Mideast Security and Policy Studies

Mideast Security and Policy Studies serve as a forum for publication or re-publication of research conducted by BESA Center research associates.

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The collapse of strategic warning—the “fundamental surprise” written about by Dr. Zvi Lanir—is no longer a localized intelligence failure but rather a profound conceptual one. It is defined by the loss of the ability to identify the enemy’s changes in intent and pattern in time, within the framework of outdated conceptual models. In this reality, the pattern of the “Modern Blitz” has evolved—a multi-domain, simultaneous, massed offensive intended to exploit the operational “zero-time” of the first 24-72 hours to generate a decisive strategic achievement. The technological capability to mass, maneuver, and camouflage threats at high speed under a cloak of strategic deception erodes the relevance of tactical alert as a mechanism enabling adequate preparation for border defense.
The June 2025 open war between Israel and the Islamic Republic of Iran marked a watershed moment in the history of the Middle East and in the evolution of Israeli warfare. While Israel had previously conducted long-range, high-risk operations such as the 1976 Entebbe raid, the 1985 strike in Tunis and operations against the Houthis in Yemen in the Iron Swords war, the Iran war was the first time in its history that Israel waged a sustained, multi-domain campaign against a geographically distant regional power with no shared border. For 12 days, Israel brought to bear the full weight of its long-range strike capabilities, missile defenses, intelligence networks, cyber arsenal and spectrum warfare, demonstrating a level of operational reach, integration and coordination unprecedented in its military history.
This research offers a thorough historical exploration and a quantitative-statistical analysis of the allegation that the State of Israel committed genocide against the Gazan population following the October 7, 2023, massacre. Specifically, we address the claims that Israel intentionally starved the Gazan population, that IDF ground forces deliberately massacred civilians, and that the Israeli Air Force (IAF) carried out indiscriminate bombings, failing to distinguish between combatants and civilians and conducting disproportionate strikes.
The FPV drone revolution represents a paradigm shift in modern warfare, fundamentally altering tactical operations, force organization, and strategic thinking across all military dimensions.Combat evidence from the Russia-Ukraine conflict demonstrates the unprecedented lethality, operational scale, and tactical versatility of FPV systems. Yet most military establishments remain anchored to obsolete paradigms, failing to comprehend the implications of this transformation.
In the Iron Swords War, the IDF achieved battlefield decision over the enemy in two theaters of war in a manner contrary to customary IDF doctrine. In Gaza, a tactical and operational battlefield decision was achieved against Hamas based on the erosion of the enemy’s forces and capabilities, mainly through offensive ground activity. In Lebanon, a strategic, operational, and tactical battlefield decision (in that order) was achieved against Hezbollah that was based on the stratagem of a series of strikes, including the explosion of pagers, air strikes against capabilities and commanders, and a later ground operation against combat infrastructure in the border area. The concept of the battlefield decision has gradually disappeared from IDF discourse in recent years, but it warrants renewed discussion.
Israel is currently at war with Iran. Despite being non-nuclear, Iran could draw Israel into a protracted conflict involving "only" conventional missile and drone weaponry. Quickly, any such conflict in which both sides would seek "escala-tion dominance" and wherein the Israeli side might not be sufficiently advan-taged could compel a time-urgent decision in Jerusalem: (1) threaten calibrat-ed and plausible nuclear reprisals, or (2) submit to seemingly interminable at-trition warfare. Though the first option would amount to making threats of "asymmetrical nuclear war," it could still represent the most rational and cu-mulatively humane approach to Israeli national survival. In the final analysis, Israel can only succeed in its current war if it prevents Iranian nuclearization.
In the complex and often unpredictable realm of global politics, few political developments carry as much potential for transformative impact as the prospect of a second Trump presidency. This collection of expert analyses delves into the multifaceted implications of such a scenario, offering a comprehensive and nuanced exploration of how a Trump return to the White House could reshape global strategic landscapes. With a special focus on the Middle East and Israel, the publication provides an in-depth examination of how potential shifts in US foreign policy could reconfigure regional dynamics and strategic relationships.
In the aftermath of October 7, there is a clear need to reexamine Israel’s principles of defense. It is already clear that a considerable military build-up and additional investments will be required. However, we must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past. More of the same – the restoration of a strategy based on deterrence, greater firepower, a wider order of forces, and more durable fortifications – may prove unsatisfactory and even distracting. This study seeks to contribute to the formulation of a sustainable strategy. We will do this not by citing principles that should be added to the concept of security but by addressing the type of discussion that is required. Along the way we will question some of the automatic responses to the crisis.
In the aftermath of October 7, there is a clear need to reexamine Israel’s principles of defense. It is already clear that a considerable military build-up and additional investments will be required. However, we must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past. More of the same – the restoration of a strategy based on deterrence, greater firepower, a wider order of forces, and more durable fortifications – may prove unsatisfactory and even distracting. This study seeks to contribute to the formulation of a sustainable strategy. We will do this not by citing principles that should be added to the concept of security but by addressing the type of discussion that is required. Along the way we will question some of the automatic responses to the crisis.
In the aftermath of October 7, there is a clear need to reexamine Israel’s principles of defense. It is already clear that a considerable military build-up and additional investments will be required. However, we must be careful not to repeat the mistakes of the past. More of the same – the restoration of a strategy based on deterrence, greater firepower, a wider order of forces, and more durable fortifications – may prove unsatisfactory and even distracting. This study seeks to contribute to the formulation of a sustainable strategy. We will do this not by citing principles that should be added to the concept of security but by addressing the type of discussion that is required. Along the way we will question some of the automatic responses to the crisis.

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