Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen

Maj. Gen. (res.) Gershon Hacohen

Served in the IDF for 42 years, commanding troops in battle on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. Was a Corps commander, and commander of the IDF Military Colleges. Email: [email protected]

What Should Be Learned from the Gaza Disengagement?

The debate over the interpretation of the clear and present danger from Gaza in the wake of the 2005 unilateral disengagement holds the key to saving Israel from the dangers attending the creation of a Palestinian state in the West Bank.

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Disowning Ben-Gurion’s Vision

The rejection by Israeli intellectuals of Jewish spiritual and political activism, as exemplified in the preaching and actions of Rabbi Akiva, who was executed by the Romans for his support of the Bar-Kochba revolt (132-35 CE), runs counter to the thinking of David Ben-Gurion, who considered himself a disciple and successor of the eminent sage.

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The Six-Day War and the Israeli Dream

The Six-Day War was a decisive turning point in the Zionist enterprise. But the project of building Israeli communities on the West Bank and the messianic aspects of Zionism were not born in 1967. They are stages in processes that were initiated by the workers’ parties and the Herut movement.

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Annexing Parts of the West Bank Area C: An Israeli National Interest

The former commanders who are demanding a referendum on the possible annexation of parts of the West Bank’s Area C misunderstand the threats confronting Israel. One need only consider the latest round of fighting in Gaza to understand what the threat to the cities of the coastal plain would look like if Israel were to give up control of the mountainous terrain dominating the country’s economic-social-industrial heartland.

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The Meaning of “Mamlachtiut”

For David Ben-Gurion, the concept of mamlachtiut captured the perennial tension between the establishment of the state of Israel as an orderly and delimited institutional project and the view of the state as a means in an exalted process of redemption. Hence, even after its establishment, Israel would continue – as an instrument through which to fulfill an infinite vision – to be “a state in the making.”  

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The West Bank’s Area C: Israel’s Eastern Line of Defense

This study explores the strategic-military implications of the establishment of a Palestinian state along the pre-June 1967 lines. Its central thesis is that the creation of such a state, on the heels of the IDF’s total withdrawal from the West Bank, will not only deprive Israel of defensible borders but will almost certainly lead to the advent of a terrorist entity like the one created in the Gaza Strip – at a stone’s throw from the Israeli hinterland.

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Handing Gaza to Abbas Will Solve Nothing

Overthrowing Hamas and handing rule in Gaza to Mahmoud Abbas will not bring about a solution to the Gaza problem. In fact, it was Yasser Arafat, Abbas’s predecessor as PLO leader, who transformed Gaza into an ineradicable terrorist hotbed by flouting the Oslo Accords that he had signed. The solution to the Gaza problem does not lie in Ramallah but rather in the Strip’s historic hinterland – the Sinai Peninsula.

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Israel’s Dilemma in Gaza

At this strategic watershed moment, one can discern the logic of the policy that has guided the Netanyahu government’s approach to Gaza over the past decade – that it is in Israel’s interest for Hamas to remain in control until the group is rejected by its own people.

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Security Is Not Enough

The State of Israel is at a fateful crossroads. The unending necessity to safeguard the state’s secure existence ensures that its leaders will face complex and painful decisions. But there are other, no less critical considerations that must be factored into the decision-making equation, notably powerful national, historical, cultural, and religious sentiments and aspirations.

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Stifling the National Security Debate: A Response to Shabtai Shavit

In the public debate on Israel’s national security in general and a desirable Israeli-Palestinian settlement in particular, the dividing line between “political” and “professional” has been drawn by old elites and interest groups. Proponents of concessions and withdrawals are traditionally cast as guided entirely by professional considerations, while opponents of such ideas are dismissed as driven by ulterior motives and political agendas. This presentation is not only false but the inverse of the truth.

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