In December 2023, the BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program published papers on separatist threats and Church-related antisemitism in Russia, French participation in post-Soviet geopolitical dynamics, the perception of Israel’s war against Hamas in Russia and Ukraine, and the geopolitical (re)orientation of Armenia.
In two subsequent papers, Velvl Chernin scrutinizes the separatist threats in the “ethnic” regions of Russia, namely, Tuva (Tyva) and Kalmykia. Against the background of the war in Ukraine, many representatives of non-Russian ethnic groups accuse the federal authorities of “sending their representatives to the front in much larger proportions than ethnic Russians,” an assumption that might lead to the formation of a deep grievance. Moreover, the federal center encourages creating regional volunteer battalions that become in fact “ethnic military units” placed under the direct control of the “ethnic” regional authorities; the author thinks this practice can potentially change the center-region relationships. Against this background, the Tuvan authorities were involved in the conflict between the Tuvan and non-Tuvan soldiers fighting in Ukraine, and the anti-war “women’s movement” is also particularly active in the regions of Tuva and Buryatia. Chernin points to the complicated history of Tuva which was “the last territory that became part of the USSR” in 1944, and which became in the early 1990s a zone of severe anti-Russian violence. Nowadays, the well-being gap between the Tuvans and the Russians in the region, the migration of the Tuvan youth to the cities, and the return of the Tuvan servicemen from the front might contribute to inter-ethnic tensions and even potential separatist claims.
The war might be seen as a window of opportunities in several other “ethnic” regions of the Russian Federation. The history of Kalmykia is different from that of Tuva, being dominated by the experience of Stalinist deportations that resulted, inter alia, in severed inter-ethnic relationships with the local Chechens, and territorial disputes with the neighbouring regions. Being an East Asian minority surrounded by Caucasian peoples, and a Buddhist people surrounded by Christians and Muslims, contributes to preventing assimilation. However, the separatist bodies do not provide a distinct strategy for economic development, which is crucial for one of the poorest regions in Russia.
Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman analyses the role of conservative actors within the Russian Orthodox Church in stimulating antisemitism. He points at the domineering position of the Metropolitan Tikhon (Shevkunov), who is allegedly very close to Vladimir Putin, and is known as a leading figure in conservative circles. Kazantsev-Vaisman underlines the importance of the myth of the Tsar’s “ritual murder” (by the Jews, supposedly) in fueling the religious antisemitism in Russia, stimulated by the “Tsar-worshippers” movement and supported by several high-ranked church actors. Other important elements in the symbolic Orthodox antisemitism are the veneration of Joseph of Volotsk, a theologian who initiated the persecution of the “heresy of the Judaizers” in the 15th century, and of Ivan Ilyin, a Russian religious philosopher whose works are repeatedly quoted by Vladimir Putin. The author concludes that “for conservatives in the Russian Orthodox Church, the country’s history is presented as a series of globally significant conspiracies, usually involving Jews. (…) To suppress these conspiracies and save the country, according to conservatives in the Russian Orthodox Church, a harsh political regime and terror are necessary.”
Gela Vasadze draws the readers’ attention to the Armenian position within the Eurasian Economic Union. Since January 1, the country assumes the chairmanship of the organization, against the background of growing political tensions with the Russian authorities, who have the leading role in the EAEU. However, the Armenian political leadership underscores the economic component of the organization while dismissing its political essence. The author supposes that in the Armenian case, such parallel development might be effective, while also pointing to the rapidly developing economic ties between Armenia and Iran and the country’s potential role as a hub in the transportation and communication network that emulates the Silk Road.
The problem of the geopolitical (re)orientation of Armenia is, inter alia, discussed in the paper by Andrei Kazantsev-Vaisman. He considers Armenia and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as key regional priorities for French foreign policy. The author places the French influence in the framework of the “new Great Game” and concludes that, with the American interest in Central Asia declining, France gained the opportunity to rival Germany as the leading European actor in the post-Soviet area, thus compensating for (partly) losing its traditional sphere of influence in Africa. “An attempt to reorient Armenia toward France (as well as the United States) became evident after the Second Karabakh War (2020)”, partly because “despite its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Armenia has not received allied assistance from Russia.” For France, Armenia is on the list of priorities because of the large Armenian diaspora and of its potential as a weaponry market. In Central Asia, France prioritizes cooperation with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, mostly because of the necessity for cooperation in importing uranium (its major supplier in Niger was lost because of the coup d’etat) and minerals needed for the green energy transition. Symbolically, in 2023, the first official visit by a French president to Uzbekistan in 30 years took place.
The analysis by Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin sheds light on the implications of the war against Hamas on the perceptions of Israel in Russia and Ukraine. The author notes that “Moscow almost openly supports Hamas as a satellite of Iran, Russia’s closest partner in the Middle East. This significantly sets the current situation apart from the relatively balanced approach demonstrated by Moscow during, for instance, the IDF’s Operation Protective Edge in 2014, and Russia’s subsequent policy of presenting itself as an ‘impartial mediator’ between all participants in the Middle East conflict.” He finds that “Russia’s interest lies in the possible slowing down (…) of the process of normalization of Saudi-Israeli relations” that would facilitate the “formation of an alliance between the United States, Israel and the Saudi bloc countries, which would pose a serious challenge to the interests of Russia, Iran and China in the region.” Although an outspokenly pro-Israeli position is voiced in Russia even by some of the most conservative authors, the pro-Palestinian stance has been manifested both in diplomatic demarches and in media coverage. The latter has already led to the formation of a public opinion unfavorable towards Israel, which looks like an overnight metamorphosis and makes the observers think of a Soviet-style anti-Zionism. On the contrary, in Ukraine, many consider Israel as a “role model,” even despite some frustration caused by the, allegedly, insufficient support from the Jewish state; moreover, Ukraine is interested in maximizing the diplomatic isolation of Iran, a close Russia’s ally. The Ukrainian state machinery has voiced unequivocal support for Israel in its fight against the Hamas terrorists, which is also reflected in public opinion: according to the polls, Ukrainian society was “overwhelmed by a wave of solidarity and sympathy for Israel”.
The Post-Soviet Conflict Research Program will continue monitoring the dynamics in the ex-USSR area in 2024 and inform you of our experts’ findings.