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September 27, 2020

Two messages continue to ring out on the eve of the anniversary of the Yom Kippur War. One concerns the severity of the intelligence failure at the time, and the other promises that the right lessons have been learned and the IDF is now prepared for any scenario. When the failure is portrayed as essentially the lack of an intelligence warning, it is easy to promise that it has been diagnosed and remedied in a way that prevent its future recurrence. But an in-depth look at the war shows that the reasons for the fiasco went far beyond the intelligence failure.
The IDF’s difficulties at the outset of the 1973 Yom Kippur War stemmed from an inherent command flaw rather than an intelligence failure as is commonly believed. The roots of this flaw date back to 1957, when Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan decided on an early retirement age for IDF personnel so as to enable them to embark on a second career. Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion, who saw the dangers of the decision, opposed it but did not use his authority to revoke it. 

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