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Second Lebanon War

Many have suggested that Israel's questionable military performance in the Second Lebanon War have impacted negatively on Israel's ability to deal with the Palestinians. However, in reality the recent war revealed that the tendency to see the conflict in broader terms, such as a clash of civilizations, is very much exaggerated.
There were five central problems in Israel's management of the summer 2006 war in Lebanon: adherence to the rules of "post-heroic" warfare despite its limitations; playing into the enemyย’s hands; operation on the basis of false assumptions and beliefs; violation of basic military principles; and hesitancy on the part of Israel's leadership. The outcomes of the war can be seen on the battlefield, on the grand-strategic level, in terms of victory, and in longer-term perspective.
Israel's political and military leadership was ill-prepared for the war against the Hizballah in the summer of 2006. A series of strategic mistakes on the part of Israeli leaders denied Israel a military victory and squandered an important opportunity to destroy the majority of Hizballah'ย’s military presence in Southern Lebanon, settle scores and enhance Israel's deterrence. Hopefully, Israeli leadership will be better strategically prepared so as to attain a clearly-defined victory in the next round.
The current Israeli operation in Lebanon focuses on removing the threat posed to Israel by Hizballah missiles and on destroying Hizballah'ย’s military infrastructure. Israel's use of force is fully justified and proportionate, considering the magnitude of the threat. However, Israel should be targeting Damascus, as subduing Syria is the key to rolling back Hizballah and weakening Iran and its radical Islamist influence in the Middle East.

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