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Armenia

Forty-four years ago, in March 1979, Israel’s Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat signed a peace treaty that many thought impossible. The negotiations were often tense, with numerous crises and complex compromises, but eventually, terms were settled, and the agreement has held firm ever since. The warfare ended; embassies, economic ties and transportation links were established; and over time, close strategic coordination in promoting stability in the region was established. In many respects, this was the most significant example of a successful peace process since the end of World War II, and it can serve as an example for Azerbaijan and Armenia. 
With the outbreak of war in Ukraine, the Islamic Republic of Iran found a new avenue through which to carry on its anti-Western and anti-Israeli missions. Tehran has pledged to support its Russian ally in Ukraine and is sending weapons and other supplies to the Russian war effort. It is similarly assisting Armenia, its ally in the Caucasus, in its ongoing conflict with Israel- and-Turkey-backed Azerbaijan.
President Joe Biden’s use of the word “genocide” on Armenian Remembrance Day was not a game-changer in US-Turkish relations, which are plagued by more fundamental problems. But it enhances Turkey’s political isolation, weakens its arguments on whether a genocide did or did not occur in 1915-24, and further destabilizes whatever is left of Ankara’s soft power.
During simultaneous crises in Armenia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan, Moscow faced challenges that contained opportunities to reap geopolitical benefits. Moscow’s handling of these crises demonstrates that its policy toward its neighbors has evolved away from direct intervention and toward careful maneuvering, which is both face-saving and more geopolitically rewarding.
A nationalist Turkish television station with close ties to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has dug up a 12-year-old map that projects Turkey’s sphere of influence in 2050 as stretching from southeastern Europe on the northern coast of the Mediterranean and Libya on its southern shore across North Africa, the Gulf, and the Levant into the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has become an important component of Turkish foreign policy. Over the years, Ankara’s support for Baku has grown exponentially. Diplomacy was an element of this support, but more significant was the dispatch of sophisticated weaponry. Greater support for Azerbaijan coincided with Turkey’s more active foreign policy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, and is now strikingly different from Ankara-Baku relations of the 1990s and even the early 2010s. The reason for Ankara’s assertiveness could be access to energy and trade routes.

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