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US President Donald Trump’s staunch opposition to the nuclear agreement with Iran (the JCPOA) has sparked a serious transatlantic rift. The EU is, however, attempting to balance its appetite for business with an examination of security risks. In so doing, it is slowly awakening to Israeli and Sunni Arab sensitivities regarding Tehran’s hegemonic aspirations in the Middle East.
Following the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital by US President Donald Trump, President of the Palestinian Authority Mahmoud Abbas is counting on the EU to support his cause. In his January 2018 meeting with EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, he was assured “of the firm commitment of the EU to the two-state solution, with Jerusalem as shared capital of the two states – the State of Israel and the State of Palestine”. However, it remains questionable whether the EU has the necessary gravitas to play a catalytic political role in the peace process. BESA joins the debate by posing the question: Can Mahmoud Abbas achieve anything in Europe?
In recent months, Germany and France have expressed skepticism and raised security concerns about the implications of Chinese investments in Europe. The 2017 State of the Union speech by the President of the European Commission, Jean Claude Juncker, reflected those voices, marking the beginning of a new period in Sino-European relations. The EU seems determined to be more careful about welcoming future Chinese business interests and is devising a screening model. However, it remains to be seen whether or not the new European strategy will be efficient, as the EU  needs foreign cash and investment.
Turkey says it wants to join the EU, but has no intention of complying with membership rules. The EU says it wants Turkey to join, but is fully aware that it does not qualify. Turkey pushes forward in the hope that the EU might someday change its rules; the EU pushes forward in the hope that Turkey might someday qualify. Neither will happen.
The German Chancellor’s daily routine has been attracting wide attention of late. Angela Merkel met recently with US President Donald Trump, followed by meetings with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang. Merkel expressed some of her colleagues’ thoughts after meeting Trump by saying, “Europe can no longer completely rely on its longstanding US alliance”. The timing of the Chinese visit, shortly after Trump’s visit, was not coincidental. China has a vision of joining forces with Europe to counterbalance the US, and President Trump’s reception in Europe made this vision more plausible.
Since 2004, Turkey has descended from winning accession talks with the EU to the “sick man of European democracy.” President Erdoğan, in his efforts to consolidate his conservative and nationalist voters, continues to fan fears of real or fabricated enemies, with particular emphasis on “Christian crusaders.” Few Turks (or Kurds) appear to care about Ankara’s disturbing and ever-worsening democratic deficit. Twenty-first century Turkey is behaving like the country described decades ago by a Turkish philosopher: “[It] is a ship heading east. Those aboard think they are heading west, but they are just running west on a ship sailing east.”
European countries, concerned about Turkey's swing towards authoritarianism, are not allowing political campaigns by AKP members on their soil, a decision that has rankled the Turkish ruling party. Ankara’s relations with Europe have deteriorated for other reasons as well: the support Europe allegedly gives the PKK, its reluctance to acknowledge the alleged responsibility of FGM for the coup attempt in July 2016, and the refugee deal. As the gaps widen between Turkey and Europe, it might be better for both sides if Europe made up its mind about Turkish admission to the EU.
The unending refugee crisis, the failed Turkish coup and subsequent purge, and Brexit are all causing great apprehension in Athens. But these challenges might present new opportunities. Turkish tensions with the West highlight Greece’s status as the most responsible element in the eastern Mediterranean, which could bolster Greece’s relations with both the EU and the US.
The three types of area jurisdiction in Judea and Samaria (the West Bank) – A, B and C – were meant as a short-term fix until a real Israeli-Palestinian peace accord could be crafted. More than 20 years later, both sides have broadly infringed on these parameters. Israel regularly penetrates Area A for security reasons, while the PA (with EU support) is building illegally and dangerously in key parts of Area C that are critical to Israel. Israel should halt this encroachment with determination.

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