PSCRP-BESA Reports No 33 (February 7, 2024)
Transnistria (officially the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic) is one of the three quasi-state entities, along with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which still exist today, created on the initiative and with the active support of Moscow in 1990, even before the official collapse of the USSR, in order to maintain influence over the Union republics that sought independence. At the same time, another quasi-state entity — the Republic of Gagauzia — was created on the territory of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian SSR), but in 1994–1995 it was peacefully reintegrated into the already independent Republic of Moldova, receiving the status of “Autonomous entity Gagauzia — Gagauz Yeri” and guaranteeing the preservation on its territory of the status of the Gagauz and Russian languages as official languages along with Romanian.
The formal reason for the proclamation of Transnistria’s independence was the claim of legal succession of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian ASSR), which existed as part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (Ukrainian SSR) in 1924–1940. Since 1929, its capital was Tiraspol, which is now the capital of Transnistria. In 1940, most of the Moldavian ASSR, as well as most of Bessarabia (a part of Romania from 1918 to 1940 annexed by the USSR), was incorporated into the newly created Moldavian SSR. In 1992, Moldova attempted to regain control of Transnistria by force, but Russian intervention led to the failure of this attempt, and on July 21, 1992, an agreement on peaceful settlement of the conflict was signed between the Republic of Moldova and the Russian Federation, under which Russia maintained its military presence in Transnistria. This became one of the most striking examples of a frozen conflict on the territory of the former USSR, which remains a factor of instability for both Moldova and neighboring Ukraine.
Unlike Gagauzia, where, according to the 2014 census, 83.8% of the population was Gagauz, no ethnic group is a majority in the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. According to the 2004 census, 31.9% of its population is Moldovan, 30.4% Russian, 28.8% Ukrainian and 2.5% Bulgarian. The official languages recognized are Russian, Moldovan (with Cyrillic alphabet, in contrast to Moldova, where the same language is called Romanian and uses the Latin alphabet) and Ukrainian. At the same time, Russian unambiguously dominates in cities and in the state administration. Since the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic remains an unrecognized state and the documents issued by it are not recognized anywhere, virtually all its citizens have citizenship of other states, primarily Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, as well as Bulgaria, Romania and Israel.
The isolation and criminalization of the Transnistrian economy resulted in unemployment and a low standard of living. As a consequence, despite the fact that there has been no war in Transnistria for more than 30 years, its population is constantly decreasing. Over the past years, it has almost halved and is now estimated at about 400,000 people.
The author had to make several work visits to Transnistria in the late 2010s. The presence of entire neighborhoods abandoned by residents was striking. In these conditions, contractual service in the Russian army units stationed in Transnistria, as well as in local armed formations (Armed Forces of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic and other security forces) became an important source of income for local residents.
In the spring of 2014, the Russians actively used Transnistria as a base for destabilizing the situation in Ukraine, primarily in nearby Odessa, where local pro-Russian separatists were active against the background of Russia’s occupation of Crimea and the proclamation of the separatist DNR and LNR in Donbass. The ensuing sharp deterioration of Russian-Ukrainian relations seriously complicated both the rotation of the Russian military contingent in Transnistria and its rearmament and supply, since the Russians could no longer do so by rail or road through Ukrainian territory.
With the onset of Russia’s full-scale aggression against Ukraine in February 2022, the Russians again attempted to use Transnistria as a springboard against Ukraine. Since the Russian military contingent stationed in the unrecognized republic and the local military formations, de facto subordinate to the Russians, had no real opportunity to strike an effective blow at Ukraine from the southwestern direction, the Russians made every effort to at least pull back to the borders with Transnistria some of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), which could be used to repel Russian aggression in the northern, eastern and southeastern directions. On April 22, 2022, Major General Rustam Minnekaev, acting commander of the Central Military District of the Russian Army, claimed that “control over the south of Ukraine is another way to Transnistria, where there are also facts of oppression of the Russian-speaking population.”
This was followed a short time later by a statement by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, Vitaly Ignatiev, about the desire to become part of Russia. In response to this statement, Dmitry Belik, a member of the Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs, immediately stated that “the desire of Transnistria to become part of Russia should be taken seriously, it is not a question of the distant future, but a prospect for the near future” . The Moldovan authorities called these statements “unacceptable” and already on April 23 summoned the Russian ambassador in Chisinau to give explanations.
Two days later, the authorities of the self-proclaimed republic declared the highest level of terrorist threat, citing the fact that in the previous two days the Ministry of State Security in Tiraspol had been shelled with grenade launchers, an explosive device had gone off at a military airfield, and two radio towers had been blown up. The perpetrators have not been found, but according to Transnistrian President Vadim Krasnoselsky, “the traces (allegedly) lead to Ukraine.”
At the time, the author of this article was in Moldova as an envoy of the Jewish Agency working with Jewish refugees from Ukraine. Therefore, he can confirm first-hand that the situation in the country was extremely tense and there was serious talk in Chisinau about the possibility of an invasion by Transnistria. Since the Moldovan government at that time did not have serious armed forces capable of confronting the Russian group stationed in Transnistria and the armed formations of Transnistrian separatists, the threat of an invasion of Chisinau at a certain point looked quite real. Help could only come from Romania or Ukraine. In the end, the Russians decided against this venture, realizing that intervention by Romania (a NATO member) and/or Ukraine would inevitably lead to the liquidation of the unrecognized republic, not to mention the far-reaching consequences of this step.
The failure of the Russian blitzkrieg and, above all, the fact that the Russian army failed to capture not only Odessa, but also Nikolaev, located to the east of it, showed the untenability of the plans for “access to Transnistria”. Nevertheless, the Russian authorities still tried for some time to threaten Moldova using their Transnistrian proxies. Thus, on August 31, 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that “threatening the security of Russian peacekeepers in Transnistria could provoke a military confrontation with Moscow” and that “any actions that will threaten the security of our servicemen will be dealt with in accordance with international law […] as it happened in South Ossetia when our peacekeepers were attacked by Saakashvili”.
In response to these threats, Moldova began to urgently modernize its army, relying on assistance from NATO countries, which increased after the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, Ukraine began to openly discuss the possibility of military liquidation of the unrecognized republic. Against this background, Tiraspol backtracked. In the spring of 2023, economic cooperation between the Republic of Moldova and the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic even intensified. At the same time, the Transnistrian authorities continued to express fears about the preservation of independence of the unrecognized republic. The same tendency persists at present. In this sense, it is indicative that in early January this year, the president of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic said in an interview with the TASS agency: “All international players and even western partners of the Republic of Moldova recognize that Transnistria does not pose a threat to this country” .
To summarize, we can state that at present Transnistria indeed does not pose a serious military threat to Moldova, let alone to Ukraine, although it remains a base for Russian special services and can be used by them for subversive activities. This unrecognized state — unlike Abkhazia and South Ossetia — lacks a consolidating ethnic component. After the Russian army failed to take Odessa and reach Transnistria, Transnistrian leaders gained some agency and are now trying to defend their own interests to a noticeably greater extent than those of the Kremlin. In the current situation, the possibility of reintegration of Transnistria into the Republic of Moldova on conditions similar to those on which Gagauzia was once reintegrated begins to look somewhat more realistic.