Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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The success of Israel's 2023–2026 campaigns against Iran, its proxies, and its allies should not be judged by simplistic measures of targets destroyed or by the continuing existence or otherwise of the Iranian regime, but by whether or not Iran's grand strategy has been disrupted. Rather than viewing Iran's nuclear program in isolation, we interpret it as one pillar of an integrated strategy that also included the "Ring of Fire" proxy network and long-range missile forces. Following the degradation of much of this regional architecture after October 7, 2023, Iran accelerated its nuclear and missile programs in an effort to restore its strategic position. The Israeli campaigns against Iran itself are therefore best understood as efforts to prevent Iran from reconstructing this integrated military architecture rather than as attempts to achieve either regime change or a decisive military victory. Israel's success should be measured by assessing whether this goal was achieved and by calculating how long it will take Iran to once again pose an existential threat to Israel.
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The Kargil War is remembered in India as a military victory, but its legacy extends far beyond the recapture of positions seized by Pakistani forces in 1999. It was an early test of India's ability to employ conventional military force under the shadow of nuclear deterrence and a turning point in its relations with both Israel and the United States. Israel continued an established pattern of assisting India during times of crisis, but in this instance, it evolved from a discreet supplier into a reliable operational partner, helping adapt precision-strike capabilities in real time according to the campaign's requirements. The United States, for its part, provided diplomatic significance to India's restraint and pressed Pakistan to withdraw. The Kargil War demonstrated that strategic autonomy does not require isolation: India can rely on external partners, integrate technologies from multiple sources, and still retain full authority over how and when to employ military force.
Following the October 7 war and the documentation of the atrocities committed by Hamas against Israeli civilians, the limited political legitimacy the organization had retained within the Palestinian political system eroded dramatically. The Palestinian elections scheduled for 2026 are being held in a framework of institutional reform intended to align the Palestinian Authority with international requirements as it seeks international recognition of a future Palestinian state. One of the reform's defining features is the deliberate exclusion of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad from the democratic process because of their status as terrorist organizations. The upcoming Palestinian elections are thus a mechanism by which to create a new source of legitimacy for the Palestinian political system—one that no longer rests on Hamas's victory in the 2006 elections but instead on an institutional framework from which the movement is excluded. Despite the public support Hamas continues to enjoy for its October 7 attack, its absence from the forthcoming elections indicates that in practical terms, the organization has lost its status as a legitimate political actor within the Palestinian arena following the war and has been relegated primarily to the role of a militant military organization operating outside the institutional political system.
Israel has had the technological and industrial wherewithal to manufacture its own fighter-bombers since the early 1970s—yet ever since the mid-1980s, Jerusalem has repeatedly passed up this option in favor of continuing to rely on the United States to fulfill the IAF’s manned aircraft requirements. In light of current trends in both Israel and the United States, Jerusalem must urgently revisit this approach. Israel needs to design and build its own fighter-bomber—a Lavi 2.0.
For many years, the Armenian question has constituted one of the most sensitive issues in Israeli–Turkish relations. Although it was never at the core of the bilateral relationship, it repeatedly resurfaced whenever the question of recognizing the Armenian Genocide was raised, confronting Israel with a complex dilemma: how to balance its commitment to historical memory and the struggle against genocide denial with the strategic importance of its relations with Turkey. Over the years, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has regarded the issue primarily as a diplomatic matter with direct implications for relations with Ankara rather than merely as a historical or moral debate. Nor has this tension characterized Israeli policy alone. In recent years, Armenia itself has adopted a more pragmatic approach by advancing a process of normalization with Turkey without making Turkish recognition of the Armenian Genocide a precondition. The Armenian question therefore reflects a dynamic reality in which both Israel and Armenia are required to balance historical memory against changing strategic interests.
The most recent—though highly unlikely to be the last—war between the US and Iran was fought by an American president whose irresolution allowed a critically weakened Iran to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat. The fear of “boots on the ground”, unjustified though it was by the reality of the conflict, has emboldened America’s most committed and resolute enemy to double down on its catastrophic national and international policies.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is a seminal connectivity initiative linking India, the Middle East, and Europe. For it to succeed, its infrastructure, routes, ports, and chokepoints must be effectively protected. This applies across the maritime space stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Eastern Mediterranean. Attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea, persistent tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, and the growing vulnerability of undersea infrastructure have highlighted the security challenges facing contemporary trade networks. In the current security environment, Greece, Israel, and India occupy key positions along the corridor. Together, they form a maritime chain linking the Indo-Pacific to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean. The convergence of their strategic interests, geographic locations, and maritime capabilities lays the foundation for a new security architecture conducive to the wider objectives of the IMEC. Through naval cooperation, maritime domain awareness, critical infrastructure protection, and professional military education, these three countries have an opportunity to shape a more resilient East-West corridor extending from Mumbai to Souda Bay.
The scope of the signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the United States and Iran is very narrow. The MoU creates an interim state of deescalation between the United States and Iran within a rough, non-binding framework for future negotiations toward a permanent settlement. Despite its limitations, the MoU will serve as the primary strategic driver shaping the Middle East and beyond for at least the next six months. A net assessment of the MoU's implications reveals that while the United States successfully generated distinct advantages through the application of military force and agreed only to a temporary framework that does not forfeit its demands of Tehran, the manner in which the agreement was reached, along with its core content, represents a setback. It erodes Washington's substantive leverage over Iran, a development that will demand significant future American effort—including an increased probability of utilizing military force—to achieve a reasonable long-term arrangement. Regarding US-Israel relations, this is not the first time Washington has leveraged Israeli military achievements to serve its own interests. However, the overarching challenge lies in the future: Donald Trump will likely be Israel’s last unequivocally supportive president.
Any new Israeli government is now legally required to prepare a codified national security strategy within 150 days of its official formation. Though nuclear doctrine and strategy will likely be limited to the highest security-level classifications, nothing could have greater existential impact for Israel. Moreover, at a time when the principal threats to Israel are coming from a still pre-nuclear Iran and certain sub-state proxies, the National Security Council will have to consider wider and more explicit applications of nuclear deterrence. Israel’s decision-makers will need to undertake incremental but prompt shifts from “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” to “selective nuclear disclosure.” Otherwise, Jerusalem will have to accept a strategic reality in which Iran and other adversaries continuously threaten Israel with non-nuclear but high-lethality ballistic missiles and/or chemical-biological (CBW) ordnance – an unsustainable reality of interminable war.

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