Israeli Gas Exports to Syria:
The Dilemma of Formalizing Direct Gas Cooperation

Israeli gas exports to Syria are already a reality, but they are conducted indirectly, through swap deals and resale arrangements with Jordan and Egypt rather than through a formal Israel-Syria contract. This creates a strategic dilemma for both sides. On the one hand, a direct Israel-Syria gas contract could provide clearer accountability, stronger safeguards against disruptions, and a basis for future energy cooperation that may include Lebanon as well. On the other hand, direct gas trade could be politically premature and expose both sides to domestic criticism: in Israel, because of concerns over dwindling domestic gas reserves after the large export agreement with Egypt in 2025; and in Syria, because of fears that Israel could politicize gas supply or use it as leverage. Indirect contracts through Jordan and Egypt may be easier to implement and deny, but they also blur responsibility and reduce both sides’ control over supply conditions. Israel should approach this question not as a binary choice between formal normalization and continued ambiguity but as a practical debate over which contracting model best serves stability, leverage, deniability, and long-term regional integration.

Azerbaijan’s Entry into Israeli Waters May Open New Export Routes with Turkey

The decision by SOCAR, Azerbaijan’s state oil company, to press ahead with a gas exploration license in Israeli waters marks another significant step in the ever-deepening partnership between Israel and Azerbaijan. In addition to the economic opportunity it provides to discover new gas, the involvement of SOCAR carries significant strategic weight in a region where energy projects can forge new ties or rekindle old rivalries. SOCAR’s role as the project’s operator may facilitate a more stable multilateral energy framework in the Eastern Mediterranean due to Azerbaijan’s close relations with Turkey, which enable it to serve as a mediator. Azerbaijan’s involvement may also offer Israel a viable route for future gas exports to Turkey that buffers the volatile relations between Jerusalem and Ankara, mirroring the current oil trade arrangements between the sides.

The Syrian Pipeline Game: How Turkey’s Plans Affect Israel’s Regional Ambitions

The fall of the Assad regime in Syria has revived Turkey’s plans to construct oil and gas pipelines through the country, turning it into a regional “energy corridor” for neighboring states. Some of these plans would offer the Arab Gulf States a more convenient land route for exporting energy to Europe through Turkey, posing a challenge to Israel’s similar aspirations. Israel has other opportunities to export its natural gas to new markets via pipeline, but they pose the risk of undermining Israel’s relationship with Greece and Cyprus. Israel should follow the "pipeline game" in Syria closely to ensure that new economic opportunities in the region don't pass it by.

Is the Aphrodite Gas Field
Politically Viable?

The companies that share ownership of the Aphrodite gas field announced on September 1, 2024 that they have submitted an updated development plan to the Cypriot government and are awaiting its approval. They estimate its cost to be around $4 billion. The announcement was preceded by months of fraught discussion between the companies, led by the US company Chevron, and the Cypriot Minister of Energy. If the development of the field can move forward successfully, it has the potential to redound to Israel’s benefit.

Relieving Gaza’s Electricity Burden After the War

The Gaza Strip's heavy dependence on electricity and diesel supplied by Israel has turned from an Israeli strategic advantage into an economic and humanitarian burden for Israel. The reconstruction of postwar Gaza must include more independent energy generation capabilities in the form of solar PV expansion and the development of the Gaza Marine gas field. It must also include more grid connections to other electricity suppliers beside Israel, primarily Egypt. Otherwise, Israel will remain responsible for meeting the needs of millions of Gaza’s residents in the coming decades, regardless of who controls the Gaza Strip.

The Great Sea Interconnector: Prospects for an Electrical Cable Connecting Greece, Cyprus, and Israel

In recent years, energy security has become a central issue for many countries, not least those that suffer from political and energy isolation. The Iron Swords War has greatly sharpened Israel’s need for a solution to the problem of damage to, or shortages in, electricity supply in times of crisis. The close relationship that has developed over the past decade between Israel, Greece and Cyprus enables and encourages projects of this kind. One project that has been on the table in recent years is an electrical cable that would connect the three countries. This is an ambitious and expensive project with quite a few question marks regarding its practicality. However, under the circumstances, it is essential to move this strategic issue from policy statements to action. It is time to make decisions and allocate budgets to take advantage of the political opportunity provided by the Israeli-Cypriot-Greek triangle to come up with the kind of energy solution Israel urgently needs.

Fuel Supply in Gaza – Needs and Uses

This article provides an overview of the current fuel supply situation in the Gaza Strip. It examines how much fuel is needed for Gaza’s basic humanitarian needs, how much fuel is held by Hamas, and who is responsible for providing more fuel once it runs out. It concludes that Israel’s denial of fuel supply into Gaza offers relatively marginal tactical advantages since Hamas has enough diesel stored away to last for several months. Diesel denial mainly affects the operation of hospitals and water supply to Gaza’s population, adding to international pressure against Israel to end its military campaign.

The War in Gaza and the Implications for Energy in the Eastern Mediterranean

Cutting the Electricity Supply to Gaza – Consequences and Implications

This policy brief provides a short background on Gaza’s electricity and water sectors and examines the immediate consequences of cutting off supply to the Gaza Strip. Overall, it argues that the tactical benefits from such a move are somewhat limited since Hamas has adapted to frequent supply cuts with a wide array of small-scale generators and rooftop PV panels, leaving the population to absorb the brunt of the shortage. The broader impact of the power outage will be on the ability to supply water to the Gaza Strip, which can create a humanitarian crisis if not addressed.

Why Israel Approved Development of the Gaza Marine Gas Field

In June 2023, Israel quietly approved the development of Gaza Marine, a small offshore gas field near Gaza that will benefit both the Palestinian Authority and Hamas in terms of revenue and energy independence. Why was the deal approved by the most right-wing Israeli government to date, and how does this relate to the Lebanon maritime border deal from October 2022?

Geo Energy Program