Search
Close this search box.

Palestinian-Israeli Diplomacy

Ehud Olmert failed to move Israel forward either in confronting or negotiating with the Palestinians. He lurched from unilateralism, to negotiations, to military conflict with the Palestinians, and failed in all three tracks. His failure to deal effectively with Hamas is the most serious.
While venerated by the Left as a hero of peace, the cautious Yitzhak Rabin was first and foremost a military man, for whom peace agreements were primarily a means to buttress security. He believed that transition to real peace would take decades, and would have ditched the Oslo process by now.
Liberals argued that the Oslo process collapsed because it was not implemented properly; while Realists said that the process was flawed from the outset. Israel and the Palestinians were ripe for negotiations but not for conflict resolution because the parties remained too far apart on core issues. Attempts at integration actually made matters worse by increasing friction. The key to conflict management is not integration but physical and political separation.
The Olmert-Livni "shelf agreement" concept for Israel-Palestinian peace is strategically illogical and tactically ill-considered. It has no foundation in negotiation theory; and incautiously assumes best case scenarios. It would not end the conflict because the Palestinians would proceed to bargain with Israel for additional concessions, and Israel inevitably would be forced to forgive the Palestinians on needed reforms.

Accessibility Toolbar