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Azerbaijan

The military escalation that took place in Karabakh in November 2020, has fundamentally transformed the (geo)political configuration in the region. After the fall of 2020, the territory of unrecognized “Artsakh” – “Nagorno-Karabakh republic”, established in 1991 on the part of the territory of mostly populated by ethnic Armenians Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan, shrank almost four times. Azerbaijan has regained internationally recognized control of its lands and its refugees, who were forced out by the Armenians started to return there.   Authorities of Armenia, historically a patron of the unrecognized enclave, are now actively preparing for a peaceful solution. However, this solution will be now probably written not in Yerevan.
Forty-four years ago, in March 1979, Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat signed a peace treaty that many thought impossible. The negotiations were often tense, with numerous crises and complex compromises, but eventually, terms were settled, and the agreement has held firm ever since. The warfare ended; embassies, economic ties and transportation links were established; and over time, close strategic coordination in promoting stability in the region was established. In many respects, this was the most significant example of a successful peace process since the end of World War II, and it can serve as an example for Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the Islamic Republic of Iran found a new avenue through which to carry on its anti-Western and anti-Israeli missions. Tehran has pledged to support its Russian ally in Ukraine and is sending weapons and other supplies to the Russian war effort. It is similarly assisting Armenia, its ally in the Caucasus, in its ongoing conflict with Israel- and-Turkey-backed Azerbaijan.
The emerging Islamic bloc of three Muslim states—Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Pakistan—seems feasible in theory, but its growth is constrained by the realities. Azerbaijan is still more Russian turf than Turkish, and Pakistan remains Chinese territory. The new Islamic bloc resembles three kids playing cowboy while their parents smile and watch. The parents will stay on the sidelines only until such time as they sense danger to their interests.
A nationalist Turkish television station with close ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has dug up a 12-year-old map that projects Turkey’s sphere of influence in 2050 as stretching from southeastern Europe on the northern coast of the Mediterranean and Libya on its southern shore across North Africa, the Gulf, and the Levant into the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has become an important component of Turkish foreign policy. Over the years, Ankara’s support for Baku has grown exponentially. Diplomacy was an element of this support, but more significant was the dispatch of sophisticated weaponry. Greater support for Azerbaijan coincided with Turkey’s more active foreign policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and is now strikingly different from Ankara-Baku relations of the 1990s and even the early 2010s. The reason for Ankara’s assertiveness could be access to energy and trade routes.
No major power has attempted in earnest to mediate the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis, and some have actively participated in keeping the situation ablaze. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan have been actively preparing for hostilities, but Armenia finds itself at a political and military disadvantage.

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