PSCRP-BESA Reports No 45 (March 28, 2024)
by Joseph Epstein
Two years following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the situation on the ground has shifted in Moscow’s favor. Although, President Joe Biden has rallied Western Nations to come to Ukraine’s aid and has done much to support Kyiv, there is a disconnect between his rhetoric and Washington’s concrete actions in supporting the war effort. This report seeks to explore this divide, while analyzing the causes and consequences.
The Talk
Following Russia’s 2022 invasion, the Biden administration came out with strong messages of support for Ukraine. Biden pledged hefty U.S. military and economic packages while saying his only red line was sending American ground troops. Biden also backed President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s goal of pushing Russia out of Ukraine. Two months following the invasion, U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said the U.S. sought to punish Russia and make it incapable of carrying out similar invasions in the future.
Yet, at the same time, the administration tried to toe a delicate line to avoid de-escalation. In May 2022, Biden penned an oped in the New York Times discussing what he would do and not do to support Ukraine’s war effort. He wrote that he did not want a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia, enable Ukraine to strike beyond its borders or to “inflict pain” on Russia. He also envisioned the war ending by a negotiated settlement.
At the one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion, Biden made an unprecedented visit to Kyiv. After the visit, he reaffirmed U.S. support in a Warsaw speech, saying, “Ukraine will never be a victory for Russia. Never.” He also reaffirmed Washington’s “unflagging commitment” to Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
Over time, however his strategy has changed. Last December, anonymous sources in the Biden administration told Politico that the U.S. was shifting to a more defensive policy. Unconfident in Ukraine’s ability to take back territories occupied by Russia after a much-touted Ukrainian counteroffensive failed and with Congressional gridlock preventing more support, the administration now wanted Zelensky to end his objective of total victory and, instead, seek a negotiated settlement. The administration has not, however, made any official comment in this regard.
Critics have chided the Biden administration for not clearly and coherently making the case for supporting Ukraine to the American people early on. During World War II, many Americans were committed to isolationism. This prompted then-President Franklin D. Roosevelt to give his famous “Four Freedoms Speech,” in which he argued that it was in American’s interest to support to the besieged United Kingdom four months after it was attacked. Biden referenced that speech during his March State of the Union, warning of the danger Putin presented to freedom and Europe, — more than two years after the Russian invasion.
The administration has also been ineffective in countering opponents of aid to Ukraine and promoting how such aid is in America’s interest. As the editorial board for the tabloid New York Post wrote in December, the administration has not properly challenged rumors of mass scale corruption in Ukraine even though –according to a study by the center-right American Enterprise Institute — 90 percent of Washington’s aid to Ukraine is spent inside the United States. The editorial board also accused Biden of not properly making the case to lawmakers in Congress or rallying the public around support for Kyiv.
It should not be a hard case to make. For 5% of military spending, Washington is destroying a major adversary’s capacity without the need for American boots on the ground.
The Walk
Although Biden’s rhetoric has been determined and supportive, albeit sometimes incoherent, some have accused the president of acting as if he does not want Ukraine to win.
To Biden’s credit, he has done much to help Kyiv. To date, the United States has supplied Ukraine with $46.3 billion in security aid. Additionally, the Biden administration has lobbied lawmakers – but has faced staunch opposition from Republicans who have tied the release of $60 billion in military aid to Ukraine to a U.S. border bill. However, when it comes to the actual military equipment supplied to Kyiv, military experts have noted problems with the quality of equipment, timing of shipments and hesitancy to delivery key weapons that could have made a difference earlier in the conflict.
In December 2023, the Wall Street Journal Editorial Board highlighted the times such hesitancy hurt the Ukrainians on the battlefield. Take the delivery of Patriot defense missiles. Just a month following the war, a senior U.S. defense official said there would “no discussion” about supplying the defensive system since it would require U.S. boots on the ground to train Ukrainians. This allowed Russia to take out critical infrastructure before the U.S. opted to train Ukrainian troops in Oklahoma in December 2022. The delay caused the first Patriot batteries to be operational in April 2023.
A similar story transpired with F16 fight jets. In February 2023, Biden said Ukraine did not need such advanced planes despite military experts saying they would make a big difference on the battle field. Only in May 2023 did the administration approve training for Ukrainian pilots. Another wavering case involved the mobile rocket launchers MLRS and HIMARS. In May 2022, Politico reported that concerns of escalation prevented the White House from shipping these systems to Kyiv. The administration caved in later that month and HIMARS were finally sent.
But as the WSJ article noted, the most harmful to Ukraine’s war effort was the Biden administration’s foot-dragging on long-range ATACMS missiles that can travel over 300 kilometers. ATACMS would make Crimea a target and allow Kyiv to break Russian supply routes.
Almost all military strategists from Sun Tzu to Claude von Clausewitz have spoken of the importance of logistics. Head of Information Security at defense contractor Genesys Defense and Technologies Adib Enayati noted the importance of supply routes to the Russian military, which has allowed Moscow to quickly recover and repair equipment, reduce the cost of transportation and repairs, ensure continuous supply to its forces, preserve Russian force projection and provide ongoing maintenance and upgrades to military equipment. In June 2022, U.S. National security adviser Jake Sullivan said that supplying Ukraine with ATACMS could lead to a world war. But last October, the U.S. sent Ukraine the ATACMS short-range cluster warhead version that could not reach Crimea after the failed Ukrainian counteroffensive.
After they were shipped, the ATACMS proved effective on the battlefield. ATACMS strikes are believed to have destroyed at least nine Russian military helicopters and other high-value equipment at airbases close to Berdiansk and Luhansk in southern and eastern Ukraine. Moreover, Ukrainians have complained that many of the weapons supplied to them are old. According to the Institute for the Study of War, some of the U.S.-supplied equipment to Ukraine is even “inoperable.”
Possible explanations and consequences
From statements and accounts coming from the administration, it seems that Putin’s strategy of trying to deter full-fledged U.S. support for Ukraine through his threats of nuclear war has worked. Although Putin is waging a war with Ukraine, he sees the West and specifically the United States as the real aggressor and cause of the conflict. Multiple times, he has threatened nuclear war and during his February State of the Union address said that NATO escalations could cause the “destruction of civilization.”
The Biden administration has said it does not expect Putin to use nuclear weapons but has not completely dismissed the possibility. In fact, in response to Putin’s announcement of moving tactical nuclear weapons into Belarus last June, Biden said that the possibility of Putin using them was “real.” According to the New York Times, the Central Intelligence Agency warned early in the war that there was a 50% chance that Putin would use nuclear weapons if Ukraine looked like it might retake Crimea. How the CIA came up with this number is unclear given the abstract nature of the question. However, according to the same article, the threat of nuclear warfare accomplished Putin’s likely goal — rattling U.S. officials and deterring certain types of support for Ukraine.
Escalate to de-escalate
The initial strategy of the administration was to “escalate to de-escalate,” meaning to supply enough military aid to Ukraine to force Russia to the negotiating table. However, when it came to supplying vital military aid, Washington hesitated to avoid de-escalation – directly contradicting this strategy. This led to a confused policy detached from Biden’s rhetoric and a trickling of key aid that ended up prolonging the war.
This policy of “peace through de-escalation” was influenced by such members of Biden’s foreign policy team as Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Jake Sullivan. This has also been the case in the Middle East, where the administration has preached de-escalation with Iran while not providing a credible deterrent.
In the case of Ukraine, the administration’s hesitance has been devastating. Supplying Ukraine with the weapons they needed early on could have prevented the current tide shifting in Putin’s favor. In fact, according to Alina Polyakova, the president of the Washington, D.C.-based Center for European Policy Analysis, if it had not been for the incremental nature of aid due to escalatory concerns, Ukraine would have ended the conflict in the first year.
The administration also is concerned with domestic challenges from Trump-supporting Republicans and what the potential of A Trump presidency would mean for the war effort. In December, after facing months of gridlock over support to Ukraine, Biden said that without supplemental funding, Washington would not be able to help Ukraine fulfill its military He is likely also worried about his potential successor immediately abandoning Kyiv.
Trump for his part, has previously said he would end the war within 24 hours and earlier this month. Earlier this month, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said after meeting the former president that Trump “will not give a penny in the Ukraine-Russia War. That is why the war will end.” The success of the Ukrainian military largely depends on U.S. support. Putin has understood this and for that reason has aimed at disrupting support through nuclear threats as well as misinformation campaign.
The hesitancy by the Biden administration to withhold advanced weaponry damaged the Ukrainian counteroffensive and may have led to Russia’s current upper hand in the conflict. As Russia has now adapted to the war, it will be much harder to change the momentum back.
Joseph Epstein is a Director of Legislative Affairs at the Endowment for Middle East Truth (EMET’) and a research fellow at the Yorktown Institute.