, the campaign will be much more effective than if Israel operates on its own.
The new Syrian regime is embroiled in a host of conflicts to establish its dominance and is not likely to test Israel’s resolve in the near future.
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16 January – 15 February 2025
WINDING DOWN, BUT NOT YET DONE
The Iron Swords/Al-Aqsa Flood War (each side uses a different name) that began on 7 October 2023 is not over, but – barring a dramatic U-turn – it is winding down.
At its height, the war was conducted on seven fronts: Gaza, Lebanon, Judea and Samaria (the West Bank), Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Iran. The intensity and method of fighting was different on each front and varied over time.
Though the war was initiated by Hamas from Gaza, it was no less a war between Israel and the Iranian axis than a war between Israel and Hamas. For now, that war is ended. Iran, its proxies and its allies, not including its Palestinian allies, decided that continuing the hostilities was costing more than it was worth. An agreement was reached between Israel and Hezbollah, and the others, though not part of that agreement, ceased action.
The war between Israel and the Palestinians continues, albeit differently. There is an almost complete ceasefire in Gaza that may or may not continue, and Israel has escalated its operations against Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Judea and Samaria.
The war between Israel and the Iranian axis:
The Iranian axis is headed, of course, by Iran itself, which has planned and worked for decades to destroy Israel.
AP photograph of a banner declaring Iran’s goal vis-à-vis Israel from a ceremony in support of Palestine about two decades ago
Initially, following the deposing of the Shah of Iran and his replacement by the Islamic Regime, this was only one aspect of the new rulers’ concept of “exporting the Islamic revolution” across the entire Muslim world. Over the past decade, as Iran’s position in the Middle East became stronger, it became a central pillar of its policies. After the 2015 signing of the agreement with the US and various European states to temporarily close Iran’s program for developing nuclear weapons, Iran’s Supreme Leader Khamanei said in a speech, “Some Zionists have said that due to the outcome of the nuclear negotiations, we have been relieved from worry about Iran for [the next] 25 years. But we say to them, you will essentially not see [what will happen in] the next 25 years, and with the grace of God, something by the name of the Zionist regime will no longer exist in the region.”
Iranian statements that Israel should be annihilated are hardly new. Khamanei’s predecessor and the first leader of Islamic Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini, made them too. But this was the first time an Iranian leader provided an actual timeline for that annihilation. From that point on, Iranian political and military leaders publicly repeated this timeline. On 25 June 2017, a digital clock was unveiled in a public square in Tehran counting the days until Israel would be destroyed.
Unveiling ceremony of the clock counting the days “left before the destruction of Israel”—8,411 days from the unveiling, meaning early July 2040
Obviously, the exact date is less important than the principle – that by that day, Israel will have ceased to exist. The Iranians developed a program to achieve that ultimate goal, with the understanding that building up the capability to achieve it would take time. Delaying the nuclear program does not change the goal. Indeed, the nuclear delay incurred by the agreement provided Iran, through the release of frozen funds (the exact sum is in dispute) and a reduction in economic sanctions, with a means to accelerate its plan of “exporting the revolution” and targeting Israel.
The financial windfall the agreement provided Iran enabled it to boost its subsidies to Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Furthermore, Iran cheated on the terms to which it had agreed to reduce its nuclear capabilities. It reduced some of them as a façade while increasing others at secret locations that it kept off-limits to the International Atomic Energy Authority inspection teams.
Iran’s plan to annihilate Israel required constructing a “ring of fire” around Israel. This would include proxies and allies located in the countries surrounding Israel – especially those with direct territorial access to Israel’s borders. Initially, this meant Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria as well as the Islamist Palestinian organizations Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. It also involved constructing an Iraqi Hezbollah and building roads through Iraq to Syria.
Political work had also been underway for some time against the Hashemite regime in Jordan in the hope of eventually replacing it with a religious regime allied to Iran. (Jordanians, like the Palestinians, are Sunni Muslims who will not accept Iranian suzerainty, but they will ally against a non-Muslim common enemy.) Jordanian territory has been used by Iran to smuggle weapons to its proxy organizations in Judea and Samaria, and Egyptian territory has been used to smuggle weapons to Gaza. (Some of these shipments are intercepted by Israeli security forces, but not all.) Iran’s assistance to the Houthis in Yemen was originally meant to strengthen the Yemenite Shiites against the Sunnis, but it turned out to provide a means of attacking Israel’s economy as well by blockading the Bab al-Mandeb Straits, which connect Israel’s port of Eilat with central and eastern Asia and eastern Africa. When the technology became available, Iran also provided the Houthis with long-range missiles and exploding drones with which to attack Israel directly.
Creating nuclear weapons is part of Iran’s plan to surround and destroy Israel, though probably less for immediate use and more as a backup should its non-nuclear offensive fail to deter or reduce Israel’s likely response against Iran itself.
By the end of 2024, 15 months after the Hamas attack on 7 October 2023, Iran’s entire program had been completely up-ended by Israel’s response to the Hamas offensive. Hamas leader Yahye Sinwar jumped the gun by at least a decade. It is difficult to assess what exactly he was thinking, but apparently he did not appreciate the necessity for a long wait. He also apparently believed that if he initiated the war, he would force Iran’s hand and it, as well as Iran’s other proxies and allies, would join Hamas in full force against Israel.
Sinwar’s appreciation of the strategic capabilities of the Iranian axis vis-à-vis Israel was obviously exaggerated. Iran was forced into a war its leaders believed they were not ready for, but in which they had no choice but to participate, at least for show – providing Israel with the opportunity to reduce Iran’s existing capabilities. Apart from Israel, it is likely that no one was more angry at Sinwar than Iran’s leaders. After decades of painstaking effort, most of their preparations for the war of annihilation to be unleashed by Iran on Israel were destroyed or dismantled:
- Hezbollah has not been destroyed, but it has been significantly diminished. Because of the situation in Lebanon, where the group’s local rivals are exploiting Hezbollah’s defeat to try to reduce it even further, and in Syria, where a revolution brought an anti-Shiite coalition to power resulting in the blocking of Iran’s land and aerial access to Lebanon, rebuilding Hezbollah will take a long time—perhaps so long that it will never return to its previous strength.
Forty-eight Israeli civilians and 84 soldiers were killed and a few thousand wounded, directly or indirectly (through injuries incurred while rushing to shelters, with people falling down stairs or in the streets).
Approximately 4,185 Lebanese were killed, of whom at least 3,500 were members of Hezbollah or other terrorist organizations. More bodies of Hezbollah personnel are being collected from villages from which the IDF has withdrawn, so these numbers are probably not final. The dead include most of Hezbollah’s senior commanders and staff officers. Thousands more Hezbollah personnel were wounded. Huge stores of weapons were destroyed, as were secret storage sites and command posts.
The defeat and new weakness of Hezbollah is visible in its almost complete non-response to Israeli actions ever since the ceasefire began. Israel has conducted dozens of airstrikes on Hezbollah personnel attempting to recover equipment from damaged storage sites, smuggle new equipment in from Syria, or infiltrate personnel back into southern Lebanon. All these Hezbollah actions are infringements of the ceasefire. Apart from three or four weak actions that failed, Hezbollah has not reacted to the killing of about 60 of its personnel in these actions and the wounding of dozens more. Furthermore, in late January 2025 Israel demanded that the conditions of the ceasefire be amended in its favor, lengthening the time provided for it to withdraw from southern Lebanon. The Lebanese government agreed to this demand. Hezbollah threatened to renew attacks on Israel if this occurred, but so far it has done nothing.
Hezbollah has attempted to pressure Israel by sending its personnel into southern Lebanon posing as civilians, but the Israeli military blocked them aggressively. According to the Lebanese government, more than 20 were killed and more than 120 wounded, though they did not provide a breakdown of who were Hezbollah and who were Hezbollah-supporting civilians. Again, Hezbollah did nothing in response.
Furthermore, a new president and government of Lebanon were elected without asking Hezbollah’s approval. It did receive two ministerial posts in the government despite an American demand that it be completely excluded.
Hezbollah has given notice that compensation to its supporters for injuries and property incurred during the war will be delayed. This suggests a problem of liquidity in its finances. Attempts by Iran to send money via civilian flights have been blocked by Israel demanding that the aircraft not be allowed to land in Lebanon. This has sparked riots of Hezbollah supporters near the Beirut airport, which included an attack on a UNIFIL convoy and the wounding of the deputy commander of UNIFIL. The Lebanese government sent the military to suppress these riots, resulting in wounded on both sides.
- The situation in Syria was not directly Israel’s doing, but the rebels exploited Israel’s successes against Hezbollah, which had provided military forces for the Assad regime. The rebels attacked the pro-regime Iranian proxies in Syria that had both supported the Assad regime and shot at Israel. After a decade of failure in which they barely survived, the rebels deposed the Assad regime within days. Iran has thus lost all access to Syrian territory, including all the bases and supplies it accumulated in Syria over the past decade. This means Iran can no longer transport equipment and personnel through Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon, further weakening Hezbollah’s ability to recover its losses.
- In Iraq, Iran’s proxies seem to have severely weakened their resolve, though again not as a direct consequence of Israeli military actions. There was perhaps at least one Israeli attack directed at the local Iranian proxies, but the groups appear to have been demoralized primarily by the defeat of Lebanese Hezbollah and the humiliation of Iran in its own territory. Generally termed Iraqi Hezbollah for the sake of brevity, several different organizations are in fact involved. Negotiations have begun between at least some of them and the incumbent Iraqi government on “coming back to the fold”– in other words, returning to being Iraqis first and Shiites friendly to Iran only second, or perhaps not at all. The Iraqi Hezbollah organizations released the names of 26 members killed in the war, but it is not clear if they include only members killed in Syria during exchanges with Israel or also those killed in Iraq when US forces responded to attacks on them during the same period. Since 7 October 2023, Iraqi Hezbollah fired more than 300 missiles and exploding drones into Israel. These killed two Israelis and wounded more.
- Iran itself has been directly humiliated three times:
- through the killing on Iranian soil of Hamas supreme political leader Ismail Haniyeh by a bomb placed in his room in a building in the center of a highly guarded Iranian Revolutionary Guard residential area;
- through the destruction of an anti-aircraft battery protecting one of Iran’s most important nuclear weapons development sites – hinting that Israel can attack the site itself whenever it chooses;
and finally,
- through the destruction of anti-aircraft systems and a factory near Tehran that were critical to Iran’s long-range surface-to-surface missile production. This was actually three blows in one. It proved once again that Iran’s air defenses cannot defeat Israel’s air force; it halted production of Iran’s main direct weapon for attacking Israel for an extended period of time (though of course it has a large arsenal already accumulated); and it levied an implicit threat to Iran’s center of government and industry in its capital Tehran, which apparently can be attacked whenever Israel decides to do so.
Iran’s continuing ability to harm its neighbors in the Middle East should not be underestimated, but the limits of those capabilities have been exposed and Iran has unquestionably been weakened. The Iranians are now going back to the drawing board to rethink their options and programs. One option is to speed up their nuclear weapons program in order to create deterrence from the one thing they truly fear – an attempt to topple the regime itself. Instead of a tool to enable the destruction of Israel and instill fear in the region’s other states so as to limit responses to Iranian non-nuclear aggression, it will now become a tool to deter attacks on Iran itself.
The situation in Yemen is completely different. The Houthis, unlike the Lebanese and Iraqi Hezbollah organizations, are an ally, not a proxy. For them, this war, though it caused them economic and military damage (including, according to their reports, 106 killed and 328 wounded), has provided it with more gains than losses. They fired approximately 370 missiles and exploding drones at Israel, but Israel’s few responses caused economic damage that they can afford. They also attacked some 400 ships, sinking a few and capturing one. The military response of the US and European states was weak and ineffectual and did nothing to cause the Houthis to desist.
The Houthis still hold an entire global supply route via the Red Sea hostage. They managed to face off with the US and its allies, inflicted economic damage on Egypt and Israel and to a degree all the European states that had to divert their merchant shipping to the longer and more costly route around the southern tip of Africa. They are now a force to be reckoned with in the calculations of local and European powers that had previously ignored them. China and Russia preferred paying them off to fighting with them, enriching their coffers, and there are reports that Russia has negotiated with them for support in its war against the West in return for Russian weapons.
Following the ceasefire in Gaza, the Houthis ceased firing at Israel, not because they were compelled to so but because they saw no purpose in continuing. Should fighting be renewed in Gaza, they will be able to freely decide whether to renew their attacks on Israel or not. During the recent crisis in the ceasefire in Gaza (see below), they said they would renew their attacks if the fighting in Gaza resumes. However, if they do renew attacks on Israel, they are likely to face a much more intensive Israeli response – one no longer hampered by an American administration demanding that Israel temper its response.
Judea and Samaria (a.k.a. the West Bank)
As the fighting on all the other fronts abated, Israel transferred forces and equipment to Judea and Samaria. On 21 January 2025, the IDF initiated an offensive operation, Iron Wall, against the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad units operating there.
Operation Iron Wall is actually a continuation of Israeli operations that were being conducted in Judea and Samaria from before the onset of the Iron Swords War.
The average number of Palestinian attacks on Israelis in and from Judea and Samaria during the years 2016-2020 varied from approximately 1,300 to 1,600 per year.
In 2021, there was an escalation to 2,135, in 2022 to 2,613, and in 2023 to 3,436 (of which 2,374 occurred before 7 October 2023, so, based on the monthly average before the Hamas terror offensive, we can estimate that it would have been at least 3,000 if the war had not broken out). In 2024 there were approximately 2,665 attacks.
This escalation of attacks required Israel to transfer forces from other fronts to reinforce Judea and Samaria and the pre-67 border. This operation, named Breakwater, was one of the reasons for the reduction of forces along the border with Gaza and elsewhere in the Negev. Had these forces not been reduced, they could have arrived more quickly to the Gaza border on 7 October 2023. It is not clear if the escalation in Judea and Samaria was a deliberate Hamas-directed operation to achieve a force reduction in the south or whether the escalation was unconnected to the Hamas plan to attack Israel.
The Hamas attack on 7 October 2023 and threat of a follow-on Hezbollah attack redirected the focus of IDF operations to Gaza and the Lebanese border. Forces were reinforced in Judea and Samaria too, with reservists replacing the regular forces, but the focus of their operations was defensive, with occasional small-scale offensive raids.
Israel does not have enough regular forces to conduct major combat operations on all its fronts simultaneously. The Iron Swords war was conducted on seven fronts, of which three required major ground forces participation. One of the mistakes made by the IDF over the past three decades was a drastic reduction in its ground forces, on the belief that a major ground war was no longer likely and that modern hi-tech capabilities enabled replacing “old-style” ground forces with precision fire from aircraft and fewer “modern” ground-launched fire capabilities. The government and the IDF had to decide on a clear set of priorities for allocating ground forces: first Gaza and then Lebanon, with Judea and Samaria as only the third priority. These priorities were determined by the relative danger from each front. Now, the main direction is Judea and Samaria because the ending of operations that required large forces in Gaza and Lebanon enables the diverting of forces and resources to that area.
After 48 days of Fatah-controlled security forces of the Palestinian Authority operating in the Jenin area (northern Samaria) against the same groups, the Palestinian Authority forces withdrew and the IDF moved in. The Palestinian Authority claimed that it had arrested approximately 250 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad personnel, removed 245 IEDs, stopped 17 cars carrying bombs from the streets, and seized large amounts of weapons. There is no way to confirm these numbers. In these confrontations, about 12 people were reported killed – half from Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad and half from the Palestinian Authority forces.
In the four weeks of the subsequent IDF operation in the Jenin area, some 65 terrorists were killed and some 500 captured. In addition, some terrorists fleeing from the IDF were apprehended by Palestinian Authority forces.
Gradually the IDF operation was expanded to other areas of Samaria as well, particularly the town of Tulkarem.
Hamas has attempted to galvanize the population to join the fighting against the IDF, but this demand has been met so far with almost no response.
Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 36 Israeli civilians killed (0 more since my last update) and 27 soldiers/police killed (four more since my last update during Operation Iron Wall), and approximately 440 wounded (28 more since my last update) – most of them civilians.
Total Palestinian fatalities since 7 October 2023 are approximately 925 and more than 6,000 have been arrested. The number of wounded is not known.
Gaza:
On 17 January, a ceasefire agreement was signed that included a phased release of the Israeli kidnappees in return for Israel’s release of imprisoned Palestinian terrorists. At the time of the signing of the agreement, 94 kidnappees of the original 251 were still in Gaza (not all in the hands of Hamas; some are held by other organizations). Hamas promised to provide information about which kidnappees are alive and which are not, but has still not given a full tally.
It is currently assumed that about 35 hostages are dead (most of them killed on 7 October and their bodies abducted, though a few died while captive in Gaza). In addition, there are the bodies of two Israeli soldiers who were killed in 2014 as well as two living Israeli civilians who crossed the border into Gaza while suffering from mental illness (one in autumn 2014 and one in spring 2015) and have been held there ever since.
The number of terrorists incarcerated in Israel is approximately 10,220, including 3,464 captured during the war in Gaza and approximately 5,500 in Judea and Samaria. Of these, Israel agreed to release 1,904 in return for 25 living and eight dead Israelis and five Thai migrant workers held in Gaza.
The release began on 19 January 2025 in weekly installments of three or four Israelis for 90 to 370 Palestinians (the price per Israeli varies depending on whether they are civilians or soldiers). By 16 February, 19 living Israelis and the five Thais had been released in exchange for approximately 1,135 Palestinian terrorists. The body of one of the soldiers killed in 2014 was discovered and recovered by the IDF.
One clause of the agreement stated that the population of Gaza would be allowed to return to northern Gaza through specific filtration points. Initially, this was to be accomplished through the Netzarim corridor while it was still held by Israel. At a later stage, Israeli troops would withdraw completely from the corridor, but movement would still be limited to the specified routes.
During the first few weeks, Hamas tried to play with the details of the agreement. It did not provide a full list of living and dead hostages; civilians were supposed to be released first, but in the second exchange, Hamas released soldiers instead; attempts were made to bypass the filtration passages to infiltrate combat personnel into northern Gaza; and there were delays in releasing the kidnappees. Israel responded aggressively to these violations by halting the movement of Palestinians heading to northern Gaza until Hamas released the civilians it had promised and shooting near or at vehicles or people attempting to bypass the filtration passages. After Hamas began to follow the terms of the agreement, Israel opened the passages, and at least half a million Palestinians returned to the northern Gaza Strip.
On 9 February, the IDF withdrew its forces from the Netzarim Corridor (captured in the first couple of weeks of the Israeli offensive from the end of October 2023) separating northern Gaza from the rest of the strip. The following day, 10 February, Hamas declared that it was not going to continue to release kidnappees, claiming that Israel had not conducted some of the requirements of the agreement. Israel responded with a reinforcement of IDF units around Gaza, including recalling reserves, and stating that not releasing the three hostages who were supposed to be released on 15 February would result in a renewal of the Israeli offensive into Gaza. This time, Israel had the full backing by the new US president, Donald Trump, who also ordered the immediate supply to Israel of all the weapons delayed by the previous president, Joe Biden. Hamas backed down and the hostages were released, followed by the release of Palestinian prisoners.
During the temporary impasse, a rocket was launched from central Gaza towards Israel. The launch was a failure and fell in a Palestinian residential area not far from the launch site, apparently killing a Palestinian teenager.
Negotiations have begun on the second phase of the ceasefire and exchange of more kidnapped Israelis for more Palestinian terrorists incarcerated in Israel. During this phase, another 59 Israeli kidnappees are to be released. Thirty of them are known to be dead, but the number of dead may be higher. The number of Palestinians released in return has not yet been determined.
The Hamas Ministry of Health has updated the number of Palestinian casualties since the beginning of the war to 61,709 dead, including the 14,222 it claims are missing under the rubble, and nearly 111,600 wounded. Even assuming the numbers are close to accurate, according to the IDF, these include more than 20,000 Hamas personnel and at least 3,000 personnel of other terrorist organizations. The number of wounded terrorists is not known but is probably similar to the number killed. Hamas claims that approximately 80% of the residential buildings in Gaza have been damaged or destroyed.
Since the war began, Hamas has inducted thousands of new personnel (a US intelligence report estimates 10,000-15,000 new militants), so numerically it has compensated for 50-75% of its killed personnel. However, the new personnel have much less training and are therefore much less competent. There are also thousands of wounded who cannot return to service because of the extent of their injuries.
The number of trucks carrying humanitarian aid entering Gaza has more than doubled to 600-915 per day. However, there are repeated complaints on Palestinian social media that the cargo is not reaching the markets and is not being supplied to the population. Hamas is hoarding and selling part of the food and other produce at exorbitant rates. It is doing this in order to maintain its grip on the population and fund salaries to entice new recruits.
Syria:
Israeli troops are still holding a buffer zone inside Syria. There has been one incident in which they were fired at (no casualties) and two or three small non-violent protests, but the majority of the local population prefers not to interfere with the IDF’s activities and to hand over weapons when called upon to do so.
Meanwhile, the new regime is negotiating a defense treaty with Turkey. There are still fighting incidents across Syria, cases of abuse by the victors against non-Sunni Muslims, and skirmishes on the Syrian-Lebanese border between the new regime’s forces and the Lebanese army or Hezbollah forces.
Israel bombed a Hezbollah storage facility in Syria near the Lebanese border as Hezbollah personnel were attempting to transfer equipment from it to Lebanon.
Lebanon:
So far, the ceasefire that began at 4:00 a.m. on 27 November 2024 is holding – at least in Middle East terms. Israel is continuing its aggressive enforcement of the agreement, striking Hezbollah sites in which infractions are observed. Hezbollah personnel attempting to operate in southern Lebanon are also being attacked. Israeli troops are continuing to comb the territory they control and are locating more hidden weapons storage sites. The weapons are either taken to Israel or destroyed on site and the sites exploded.
The ceasefire was supposed to end on 26tJanuary 2025 with Israeli forces withdrawing from Lebanon and Lebanese army forces replacing them. However, Israel halted its withdrawal when the Lebanese army forces did not meet the required activities or numbers. Israel demanded a delay until 18 February, and the Lebanese government agreed to the delay.
Hezbollah attempted to send the Lebanese population that had been evacuated back into Israeli-held territory prematurely, a violation of the ceasefire agreement, and the IDF responded aggressively. The Lebanese government claimed that more than 20 were killed and about 125 wounded. Israel claimed that the casualties were Hezbollah personnel or affiliates attempting to use the civilians as cover to approach IDF positions. After a few days, the attempts to move civilians south halted. A senior Lebanese army officer provided Hezbollah with information from the ceasefire committee overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire by both sides.
There is now a report circulating that Israel has asked for another deferment of its withdrawal in certain areas.
Israeli casualties:
The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 06:30 a.m. on 7 October 2023 is now 1,004 civilians and 846 soldiers. Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 15,000 soldiers have been wounded (this number includes both physical and psychiatric casualties). There are still 70 hostages in Gaza, some of whom – at least 35, probably more – are dead. Also, there are the two mentally ill civilians who crossed on their own volition into Gaza and the body of the second Israeli soldier killed in 2014.
WHAT NEXT?
As written in the opening – the war is winding down but is not yet done.
Currently, Judea and Samaria is the only active front in this war. Officially the Lebanese and Gaza fronts are no longer active, but the IDF is responding aggressively with fire to every infringement of the ceasefire agreements.
The IDF’s Operation Iron Wall in Judea and Samaria will probably continue and new areas will be added as the IDF methodically goes through each town and village from which there are indications of terrorist activity, weapons storage sites and weapons manufacturing sites (mostly bombs, submachineguns and ammunition). Iran is trying to provide more weapons to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad through Jordan and Egypt. Some of these smuggling attempts have been intercepted, but it is likely that some were not.
The situation in Gaza is tense. Hamas’s attempts to change the agreement and gain more advantages will continue, and Israel will probably continue to react aggressively each time.
The second agreement, for the remaining Israelis in Gaza, is likely to be difficult. Hamas will demand clear-cut guarantees that after the last kidnappees are returned Israel will not renew its offensive. Israel, backed by the US, is not likely to agree to this. Both Jerusalem and Washington have stated clearly that Hamas cannot remain in power in Gaza. President Trump’s suggestion that most of the population be transferred to other locations to enable the rebuilding of Gaza has been met with angry refusal by the Palestinian leadership and the leaders of various Arab states (not all) and also some European leaders. However, on social media in Gaza, some Palestinians have responded positively to the idea. As one person put it, if you just open the gates, we will leave of our own accord.
The issue of Hezbollah is not yet over. Hezbollah’s enemies in Lebanon are attempting to exploit its defeat politically, but are still not willing to fight it. The suppressing of the riots near Beirut airport is not the same as dismantling or defeating Hezbollah’s remaining military capabilities. If Hezbollah survives the political attack and overcomes its financial woes, it will be able to slowly recover and once again become a formidable military force – though it is not likely to achieve the same level of strength it had before the current war for many years. Perhaps the only way it can fully recover is if Turkey allows Iran to resume its use of Syrian territory to support that recovery. Given Turkish-Iranian rivalry in general and their rivalry specifically in Syria, this does not seem a likely scenario, but in the Middle East, stranger things have happened.
The issue of Iran is not finished either. Iran is likely considering, or perhaps already implementing, an escalated pace of development of nuclear weapons. Both Israel and the new American administration have declared they will not allow this to happen. Since it is unlikely that Iran will back down willingly from its pursuit of these weapons – especially now, with the loss of virtually all its other tools – it is highly likely that Israel, with or without American participation, will attempt to physically reduce Iran’s nuclear program with an aerial campaign. This would not be enough to completely eradicate the program, but would have the potential to push it back for years. If the US participates in this aerial campaign it will be much more effective than if Israel operates on its own.
Meanwhile, in Syria, the new regime is working to stabilize control over the entire state. Israeli forces are occupying a buffer zone in southern Syria, but the new regime has not attempted to attack them. However, over the past few weeks, the new leadership has conducted military operations on the border with Lebanon and has even attacked Hezbollah bases and Hezbollah-affiliated clans on the Lebanese side, drawing the Lebanese army into the fight. These clans are part of Hezbollah’s Syria-Lebanon weapons-smuggling apparatus. The new regime is not willing to allow this smuggling to continue as it views Hezbollah, the ally of the Assad regime, as an enemy.
****
9 December 2024 – 15 January 2025
WHAT HAS HAPPENED?
Negotiations for a ceasefire in Gaza:
The latest round of negotiations seems more likely to succeed than earlier rounds. The details are still unclear, but apparently Hamas and the other organizations will release a handful of Israeli kidnappees every week in return for a ceasefire and certain withdrawals of Israeli forces from Gaza.
It is very likely that Trump’s threats against Hamas helped to make its demands more flexible.
Gaza:
Meanwhile, fighting has continued in the northern area of the Gaza Strip. Thirty-one more Israeli soldiers have been killed since my last update, and probably as many as 500 more terrorists. Israeli forces are combing the area thoroughly, house by house, including hospitals and other similar sites used by Hamas and other groups as sanctuaries. In one hospital, 240 terrorists surrendered with their weapons. The hospital was surrounded and the civilian population told to evacuate through filtration points to ensure terrorists would not escape with them. About 700 were questioned and released after it was clear they were merely civilians. A number of the terrorists attempted to escape in the ambulances evacuating civilian patients.
The main cause of Israeli casualties are remotely detonated hidden bombs emplaced throughout the streets and in houses.
The IDF has also continued to conduct ground raids and air strikes based on intelligence information in other areas of Gaza.
The Hamas Ministry of Health has updated the number of Palestinian casualties since the beginning of the war to almost 46,600 killed and nearly 110,000 wounded. According to the IDF, these include 22,000-23,000 personnel of Hamas and the other terrorist organizations. The IDF has also released the number of terrorists captured throughout the war: 3,464.
A recent study of the entry of humanitarian aid into Gaza has concluded that from December 2023 to July 2024, Hamas earned approximately $700 million from selling the products that were being sent in – products that were meant to be freely distributed to the population. It can be safely assumed that the earnings of Hamas have been at least that high from August 2024 till today. Essentially, the humanitarian aid being donated to the civilian population of Gaza is funding Hamas’s continued military effort against Israel and enabling it to enlist a few thousand new fighters to replace the ones killed, wounded or captured by Israel – especially since Hamas is the most lucrative employer in Gaza.
Syria:
On 8 December, the Syrian regime fell and was replaced by a new regime dominated by the Hayat al-Tahrir organization. This organization is based on the Syrian chapter of al-Qaeda. Its leaders claim they have reformed and no longer believe in that ideology. However, the local Syrians (especially the non-Sunni minorities, who include Shiites, Christians, Alawites, Druze, and others), the Lebanese and the Israelis are still extremely suspicious. Officially, the new regime has ordered that no reprisals be undertaken against the Syrian minorities, who supported Assad’s regime out of fear of the future plans of radical Sunni jihadis. In fact, there are reports of violence against these minorities, though there have not been huge massacres. There were also a few incidents between the new Syrian regime forces and the Lebanese army in which the Syrian forces crossed the border. The Syrians claim that this occurred by accident, while the Lebanese claim they were “testing the waters” – perhaps to prepare for a future incursion to force the jihadi Sunni doctrine on Lebanon as well.
As soon as Assad’s regime fell, Israel’s air force immediately began a series of air strikes against the Syrian army’s stores, aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles, surface-to-air missiles, shore-to-sea missiles, combat ships, tanks and other armored vehicles, etc. These strikes have continued throughout the month since the last update, though their intensity and frequency have diminished as the number of targets has been reduced.
Israeli ground forces crossed the border and advanced into Syrian territory. Initially they advanced only up to the line marking the rear of the demilitarized zone in Syria. Then, in some locations, especially along the center and southern sections of the border where the demilitarized zone is narrower, they advanced further to create an Israeli-controlled buffer zone of equal depth. In some places brief raids were conducted even further in. In the buffer zone and in the raids, the Israeli forces combed military sites for weapons, either destroying them or collecting them and taking them back to Israel.
There were no attempts during the month to resist Israel’s air strikes and ground offensive. Nor was there any resistance to the Israeli units setting up positions inside Syria for a long sojourn. The greatest resistance has consisted of one or two demonstrations by locals. In the Druze villages (in the northern sector), some residents have even suggested requesting that Israel incorporate them, as it did the Druze villages on the Israeli side of the border.
As noted in the last update, the new regime has Turkish backing. Given Turkey’s official anti-Israeli policies, we may have traded an Iranian-backed Shiite alliance for a Turkish-backed Sunni alliance. Over the years, Turkish President Erdogan has made a number of threats of Turkish military action against Israel, including one this past summer and one as recently as 15 January 2025.
Very likely the new regime does not currently feel capable of attacking Israel – especially as fighting continues, albeit at low intensity, in various places across Syria. The heaviest fighting is between Turkey’s Syrian proxy organization and the US-backed Kurdish autonomy (Rojava). However, this could change if the situation is finally soothed and the new regime begins to rebuild Syria in general, and a new military in particular, subscribing to jihadi Sunni doctrine. General Ahmed Osman, who is part of the leadership, gave an interview to the Turkish publication Türkiye Gazetesi in which he stated that a new 300,000-strong army will be created in Syria with the support of Turkey.
The US has conducted “dozens” of airstrikes on more than 75 Islamic State targets to ensure that the militant group “does not seek to take advantage of the current situation to reconstitute in central Syria.”
Lebanon:
So far, the ceasefire that began at 4:00 AM, 27 November 2024 is holding – in Middle East terms (see below). Officially the ceasefire is set to last until 25 January 2025. During that time, the Lebanese army will gradually move into southern Lebanon to take over security of the entire area while Hezbollah forces leave that area and move north. If this works out, the IDF will also begin moving back to the border, handing over territory it captured to the Lebanese army.
Only a few attempts have been reported of Hezbollah firing at Israeli forces in Lebanon or into Israel. However, according to the agreement, Hezbollah was supposed to move its troops north of a certain line, and it was not supposed to conduct recovery or weapons preparation operations south or north of this line. It has been ignoring both these clauses. Hezbollah units have attempted to infiltrate south into areas still controlled by the Israelis, and they have attempted recovery and other operations as well.
Contrary to other agreements that were similarly flouted by Israel’s enemies in the past, Israel’s response to these violations has been aggressive:
- Verbal and written warnings to Lebanese civilians not to return yet, with warning shots fired near civilians moving south. Very common during the first couple of weeks, these warnings are occurring less often as the civilians have apparently realized they will not be allowed back before the IDF withdraws back to Israel.
- Direct fire against Hezbollah personnel trying to reach positions near or within IDF-controlled areas (a number of them were captured). This too has happened less often in the second half of the period being described.
- Airstrikes on rocket launchers being prepared for use. This has escalated both in frequency and in the targets chosen, which are further north of the border with Israel.
- Airstrikes on Hezbollah storage sites inside Syria prior to the weapons within them crossing the border into Lebanon, and the bombing of the border crossing sites. These have diminished as there are fewer targets and the new Syrian regime is quite happy to prevent Hezbollah from transporting its weapons and equipment from Syria to Lebanon.
In these actions approximately 50 Hezbollah personnel have been killed and more wounded.
Meanwhile, in the areas the IDF captured during its ground offensive, its troops are continuing to comb the houses and open brush areas to find more hidden stores and positions. These sites and stores are either destroyed on the spot or taken to Israel. Thousands of weapons and ammunition (firearms, RPG anti-tank launchers and various types of guided anti-tank missile launchers, anti-aircraft missile launchers, mortars, artillery rocket launchers, etc.) and many tons of explosives have been removed from Hezbollah sites within five kilometers of the border with Israel and taken by the IDF to Israel. This does not include thousands of pieces of equipment and hundreds of tons of explosives destroyed in situ because moving them was too dangerous. In addition, approximately 70% of Hezbollah’s medium and long-range weapons arsenal, including shore-to-sea missiles, were destroyed during the war.
Hezbollah has been very limited in its responses to the IDF strikes. It is clear that despite the heavy casualties and loss of equipment the organization still has a great deal of capability. However, it is in a difficult situation not only vis-à-vis Israel but in general. The new Syrian regime is hostile and will not allow new weapons or other Iranian assistance to arrive in Lebanon through its territory. There have been skirmishes on the border between Lebanon and Syria as the former Syrian rebels encroach on Lebanese territory and directly threaten Hezbollah assets near the border.
Furthermore, inside Lebanon, all Hezbollah’s rivals who were previously cowed by its superior military strength are coming out and conducting political actions that further weaken its position. Thus, for the first time in more than two decades, the election of the new prime minister was conducted without consulting Hezbollah’s opinion. Even some of Hezbollah’s allies among the non-Shiite communities are changing their tone.
There is therefore a clear threat that re-escalating the war with Israel might create an opportunity for Hezbollah’s other enemies to pounce on it. Furthermore, the way the war with Israel evolved has left the organization feeling extremely vulnerable. Israeli intelligence seemed to know everything going on, even at the most secret sites in the extensive underground systems where Hezbollah commanders were located. Thus, for example, Hezbollah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was killed during a brief visit to a command bunker that was precision-attacked despite its being located several stories underground.
An elderly Israeli woman, wounded half a year ago in a Hezbollah rocket attack, died of her wounds.
Judea and Samaria:
The IDF continues to conduct raids in various areas and of various sizes to arrest or kill Palestinian terrorists. The latest reports mention plans to increase the size of the Israeli forces there (freed from the other fronts) to conduct a more intensive offensive operation.
Over the past month, fighting has also escalated between the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority’s security forces and the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad factions and their militias. Most of the fighting is in northern Samaria, especially in and around the city of Jenin. The Palestinian Authority claimed that it has arrested approximately 250 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad personnel, removed 245 IEDs from the streets, stopped 17 cars carrying bombs, and seized large amounts of weapons. There is no way to confirm these numbers. About 12 people have been reported killed in these confrontations so far.
The Palestinians claim that the IDF has arrested almost 12,500 people (about 400 more since my last update). The latest IDF numbers are approximately half this figure. The difference is probably between those detained for questioning and later released as opposed to those who are arrested and then incarcerated. The number killed in confrontations with the IDF has not been updated, but from fragmentary news reports, it appears that a few dozen terrorists have been killed over the past month by the IDF.
Israeli casualties in or from Judea and Samaria since 7 October 2023 are 36 Israeli civilians killed (five more since my last update) and 23 soldiers/police killed (0 since my last update) and 420 wounded (30 more since my last update) – most of them civilians.
Yemen:
The Houthis continued to launch exploding drones and missiles towards Israel, virtually all of which were intercepted. Since 7 October 2023, the Yemenite Houthis have launched approximately 205 exploding drones and missiles at Israel. The rate has increased, and since the last update these attacks have been almost daily. They usually include only one drone or missile, occasionally two, and rarely three.
All told, perhaps half a dozen of these attacks have hit targets in Israel. All the rest were shot down or malfunctioned and fell enroute. One Israeli civilian was killed in one attack. A number have been wounded directly by the explosions and several dozen have been wounded in accidents while rushing to bomb shelters (falling down stairs, tripping in the street, etc.). Regardless, the Houthis claim every time to have hit a military target somewhere in Israel. Lately, their claims have focused on the Israeli IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv, though none of their weapons has gotten anywhere near it.
The Houthis continue to report occasional attacks on merchant ships north and south of the Bab al-Mandeb Straits between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Since 7 October 2023 they have attacked approximately 350 times. They have attacked not only merchant ships but occasionally also American or British military ships. In one attack they just barely missed an American aircraft carrier (according to one report, the missile hit the water about 200 meters from the American ship). During one of these attacks, on 22 or 23 December, an American F18 fighter bomber taking off from an aircraft carrier was mistaken by the air defense of another American ship as a Houthi missile and shot down. A second F18 was also almost shot down.
The Houthis claim to have shot down another American aerial drone, the fourteenth such claim since the war began. The US military has not confirmed any of these reports but calls the numbers “exaggerated”, so apparently some drones were in fact shot down.
Since the last update the number of American and British strikes on the Houthis has increased somewhat.
On 10 January 2025, Israel conducted its third retaliatory strike on the Houthis. Apparently this attack was coordinated with the Americans and British who also conducted strikes at roughly the same time. The targets were economic (port facilities, oil storage tanks) and military (Houthi bases and headquarters). After this attack the rate of Houthi launches towards Israel diminished but did not stop (plus claims of launches that did not reach Israel and were not intercepted – launches that either did not occur at all or that malfunctioned and fell short of Israel’s detection system range).
Iraq:
The last Iraqi Hezbollah exploding drones attack on Israel was on 24 November 2024. Over the previous month they claimed to have launched almost every day, on some days twice. Israel reported fewer attacks and shot down virtually all of those it reported. Either the Iraqi Hezbollah announcements were exaggerated or some fell along the way because of technical malfunctions. In mid-December 2024 the Iraqis declared officially that they were implementing a ceasefire.
From 7 October 2023 till the ceasefire declaration in mid-December 2024, Iraqi Hezbollah launched about 280 exploding drones and missiles at Israel.
Israel did not generally respond to these attacks until late November 2024. Then, on 20 November, the Israeli air force struck a camp in eastern Syria housing several Iranian proxy groups from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. There was no official casualty figure reported by Iran or the groups, but apparently many dozens (one source: 92) were killed and many more wounded. This number suggests the Israeli strike caught them completely by surprise.
According to the Iraqi Parliament Chairman in an interview with Saudi Al-Hadath television, Israel was planning a major aerial offensive against Iraq that was halted only through American pressure. The Iraqi Hezbollah militias had, in return, agreed to cease attacks on Israel. Apparently the example of what happened at the attacked base and possibly also in Yemen convinced them that the expected cost was greater than the benefit.
Another factor that possibly contributed towards this decision to discontinue strikes on Israel was the Syrian rebel offensive that began on 27 November, the sudden subsequent collapse of the Syrian regime, and its replacement by a hostile regime (8 December). Iraqi Hezbollah has a new threat to concentrate on besides Israel.
Iran:
Since the last round between it and Israel and the fall of the Syrian regime, Iran has not attempted any more direct attacks on Israel.
Iran’s entire strategic plan for destroying Israel has been shattered. They now have to focus on rebuilding the pieces. This moment of apparent vulnerability might push Iran to expedite its nuclear weapons program.
Israeli casualties:
The total number of Israeli fatalities since the war began at approximately 6:30 am on 7 October 2023 is now 1,003 civilians and 840 soldiers. Approximately 10,300 Israeli civilians and 13,500 soldiers have been wounded. There are still 98 kidnappees in Gaza, some of whom (at least 30, probably more) are dead.
WHAT NEXT?
Currently, Gaza and Yemen are the only active fronts in this war.
What happens next depends on whether an agreement is finally achieved this time on the release of the kidnappees and a ceasefire in Gaza. It also depends on whether the agreement is adhered to. Hamas wants to use the agreement to recover, rearm (by smuggling weapons through Egypt), and recruit and train more personnel.
Judging by Israel’s actions in Lebanon and Syria, the Israeli government will not accept the typical behavior of the past in which a ceasefire becomes merely a piece of paper and Hamas (or others) try to cheat or conduct small attacks to chip away at the agreed-upon rules of behavior. If someone fires a rocket towards Israel from Gaza or attacks an Israeli unit inside the Strip, the IDF is likely to respond aggressively.
If the Gaza ceasefire does manage to hold, the next question is Yemen. Will the Houthis continue to fire at Israel if Hamas agrees to a ceasefire? If they do, will Israel escalate its response?
And finally – Iran. It is currently quiet, but it is still striving to develop its nuclear weapons. Given the shattering of its long-term strategy, loss of allies (Syria) and drastic reduction in the military capability of its main proxy against Israel (Hezbollah), not to mention the humiliating results of its direct exchanges of fire with Israel, it could very well decide to accelerate its nuclear weapons program.
Until today, the Iranians had been content to advance their nuclear capabilities slowly, while the other strands of their strategy were progressing. They needed their nuclear weapons to be ready at some time during the 2030s, which is why they had no problem accepting the supposed 15-year delay created by the agreement with Obama that was signed in 2015.
After signing the agreement, Iran’s ruler, Ayatollah Khamanei, declared that Israel would not exist by 2040, providing the timeline by which the Iranians expected their strategy to be fulfilled. This was not an off-the-cuff remark. It has been repeated time and time again by senior Iranian politicians and military commanders.
Given the possibility that Iran will accelerate its nuclear weapons program, will Israel attack the known sites of its nuclear weapons facilities to create a long-term delay in the project? If so, will this be with or without US involvement? Completely destroying the project militarily is not feasible. The Iranians will rebuild it, and they will not lose the knowledge they have accumulated. They will also improve their defenses to make it harder to repeat such an attack in the future. Totally halting the program would require the destruction of the current regime. The other option is to conduct repeated attacks every time the program is restarted, but that assumes very good intelligence penetration of the Iranian project to ensure sufficient warning and provide exact locations. It also depends on the Iranians failing to learn how to improve protection of these sites.
****
18 October – 8 December 2024
WHAT HAS HAPPENED?
Lebanon:
At 0400 AM, 27th November, a ceasefire commenced on the Lebanese front of the war. However, fighting continues, albeit at a much-reduced level.
Israel’s minimum demands for the ceasefire were:
- Hezbollah troops and equipment will be withdrawn north of the Litani River. Also, because the river’s distance from the border varies from 5 kilometers to 15, Israel demanded a further withdrawal in some areas.
- The cleared area will be held by the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Forces In Lebanon), who will ensure that Hezbollah complies with this demand both now and in the future.
- Hezbollah is to be disarmed, and at the very least, Iranian arms supplies will be blocked from entering Lebanon to rearm the group.
- If the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL fail to fulfil their mission, Israel retains the right to freely conduct military operations to enforce the agreement.
All Israel’s demands were accepted in the agreement. The last demand, that Israel retains the right to act freely if it observes infractions of the agreement, is probably the most important clause. The other demands were part of the post-Second Lebanon War (summer 2006) agreement too, but neither UNIFIL nor the Lebanese army ever made any attempt to enforce them. This negligence led to the situation at the beginning of this war in which Hezbollah had a wide array of combat and storage positions and thousands of troops in an area where they were supposed to have none.
A typical result of previous agreements between Israel and its enemies is that immediately after a ceasefire begins, Israel’s enemies began to act against it, while Israel is compelled to abide by the agreement’s terms by political pressure from the US and the Europeans. This led to situations like the build-up of Hezbollah’s base of operations to attack Israel despite the agreement that ended the Second Lebanon War. There have been numerous similar examples with the Palestinians and Israel’s other neighbors too.
Officially, the current ceasefire is to last for 60 days, until 25th January 2025. During that time, attempts will be made to achieve a more durable agreement. By the end of the 60 days, the Lebanese army is to begin moving into the agreed areas and the IDF is to withdraw gradually from the areas it holds inside Lebanon. These movements are to be coordinated between Israel and Lebanon. Until then, the area is to remain empty of Lebanese. Another clause is the setting up of a committee that will oversee the implementation with American and French representatives.
Though UNIFIL is mentioned in the agreement and is supposed to assist in its implementation, Israel is in essence ignoring it. Over the 46 years of its existence, and despite its enhancement after the 2006 Second Lebanon War, UNIFIL has proven to be useless or, worse, to have a negative impact. It failed to prevent Palestinian activities against Israel (1978-1982) in its mandated area of control, did nothing to hinder any of Hezbollah’s activities against Israel from 2000 till today, and prevented or impeded Israel from acting against either of those hostile parties. An interview in a Danish newspaper with a Danish soldier who served with UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) 10 years ago described this failure. UNTSO and UNIFIL were supposed to keep Hezbollah out of their area of responsibility, but in fact did exactly the opposite. Anywhere Hezbollah placed its positions, equipment and personnel became off-limits for UNIFIL. (https://www.bt.dk/udland/michael-var-fn-soldat-i-libanon-vi-var-totalt-underlagt-hizbollah).
This time, too, as soon as the ceasefire officially began, Hezbollah started trying to undermine it by sending troops south to recover weapons and equipment abandoned in the areas adjacent to IDF positions. On at least three occasions after the ceasefire came into effect, IDF surveillance sighted Hezbollah personnel emplacing and loading rocket launchers aimed towards Israel. Furthermore, whether of their own volition or on instructions from Hezbollah, and despite Israeli warnings not to do so, Lebanese civilians began moving south, thereby providing cover for Hezbollah personnel moving back to their former positions. And lastly, Iranian arms shipments to Hezbollah have not stopped.
Contrary to the past, Israel’s response to these violations has been aggressive. Israel has:
- issued verbal and written warnings to Lebanese civilians not to return yet and fired warning shots near civilians moving south
- fired upon Hezbollah personnel trying to reach positions near or within IDF-controlled areas (several of them were captured)
- conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah rocket launchers being prepared for use
- conducted airstrikes on storage sites for rockets and launchers across southern Lebanon after rockets or mortar bombs were fired at an Israeli position
- conducted airstrikes on Hezbollah storage sites inside Syria prior to the weapons they contained crossing the border into Lebanon, and bombing the border crossing sites
- sent Israeli combat aircraft to warn an Iranian transport aircraft flying into Syria with weapons for Hezbollah not to land.
Meanwhile, in the areas the IDF captured during its ground offensive, its troops are continuing to comb the houses and open brush areas to locate hidden stores and positions. These sites and stores are either destroyed on the spot or taken to Israel.
It should be noted that officially, the agreement is between Israel and Lebanon, not Israel and Hezbollah – though the government of Lebanon is not an official participant in the war and holds no sway over Hezbollah and its actions. This reflects the accepted fiction in Western political culture that only states can conduct wars or be party to international agreements.
Hezbollah’s new leader, Naim Kassem, has declared the war to have resulted in a victory for Hezbollah – an even greater victory than that of 2006. His speech was received with ridicule by Hezbollah’s political rivals in Lebanon.
Assuming for the moment that this iteration of the war between Israel and Hezbollah is indeed over (at least for a time), the following is a brief summary of what has occurred since 7th October 2023.
Hezbollah and its Iranian backers were just as surprised as Israel by the Hamas attack on 7th October. Apart from the Israelis, the people most furious with Hamas for initiating the attack are probably the Iranian and Hezbollah leadership (those who are still alive). In their view, the assault was a premature action that ruined Iran’s long-term plan to attack Israel.
The Iranians had stated repeatedly and clearly that by the summer of 2040, there would be no more Israel. This gives a rough indication of the timeline of their build-up plan and why they were not yet in a hurry to create nuclear bombs. However, conducting their eliminationist offensive against Israel was going to require an extensive force build-up on the borders of Israel. The plan included preparation of Syrian territory to receive Iraqi Shiite and other Iranian proxies (Afghani and Pakistani Shiites), organized in a manner similar to Lebanese Hezbollah, as well as Iranian forces. The plan was also meant to entail the destabilization of the Jordanian regime and its replacement by a radical Sunni regime similar to Hamas. It also included a program to smuggle huge amounts of weapons into Judea and Samaria for use by the local Palestinians.
The Lebanese portion of the ground offensive plan was created according to a program developed by the Iranians and Hezbollah over the past 15 years. During that time, Iran and Hezbollah invested heavily in building the necessary infrastructure across Lebanon in general, but in southern Lebanon in particular. They built and trained an offensive force, the Radwan Force, dedicated to its implementation. By 7th October 2023, this force included approximately the same number of combat personnel as a typical Western army infantry division (though much fewer administrative personnel). Its mission was to invade northern Israel and take a large swath of territory inside it.
Behind the Radwan Force, Hezbollah prepared a large artillery force to be used for strategic bombardment of Israel in lieu of an air force. This force included a mix of ordinary statistical rockets, accurate missiles and exploding drones, with ranges covering all of Israel from the Lebanese border to the city of Eilat, which lies at Israel’s most distant southern tip. The total number of such munitions stored by Hezbollah was assessed as about 150,000 (of which perhaps 10,000 were of the guided type). Had Hezbollah initiated the war, it would have been able to fire at least 5,000 of these projectiles every day for several days at Israeli cities and towns and national infrastructure (water, electricity, etc.). It would then probably have had to reduce its rate of fire to about 1,000-2,000 per day, a rate that it could have maintained for weeks at least.
Behind this combined ground and rocket offensive, Hezbollah prepared about 200 villages throughout southern Lebanon, from the border to about 40 kilometers north of the border, to be used as fortified defensive positions. In some areas, where the villages were distant from each other, it also prepared fortified positions in the dense brush between them. The terrain consists of very steep sloped hills and the villages are located mostly on the higher ground, so units in each fortified village could support the adjacent fortified villages with long-range fire and could fire on IDF units trying to bypass them between the villages.
Holding these villages was a force equivalent to about three typical Western army infantry divisions, with roughly one heavily armed (mortars and anti-tank guided missiles plus the usual infantry weapons) company-equivalent in each fortified position. Each fortified village included fortified houses to be used as combat positions, underground facilities for waiting, storage, or command posts, and external combat positions reached by tunnels consisting of semi-buried bunkers or small trenches (for weapons that cannot be fired from inside a bunker).
In addition, there were, in some locations, tunnels that were big enough to accommodate vehicles up to truck size. These tunnels also had roofs that opened to allow the firing of rockets and missiles. The mission of the infantry forces was to block any Israeli ground forces advance, protect the rocket launcher sites from Israeli ground troops while simultaneously firing into Israel, and to protect the Radwan Forces underground assembly areas near the border as they prepared to invade Israel. The defensive troops in each Shiite village were mostly local inhabitants – essentially reservists – whereas Radwan and the other mobile troops were mostly career soldiers.
On 7th October 2023, surprised by the Hamas initiative, Hezbollah was not ready to implement its offensive plan. Had it been able to carry it out, Israel’s northern border would have been severely affected, as it was just as undermanned as Israel’s border with Gaza. A few dozen northern villages and a couple of towns were within reach of a penetration equivalent to that achieved by Hamas (about 20 villages are right next to the border). However, Hezbollah’s plan was deeper than that of Hamas, so the number of villages and towns that would have been encompassed within its ground offensive would have been several times the number attacked by Hamas in the south.
Hezbollah mobilized its troops, but Israel conducted a rapid mobilization to seal the border. The race by both sides to get troops to the border continued on 8th October, by which time the Iranians and Hezbollah had decided they could not conduct a successful offensive because of the rapid deployment of the Israeli reserve forces defending it (five divisions in total, later reduced to three when two of those divisions were sent to Gaza). However, they maintained their mobilized forces at the ready and began a low-intensity offensive campaign of artillery and anti-tank missile fire along the border. They decided not to implement their full strategic bombardment capability so as not to compel Israel to respond with full force. In response, Israel evacuated its civilians from the villages and towns within a distance of about five kilometers from the border, and many civilians from areas a bit further south also decided to evacuate. (At the height of the evacuation, 60,000 civilians were evacuated by the Israeli government and another 40,000 to 60,000 evacuated on their own.)
American government officials claim that the Israeli government considered as its first move to conduct a ground offensive into Lebanon to push back the Radwan Force, but decided against it because of American pressure and chose instead to focus on Gaza. The order given to Israel’s Northern Command was to conduct an aggressive defensive campaign only.
Over the next 11 months, Hezbollah maintained its low-intensity fire campaign and occasionally initiated small raids on Israeli army positions along the border. Israel responded with a similarly low-intensity counter-fire campaign aimed at Hezbollah launch teams along the border, with occasional strikes on specific targets further north – focusing on senior commanders of Radwan and the southern defensive divisions and of the strategic artillery forces. Israeli commando forces also conducted a number of raids into southern Lebanon to collect intelligence or hit targets that were difficult to hit via airstrike.
Hezbollah attempted to widen the exchange to the Israel-Syria border. Israel reacted there as well, hitting Hezbollah personnel not only along the border but as far as Damascus. In a couple of cases, Israel attacked Iranian senior commanders in Syria (including the overall commander of all Iranian forces and proxy forces in Syria and Lebanon) who were overseeing the supply conduit to Hezbollah and Hezbollah operations through Syria.
The result of this campaign was tactically in favor of Israel. The ratio of casualties inflicted during these 11 months was approximately 500 Hezbollah personnel killed (including a number of senior commanders, including the overall commander of the Radwan Force) as opposed to 25 Israeli civilians and 25 soldiers killed. There is no accurate reporting of wounded, but from anecdotal information it can be assessed that the ratio is probably not much different. However, strategically speaking, the campaign was a failure for Israel. It did not compel Hezbollah to cease fire or enable Israel’s northern refugees to return to their homes, many of which were destroyed. Israel’s focus of strategic effort was Gaza.
By early September 2024, the intensity of fighting in Gaza had diminished considerably, and Israel’s government decided the situation was ripe for a change of strategy on the Lebanese front: an offensive focused on overwhelming aerial firepower assisted by a minimal ground offensive. The Israeli offensive, officially dubbed “Northern Arrows”, began on 17th September with the simultaneous exploding of some 4,000 pagers used by Hezbollah members and, the next day, the exploding of approximately 1,000 Hezbollah walkie-talkie radios. This double act alone caused at least 4,000 Hezbollah casualties, most of them wounded and some killed. Israel then began warning Lebanese civilians living in areas near Hezbollah storage sites to evacuate their homes (in many cases, Hezbollah weapons and munitions were stored inside or underneath civilian residential buildings). This was followed by an intense aerial offensive campaign that in the first couple of days struck some 2,000 targets across Lebanon, the focus being headquarters and rocket, missile and exploding-drone storage sites. The rate of strikes lessened in the following days, but remained at a level of several hundred per day.
As the Israeli offensive progressed, the populations of more and more areas across the Shiite areas of Lebanon were ordered to evacuate, the majority in southern Lebanon and the Dakhya quarter of Beirut. All told, 1.25 million Lebanese, virtually all Shiites, fled these areas looking for safe places to stay. Many who tried to move to non-Shiite areas (i.e., inhabited by Sunni Moslems, Christian and Druze) found their way blocked by the locals.
Over the past 20 years, the superior military strength of Hezbollah instilled fear and submission in the other ethnic groups. In some groups, factions evolved who became Hezbollah’s allies (“if you can’t beat them, join them.”). But with the heavy casualties inflicted on Hezbollah by Israel and the destruction of much of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure, the other ethnic groups felt freer to express their hostility. Even factions in other ethnic groups who had become Hezbollah’s allies started to distance themselves from it, with some of their leaders going so far as to say Hezbollah had become the enemy of Lebanon. This was a response to Hezbollah propaganda over the years, which has long declared the group to be “the protector of Lebanon“. In some non-Shiite areas, Hezbollah military personnel were physically attacked by members of the local ethnic groups to drive them away. Their main argument was, you are a threat to us because if you operate from here, the Israelis will attack you and we will be forced to abandon our homes. In most non-Shiite areas, Shiite civilian evacuees were blocked from entering, sometimes even with violence – “You brought this disaster upon yourselves and you are not welcome here.”
There was, in essence, a settling of ethnic scores. At least half a million Syrians who had fled the Syrian Civil War to Lebanon returned to Syria, and a couple of hundred thousand Lebanese Shiites left along with them. According to the new head of Hezbollah, Naim Qassem, in a speech on 5th December, approximately 233,500 Shiite families were forced to evacuate their homes and Hezbollah will reimburse them with money received from Iran.
While striking mostly weapons and weapons stores, the Israeli aerial offensive also included an effort to kill off the Hezbollah command hierarchy. A long list of Hezbollah senior commanders and staff officers were killed, culminating in the killing of Hezbollah’s supreme leader, Hassan Nasrallah, on 27th September. In some cases, the replacements of the killed commanders were also killed within days of being appointed. Beyond the physical effect of the loss of all these commanders, the repeated Israeli successes created a morale crisis in Hezbollah: how was the IDF finding these people so precisely? Gradually, the IDF began going down the command hierarchy – focusing on division commanders, brigade commanders, battalion commanders and their staff officers.
All together, according to the IDF website, the Israeli air force bombed 12,500 targets throughout Lebanon: of these 360 were in Beirut, approximately 1,000 in the Bekaa Valley, and the rest in southern Lebanon to a depth of about 60 kilometers from the Israel-Lebanon border. The targets included more than 1,600 headquarters and command posts from the company level all the way up to the supreme Hezbollah command headquarters and more than 1,000 major weapons storage sites, plus thousands of small storage sites that each held only a single launcher or exploding drone or small amounts of ammunition.
Hezbollah responded by doubling its strategic artillery fire to a few hundred rounds per day, but its attempts to create the concentrations of the kind it had planned, of several thousand per day, failed, as its storage and launch sites were hit before the weapons could be prepared and fired. Furthermore, the numerous casualties among Hezbollah’s command, operational and administrative staffs created confusion and difficulty in organizing the forces required to achieve such huge salvos – especially because the Israeli strikes on storage sites required replanning and moving surviving launchers and munitions to the pre-existing or new launch sites. To survive and keep fighting, Hezbollah’s artillery forces abandoned mass concentrations, which take time and preparation, and instead made do with much smaller salvos. Gradually, as the Israeli offensive continued, the number of munitions fired per day by Hezbollah dropped from an average of 200-250 to 100-150 and then to about 50-100 per day, with individual salvos numbering only 1-10 munitions. In a major effort a couple of days before the ceasefire, they managed to fire approximately 250 munitions in one day, but then the number dropped again on the following days till the final ceasefire.
Altogether, from 8th October 2023 till the ceasefire on 27 November 2024 (416 days), Hezbollah launched approximately 16,000 munitions into Israel: approximately 15,000 rockets, 500 exploding drones, and several hundred guided anti-tank missiles. The majority were fired into villages and towns and Israeli army positions and bases within 20 kilometers of the border, but many were fired further south on Haifa (approximately 35 kilometers south of the border) and a few even at Tel Aviv (approximately 125 kilometers south of the border). A few thousand were intercepted and the majority landed in empty areas.
Approximately 1,000 munitions hit residential, civilian and military infrastructure targets, killing 77 Israelis (47 civilians and 30 soldiers) and directly or indirectly wounding several thousand people. There is no available means to accurately break down the numbers of wounded between soldiers and civilians, but the vast majority of Israelis wounded by Hezbollah artillery fire into Israel were civilians. Wounded civilians include many who were hurt while rushing to shelters (for example, the daughter of one of the author’s friends, who tripped and suffered bone fractures and tissue damage to her leg). There were also a few fatalities in such incidents (civilians falling down stairs, rushing across a road and being hit by a car, etc.), especially among the elderly.
It should be noted that the majority of targets struck by Hezbollah were empty buildings in the evacuated Israeli villages, so the number of civilian casualties was lower than would it would have been had the villages been attacked prior to evacuation – as Hezbollah originally planned to do. This is especially true as the warning time to reach shelters in these villages would have been 5-15 seconds.
Hezbollah claims it hit these buildings because IDF personnel were located in them after the evacuation of the Israeli civilians, but the vast majority were empty. (Some civilians who refused to evacuate were among the casualties.) However, Hezbollah also fired into cities, towns and villages that were further south and had not been evacuated, causing casualties there too. Among the most numerous casualties were civilians working in agricultural fields not far from the border, as some farmers refused to lose their entire annual crop and attempted to harvest what they could or had to attend to their poultry, cattle and sheep (quite a number of the livestock were also killed).
Hezbollah also targeted the Israeli gas rigs in the Mediterranean Sea with rockets, missiles, regular exploding drones and submersible exploding drones, but apparently none were hit.
During the evening of 30th September, IDF ground forces crossed the border into Lebanon in a series of attacks towards known locations of Hezbollah staging sites for its planned offensive into Israel. As noted above, these sites were dug underneath Lebanese villages adjacent to the border and in some cases in the open ground between these villages. Gradually the IDF ground forces were increased and new areas added.
The villages and areas between them that were entered by the IDF units were combed thoroughly, house by house, room by room, to locate above-ground weapons stores and entrances to the underground complexes built by Hezbollah under each village and in areas between them. Once those complexes were found, they were entered and combed as well. The IDF discovered huge stockpiles of weapons (anti-tank missile launchers and missiles, light and medium mortars, machine guns of all sizes, rifles) and other equipment. Depending on the case, these were either taken back to Israel or destroyed on the spot. The tunnels that were discovered were all demolished with explosives. In one location, a store of 400 tons of explosives was found (mines, bombs and demolition charges). This store was exploded, setting off earthquake warning seismographs across northern and central Israel.
These sites had been prepared by Hezbollah to serve as assembly and jump-off areas for an attack into Israel. The idea was that Hezbollah personnel would reach the forward villages as “unarmed innocent civilians”, equip themselves, and then cross the border in a rush, as Hamas did along the Gaza border last year (the Hamas plan was developed according to the Hezbollah pattern, which had been in preparation since 2010). By the time of the ceasefire, the IDF had sent units to a depth of 5-6 kilometers into Lebanon. Before the offensive, there was an internal debate in Israel about whether to make do with only the forward zone of Hezbollah’s preparations or advance 15 to 20 kilometers, or perhaps as far as the Litani River. Apparently the decision was to make do with the minimalist approach.
All together, the ground forces collected about 155,000 pieces of equipment, including:
- about 12,000 pieces of explosive ordnance (ammunition, exploding-drones and IEDs)
- hundreds of anti-tank medium and heavy guided missile launchers, light anti-tank rocket launchers and man-portable anti-aircraft launchers and more than 12,000 munitions for all these launchers
- more than 121,000 documents, computers, radio sets and other electronic equipment.
Huge uncounted amounts of equipment were destroyed on site.
In most areas, fighting with Hezbollah ground forces was not extremely intense as most withdrew. However, in a number of areas, the Hezbollah forces did attempt to hold their ground or conduct counterattacks. As the fighting continued and Hezbollah recovered from the initial shock of Israel’s successes, it increased in intensity. In total, by the beginning of the ceasefire, 40 Israeli soldiers had been killed and several hundred wounded (there is no accurate official figure).
After the ceasefire, the Lebanese government reported a total of approximately 4,050 Lebanese killed and 16,600 wounded since the beginning of the war on 8th October 2024. They do not distinguish between civilians and combatants; nor do they distinguish between the various affiliations. The IDF has confirmed that at least 2,500 of those killed were Hezbollah personnel. Photographs and videos from southern Lebanon outside the area held by the IDF (published on social media by the locals) show numerous funerals being conducted with Hezbollah flags draped on the coffins. It is very likely that these include many about whom the IDF does not have information, and likewise in the more northern areas of Lebanon.
The Lebanese public media have stated that 45 Lebanese army personnel were killed. The other military organizations have not updated their official numbers, but obituaries and general statements suggest that they number several hundred. At least one of the killed was from an Iraqi pro-Iranian militia who had come to fight with Hezbollah. There were rumors in the past of Iraqi personnel coming to fight in Lebanon, but nothing concrete was published. At the very least, there were 3,000-3,200 Lebanese combatants of all affiliations killed and probably as many as 8,000 wounded.
Hezbollah has suffered a total reduction in force of perhaps 10,000 personnel. (Some were lightly wounded and returned to fight; photographs and videos published by Hezbollah showed men who had lost fingers in the pager explosions returning to action in rocket launcher units.) It is not possible to distinguish between Hezbollah personnel killed by Israeli airstrikes throughout Lebanon and those killed in the ground fighting in the south.
A World Bank study estimates that across all of Lebanon, about 100,000 buildings were damaged (with various levels of damage, ranging from totally demolished to structural damage to superficial damage). The number of destroyed and damaged buildings in Israel has not been published, but according to anecdotal information, there are probably thousands. The majority of the destroyed and severely damaged buildings are in northern Israeli, but some are also in central Israel (mostly sustaining superficial damage from fragments of intercepted missiles and drones and the intercepting missiles). This number does not include damage from Iranian, Iraqi and Yemenite attacks on Israel, which probably add several thousand more.
Syria:
Almost immediately after the beginning of the Israel-Hezbollah ceasefire, the Syrian rebels concentrated in Idlib province broke their ceasefire agreement with the Syrian regime (officially in place since March 2020, though there have in fact been intermittent exchanges of fire since then) and conducted a full-scale offensive against the regime. By the morning of 8th December, the Assad regime had collapsed.
The last time a similar crisis occurred, approximately 10 years ago, many expected the Assad regime to fall quickly, yet it survived and even seemed to thrive. This time, the rapidity of the collapse suggests that more than a rebel success, it was an internal failure of the Assad regime that caused it to collapse from within.
Technically, this is not an Israeli issue, but it could affect Israel’s security in these ways:
- On the positive side, if the Sunni rebels take control of Syria, Iran will no longer be able to use it in future as a base for operations against Israel – whether directly (attacking Israel via Syria) or indirectly (replenishing Hezbollah via Syria, which was their main route of supply until today). Iran and Hezbollah have already blamed Israel for instigating the rebel offensive for this very reason. Initially, Hezbollah forces were sent to reinforce the Syrian border and an enclave beyond it. However, the latest reports are that all Hezbollah forces in Syrian territory have retreated, and at least one of their retreating convoys was attacked by Israeli aircraft. Also, an attempt – or at least a statement of intent – to reinforce the Assad regime with Iranian proxy forces and actual Iranian forces did not materialize.
- On the negative side, the Sunni rebels are led by extreme jihadis, the local chapter of al-Qaeda (though they are currently trying to hide this affiliation). Israel will now have a common border with jihadi Sunnis instead of jihadi Shiites. It is not likely that the jihadi Sunnis will be free to act against Israel immediately after taking control of Syria, but in the medium to long term, they could become every bit as serious a menace as Hamas, but with much greater resources, freedom to import weapons, and so on.
Turkey, ruled by the local chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood (Hamas’s parent organization), is a much more powerful threat than Iran. It is richer, has better technology and a much more powerful military, and is a member of NATO, with access to its capabilities and information. Its leaders have been threatening Israel for years, though they have never explicitly declared an intention to eradicate it. A few months ago, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to involve the Turkish military in the war against Israel (not for the first time). He has already declared economic sanctions on Israel. Turkey is geographically closer to Israel and has a powerful Western-style air force (235 American F16s and almost 20 upgraded F4s), as well as one of the most powerful navies in the Mediterranean Sea (13 submarines, 43 combat surface ships, and the ability to simultaneously land two brigades of ground troops from the sea) with direct access to Israel by sea (about 450 kilometers by the shortest route).
In the longer term, the replacement of a jihadi Shiite alliance dominated by Iran with a jihadi Sunni alliance backed/dominated by Turkey is not necessarily an improvement for Israel.
Though, as noted, it is unlikely that the new regime will immediately attack Israel, the Israeli government decided not to take chances. Early this morning, 8th December, the IDF began an aerial offensive aimed at destroying Syria’s arsenal of strategic weaponry: chemical weapons stores and manufacturing sites, surface-to-surface missile stores and manufacturing sites, advanced anti-aircraft batteries, and probably also combat aircraft. Whatever the immediate, medium-term or long-term intentions of the rebels may be, these are not weapons Israel wants them to have.
IDF ground units have reportedly crossed the border in at least two areas, near the town of Quneitra and on Hermon Mountain – but their exact mission has not been reported. Israeli ground forces on the Golan have been reinforced in case the rebels decide to “spill” the fighting over into Israeli territory.
During the original 10-year civil war, this happened quite often. In some cases, the “spillage” was accidental and in others it was deliberate. Artillery fire between the rebels and the regime forces landed occasionally in Israeli territory, and there were even some casualties. There were also several small raids in which Hezbollah or ISIS attempted to cross the Israeli border.
At the height of the fighting, the border area on the Syrian side was divided into three sectors. In the north, it was controlled by regime forces and Hezbollah. The center was held by al-Qaeda-affiliated rebels (the ones now replacing Assad’s regime). The south was in the hands of ISIS. At the time, the al-Qaeda affiliate had its hands full fighting the other two forces, so it was meticulous about not provoking Israel. In a sense, it was defending Israel from the other two. Israel provided huge amounts of humanitarian assistance to the civilians in that area. It received sick and wounded Syrians with no questions asked about whether they were civilians or combatants or on which side. Israel brought them into Israel for hospital care and then returned them to Syria.
Gaza:
The US made a statement that Hamas has refused to accept the latest negotiation proposal and the US is therefore demanding that Qatar evict all Hamas representatives from their country. The Qataris have not made an official response to this demand, but Hamas claims that it has not received an order to move out. Qatar has said it will no longer serve as a mediator until both sides get “serious”. Now, following the defeat of Hezbollah and the implementation of a ceasefire in Lebanon, attempts have been renewed to achieve a ceasefire in Gaza too. However, at least for the time being, neither side has expressed any willingness to change the conditions it demands for a ceasefire, so it is not clear that anything will happen.
The last update described an Israeli operation to cut off the towns north of Gaza City and clear them of a renewed concentration of a few thousand Hamas and other groups’ combatants. The fighting there has been fairly intensive. Thirty-four Israeli soldiers (including the commander of an armored brigade) were killed (30 since my last update). The IDF has not provided details, but extrapolating from partial information, several hundred Hamas terrorists were killed in this fighting (perhaps as many as 500). Many hundreds of Hamas terrorists have surrendered (perhaps almost 1,000).
Several tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians who had returned to the towns north of Gaza City (Beyt Lahiya, Jabalya and Beyt Hanoun) after the IDF withdrew from them about half a year ago were told to leave through safe-passage corridors. They were screened en route, and dozens of suspected terrorists attempting to leave with them were detained. Suspects who were cleared after interrogation were released.
Meanwhile, the IDF has continued to conduct ground raids and airstrikes in various areas based on intelligence information.
The Hamas Ministry of Health has updated the number of Palestinian casualties since the beginning of the war to 44,665 killed and nearly 106,000 wounded. According to the IDF numbers of those killed, more than 17,000 are Hamas personnel and approximately 3,000 are members of other terrorist organizations.
The UN and others continue to complain that Israel is not allowing sufficient supplies of food to enter Gaza. In fact, there are daily supplies entering, but they are not being distributed by Hamas and the relief organizations. At any given moment, there are hundreds of truckloads of food sitting in warehouses inside Gaza.
Israel does not control populated areas in Gaza and is not in charge of distributing supplies. That is the role of the Hamas government and the relief organizations. Furthermore, most of the supplies are stolen by Hamas for its own use, including selling them on the open market at exorbitant prices instead of handing them out for free, as the donors intended. Other armed groups have taken over truck convoys for themselves as well. There have also been firefights between Hamas and other groups over aid trucks and their loads. UNRWA has even stated that certain routes will no longer be used for transporting aid because of attacks by armed gangs.
One aid convoy searched by the Israelis was found to have weapons concealed in the food.
Israel has declared that it will cease to cooperate with UNRWA the end of January 2025. The organization is and has always been complicit in terrorist activities. It has provided support and education based on Hamas’s exterminationist, antisemitic agenda, and among its employees are Hamas personnel who participated in the 7th October attack and in the fighting since. Its facilities are used by Hamas and other organizations with impunity, and it has never done anything to rid itself of any of these taints.
Judea and Samaria:
The IDF continues to conduct raids of various sizes targeting Palestinian terrorists.
The Palestinians claim that the IDF has arrested almost 12,000 people (about 700 more since my last update), though the latest IDF numbers are approximately half of this. The difference is probably between those detained for questioning and later released and those arrested and incarcerated. The Palestinians have reported that 805 Palestinians have been killed. At least 750, possibly more, were terrorists, some of whom were killed while in the act of attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians and the majority of whom were killed while fighting the IDF during itsoperations against terrorists inside Palestinian Authority areas. The Palestinians have not provided an updated number of wounded since 21st September 2024, but taking into account partial incident reports, there have been a few hundred more than there were at that point, so they probably now total about 5,500 (without distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants). These numbers include casualties incurred during the fighting between Palestinian factions.
Israeli casualties in Judea and Samaria since 7th October 2023 are 31 Israeli civilians killed and 23 soldiers/police killed and 390 wounded, most of them civilians.
There have incidents recently between the IDF and local Israelis who threw stones at IDF troops in very specific areas. These occurred after the IDF intervened in incidents between Palestinian and Israeli civilians and forced the Israelis to leave the vicinity of a Palestinian village. Of course, each side – the Palestinian and Israeli civilians – blamed the other for starting the incidents in the first place.
Iran:
On 26th October 2024, Israel responded to the Iranian missile attack (1st October) reported in the last update with an aerial attack on a variety of Iranian facilities. Three or four of Iran’s most advanced anti-aircraft missile batteries were destroyed, and then a number of military industrial sites for manufacturing surface-to-surface missiles were hit with air-launched missiles. One of the sites was apparently Iran’s main manufacturer of solid missile fuel. Without this capability, the Iranians can no longer manufacture the missiles themselves. It is estimated that Iran will need at least two years to rebuild this capability, unless someone provides them with fully ready-to-use replacement machinery. However, these are not the sorts of machines that are kept in the storeroom, and in any case, Iran’s possible suppliers – Russia, North Korea and China – are not likely to hand over such machinery to Iran.
Yemen, Iraq and Syria:
The Houthis and Iraqi Hezbollah continued to fire exploding drones and missiles towards Israel, virtually all of which were intercepted. Since 7th October 2023, Iraqi Hezbollah has launched 280 exploding drones and missiles at Israel and the Yemenite Houthis have launched 202.
In response, Israel attacked a camp in eastern Syria housing several Iranian proxy groups, apparently killing dozens of their members. There is no official figure of casualties, but the highest number reported is 92 killed from a number of groups, including a few Hezbollah personnel.
Global:
On 7th-8th November, in Holland, local Muslims attacked fans of a visiting Israeli soccer team that had just played a Dutch team. Ten Israelis were wounded, of whom five required hospitalization.
There have been a number of threats of terrorist attacks against Israelis and Jews across the world, in Europe, Thailand, Sri Lanka, and elsewhere.
Iran and proxies vs USA and allies:
The Houthis continue to report occasional attacks on merchant ships north and south of the Bab al-Mandeb Straits between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Since 7th October 2023 they have conducted such attacks approximately 350 times.
In one case they apparently (for the second time in a few months) attempted to directly hit American naval vessels. They missed. Seemingly in response, there was an American strike against the Houthis that was bigger than the usual strikes.
The Houthis claim to have shot down another American aerial drone, the thirteenth since the war began.
There have also been a number of attacks on American troops in Iraq and Syria, though only a few appear to have been wounded.
International forums:
The International Criminal Court has issued warrants for the arrest of Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Yoav Galant (who was fired by Netanyahu at the beginning of November). It also issued an arrest warrant for the dead Hamas military commander Muhammad Deif.
The European Union, Britain, Ireland, France, Holland, Italy, Canada, Norway, Belgium and South Africa unsurprisingly declared support for this decision by the ICC. The United States and Hungary stated unequivocally that they are against it. Germany, Bulgaria and Romania gave statements that are more diplomatically nuanced but which in essence disapprove of the decision.
The United Nations Security Council voted to demand a ceasefire in Gaza. The United States vetoed the decision, stating that any such demand that does not include an immediate release of all the Israeli kidnappees is wrong and unworthy.
WHAT NEXT?
Currently the two leading questions for the immediate future are:
- Will the ceasefire with Hezbollah hold?
- Will the defeat of Hezbollah pressure Hamas to follow suit and reduce its demands vis-à-vis Israel?
As to the first question: With the defeat of Hezbollah’s ally, the Assad regime, by extreme Sunni rebels who regard Hezbollah as infidels and who have a serious score to settle with them over Hezbollah’s actions in the Syrian Civil War, Hezbollah now has to worry about a second front. To add to Hezbollah’s troubles, Iran will now find it much more difficult to replenish the group with arms. Therefore, the probability of renewed escalation of fighting between Israel and Hezbollah has diminished considerably. The probability is NOT zero, as Hezbollah may feel capable of conducting some low-intensity operations. However, for the foreseeable future, the group is not likely to attempt to renew full-scale high-intensity combat with Israel.
The second question is more difficult to answer. Hamas believes it can maintain the current situation for a long time, and is applying psychological pressure on the Israeli public by releasing videos of kidnappees who are still alive and begging to be freed. The issue there is still an open one.
A third question, for the slightly longer term, is what the policy will be of the new American president after he is inaugurated on 20th January 2025. Donald Trump will have issues to deal with that are certainly more important for the US, but the current war is a very emotional issue that might require his attention. The Biden administration provided Israel with a great deal of support but also curtailed Israel’s freedom of action, thereby lengthening the war and making Hamas less willing to make concessions. Will Trump provide complete backing and support for Israel? If so, how will that affect Hamas’s position?
The fourth, even longer-term question is how the change of regime in Syria will affect the areas around that country, including Israel. Has one enemy of Israel merely been replaced by another – one that, in some respects (not including Iran’s pursuit of nuclear bombs), is even more dangerous to Israel? As noted, Israel has decided to not take chances and has begun to attack Syrian strategic weapons stores.
In addition to the possibility of a direct confrontation initiated by the new Syrian regime, there are other possible sources of friction. One is the issue of the new regime’s treatment of the Druze minority in Syria. Historically, the Druze have been persecuted by the Sunni Arab majority for being heretics. During the civil war, there were cases in which religious Sunni organizations attacked areas inhabited by Druze, captured the areas, and forced the residents to convert or killed them outright.
Israel has a sizeable Druze community who consider themselves Israeli and who serve in the Israeli military with distinction. One of the Syrian Druze areas is adjacent to the northern part of the border with Israel. When this area was attacked by al-Qaeda affiliates approximately 10 years ago, the Israeli Druze community demanded that Israel protect their brethren in Syria. Given Israel’s relations with the attacking al-Qaeda forces, it was enough for Israel to talk to them to halt the attacks. But what if the new regime resumes its attacks on the Syrian Druze? It is highly likely that the Israeli Druze would demand once again that Israel step up to protect their ethnic brethren. Would diplomacy suffice, or would Israel have to use military force? These villages are near the border. What about Druze communities further away? How far would Israel be willing to go to confront the new regime for this purpose?
****
28 September – 17 October 2024
WHAT HAS HAPPENED?
Lebanon:
The last update ended with the death of Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an underground command post in Lebanon by Israeli aircraft. The aircraft dropped approximately 80 bombs to gradually excavate a passage through the earthen and concrete walls of the bunker. His body was found with no external physical injuries, so he was apparently killed by the concussion waves.
Hezbollah’s official response to Nasrallah’s death did not involve a dramatic escalation in the number of rockets, missiles and exploding drones fired into Israel, suggesting that the group is finding it difficult to collect munitions and operate launchers from its surviving storage sites. The rate of daily launches has gradually risen, but not to the intensity expected and planned for by Hezbollah before the war. Hezbollah originally had the capability to launch up to 4,000 rockets per day – a figure equivalent to the total number they launched in the entirety of the month-long Second Lebanon War. As of now, even on the most intensive days, Hezbollah manages to launch 250-300 rockets, missiles and exploding drones toward Israel, and on most days, the numbers are closer to 150-200.
Sometimes, launchers are destroyed shortly after they launch munitions, which prevents their being reloaded and reused. Some of Hezbollah’s rockets are landing in Palestinian areas in Samaria (northern West Bank), and one even overshot Israel altogether and landed in Jordan.
The IDF has reported that since 8 October 2023, when Hezbollah began firing into Israel, a total of approximately 13,000 rockets, exploding drones and missiles have been fired from Lebanon. Since then, at least another thousand or so munitions have been fired into Israel, with some aimed at the Tel Aviv area. Over the past month, three Israeli civilians and one Thai civilian working in Israel were killed by Hezbollah (bringing the total to 30 since the war began), and a few dozen civilians were wounded. Four soldiers were killed and 67 wounded when an exploding drone slipped through undetected and hit the dining room of an IDF base south of Haifa.
While the aerial offensive was in progress, several IDF reserve brigades were remobilized from home and sent north to join regular brigades that had been sent north from Gaza over the past few months.
Beginning in late September, the IDF began publishing evacuation notices for more and more villages in southern Lebanon. The list of villages has gradually grown to include some that are further north of the border. The evacuees are being told to move north of the Awali River, 40-60 kilometers north of the border (distances vary with the shape of the border and the winding route of the river).
After killing some of Hezbollah’s senior commanders in south Lebanon, the IDF turned its airstrikes in that area toward lower-level commanders of battalions and companies, with occasional strikes on the appointed replacements of killed or wounded senior commanders.
During the evening of 30 September, three IDF brigades entered Lebanon. There are hints that prior to this mass entry there were, over the past months, smaller special forces operations to collect intelligence or target specific locations. By 11 October at least six more IDF brigades had begun to enter Lebanon. Another brigade has been mobilized and is preparing to enter Lebanon as well.
Each brigade is attacking in a separate sector, so the operations are being conducted across almost the entire border. The distance from the westernmost to the easternmost points of the border is about 50 kilometers as the crow flies, but because of the border’s winding shape, it is in fact approximately 110 kilometers.
The border runs along a ridge line of hill crests. In some areas the Lebanese side is higher; in others, the Israeli side is higher. The hills are mostly concave with steep slopes, and the ravines between the hills and ridges are mostly deep. This means that being on the crest often does not allow the bottoms of the slopes and the ravines to be observed. In addition, the hilly terrain is covered with bushes of various heights and in some areas dense small trees. The open areas are mostly agricultural fields containing cereals, orchards, and olive trees. The areas not cleared for agriculture are covered with rocks, making off-road or off-track movement difficult and slow.
So far, the advance has been fairly shallow: it has targeted the first line of Lebanese villages facing the border in which Hezbollah placed its weapons and prepared fighting positions and concentration points for an attack into Israel.
Each Shiite village in southern Lebanon is fortified and has approximately a reinforced company of infantry holding it as a defensive compound. Because the terrain is hilly, all roads pass through these villages, so they serve as blocking positions to inhibit road travel. Some villages are organized as battalion-sized defensive localities. There are also defensive positions between villages to prevent their being bypassed, with adjacent villages usually dominating the lower ground between them. In addition, there are Hezbollah fortifications in the dense brush-covered areas between separate villages, most of which include underground complexes with entrances hidden by brush and trees.
Large stores of weapons have been found in houses, in tunnels Hezbollah dug underneath the villages, and in the complexes between the villages. The official Hezbollah attack plan, as publicized by Hezbollah over the past decade and a half in its propaganda, looked very similar to the assault conducted by Hamas on 7 October (the Hamas plan was an adaptation of the Hezbollah plan), but with a force three times bigger and much better trained. The concentration points were prepared so the attacking Hezbollah forces could reach the Israeli border villages looking innocent. The plan was that they would not overtly carry weapons, but instead take the weapons and other equipment that was waiting for them in the houses and tunnels. They were then to attack into Israel from a very short distance, thus minimizing the early-warning time available to the IDF.
In addition to storage and defensive tunnels, there are quite a number of tunnels that lead to locations all the way up to the border (so units using them could pop up out of the ground and cross the border by surprise). One Hezbollah tunnel even crossed the border by about 10 meters. With regard to that last tunnel, it is not clear if this was an underground navigation error or intentional.
Nearly six years ago, the IDF blocked six tunnels that crossed the border at greater depths. The tunnels were blocked by streaming liquid concrete into them that gradually solidified. The liquid concrete poured out of the entrances to the tunnels, revealing their locations inside Lebanese villages – mostly inside buildings. Since then, no more cross-border tunnels had been detected until this one. This tunnel was filled with liquid concrete; the others were filled with explosives and detonated.
The initial fighting was intense, though IDF casualties have been relatively fairly light except in two incidents. But over time the intensity has gone down. It seems that many Hezbollah fighters retreated north rather than defend their positions. One captured fighter said that after the death of Nasrallah, many of his unit lost faith and left.
Most of the resistance encountered so far has been from remote-controlled bombs, mortars and long-range anti-tank missile fire. So far, 20 Israeli soldiers have been killed in the ground offensive in Lebanon. The total number of wounded has not been reported but is probably several times the number killed. Hezbollah and the other armed organizations have stopped declaring casualty figures, but many of their casualties are reported in social media or the local news. Each day, approximately 20 obituaries are published in southern Lebanon alone, which gives an idea of the extent of their casualties.
The IDF spokesperson has stated that at least 500 terrorists were killed from all the groups combined during the first 10 days of the ground offensive in Lebanon. Given partial reports since, the number is now probably above 1,000. This figure includes those killed in airstrikes in central and northern Lebanon. This brings the total Hezbollah personnel killed to at least 1,500. In addition, at least seven Hezbollah fighters surrendered to the Israeli forces that attacked their positions.
Typical obituaries of Hezbollah and Amal personnel (collected by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express)
Two Lebanese army soldiers have been killed and three wounded. Both of the killed soldiers were Shiites – i.e., from Hezbollah’s ethnic group. (The Lebanese army is organized along ethnic lines, with each unit composed of a single ethnic group). Before the Israeli ground offensive began, the majority of the Lebanese army units stationed in south Lebanon were ordered to withdraw northwards, away from the area expected to be entered by the IDF.
Officially, the Lebanese army is staying out of the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah. It is not clear if the personnel hit by Israeli fire were in those areas in an official capacity or were individual soldiers who had decided to stay and fight with Hezbollah.
There were also incidents in which Israeli fire accidently hit UNIFIL positions, wounding two soldiers from Indonesia and two from Sri Lanka. Israel had previously requested that all UNIFIL personnel evacuate the area so as not to get caught in the crossfire, but UNIFIL refused to comply.
UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon) was set up in spring 1978 after Israel, in response to repeated attacks by the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) from Lebanon (the last of which killed 35 Israelis, including a friend of the author of this update, and wounded 71), captured all the ground between the border and the Litani River. The area was handed over to UNIFIL, whose mission was to prevent the return of PLO terrorists into it. This they failed to do (or, more accurately, did not even attempt to do).
In 1982, Israel retook the ground (though UNIFIL remained there), and then withdrew in 2000. Once again, UNIFIL ignored the entry of terrorists – this time Hezbollah – into the area. In 2006, UNIFIL videoed the Hezbollah attack that precipitated the Second Lebanon War but did nothing to prevent it; indeed, at first it did not even admit to having the video.
After the 2006 Second Lebanon War, UNIFIL was enlarged and its mandate reiterated to prevent entry of any armed force other than the official Lebanese army. Yet again, it ignored the entry of Hezbollah and stood by passively as the terrorist group built up military positions in and between the villages on the border and massively increased its military capability. Many UNIFIL positions and camps have Hezbollah positions right on their perimeters.
Before the Israeli ground offensive began, Israel requested that UNIFIL evacuate the area to prevent its personnel from being harmed. UNIFIL refused, and is now complaining that some of the fire conducted by the IDF at Hezbollah positions nestled close to UNIFIL is hitting their positions. In one case, IDF tanks evading Hezbollah anti-tank missiles reversed into the gates of a UNIFIL position, waited for the Hezbollah fire to abate, and then moved to a different location.
As per form, European political leaders and UN senior staff are criticizing Israel for the incidents in which UNIFIL was accidentally hit, falsely claiming that it was done deliberately. They are all ignoring both UNIFIL’s total failure to fulfill its mandate to prevent terrorists from being there in the first place and Israel’s request that the UNIFIL troops move away from its area of operations.
Meanwhile, a German military ship operating in cooperation with UNIFIL reported shooting down a drone off the shore of Lebanon. It was not reported whether this drone was Hezbollah’s or Israel’s. It should be noted that Germany is one of the few European states that has consistently supported Israel in this war and has officially declared that it will not join the embargo against Israel of military goods declared by France, Britain (a partial embargo), Italy and Holland.
The ground fighting in the south has not reduced Israeli air strikes in central and northern Lebanon, especially not in the Dakhya quarter of Beirut, where Hezbollah’s main command and storage areas are concentrated (though there was a three-day halt in bombing in that area). The IDF has repeatedly ordered civilians to move out of the area in general and in specific buildings before bombing them.
The IDF has attacked more senior leaders of Hezbollah, killing the man slated to replace Nasrallah as well as many other commanders and senior staff officers. One attack struck Hezbollah’s intelligence headquarters. Others struck weapons storage sites, setting off secondary explosions. One such attack destroyed a large portion of Hezbollah’s shore-to-ship missiles, which included Russian (Yakhont) and Chinese (C-802) models.
Prior to attacking Hezbollah storage sites, the IDF publishes evacuation warnings to the population living in the area, providing the exact addresses to be evacuated (see example above). In most cases, the targeted facilities are underground, so the dropped bombs explode only after penetrating into the ground. In other cases, the targets are specific apartments that are attacked with small warheads to limit collateral damage.
Translation of a typical warning published by the IDF of a specific target building in the Dakhya quarter (the original is in Arabic)
Israeli aircraft has also attacked a variety of crossings between Lebanon and Syria that are used to transport weapons, equipment and perhaps also combat personnel from Syria to Lebanon. Large bombs were dropped to crater the narrow mountain routes, with occasional repeat strikes conducted when there were signs of repairs being done to reopen them. Initially these were all side routes. Israel warned the Lebanese government that if it detected that official border crossings were being used for the same purposes, they too would be attacked. One such crossing was attacked a few days later, with an evacuation warning given in advance to prevent civilian casualties. Foot traffic continues, but the craters prevent vehicles from crossing.
At least 460,000 people have left Lebanon for Syria through the border crossings. The majority are Syrians who had fled from Syria to Lebanon during the civil war there (2011-2020). The others are Lebanese.
Attempts to land aircraft carrying military supplies from Iran and Iraq at Beirut Airport were also warned off by Israel. In a couple of cases, the Israelis took control of the air traffic control frequency of the airport and ordered specific aircraft not to land or risk being attacked. Other than this, air traffic continues.
On 16 October, the Lebanese Ministry of Health reported that since the beginning of the war on 8 October 2024, 2,412 Lebanese have been killed and 11,285 wounded. It has not distinguished between combatants and non-combatants, but comparing the IDF statements, Hezbollah statements and published obituaries, at least 1,500 are Hezbollah terrorists and at least a couple of hundred more from other armed organizations. The number is likely to be higher given the halting of official casualty statements by Hezbollah and the other armed organizations, so the numbers that are available are based on partial sources.
The Lebanese government also stated that about 1.4 million Lebanese have evacuated the combat zones in southern Lebanon, the Dakhya quarter of Beirut, and several other Shiite towns and villages in northeastern Lebanon that were warned by Israel to distance themselves from Hezbollah strongpoints, storage sites and other facilities.
In addition to attacking Hezbollah and its allies in Lebanon, Israel is also attacking Hamas personnel there. This includes killing a number of high-ranking personnel and destroying various storage sites.
A second front between Hezbollah and Israel is escalating in Syria. Israeli air strikes in Syria against Hezbollah and Iranian facilities are not new, but over the past couple of months, they have increased in frequency. More pointedly, the IDF has attacked areas not previously struck, including areas in the vicinity of Russian bases in Syria. No Russian base has been attacked, but the proximity to these bases – and the fact that Russian air defenses have not attempted to intervene to defend the targets of these strikes – has raised suspicions in Syria that Israel and Russia have a tacit agreement in place allowing the Israelis to conduct these attacks. The latest targets are storage sites of weapons being transferred to Hezbollah from Iran via Syria.
It was recently reported that at least some Russian troops stationed on Syria’s border with Israel have evacuated their positions and that Israeli ground troops have conducted a number of operations inside Syrian territory adjacent to the border to remove or replace ground obstacles.
A Syrian dissident group has published a report claiming that the Assad government is feeling pressure to prevent Israel from attacking him directly if he gives the Iranians and Hezbollah too much freedom to operate in Syria. According to the group, Assad has published an instruction defining various restrictions on Hezbollah and pro-Iranian militias in Syria – especially in areas near Syria’s border with Israel.
Iran – Israel:
On the evening of 1 October, Iran launched 180 ballistic missiles at Israel. This was Iran’s retaliation strike for the killings of Ismail Haniyeh, Hamas’s political chief, when he was in Tehran; Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah; and a number of high-ranking Iranians while they were meeting Hezbollah senior staff (including one who was killed together with Nasrallah). Twelve of the Iranian missiles were apparently shot down by US forces, but the majority were shot down by the IDF. Some landed in open areas and a few in IDF air bases, but the damage was minimal. Satellite imagery of the strikes has been published by western media.
One Palestinian from Gaza who had moved to the Palestinian city of Jericho (east of Jerusalem) was killed by a piece of a missile engine that fell on him from an intercepted missile. Most of the damage in Israel was of this sort – fragments of missiles falling from the sky. Very few hit with their warheads intact. Varying levels of damage were caused to many residential, shopping and office buildings, but only three Israeli civilians were wounded.
Remnants of an Iranian missile
Another Iranian effort against Israel has been to enlist Israelis to operate against their own state for pay. Over the past year, several such people have been captured by Israel’s security agency. Iranian attempts to enlist Israelis are conducted by befriending them on social media. First, they are used to publish inflammatory propaganda on social media and to put up graffiti and placards designed to aggravate internal political tensions in Israel. Gradually, they are asked to provide seemingly “innocent” pieces of intelligence before being asked to provide information on military sites. Over the past couple of months, a few were ordered to try to assassinate Israeli politicians and at least one scientist. So far, no such attempt has occurred because the would-be perpetrators were all captured in advance. The two underlying traits common to the enlisted persons were poverty (one was a failed businessman, a couple were elderly women, and a couple were either unemployed or had very low-income employment) and a somewhat disconnected social background (either relatively new immigrants with no local family ties or “loners”).
A separate effort by the Iranians is to try to hack computers of Israeli academics and political or strategic think tanks. This is usually attempted through false-identity emails supposedly sent by other Israeli or non-Israeli academics purporting to be academic queries or invitations to attend conventions or joint research programs. These emails include innocent-looking malware (documents on the details of the query or invitation) which, if downloaded, penetrates the computer and allows the hackers to use it.
Gaza:
In Gaza the fighting continues at the same reduced pace.
An Israeli unit operating in the southern area of the Gaza Strip encountered three terrorists who fled into two separate houses. The Israelis fired tank shells into the house and then sent a small drone to check, whereupon they fired another tank shell and sent in an infantry team to check on the results.
In one of the houses, the soldiers found the body of Yihya Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, who planned and ordered the 7 October 2023 attack on Israel and who, after the killing of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on 31 July 2024, was appointed the chief political leader of the entire Hamas movement. A Hamas battalion commander with him was also killed. In a separate encounter, the commander of Hamas’s Rafah brigade was killed.
The IDF continues to solidify its control over the Philadelphi Corridor along the border between Gaza and Egypt and the Netzarim Corridor between Gaza City in the north of Gaza and the rest of the Gaza Strip. This includes continued combing of the ground to detect hideaways, storage sites and tunnels, which are then destroyed. IDF troops are also building infrastructure for their own use, including roads, protected positions and logistical facilities.
They are also conducting small raids to prevent attacks on the corridor areas by terrorists who are located beyond them. It was one of these raids that encountered Sinwar. In another small raid, a young Yazidi woman who was kidnapped by ISIS in Iraq 10 years ago, when she was 11 years old, was rescued by the IDF and sent to join her family. She had been sold by ISIS to Hamas and transported to Gaza, where she spent most of her decade-long captivity.
Over the past few days, the IDF initiated another large-scale raid into northern Gaza, surrounding the towns of Jabalya, Beyt Hanoun and Beyt Lahiya and cutting them off from Gaza City to their south. The IDF first communicated to any civilians still living in these towns to evacuate south and gave them a couple of days to do so. Hamas tried to prevent civilians from evacuating, but there were photographs in social media of people walking along the designated routes. An IDF division then moved in around the towns to surround them and began conducting clearing operations inside them. There have been complaints on social media by local inhabitants that Hamas tried to prevent them from leaving.
The IDF also continues to hunt and kill senior Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad staff in areas where it is not present. Collected intelligence provides locations and airstrikes are then conducted by manned aircraft, drones or attack helicopters, depending on the location. Also attacked in a similar manner are small concentrations of terrorists using schools, mosques, UNRWA facilities, and other public facilities for cover. As usual, after each strike, Hamas claims that none of the casualties were terrorists and the Israelis publish the names of the confirmed terrorists who were in fact killed in the strikes.
The Hamas Ministry of Health’s latest casualty figures claim that since the beginning of the war nearly 42,500 Palestinians have been killed (1,000 more since 21 September) and more than 99,000 wounded (approximately 3,000 more since 21 September). Hamas does not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.
During this period, four Israeli soldiers were killed and an unknown number wounded. One soldier wounded in June in Gaza died in the hospital.
The issue of humanitarian support for the Gazan population has risen again, this time with accusations that Israel is deliberately preventing the entry of food in order to create a famine. This claim has been repeated a number of times and refuted every time. The problem in Gaza is not lack of food and other necessities. It is that Hamas controls their distribution. Thus, for example, several days ago, an entire convoy of about 50 trucks was stopped and ransacked by Hamas personnel.
The aid materials taken by Hamas are not distributed equitably or for free. Hamas provides the goods to its own people first and then sells the remainder to the civilian population to raise money to pay salaries. On 17 October, aircraft from the Gulf Emirates (coordinated with Israel) parachuted supplies for the civilian population into the safe area designated by Israel. A few parachutes failed to open and some packages fell at full speed, killing an 81-year-old man.
Meanwhile, another 182,000 Gazan children have been vaccinated against polio for a total of 742,000 since the beginning of September.
Judea and Samaria:
Simultaneously with the Iranian missile attack on Israel, two terrorists from Hebron infiltrated Israel and attacked a tram in Jaffa with automatic rifle fire, killing seven and wounding 16. Before attacking the Jews, the terrorists went to an adjacent mosque, fired a few shots in the air, and ordered the Muslim congregation not to come out. They then went to the nearby tramway station to conduct the attack. Both terrorists were killed by armed civilians and police. It is unlikely, though not impossible, that the attack’s timing was coordinated with the Iranian missile attack.
In another incident two weeks later, another infiltrator from the Hebron area, originally from Gaza, took up a position near a major highway in southern Israel and fired at passing cars. A policeman was killed who had approached the terrorist, unaware that that was what he was. A civilian medic who was called to treat the wounded thought at first that the terrorist was a policeman until he himself was shot at, whereupon he drew his own gun and killed the terrorist. In addition to the killed policeman, five civilians were wounded.
There has also been an increase in the number of attempts to conduct roadside bombing attacks on Israeli vehicles in Judea and Samaria. Initially these were mostly aimed at IDF units entering Palestinian areas to conduct arrests, but there have also been bombs placed in areas frequented by Israeli civilians. So far only a few Israeli casualties have been incurred in these incidents. Some of the bombs were discovered and detonated safely or disabled by the IDF and police.
The Palestinians claim that the IDF has arrested 11,300 people in Judea and Samaria, though the latest IDF numbers are approximately half this figure. The difference is probably explained by the number of those detained for questioning and later released versus those arrested and incarcerated.
The Palestinians have reported that 752 Palestinians have been killed. At least 700 and possibly more of these are terrorists, some of whom were killed while attacking Israeli soldiers and civilians and the majority while fighting against Israeli operations inside Palestinian Authority areas to arrest or kill terrorists. The Palestinians have not provided an updated number of wounded since 21 September, but taking into account partial incident reports, there have been a couple of hundred more since then, bringing the total to about 5,200 wounded – with no distinction made between combatants and non-combatants. There are also ongoing skirmishes between official Palestinian security forces and terrorist groups, so some of the deaths reported by the Palestinians could have occurred in that fighting.
Israeli Arabs:
Over the past few months there has been a surge in attacks and attempted attacks on Jews by Israeli Arabs.
One such attack, conducted by an Israeli Bedouin, occurred in the Beersheva central bus station. That attack killed a policewoman and wounded seven others.
Another occurred in Hadera. An Arab from a nearby town conducted a spree of stabbings, killing one and wounding eight before being shot and killed by armed civilians.
A number of arrests were made of Israeli Arabs prior to their intended attacks. One such group was planning to explode a car bomb in the Azrieli shopping mall in Tel Aviv.
Yemen:
On 29 September, the Israeli air force retaliated for the missiles launched by the Houthis against Israel over the months of August and September by striking port facilities and an electrical power plant belonging to the Houthis. The distance from Israel to the targets was approximately 1,800 kilometers and included in-flight refueling.
All told, since the beginning of the war in October 2023 the Houthis have fired approximately 180 missiles and exploding drones towards Israel. One managed to penetrate into Israel without being detected in time, killing one civilian and wounding approximately 10. A few more were detected but landed inside Israel, though the damage they caused was minimal and very few people were wounded.
Israel has responded twice, in July 2024 and now. The targets were similar in both cases: port infrastructure and oil storage facilities, with an electrical power plant added in the second attack.
Iraq:
Since the beginning of the war in October 2023, Iraqi Hezbollah (an umbrella name for several Iranian proxy organizations) has claimed to have fired a couple of hundred of missiles and exploding drones at Israel. However, the verified number is much smaller. Most were intercepted before hitting targets in Israel. The deadliest success occurred on 4 October, when two Israeli soldiers were killed and more than 20 wounded on the Golan Heights by an exploding drone launched from Iraq. Another drone in the same salvo was shot down.
Iran and its proxies vs the US and its allies:
The Houthis continue to report occasional attacks on merchant ships north and south of the Bab al-Mandeb Straits between the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. At least one more ship was hit by an exploding boat drone. They have also reported shooting down another American aerial drone, the eleventh they claim to have shot down.
The Americans and British countered as before, by intercepting Houthi missiles and exploding drones and conducting a number of airstrikes on Houthi territory (at the port of Hudeyda and targets further inland). The latest strike was apparently further inland and conducted by American B2 stealth bombers.
In Iraq there have been a number of attacks on American bases by Iraqi Hezbollah, but no casualties were reported. On 30 September, an immediate American aerial retaliation to a rocket attack on an American base near the border of Syria and Iraq killed nine Syrians or 18 Iraqis (depending on the source). Another attack on the same American base was reported by Iraqi Hezbollah this past week.
WHAT NEXT?
(See also the article by Professor Eitan Shamir, “Not an End State but a Long Game: Israel’s Strategic Goals in the Iron Swords War”, BESA Center for Strategic Studies)
The death of Hamas’s supreme leader Yihya Sinwar, like the death of Hezbollah’s supreme leader Hassan Nasrallah, has not finished the war and does not even necessarily signify the “beginning of the end”. Both leaders were important and killing them, along with many other leaders of both groups, is useful, but they were not the entire reason for the organizations’ existence. Even if their replacements are less competent and/or charismatic, the organizations will continue to function. As Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stated following the death of Sinwar, the war is not over and we have a long road ahead of us.
Hamas has not been weakened enough to enable any other Palestinian party to take over the governance of Gaza, and the party closest to this capability, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, is even worse than Hamas. Therefore, it is more than likely that the fighting in Gaza will continue at the current intensity with both sides maintaining their current strategies: Hamas conducting guerrilla warfare to attempt to survive and exhaust Israel and hoping for international intervention to compel Israel to desist; and Israel conducting repeated ground and air raids to attrite Hamas personnel and commanders.
The Israelis are trying to exploit the morale effects of the death of Sinwar by making direct statements to Hamas personnel holding kidnappees. Israel’s message to them is that they now have an opportunity to return their hostages to Israel and lay down their weapons, in exchange for which they will be allowed to survive. We can hope, but no one is holding their breath that this will happen. Khalil al-Haya, Sinwar’s political deputy, who is stationed in Qatar, has already said that Sinwar’s death will not change any of Hamas’s demands from Israel.
Hezbollah has suffered much less damage to its capabilities than Hamas. They have been unable to conduct operations at the level they planned before the war, but they still have more rockets, missiles and exploding drones – even after the drastic reduction caused by the IDF – than Hamas had before the war, and the Iranians are supplying them with more. The IDF is attacking supply routes, destroying temporary storage sites and convoys, and cratering the roads, but these efforts are not likely to achieve 100% success at preventing supplies from coming through.
Furthermore, on the ground the IDF is attacking only the margins of Hezbollah’s territory, within a few kilometers of Lebanon’s border with Israel. Most of Hezbollah’s combat forces are further away. Even if they have suffered more than 1,500 fatalities and two or three times as many wounded (a statistical guesstimate based on past experience), this is only a fraction of their combat manpower and they can be reinforced by other Iranian proxies from Syria and Iraq.
Unless it is changed in the future, Israel’s political goal for the war with Hezbollah – other than temporarily degrading its capabilities (which, when the war ends, the Iranians will rush to rebuild), is to create a Hezbollah-free security zone in southern Lebanon. The planned depth of this zone has not been stated, but it will probably be at most as far as the Litani River, and perhaps less. Current IDF operations seem to be more focused on thoroughly clearing the area than advancing rapidly further north. This can change according to developments in the fighting.
The situation on Israel’s border with Syria is volatile but stable so far. It is unlikely that Israel will initiate major operations there unless Iran does. The Syrian regime seems to be very much against such an Iranian initiative, but it does not have full control of its territory as it is beholden to Iran for having saved it during the rebellion. Likewise, Russia does not seem to favor such an Iranian initiative, but it too is beholden to Iran for its support of Russia in the war in Ukraine.
Israel’s leaders have declared that a retaliation for Iran’s missile attack on Israeli will occur, but neither the methods nor the date has been published. The US and Arab Gulf states are anxious that an Israel retaliation that reaches Iran via their territories (they are in the middle) will provoke an Iranian action against them as well as Israel. They are accordingly pressuring Israel to conduct only a weak response.
****
22 – 28 September 2024
WHAT HAS HAPPENED IN LEBANON?
This update will focus almost entirely on Israel and Hezbollah.
As noted in the last update, the Israeli government decided in mid-September to escalate operations against Hezbollah and transition from a strategy of aggressive defense, conducted since 8 October 2023, to a strategy of offense. So far, Israel seems to have chosen to wage an offensive based on attrition by fire only, though there are reports of Israeli ground units being sent north and this could change very quickly.
The Israeli offensive, officially dubbed “Northern Arrows”, began on 17 September with the exploding of some 4,000 pagers belonging to members of Hezbollah.
On 18 September, about 1,000 Hezbollah walkie-talkies were also exploded by Israel. Throughout these two days, the Israeli Air Force also conducted dozens of strikes on Hezbollah positions in southern Lebanon.
On 19 September, Hezbollah began responding by doubling its average daily artillery strikes into Israel. It apparently intended to do more, but was thwarted by Israeli strikes that destroyed about 100 of its multiple-barrel rocket launchers (most have 12 to 18 barrels each) before they could launch their rockets. Two Israeli soldiers were killed in Hezbollah’s bombardment and eight wounded.
The exchange of fire continued on 20 September, though Hezbollah’s total diminished compared to the 19th. The Israeli Air Force continued striking the usual target areas but also conducted a focused strike on a meeting of Hezbollah senior officers. This strike decimated the senior command hierarchy of Hezbollah’s elite Radwan Force, as well as the chief of operations of the Hezbollah military forces (the highest-ranking military commander assassinated by Israel since the killing of Hezbollah’s chief of staff several weeks ago).
On 21 and 22 September, Hezbollah continued firing into Israel at its average rate but tried to escalate by firing at targets further south into Israel than it had previously (with the exception of the failed revenge attack for the killing of the Hezbollah chief of staff, in which it tried to hit targets in the Tel Aviv area). This escalation was clearly a response to Israel’s strikes further north in Lebanon. Meanwhile, the Israeli Air Force continued striking targets in new areas, escalating not the number of attacks but their characteristics.
On 23 September, the Israeli offensive escalated by several orders of magnitude.
The day began with the IDF sending messages to the civilian population in southern Lebanon to evacuate. The message said: “If you are in the vicinity of a building containing Hezbollah weapons, move out of your village till further notice.” The message was published in Arabic by the IDF spokesperson. Also, more than 80,000 text and voice messages were sent to Lebanese mobile phones (according to a Lebanese service provider). They were sent by hacking into Lebanese radio stations and overriding their programs. In the afternoon of the 23rd, more messages were sent directing the population of various parts of eastern Lebanon to evacuate as well.
The Lebanese population responded as requested, and there was a mass movement of people away from southern Lebanon. The population of southern Lebanon is approximately 1 million people of whom approximately half live in the narrow coastal district (1-3 kilometers wide from the sea to the hills). This area includes the cities of Tyre and Sidon. The other 500,000 live dispersed across the hills between the coastal district and the eastern borders of Lebanon (33-55 kilometers).
The Dakhya quarter of Beirut is where most of the city’s Shiites are concentrated, and it is the center of Hezbollah’s operation. It contains Hezbollah storage sites both above and below ground as well as the supreme headquarters of the organization. After a series of surprise strikes on the Dakhya quarter in which senior Hezbollah commanders and staff were killed or wounded, Israel began issuing warnings to the population specifying which buildings containing concealed Hezbollah storage sites would be bombed next to give those who hadn’t left the area time to move.
Israeli warning leaflet dropped in the Baka valley area of Lebanon
(downloaded from Lebanese social media by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express)
Hezbollah, like Hamas, hides its equipment and weapons in and under the homes of civilians as camouflage, but, unlike Hamas, it does not use the population as human shields, so it did not try to halt the evacuation. According to the Lebanese government, almost 500,000 civilians from southern Lebanon – almost all Shiites, Hezbollah’s constituency – have evacuated.
These people found themselves in trouble from two factors:
- The sheer number of people trying to move out of south Lebanon on a road network not built for such volume caused enormous traffic jams lasting all day and through the night.
- The non-Shiite Lebanese showed an unwillingness to allow them to enter their territory. Hostility between ethnic groups in Lebanon is still great, and the peace is kept mainly because Hezbollah is more powerful than any other military group in Lebanon, including the official army. The Christians and Sunnis in particular hold grudges against the Shiites and are celebrating the casualties and damage Hezbollah is suffering.
Division of Lebanon into ethnic areas:
Reddish-brown = Shiite dominated areas
Blue = Christian dominated areas
Green = Sunni dominated areas
Lilac = Druze dominated areas
Striped areas are those with a rough parity of ethnic groups, with each stripe according to the color code of that group.
Left: Evacuation in central southern Lebanon (late morning 23 September) Right: Traffic jam near Sidon (evening 23 September)
(Both photographs downloaded from Lebanese social media
by Israel blogger Abu Ali Express)
A map of the areas bombed by Israel in Lebanon (red dots) and areas targeted by Hezbollah in Israel (yellow dots), 23-25 September (Source: Khattabi Center for Studies)
Note that almost all the red dots are in Shiite-dominated areas
On this single day, the Israeli Air Force conducted 650 sorties over Lebanon and attacked 1,100 targets with 1,400 guided bombs and missiles. The targets were weapons stores and launchers hidden inside homes and other hiding places across Lebanon. The IDF published videos and photographs showing the targets, in some cases with their weapons exposed in preparation for launch and in others the secondary explosions caused by munitions inside the targets exploding after the target was bombed.
In response, Hezbollah escalated the number of rockets and exploding drones it fired into Israel and began attacking new targets, including the Haifa metropolis. A number of rockets were also fired at northern Samaria (the West Bank), one or two of which landed in Palestinian villages. These were probably incorrectly aimed.
Hezbollah missile hidden inside a residential house revealed after the destruction of the house
Over the following days, 24-27 September, the number of Israeli strikes was reduced to a few hundred per day (600 on the 24th and 220-250 on each following day), suggesting fewer available targets while the hunt continued for more. The focus still seems to be on destroying rockets and launchers in their hiding places or that are deploying to shoot into Israel.
Some analysts are claiming that over the course of the 11 months of the war, about half of Hezbollah’s rocket launchers and rockets have been destroyed. The current operation is focusing on medium-range and long-range systems while previously, the IDF focused on the short-range launchers being employed along the border. Prior to the war, it was reported that Hezbollah had 150,000 rockets, a few thousand of which were guided to improve accuracy. Most were short-range (up to 40 kilometers), a few thousand were medium range (up to 200 kilometers), and a few hundred could reach southern Israel – some even to Eilat, Israel’s southern tip. In addition, reports have mentioned a couple of thousand exploding drones capable of conducting precisely targeted strikes. It remains to be seen how accurate these claims are, but if they are correct, that still leaves Hezbollah with tens of thousands of rockets – several times what Hamas had at the beginning of the war.
Rocket launched from residential building after being hit by Israeli bombs and hitting a neighboring building
(snapshots taken from videos filmed by IDF surveillance drones)
Hezbollah’s rate of fire varied from about 150 to 300 per day. However, it achieved very few successes, and some strikes showed signs of a hurry to launch and “get out” before the Israeli response. Thus, an entire salvo of rockets fired towards Haifa landed in the sea. This also explains the previously mentioned rockets that landed on Palestinian villages in Samaria.
It should be noted that Hezbollah does not only fire rockets at Jewish towns and villages. A number of Hezbollah rockets have fallen on Israeli Arab villages as well, and unlike the unintentional strikes on Palestinian villages, these are deliberate. In the Second Lebanon War, too, quite a large number of Hezbollah strikes landed in or near Israeli Arab villages. Hezbollah also tried to hit the Tel Aviv area twice, with one missile intercepted and the other missing and falling in an uninhabited area.
The Houthis and Iraqi Hezbollah have also increased their explosive drone and missile launches at Israel, but these are still very small in number, with the Houthis firing two missiles and Iraqi Hezbollah sending nearly 10 exploding drones. One of the Iraqi drones penetrated and hit Eilat Port, but the damage was minimal. A Houthi missile was fired at Tel Aviv but was intercepted.
Water plumes in Haifa Bay as Hezbollah rockets land in the sea
(snapshot from video taken by bystander). Haifa can be seen across the water.
In addition to targeting Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal, the IDF has been focusing its attacks on Hezbollah senior commanders. In a massive strike involving 80 bombs, Hassan Nasrallah himself – Hezbollah’s General Secretary since February 1992 – was killed in a Hezbollah underground headquarters complex in Beirut. The same strike also killed a number of senior Hezbollah commanders and an Iranian general.
So far, during the war and especially over the past month, Israel has managed to kill:
- Hezbollah’s supreme political and military leader, Hassan Nasrallah
- Hezbollah’s military Chief of Staff (Nasrallah’s direct military deputy)
- Hezbollah’s Chief of Operations (the number three after Nasrallah)
- the Commander and Deputy Commander of Hezbollah’s Drone Force (essentially its air force without manned aircraft)
- the Commander and Deputy Commander of Hezbollah’s Strategic Artillery Force
- apparently also the Commander of Hezbollah’s Southern Command (the regional command responsible for southern Lebanon and Israel – this required two attempts as he survived the first)
- the commanders of two of the three defensive divisions of Southern Command
- the commander of the division-sized Radwan Force (Hezbollah’s main offensive ground force) and his replacement as well
- four brigade commanders of the Radwan Force (there are four or five brigades)
- A roster of medium- and low-level commanders in Hezbollah’s Drone Force, its Strategic Artillery Force (missiles and rockets for bombarding Israel), and its Anti-Tank Guided Missile unit
- two senior officers in the General Staff in charge of training
Beyond the physical damage caused during the elimination of these senior commanders, all of whom served very long terms in their posts, Hezbollah is now suffering issues of competence and morale.
Strictly speaking, all these people can be replaced – but anyone incoming will be less experienced than the people they are replacing, especially when deputies were killed along with their commanders.
These losses affect morale because all these people lived and operated under extreme safety protocols that were supposed to ensure that Israel never knew where they were. The fact that the Israelis “somehow” managed to pull these killings off suggests that they have penetrated Hezbollah to a degree that they are able to catch these men within very short windows of opportunity. This means the members of Hezbollah’s senior command are exposed and gravely compromised. Given that the attacks have killed concentrations of commanders at once, the Israelis apparently know their schedules, even when they are decided upon at the last minute.
On top of this, Israel has attacked Hezbollah’s vast supply of weapons in targeted strikes despite Hezbollah’s highly organized and top-secret efforts to conceal those weapons in hiding places spread across all of Lebanon.
The Lebanese Health Ministry claims that since the beginning of the war, 1,570 Lebanese have been killed and 5,410 wounded (correct to the morning of 27 September). It did not provide a breakdown differentiating between military personnel and civilians, and so far, Hezbollah and the other military groups have not provided their own casualty figures. Up to the past couple of days, Hezbollah has been scrupulous about publishing obituaries of its dead, and the total number of its personnel killed had risen to 513. Ever since the pager attack, however, it has stopped publishing obituaries except for senior commanders. Nor have the other groups published any updates.
Because the pagers and walkie-talkie radios were all bought by Hezbollah for their own people, the casualties from the attack on the devices are almost all Hezbollah personnel. This suggests that of the 5,410 wounded, approximately 4,000 were Hezbollah, and it can be assumed that quite a few belonged to the other armed groups as well.
It is difficult to assess the number of fatalities inflicted on Hezbollah over the past few days, but it is probably a few hundred at least. Again, the other groups suffered fatalities as well but the figures are not known. There is a report claiming that of Hezbollah’s wounded in the pager and walkie-talkie attack, at least 1,500 were injured to such a degree that they will not be able to return to service in Hezbollah (e.g., they lost their sight or an arm).
So far, Israeli casualties have been light – only a few wounded here and there (mostly civilians falling while running to shelters).
In Syria, Israel is continuing to strike targets, primarily those involved int the storage or transport of weapons for Hezbollah or other Iranian proxies in Syria. The most dramatic was the attack on the Syrian weapons research center at Musayf (in northwestern Syria, approximately 40 kilometers north of the border with Lebanon). Some reports claim that this attack included a heliborne raid by commandos. Israel also bombed some transit routes between Syria and eastern Lebanon, cratering the roads through the mountainous region to render them impassable and destroying at least one storage site next to one of these roads. Israeli aircraft returned to bomb the same route after repairs began to make it trafficable again.
An interesting side note is the response in social media of many rebel Syrians who suffered at the hands of Hezbollah while it was supporting the Syrian regime against them. Their social media is full of joyful and gloating comments about Hezbollah and its population (Lebanese Shiites) “getting what they deserve”. Over the past month, these Syrians have been publishing many such comments and publishing jokes about Hezbollah’s failures to exact revenge for its latest defeats.
The killing of Hezbollah commanders who played a large part in causing mass fatalities among the rebel Syrian population via starvation, artillery fire, and other means have aroused much praise of Israel’s actions. In the last remaining rebel enclave of Idlib, festivities over Hezbollah’s casualties spilled onto the streets with people handing out baklawa (a honey-soaked pastry) to celebrate the event.
Not only enemies of Hezbollah are enjoying its troubles. Several Palestinian bloggers in Gaza have published disparaging comments about Hezbollah in which they gloat at its defeats. The Gazans feel betrayed that Hezbollah did not join them in all-out war against Israel but maintained only a low intensity artillery bombardment, which allowed Israel to divert more forces to Gaza.
However, Hezbollah and Iran were apparently surprised and angry at Hamas for having initiated the war at a time not of their choosing. Hamas received weapons, training, and an operational concept of how to conduct its offensive from Hezbollah and Iran and then used them at its own convenience rather than theirs – and then expected them to join in, despite their lack of readiness. After a few days of deliberation and having brought its forces to maximum readiness on the Israeli border, Hezbollah and Iran, seeing Israel’s readiness to thwart any attempt, decided to back off and make do with a nuisance campaign of low intensity artillery fire. This sufficed to prevent the return of the Israeli population to their homes in the north, but did no more than that. Israel, gradually realizing Hezbollah’s intent, sent two of the five divisions it had placed along the Lebanon border facing Hezbollah south to join the fighting in Gaza.
WHAT NEXT?
For now, Israel seems to be focused on an aerial bombing campaign to degrade Hezbollah. It is going for Hezbollah’s leadership hierarchy and arsenal of strategic artillery. The hope appears to be that Hezbollah, given the surge in its casualties in general (a few thousand within less than two weeks) and among its leadership in particular, as well as the destruction of much (though by no means all) of its strategic artillery arsenal, will be compelled to back down and agree to a ceasefire to save what can be saved.
If this does not succeed, the Israelis are indicating that they are prepared to conduct a ground offensive into Lebanon. They have reinforced their ground forces in the north and have been conducting numerous training exercises specifically for the Lebanese theater (and reporting them repeatedly in the media for psychological effect).
The question then arises: what would be the territorial objective of this offensive?
At a minimum, it would be to create a buffer zone empty of Hezbollah from the border to a certain distance northwards. How far north of the border? The Israeli leadership is not saying. The objective could also change as the offensive progresses: it could initially be to capture all areas from which one can see Israeli territory directly from Lebanon, then connect them into a line, and clear and hold the entire area between these points and the border (which would prevent the use of direct line-of-sight weapons into Israeli border villages). If deemed necessary, a decision might be made to then advance further north. Operating in a step-by-step mode like this is counter to most military best-practice theories, but could be necessary because of political considerations that limit Israel’s freedom of action.
A second requirement is that the distance emptied of Hezbollah should be sufficient to prevent a surprise attack into Israel (especially on the numerous Israeli villages adjacent to the border) by a major Hezbollah force appearing suddenly on the border without having been intercepted along the way. It should be remembered that the preparations made by Hamas in Gaza for October 7 were taught to it by Hezbollah, which has been openly preparing for just such an operation since 2010.
Beyond these minimum requirements, there are other possible objectives, including pushing back Hezbollah’s short-range arsenal to reduce the amount of fire it can pour into Israel. It is not possible to drive Hezbollah completely out of range since it has weapons with ranges of 100 to several hundred kilometers and can acquire weapons from Iran with a couple of thousand kilometer ranges such as those used by Iraqi Hezbollah and the Houthis. The farthest point from Israel’s border to Lebanon’s northernmost tip is about 200 kilometers.
On the other hand, it is quite clear that even if the IDF conducts raids in central and northern Lebanon (as it did in the Second Lebanon War in 2006), it will not try to conquer all of Lebanon, even temporarily.
Unless Hezbollah’s personnel suddenly lose their will to fight, this will not be an easy battle, but a lot depends on how far north the IDF attempts to advance. The further it goes, the more difficult the battle will be. It should be noted that so far, most of Hezbollah’s casualties have been in the strategic artillery and higher command echelons. Its southern ground forces have taken casualties, but not in large numbers relative to their overall size.
The terrain of southern Lebanon is characterized by steep sloping ridges, some narrower and some wider, separated by deep ravines. The population lives mostly atop these ridges, thus blocking virtually all natural travel routes. There are a couple of hundred built-up areas of varying size (small villages, large villages and towns). In many areas, buildings are scattered along the roads connecting separate villages, gradually joining them together into one contiguous built-up area. The population of southern Lebanon is mostly Shiite – that is, they are Hezbollah people.
Hezbollah has prepared almost every Shiite village in southern Lebanon (there are approximately 200 in total) to serve as a fortified area – digging shelters underneath houses to provide protection for men, equipment and munitions; preparing combat positions; and accumulating combat and logistic stores. Each village is manned by varying numbers of men, from 30 to 200, depending on its location and tactical importance. In and around these villages are scattered thousands of rocket launchers and tens of thousands of rockets.
To command these forces, Hezbollah divided southern Lebanon into three regional commands, each equivalent to an infantry division in size. Assuming the casualties inflicted on the senior command hierarchy and strategic artillery units do not cause the ground force personnel to give up, Hezbollah forces will fight to hold each village and deny passage through it. Defense of each village will be aggressive and mobile. Hezbollah forces will utilize underground shelters and positions, move from house to house, and counterattack whenever possible.
In addition, Israeli control of the air will make the transfer of troops from one fortified village to another in order to reinforce them a very slow, and possibly very expensive, process. Thus, the decision on how far north the IDF is to go will determine how many fortified villages it will have to capture and clear and how many Hezbollah troops it will have to contend with – a serious consideration for a casualty-sensitive nation.
The entire area outside the villages is also prepared for battle in these ways:
- Large areas are covered in mines (including some that are remote-controlled to explode in multiples at the push of a button) that can inflict casualties on Israeli units trying to bypass fortified villages.
- Hundreds of long-range and medium-range anti-tank missile launchers remain hidden. These include not only a full panoply of direct line-of-sight missiles (mainly Russian Kornet missiles with 5.5 kilometer, 8 kilometer and 10 kilometer ranges, but also shorter-range models) but also the al-Mass, which can be fired at targets that are hidden behind hills and have been located by surveillance drones.
Hezbollah has been studying the war in Ukraine and has acquired, in addition to the long-range exploding drones it has been using against Israel, large numbers of smaller shorter-range drones that can be used to reconnoiter an area and, if they detect targets, crash into them.
The war is not over, and we may yet see a great deal of fighting and Israeli casualties.
MEANWHILE – DOWN SOUTH…
There is not much new to report.
In Gaza the fighting continues as before. The Israelis are continuing to clear the Rafah area, preparing the so-called Philadelphi Corridor (which separates Gaza from Egypt) and the Netzarim Corridor (which separates northern Gaza from the rest of Gaza) for a lengthy sojourn. They are also continuing to conduct strikes, mostly from the air but also small ground raids, on detected Hamas locations. Hamas continues to identify all casualties as civilians, whereas the IDF reports the numbers of terrorists killed. Undoubtedly civilians are also suffering casualties, but not in the numbers provided by Hamas.
In Judea and Samaria, the escalated offensive seems to be having the desired effect. Each raid into the Palestinian areas is facing less opposition. Also, the Palestinian Authority has been compelled to take firmer action against the terrorists in its territory to reduce the number of Israeli operations and the damage they cause to infrastructure (especially the under-road and road-side bomb-clearing operations, which tear up the roads inside towns and villages and turn them into dirt tracks). The number of captured terrorists in these operations since the beginning of the war has risen to 5,250 (a few dozen more over the past week) with more than 2,050 from Hamas. The Palestinians have reported 10,900 detained in total. The discrepancy between their number and the Israeli number is that the former counts those detained for questioning and then released and while the latter only counts detainees who are subsequently held.
In the Red Sea, the Houthis claim to have attacked three American destroyers with 23 missiles and to have hit them. The American military denies this, saying that all the incoming missiles either missed or were intercepted with no damage done to American ships.
There are reports that Iran has asked Russia to supply more advanced anti-ship missiles to the Houthis. If true, this could – from the Russian standpoint – be a figurative “shot across the bow” warning the US not to allow deep strikes in Russia by Ukraine with advanced American weapons, an issue much discussed of late.
***
6 – 21 September 2024
WHAT HAS HAPPENED?
Israel-Hamas negotiations:
Not much has changed since the last report.
The negotiations continue, with rumors abounding about supposed changes in Israel’s or Hamas’s positions. But every time the smoke clears, it becomes evident that with regard to the central issue, which is the prerequisite for everything else, nothing has changed: Hamas still demands a total cessation of Israeli operations and total withdrawal of all Israeli troops from the Gaza Strip, with international guarantees that after the return of the kidnappees Israel will not resume its offensive. Israel continues to refuse to accept these conditions. Hamas is also demanding that “someone” fund the rebuilding of all the damage to Gaza’s infrastructure (buildings, electricity, sewage, water, etc.).
The following are Hamas’s terms for a ceasefire as posted on the group’s internet site:
الحية: نؤكد أن أي اتفاق يجب أن يتضمن وقفًا شاملًا للعدوان على شعبنا الفلسطيني، وانسحابًا كاملًا من قطاع غزة بما فيه محور فيلادلفيا، وحرية عودة النازحين، وإغاثة شعبنا وإعمار ما دمره الاحتلال، وصولًا إلى إنجاز صفقة جادة وحقيقية لتبادل الأسرى.
“We emphasize that any agreement must include:
A total ceasefire of the aggression against the Palestinian nation,
A complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip including the Philadelphi Corridor,
Return of all the displaced people to their homes,
Aid for our people and rebuilding of what the conquerors [Israel] have destroyed,
A serious and true deal for exchange of prisoners.”
All supposed progress in the negotiations is about details – how many kidnappees will be returned according to what timetable and how many captured Palestinian terrorists Israel will give in return.
An interesting point that is not mentioned in the above official Hamas post but appears in another document apparently found by the IDF in a Hamas underground command post is that Hamas wants an inter-Arab military force placed on Gaza’s border with Israel as a guarantee that Israel will not renew its offensive later on. This force would protect Hamas as it reconstitutes its military forces in preparation for a future war.
Lebanon:
The focus of attention since the last report continues to be the Lebanese front.
As described in the last update, Hezbollah’s planned revenge attack – which, according to the latest data, was to have included about 3,000 rockets and exploding drones – was decimated (pun intended) down to about 320. Of these, very few got through Israeli anti-rocket defenses. Hezbollah falsely claimed that it had managed to hit Israel’s major signals intelligence headquarters and that 22 Israeli soldiers serving in that headquarters were killed and another 74 wounded. This is a fictitious ladder to help Hezbollah climb down from the tree of revenge.
Following the failed revenge attack, fighting between Israel and Hezbollah returned to previous levels and continued until 17 September. During these three and a half weeks, Hezbollah fired several hundred more rockets and exploding drones into Israel.
A few Israelis were wounded during these attacks.
Over the same period (6-17 September), the IDF gradually increased its attacks on Hezbollah targets in Lebanon, hunting personnel and positions and conducting air strikes on them. Meanwhile, Israeli government and military leaders began to speak more and more about shifting the focus of Israel’s military operations to Lebanon. In one case, an Israeli brigade commander used drones to drop leaflets on a Lebanese village asking the inhabitants to move north so as not to be caught in the crossfire. It was also reported by a Lebanese newspaper that Hezbollah had ordered Lebanese civilians to evacuate a line of villages further north than those previously evacuated (Hezbollah denied this report). These measures caused an exodus of more Lebanese civilians from the south, though a precise figure is not known. Up to that point, the number of evacuees from southern Lebanon officially declared by the Lebanese government was approximately 100,000.
In mid-September, the Israeli government decided to escalate Israeli operations against Hezbollah, symbolically declaring this by officially adding the return of the Israeli population of northern Israel as a separate political goal of the war. Israel thus transitioned from the previous strategy of aggressive defense conducted since 8 October 2023 to a strategy of offense. The current debate in Israel is whether this offensive should be one of attrition by fire or one involving an attack into Lebanon by Israeli ground forces, and if the latter, how far those forces should go. The options are:
- Advance just far enough to create a minimal security zone such that Hezbollah units cannot raid into Israel without breaching the zone and cannot directly fire into Israeli villages. This would require capturing all the hills from which Israeli territory is in direct sight of and within range of Hezbollah’s low-trajectory weapons (i.e., 5-10 kilometers) and the areas surrounding them
OR
- Advance further north to inflict a major defeat on all of Hezbollah’s southern forces (the equivalent of three infantry divisions plus the elite Radwan forces, which are also roughly equivalent to a division in size).
While Israeli ground forces in northern Israeli have been openly reinforced and there are constant mentions in Israeli media of IDF ground units training in the north, it seems that for now at least, Israel is making do with a strategy of attrition by fire. Transitioning from that to a ground offensive is always possible.
At 15:30 on 17 September, the Israeli offensive began with a mass attack in which the pagers and walkie-talkie radios carried by thousands of Hezbollah members exploded almost simultaneously. The devices were exploded by remote control. There have been numerous stories and rumors published in the media about this operation, and many of the details are probably untrue or at least inaccurate. What is clear is that a few months after the war began, Hezbollah purchased 5,000 pagers and at least 1,000 walkie-talkie radios. Somehow, the Israeli Mossad managed to plant explosives in these devices before they reached Lebanon.
On the first day, at least 4,000 of the 5,000 pagers purchased by Hezbollah last April exploded (the others were off or out of service range, which probably means they were inside tunnels). The explosions occurred all over Lebanon, but mostly in the Beirut area (perhaps because distribution was easier and faster there than in other areas) and also in Syria. Among the wounded were the Iranian ambassador to Lebanon and his security force.
The next day, 18 September, about 1,000 walkie-talkie radios exploded too. All told, approximately 3,200 Hezbollah personnel were wounded in the two attacks. By 20 September, Hezbollah had admitted that 39 of its personnel had been killed in the attacks. Lebanon’s Health Ministry reported that at least 450 of the wounded were in serious or critical condition. It added that of the wounded, 1,850 were in the Beirut area, 750 were in southern Lebanon, and 150 were in central and northeast Lebanon.
Simultaneously with these events, the IDF increased its air strikes in southern Lebanon, primarily targeting locations identified as hiding places for rocket launchers. These strikes destroyed approximately 100 ten-barrel rocket launchers and killed a number of Hezbollah personnel. (It is not possible from the reports to differentiate between the Hezbollah personnel killed by the pager and walkie-talkie attacks and those killed by the air strikes.)
On 19 September, Hezbollah finally responded by doubling its daily average of attacks (rockets, exploding drones and anti-tank missiles) into Israel. Two Israeli soldiers were killed and eight wounded for a total of 26 Israeli civilians and 26 Israeli soldiers killed by Hezbollah since the beginning of the war.
At 17:00 on 19 September, the head of Hezbollah, Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah, gave a televised speech on the events of the preceding days, admitting that Hezbollah had taken a severe beating but vowing revenge. Minutes before his speech, Israeli aircraft began a few dozen strikes on targets in southern Lebanon that continued throughout the speech. After the speech was over, Israeli aircraft flew over Beirut, accelerating to create sonic booms.
Early on 20 September, a two-man Hezbollah team attempted to infiltrate into Israel to plant bombs. They were spotted by an Israeli patrol and were both killed.
Shortly afterwards, Israeli aircraft struck a meeting in Beirut of the Radwan Forces senior staff attended by Hezbollah’s chief of military operations, Ibrahim Akil. Akil had become Hezbollah’s senior commander after the recent killing of Hezbollah’s chief of staff Fuad Shukr. Akil is interesting from another aspect too: he was involved in the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut in 1983, which killed 63 people. The United States posted a $7 million reward for information leading to his arrest.
In addition to Akil, 15 more Hezbollah senior personnel were killed, including the commander of the Radwan Forces. Other lower ranking personnel were also killed (number not yet known). At the time of writing, the Lebanese have reported that they had not yet cleared the ruins and people were still missing. They also claimed that at least 10 of the dead were civilians, including children. At least one of the teenagers reported dead was a ‘commander’ in Hezbollah’s youth movement, which conducts paramilitary activities.
Radwan is a division-sized force. It lost its commander, four brigade-equivalent commanders, and a number of senior operations and training staff in this attack.
According to the Lebanese Health Ministry, approximately 70 people have been killed in Lebanon since 17 September. This brings the total killed in Lebanon since the war began to 690 and the wounded to more than 5,500. The ministry did not provide a breakdown differentiating between military personnel and civilians, but the numbers admitted so far by Hezbollah and other organizations participating in the fighting indicate that military personnel were approximately 650 of the total:
- Hezbollah has admitted that so far, 501 of its personnel have been killed (66 more since my last report)
- An undisclosed number of Iranian advisers have been killed
- Perhaps as many as 50 non-Shiite members of Hezbollah have been killed
- A few dozen members of other Lebanese militias have been killed (a few more since my last update)
- 90-100 members of Lebanese-based Palestinian organizations, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad have been killed (a few more since my last update)
- Numbers of wounded are more difficult to collect, but from anecdotal evidence and the fact that most of the civilian population of southern Lebanon has evacuated north, the vast majority of the 5,500 wounded are believed to be military personnel – especially since the pagers and walkie-talkies were owned by Hezbollah and distributed solely to its own
- Total Lebanese military casualties are now two killed and approximately 10
Despite reports of more Lebanese civilians evacuating southern Lebanon, the Lebanese government has not updated its last published figure of approximately 102,000 Lebanese civilians having evacuated that region (most within the first couple of months of the war). It continues to estimate that approximately 20,000 houses across southern Lebanon, and a few further north, have been damaged.
Gaza:
The fighting in the Gaza Strip continues at the same reduced pace and with the same methods on both sides. The IDF is deliberately setting the pace, slowly combing through the Rafah area against small pinprick ambushes and raids by Hamas and other groups. IDF units are operating both above and below ground.
IDF units in the Netsarim Corridor, which separates Gaza City from the rest of Gaza, are also continuing to conduct raids and defensive operations. The corridor is held almost exclusively by IDF reserve units who are rotated every couple of months.
Most of the Hamas Rafah brigade command hierarchy has been killed or wounded and about 2,000 of its original 4,500 personnel killed or wounded. Others have fled and are hiding in the safe haven area. Thirteen kilometers of tunnels were exploded by the IDF after having been reconnoitered.
Four Israeli soldiers, including a female paramedic, were killed when a building was exploded on top of them by remote control.
In another incident, a helicopter landing at night to evacuate a seriously wounded soldier crashed, killing two of the casualty rescuer team and wounding seven others, including the pilot. Apparently the combination of dark, a dust cloud, and a complicated landing site (chosen to prevent Hamas from shooting at the helicopter) confused the pilot, causing her to make a mistake and crash into the ground.
Hamas continues to fire a few rockets every once in a while into Israel, mostly at villages near the border and occasionally at towns farther away, such as Ashkelon. So far, none has caused casualties or damage.
Hamas continues to use schools, hospitals, mosques, and UNRWA sites as command posts and storage facilities. The IDF locates and strikes these locations using small-caliber guided munitions. Every time, Hamas claims that all casualties were civilians until the IDF publishes the names and functions of those killed.
One example from the past two weeks was the attack on the al-Ja’ooni school in Nusayrat. This time, in addition to claiming the killed were all civilians, Hamas said they included UNRWA personnel. The IDF then published the names of nine Hamas personnel killed there, including UNRWA employee Yassir Ibrahim Abu Shrar, whose day job at UNRWA – while simultaneously serving on the Hamas Emergency Committee (see below) – was as a member of one of Hamas’s internal security organs responsible for population control.
Inside Gaza, in addition to fighting Israel, Hamas is busy asserting its dominance over the other Palestinian factions. One method of doing this is to take control of humanitarian aid convoys and distribute or sell the supplies according to Hamas’s needs (one of the missions carried out by the Hamas Emergency Committee). In some cases, the IDF intervenes and directs fire at the Hamas teams that are doing this, but that often results in claims that the IDF itself is attacking the convoys.
In addition, there are reports by Gazans on social media of executions, abductions, and beatings of critics or members of other factions that have taken a too-independent stance (another mission usually carried out by the Hamas Emergency Committee). Hamas of course labels all these victims “collaborators with the Zionists“. For all the talk of “the day after”, there can be no day after so long as Hamas remains the most powerful force in Gaza.
On the left: snapshot from a news video (al-Arabiya) of a Gazan criticizing Hamas. On the right: The same man in the hospital a few days later, after having been beaten up by Hamas personnel. (Downloaded from the individual’s social media account by Israeli blogger Abu Ali Express)
Another critic was less fortunate. According to reports in Palestinian social media, an engineer working for UNRWA since 2021, who criticized Hamas on social media (“After being released from prison, Sinwar should have received ‘treatment’ and not been given control over 2.5 million people“) was shot and killed by Hamas.
In the first week of September, 1.26 million polio vaccines were sent into Gaza via Israel. Since then, 560,000 Gazans have been vaccinated, thus ending the first phase of the vaccination program. A second round of vaccinations is planned to begin within a couple of weeks.
Another health program is the supply of prosthetic arms and legs from Jordan to Gaza together with a team of specialists to attach them. An interesting facet of this operation is that so far, the photographs that have been published of patients receiving the prosthetics show only men of military age.
Judea and Samaria:
Since the beginning of the war, there have been more than 5,000 attacks against Israelis in Judea and Samaria or emanating from that area into pre-1867 Israel. Twenty-six Israeli civilians and 12 soldiers have been killed and 285 wounded in these attacks.
The IDF has continued its escalated offensive counter-terrorist operation, begun 29 August, inside Palestinian Authority territories. Since my last update, approximately 15 Palestinians fighters have been reported killed and about 50 arrested.
In one incident, a Turkish-American woman was killed during a confrontation between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers. From the initial IDF review conducted of the events, she was apparently hit by a ricocheting bullet aimed at another target.
One Israeli soldier was killed when a Palestinian truck driver deliberately rammed into the checkpoint the soldier was manning.
The rival Palestinian organizations have been working together in the territories. In one skirmish, an Israeli force surrounded four terrorists in a building. They turned out to be from three different factions. Interestingly, while the terrorists in the territories belong to different factions with different ideologies, many are adopting a common symbology based on that of ISIS. For members of the religious factions, this would seem to make ideological sense, but members of the secular factions are doing this as well. Thus, for example, members of the Fatah-affiliated militia, the al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Battalion, are being buried with flags of Fatah draped over their bodies and ISIS headbands. See photo below of one such case.
In the same skirmish in which the photographed Fatah member was killed, a member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad, a group considered more extreme than Hamas (and thus unlikely to be a friend to Fatah), was also killed. They had been fighting side by side.
Throughout the month, there have been gun fights between the official Palestinian Authority security forces, controlled by the Fatah, and the militias of the other factions. The security forces cleared bombs planted by Hamas and others, arguing that they threatened the lives of Palestinian civilians living near or driving on the roads where the bombs had been placed. The interesting issue here is that at the same time that the official Palestinian Authority security forces, controlled by Fatah, are operating against some anti-Israeli activities, members of Fatah are conducting the operations those security forces are operating against. In some cases, members of the official security forces are simultaneously members of the militia factions.
On 8 September, a Jordanian truck driver carrying goods from Jordan to the Palestinian Authority surprised the Israeli border inspectors at the Allenby crossing and killed three Israelis with a pistol before being killed himself by Israeli security personnel. The Allenby border crossing has been open for use by Palestinians to travel between Israel and Jordan since shortly after the 1967 Six Day War, when it was part of Israel’s policy of supporting the economic welfare of the Palestinian population in the recently captured areas of Jerusalem, Judea and Samaria. After the 1994 peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, it became the major crossing between the two states. Some 3 million people cross that border every year – mostly for economic purposes, such as the transfer of goods or other activities, but many tourists also use the crossing, as do Palestinians and Israeli Arabs going to Mecca in Saudi Arabia for religious reasons. Since the peace treaty was signed, there had been only one other terrorist attack at the crossing, in 2014.
The border with Jordan has seen an escalation in terrorist and weapons smuggling activity since the beginning of the current war. The three killed in this attack were the first Israeli casualties there. In Jordan, the government issued a very weak statement and there were public displays of joy over the killings of the Israelis.
Jordanians celebrating the killing of three Israelis at the Allenby Bridge (from Jordanian social media by Walla News Agency)
The Palestinians claim that more than 10,700 people have been arrested since 7 October 2023, but the official Israeli figure is approximately 5,000 (about 50 more since my last report), of whom approximately 2,000 belong to Hamas and the others to other groups. The discrepancy is apparently because the Palestinians count anyone who is detained even if they are released after questioning. The number of Palestinians killed is perhaps approximately 710 and approximately 5,700 wounded. The numbers are not broken down into combatants and civilians. The Palestinians usually provide a breakdown by age, but because anyone under 18 is counted as a child and the Palestinians employ many teenagers (the youngest about 12 years old) for military duties (12-15 year olds as scouts and transporters of military equipment; 15-18 year olds for combat), this does not provide a true picture of the situation.
Iran and its proxies versus the US and its allies:
On the Yemen-Red Sea front, strikes and counter-strikes are continuing. The total number of Houthi attacks on ships since the beginning of the war is approximately 340. Since my last update there have been no new reports of attacks on ships, but the reasons for this are not clear – no possible targets? Lack of resources? Effect of American and British air strikes? American and British air strikes on the Houthis have caused them casualties and damage but had not yet had any appreciable effect on the frequency of their attacks. Is this changing or is it still true?
The Houthis claim to have shot down three more American Reaper attack drones in one week. If correct, this means 10 such drones have been shot down by the Houthis since the beginning of the campaign to halt their attacks on shipping. Other than luck, the rising incidence of Houthi successes might indicate an improvement in their capabilities (new weapons or improved proficiency) or higher risk-taking by the Americans to improve the effectiveness of their counter-Houthi campaign. The Pentagon press secretary admitted two losses only and said the Houthi claim of having shot down 10 in total is not accurate, but did not state a counter number.
If the Houthis have received improved weapons (as one report suggests), the supplier is Iran, their only international supporter. These weapons have to travel by sea from Iran to Houthi-controlled ports in Yemen, sailing past American and European warships patrolling that route to counter Houthi attacks on shipping. So the question arises – why is nothing being done to halt these weapons en route?
Meanwhile, the Houthis launched a ballistic missile at central Israel. The missile was hit but not destroyed by an Israeli interceptor. It broke up, and the separate pieces were then engaged by other interceptors. The warhead fell in an open area east of Tel Aviv and other parts scattered over a wide area. There were no casualties and the damage was mostly brush fires. Minor damage was caused to a concrete production factory (a large gravel conveyer belt caught fire) and a train station.
Israeli casualties:
The total number of Israelis confirmed killed in this war is now 1,676 (12 more since my previous report) with another 18,001 wounded (192 more since my previous report, most of them soldiers).
Of the above 1,676 Israelis killed, the total currently confirmed killed on the single day of 7 October 2023 is 1,184 (civilians, military, police, firefighters, medical personnel, etc.). Some of the people kidnapped to Gaza were dead when taken or have died in captivity and are still not confirmed as killed.
There are still 101 kidnapped Israelis and non-Israelis in Gaza. The current estimate is that at least 35 of them are dead and perhaps more. Some of them were killed on 7 October and their bodies taken to Gaza and some were killed during their captivity. In the negotiations with Hamas, Israel has demanded a list of those alive and those dead, but Hamas refuses to provide this information. Furthermore, Hamas claims not to know the whereabouts of a few dozen of the kidnappees. Some are in the hands of other groups or even “private” clans who joined the assault on Israel in the third wave of the Hamas attack on 7 October.
A total of 19 Israeli civilians have been killed in the Hamas rocket attacks since 7 October, all in the first couple of months; 26 by Hezbollah (0 more since the last update); and one by a Houthi exploding drone that hit Tel Aviv, for a total of 46 Israeli civilians killed after 7 October (not including kidnappees murdered while in captivity).
As of 20 September 2024, a total of 715 IDF soldiers have been killed on all fronts (nine more since my last update, including a soldier wounded previously who succumbed to his wounds).
Initially the number of Israelis who were forced to leave their homes in 64 villages and towns along the borders with Gaza and Lebanon reached approximately 250,000. The number of those returning to their homes since my last report has grown, mostly in the areas around Gaza, so the current number of Israeli refugees is now approximately 143,000 (about 7,000 fewer than in my last report). Some sources claim more have since returned to their homes, but the number is not clear.
Palestinian casualties:
The Gaza Health Ministry, which is controlled by Hamas in its role as the government of Gaza, claims that so far, approximately 41,500 Gazans have been killed and approximately 96,000 wounded. They do not differentiate between personnel of Hamas and other terrorist organizations and civilians, but IDF statements indicate that at least 17,000 Hamas and other terrorists have been killed. Several thousand more have been wounded. The IDF has also captured many terrorists, though the exact number has not been divulged. From anecdotal information it can be estimated as approaching 3,500.
Given that Hamas and the other groups had 40,000 to 50,000 personnel between them (possibly more, as different sources provide different numbers and there is a problem counting part-timers as opposed to regulars or official ‘reserves’), the dead, wounded and captured number almost 30,000 and thus represent a sizeable chunk of their manpower. However, we have no information on the recovery rate of the wounded. A report has come out claiming that Hamas has recruited about 3,000 new personnel.
WHAT NEXT?
Contrary to what I wrote in the last update about the likelihood that fighting would continue at the previous pace, Israel has decided to escalate fighting on the Lebanese border while maintaining lower intensity fighting in the other arenas.
However, as detailed above, the direction of this escalation is not yet clear. Will it consist solely of stand-off fire (which includes the pager and walkie-talkie radio attack) or will it also involve a ground operation? And if a ground operation, what will be its scope? The creation of a shallow buffer zone or something deeper?
Israel’s political and military leadership seem to have concluded that though the fighting in Gaza is not over, Hamas’s capabilities have been reduced enough that they can be dealt with a smaller force (currently three division headquarters, though according to mentions of units participating in the fighting, these divisions are at perhaps half-strength, having released some reserve units to recuperate at home and other reserves and regular units for Lebanon).
It should be noted that Hezbollah is a much more powerful military organization than Hamas. The success of the pager/walkie-talkie attack plus the successful killing of a major portion of the command hierarchy of the Radwan Force, Hezbollah’s most powerful unit, may have created an operational command vacuum – especially after the killing of two of Hamas’s three southern division commanders in recent months as well as other lower ranking operational commanders. However, while these blows have caused Hezbollah harm that will require time to recover, they are not in and of themselves completely crippling. Hezbollah combat units will be able to continue functioning, albeit less efficiently and less effectively.
A second issue is the repeated strikes on Hezbollah’s southern artillery capabilities. The passage of time over the past 11 months has enabled Israel to gradually detect the launchers used against it and apparently many that had not yet been used. The successes also reveal an intelligence penetration of Hezbollah’s communications system enabling the mapping and location of many people and sites. However, this does not mean that Hezbollah’s total fire capabilities have been destroyed. They had an artillery force 10 times bigger than Hamas’s, and even after the reported casualties and destruction of equipment, it is still considerably bigger today than what Hamas had before the war. Hezbollah is still a major threat and it is to be assumed that it will recover over time.
Given the above, it is likely that Israel will attempt to maintain the initiative and the advantages it has gained, so at the very least it will attempt to continue the current level of escalation. The question – not answerable given the available data – is how long can the IDF keep this up? Does it have any other surprises equivalent to the pager/walkie-talkie attack up its sleeve?
The military issue is only part of the equation. More important is the political and civilian issue. No matter the casualties and damage caused to Hezbollah, the most critical issue for Israel is when its civilians can return to rebuild their homes (many of which have been demolished or severely damaged by Hezbollah fire over the past 11 months) and livelihoods (some of which were physically destroyed and others of which have withered away because the owners and workers cannot approach them, including agricultural fields and small to medium industrial plants within immediate range of Hezbollah’s weapons). If Israel cannot compel Hezbollah to cease or at least severely reduce its fire, then the military successes accrued, no matter how impressive, cannot be translated into a political/civilian success.
As for the negotiations with Hamas, these appear at the moment to be going nowhere. Change can only happen if either Hamas or the Israeli government decides to drop its most important demands – Hamas, that Israel allow it to regain full control over Gaza; and Israel, that Hamas abdicate its control over Gaza.
All eyes in the Middle East are on the American election in November. What will American policy be after the election is over? Will it change? If so, in what direction? Will more pressure be brought to bear on Israel to halt the war without achieving its goals, or will Israel receive more support to achieve those goals?
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The Gaza Terror Offensive – 1 August – 5 September 2024
Dr. Eado Hecht, a senior research fellow at the BESA Center, is a military analyst focusing mainly on the relationship between military theory, military doctrine, and military practice. He teaches courses on military theory and military history at Bar-Ilan University, Haifa University, and Reichman University and in a variety of courses in the Israel Defense Forces.