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Perspectives Papers

Perspectives Papers provide analysis from BESA Center research associates and other outside experts on the most important issues pertaining to Israel and the Middle East.

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US Involvement in Gaza Is Not a Threat— It Is a Strategic Opportunity

US involvement in Gaza does not reflect a loss of Israeli control but rather a new strategic framework that emerged after Israel's 2022 integration into CENTCOM. This shift enabled unprecedented regional coordination, real-time intelligence sharing, and a multilayered defensive posture against Iran and its proxies. Following the Gaza fighting, a joint US-Israel command structure was established, enhancing operational integration while preserving Israel’s independent decision-making. For years, Israel debated the idea of a formal defense treaty with the United States but hesitated due to the fear of losing strategic autonomy. The current arrangement effectively creates a hybrid model. While not a formal alliance, it provides many of its advantages, including stronger deterrence, coordinated defense, deeper strategic depth, and the capacity for joint action, while maintaining Israel’s freedom of action.

Is the UAE Deepening Its Strategic Involvement Against the Houthis?

The Red Sea crisis predates the Swords of Iron War, but became a specifically Israeli security threat after October 2023, with the start of a Houthi military-terrorist solidarity campaign with Hamas. The Houthis launched a blockade on Israeli-linked shipping, but also harmed Red Sea maritime traffic in general with attacks on ships, causing a 50% reduction in Suez Canal traffic within a few months and forcing the Israeli Port of Eilat to suffer serious losses. The cessation of Houthi attacks on US vessels in May 2025, following a ceasefire agreement with Washington, did not signal an end to the conflict but rather a shifting of the crosshairs to focus more on trying to blockade Israel from the south. Since the October 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the Houthis have held their fire against Israel. Reports suggest that the UAE, possibly with the quiet blessing of Saudi Arabia, and anti-Houthi forces within Yemen are building new strategic positions to deal with the ongoing radical Shiite threat from Saana.

A Tsunami of New Technologies Is Reshaping the Battlefield

RUSI’s annual Military Technology Conference, held in London in October, presented a comprehensive picture of the technological revolution underway in the British Army and in other European militaries—a transformation that reflects the Russian threat and operational lessons emerging from the war in Ukraine. Future force design is transitioning sharply from hardware-centric to AI-driven and autonomous systems, with the strategic objective that by 2035, most combat platforms will be unmanned. Along with announcing massive investments and flagship programs, the conference identified key obstacles: bureaucratic delays, gaps between civilian AI and battlefield requirements, and legal and ethical challenges associated with integrating autonomous systems. The conference highlighted lessons learned from the war in Ukraine in shaping European military analysis, yet scarcely addressed the many lessons to be learned on Middle Eastern battlefields. The conclusion: Britain is undergoing a profound conceptual and operational shift, but its success will depend on overcoming structural barriers, accelerating innovation, and transforming advanced technological capabilities into effective military power within a short time frame.

A Whole New Ballgame:
India Has a New Security Paradigm

For nearly a decade, India has been shedding the vocabulary of strategic restraint. The cycle of responses to major Pakistan-based terrorist attacks, including Uri in 2016, Balakot in 2019, and Pahalgam in 2025, made clear that predictable retaliation had not deterred cross-border terrorism. In fact, it enabled it. Restraint, once thought to be stabilizing, had become strategically dangerous. Predictability gave militant groups the space and time to prepare for new attacks. Eventually, Delhi’s belief that terrorism could be contained below the threshold of interstate conflict collapsed. As was made clear in Operation Sindoor, India has crossed a doctrinal threshold. It no longer responds to terrorism with calibrated warnings or waits for international partners to validate its choices. It is building a new operating logic rooted in coercive clarity and a willingness to act first when its citizens are threatened.

Open Innovation in Defense: A Strategic Necessity

In today’s fast-paced technological environment, defense systems can no longer rely solely on internal R&D. Open innovation—systematically engaging with startups, academia, and civilian tech sectors—has become a strategic necessity. The distinct cases of the US and Israel suggest that diverse models can serve a shared imperative: to leverage civilian innovation in order to maintain national security and a technological edge.

The Limits of Recognition: “Palestine”, History, and International Law

Though an increasing number of states plan to recognize a Palestinian state, no such action—even in large numbers—can confer sovereignty. Under international law, statehood is “independent of recognition by the other states.” Such juridical status is based on Montevideo Convention (1933) requirements of (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) the capacity to enter into relations with other states. In the specific matter of Israel, recognizing a Palestinian state would undermine a core provision of the Oslo Accords and corollary Arafat-Rabin commitments not to alter the status of territory prior to formal agreement on permanent status. Such premature recognition would also be at odds with the status of the EU and other states as witnesses to the Oslo Accords, and with the multiple endorsements of those Accords expressed in UN resolutions. Acts of recognition in this matter would prejudge the outcome of negotiations that were never completed because of relentless Palestinian terrorism, and would violate the Natural Law origins of international law.

Analysis and Recommendations for Israel’s New National Cyber Strategy

The Israel National Cyber ​​Directorate (INCD) recently published an update of the country’s cyber security strategy. While the new strategy develops and updates the principles of its 2017 predecessor, it differs in its fundamental concept. The new version derives from broad national objectives in the cyber domain and focuses on protecting the means of securing core national processes and infrastructure. It addresses issues such as how to define the whole of national cyber security and how to deal with the technological supply network. The document is also influenced by the Iron Swords War in several ways. The strengths of the INCD should be built to the point that it can position itself as a leading part of the governmental and national cooperation network that will be required for implementation.

Israel’s Next Strategic Vector: Building Up National Strengths  

Since October 2023, Israel’s primary strategic vector has been a campaign against its enemies in the region. This campaign is nearing its end. In the coming months, the open security issues of Gaza and Iran will be decided. The next strategic vector should be a reorientation of the national focus from a security-level “strike force” to a national-level “prime force”, as David Ben-Gurion did after the War of Independence. Israel should turn its attention to five “national projects”: a public transportation network, a computing network, advanced computing infrastructure, a health and welfare response to population growth, and a longstanding relevant and strong security force.

How Israeli Intelligence Misunderstood Gender-Based Violence as a Strategic Tool on October 7

The Israeli intelligence system failed to understand the significance of the gender-based violence committed by Hamas on Israeli citizens during the October 7 attack. Raw information was not converted into meaningful insights that could have aided in strategic and operational decision-making. The failure stemmed in part from a lack of information, but also from an inability to analyze the information that was available, identify patterns, and prevent errors arising from cognitive bias and methodological obstacles. Hamas used gender-based violence as a deliberate strategy intended to cause severe harm to Israeli civilians, undermine Israelis’ sense of social security, and sow terror within Israeli society. Israeli intelligence failed to identify Hamas’s intentions prior to the attack and subsequently failed to deal effectively with the denials of Hamas and its supporters in the international system.

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