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Egypt

Seventy years ago, while the Arab-Israeli Lausanne peace talks were deadlocked, a pioneering and creative diplomatic initiative was aired to deal with the fate of Gaza and its Palestinian Arab refugees. This US initiative was a serious effort to bring about a settlement between Egypt and Israel while contributing to a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. Though it ended in failure, it provided valuable lessons.
In stark contrast to the extraordinary vision and courage displayed by PM Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in signing the peace treaty 40 years ago, the Palestinian leadership emerges as staunchly rejectionist and a serial squanderer of opportunities for peace. One can only hope that the Arab regimes, which appear increasingly reluctant to remain hostage to Palestinian rejectionism, will be courageous enough to follow in Sadatโ€™s visionary footsteps.
The long-term agreement recently signed between Russia and Egypt to build a nuclear power plant at El-Dabaa is aimed at improving Egyptโ€™s electricity sector and has no direct implications for the development of nuclear weapons. It is, however, likely to legitimize any future attempt by Egypt to build a uranium-enrichment or nuclear-fuel-reprocessing facility. While Egypt has already gained significant experience in the nuclear field, neither its plans to develop a civilian nuclear power plant nor its efforts to develop nuclear weapons have yet borne fruit.
Forty years after Anwar Sadatโ€™s historic visit to Jerusalem, most Israelis view the attendant Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as conducive to Israelโ€™s national security โ€“ yet they believe there are currently no leaders of Sadatโ€™s and Menachem Beginโ€™s stature on either side of the divide who are capable of effecting a similarly momentous breakthrough toward Israeli-Palestinian peace.
It is widely assumed that Menachem Begin and Anwar Sadat made peace despite their deep personal incompatibilities. But in fact, there were significant parallels in the lives of both men, and these may have facilitated their coming to an agreement. The similarities between themโ€”their early careers in โ€œundergroundโ€ movements, their stints in prison, their struggles against the British and hatred of the Soviet Union, their years on the margins of power, and their clearly defined definitions of homelandโ€”may have eased their final compromise.
Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser once shaped and guided Arab public opinion. Cairo was the capital of the Middle East, and Nasser's secular pan-Arab ideology challenged the West, Israel, and other Arab states. Nasser's Egypt showed how a developing country with a large population could persevere despite tremendous economic, political, and military challenges. As the 50th anniversary of the 1967 War approaches, Egyptians and Arabs of that generation might reflect with nostalgia on a bygone era when Cairo dominated the Middle East.
Israel just celebrated its sixty-ninth anniversary. Its citizens can be proud of its many impressive achievements, and particularly the building of a very strong military that has withstood many tests. Yet acceptance by all its neighbors has not, unfortunately, been attained. Israel is still at war.
Reintegrating into the Jordanian state is an economic imperative for the Arab inhabitants of the Palestine Authority. Only by once again becoming citizens of Jordan will they be able to challenge the economic stone wall imposed by domestic Jordanian economic lobby groups barring West Bank exports. A two-state solution would lead, not to an economy of peace, but to an economy of violence as lobby groups in both Israel and Jordan shut out the Palestinian stateโ€™s exports. The Palestinian state would inevitably react by threatening and committing violence to extract the international aid to which the PA has become accustomed.

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