Palestinian-Israeli Diplomacy

Flaws in General Eiland’s Alternatives

| February 7, 2010

There exists an alternative diplomatic option that Gen. Eiland did not examine in any depth: a unilateral Israeli dismantlement of the civilian
settlements established since 1967 in Judea and Samaria.

Regional Alternatives to the Two-State Solution

| January 1, 2010

Within the currently-defined, narrow confines of the conventional two-state parameters, no Israeli-Palestinian agreement is likely. Regional alternatives that widen the scope of actors taking responsibility for a settlement can creatively help break the impasse.

Obama and the Middle East

| September 24, 2009

Obama’s ambitious Mideast agenda has so far produced meager results. Many regional players are primarily concerned about Iran’s quest for nuclear weapons, and are not easily amenable to American overtures.

The Lone Terrorist

| July 13, 2009

The lone terrorist attacker is difficult to defend against. Israel must enact effective “price tag” deterrence legislation against would-be terrorists.

Olmert’s Palestinian Failures

| March 26, 2009

Ehud Olmert failed to move Israel forward either in confronting or negotiating with the Palestinians. He lurched from unilateralism, to
negotiations, to military conflict with the Palestinians, and failed in all three tracks. His failure to deal effectively with Hamas is the most serious.

Rabin and the Oslo Process Revisited

| November 10, 2008

While venerated by the Left as a hero of peace, the cautious Yitzhak Rabin was first and foremost a military man, for whom peace agreements were primarily a means to buttress security. He believed that transition to real peace would take decades, and would have ditched the Oslo process by now.

The Failure of the Oslo Process: Inherently Flawed or Flawed Implementation?

| June 16, 2008

Liberals argued that the Oslo process collapsed because it was not implemented properly; while Realists said that the process was flawed from the outset. Israel and the Palestinians were ripe for negotiations but not for conflict resolution because the parties remained too far apart on core issues. Attempts at integration actually made matters worse by increasing friction. The key to conflict management is not integration but physical and political separation.

Shelve the Shelf Agreement

| March 26, 2008

The Olmert-Livni “shelf agreement” concept for Israel-Palestinian peace is strategically illogical and tactically ill-considered. It has no foundation in negotiation theory; and incautiously assumes best case scenarios. It would not end the conflict because the Palestinians would proceed to bargain with Israel for additional concessions, and Israel inevitably would be forced to forgive the Palestinians on needed reforms.

The Saudi Initiative: A Starting Point for an Israeli-Saudi Dialogue?

| March 27, 2007

The recently revived Saudi Initiative is premised on terms permanently unacceptable to Israel. Nevertheless, given current realities, Israel should not reject the initiative out of hand. Israel should take advantage of the initiative in order to transform it into a real opening for direct yet secret negotiations with Saudi Arabia.

The Illusion of “Peace in Exchange for Territories”

Since the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, Arab leaders have repeated the mantra that peace with Israel hinges upon a withdrawal to the pre-1967 border. However, it is the Arab demand for a return of all Palestinian refugees to pre-1967 Israel that remains at the core of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and this demand disguises Arab intentions to destroy Israel.