PSCRP-BESA Reports No 10 (October 15, 2023)
One cannot fail to notice that the conflict between Israel and Palestinian Arabs occupies a distinct place in the ideological and political discourse accompanying post-Soviet armed conflicts, primarily the Russian-Ukrainian and Armenian-Azerbaijani conflicts. This can involve the use of allusions and symbols associated with the Palestinian-Israeli confrontation, aimed at ideologically justifying one’s position and demonizing the opponent. It also pertains to the attempts of direct participants in post-Soviet conflicts and/or external actors to leverage fluctuations in Israel’s relations with the “Palestinian National Authority” (PNA) in Ramallah, which governs the Arab enclaves in Judea, Samaria, and the Jordan Valley (or, in international discourse, the “West Bank of the Jordan River”) on one hand, and the enclave of Islamic fundamentalists in the Gaza Strip on the other.
The terrorist group of radical Islamists, Hamas, which seized power through an armed coup in the Gaza Strip in 2007, fundamentally denies Israel’s right to exist in any capacity or within any boundaries. They use the territory of the Gaza Strip as a launching pad for anti-Israeli terrorist forays and regular shelling of cities and towns in the heart of the country.
On Saturday, October 7, 2023, Hamas launched an unprecedented assault on Israel, firing thousands of rockets at Israeli cities and infiltrating its border communities, resulting in over 1,700 casualties, more than 3,400 wounded, and the taking of another about 120 hostages. Israel’s response was also unprecedented in its intensity, but more importantly, it was executed within the framework of a fundamentally new doctrine. While previous rounds of the conflict with Hamas aimed at damaging the terrorist infrastructure of the group without toppling the organization’s leadership in Gaza, due to a lack of alternative entities capable of “controlling the chaos in the Strip,” today the goal is nothing less than the complete dismantling of both the military and political structure of the fundamentalist regime and the elimination of its leadership.
It is evident that such a paradigm shift can, and already partially does, lead to a significant change in the configuration of power and geopolitical trends in the Middle East, which cannot help but influence the actors involved in other, including post-Soviet, fronts. Primarily, this concerns Russia, which many commentators suspect of being, at the very least, one of the architects and instigators of the recent violent Palestinian Islamist terrorist attack on Israel. Although this assumption now appears doubtful to me and requires additional evidence, there is no denying that the Kremlin is keen on using this new situation to bolster its weakening position in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Southern Caucasus.
In the Middle Eastern context, Russia’s obvious interest lies in the disruption, thanks to the war between Israel and Hamas, of the normalization process of the Saudi Arabia – Israeli relations. This process not only practically puts an end to the century-old Arab-Israeli conflict in its classic forms but also removes many obstacles to the formation of an alliance between the United States, Israel, and the countries of the Saudi bloc, which would pose a serious challenge to the interests of Russia, Iran, and China in the region.
Such concerns from Moscow align neatly with the normative framework held by a significant and influential faction within Russian foreign policy elites. According to this framework, Russia’s strategic partner in the region is Iran, which supplies Russia with critically important weaponry for use on the Ukrainian front and safeguards the “southern rear” of Russian geopolitical interests. Consequently, the survival of the Iranian proxy, Hamas, viewed as a legitimate organization in Russia, aligns with Russia’s Middle Eastern agenda.
Given this perspective, it is challenging to discern Russia’s view of Israel’s interests, as Israel is a strategic ally of Russia’s adversary, the United States. It’s not surprising that Moscow’s position regarding the Hamas terrorist attack on Israel is limited to the traditional call for both sides to “de-escalate the conflict,” which, in the current situation, effectively amounts to support for the aggressor. This stance neatly fits into the same pattern as Russia’s support for the Palestinian National Authority on the “West Bank” of the Jordan River, whose leaders have aligned with Moscow since the outset of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s stance on this issue is radically different: its leaders have unequivocally expressed their support for Israel and strongly condemned Hamas and its backers in Tehran. Beyond the moral dimension of the issue, Kyiv’s clear interest lies in diplomatically isolating Iran as much as possible, given that Iran supplies Russia with combat drones widely used by Moscow in the war in Ukraine, as well as artillery shells. Ukraine is also actively pushing for a parallel to be made in the international discourse between the Hamas (which President Vladimir Zelensky called a “terrorist organization”) attack on Israel and the “terrorist state” of Russia’s assault on Ukraine.
Such allusions have also been enthusiastically embraced by Ukrainian society, which has been swept by a wave of solidarity with Israel and sympathy for the Israelis, whose experiences are fully understood by Ukrainians who have been in a similar situation for over a year and a half.
The other side of the issue
However, there is a question whether these pronounced pro-Israeli sympathies of the Ukrainian leadership and society would not be challenged by a possible shift in the focus of interest and attention from the United States and Europe, along with the resources they provide to their allies, away from the Russian-Ukrainian conflict towards the Middle East.
A full-scale war, as announced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his address to the nation, could last for months. This would entail the expenditure of a massive amount of financial and military resources, including weaponry, ammunition, and other consumables. In this regard, the Israeli leadership is counting not only on its own reserves but also on support from the United States, which has swiftly materialized.
On the evening of October 10, President Joe Biden declared unwavering support for the Jewish state, acknowledging not only Israel’s right but also its duty to respond forcefully to the atrocities committed by Islamists. Clearly referring to Iran and its chief proxy, the southern Lebanese “Hezbollah,” Joe Biden issued a stern warning, threatening “any state, any organization, any player” with severe consequences for their attacks on Israel. He also pledged to ensure all of Israel’s defense needs, including the immediate allocation of funds through Congress and the delivery of the required quantity of weaponry and ammunition, primarily anti-aircraft missile interceptors.
A number of commentators are not ruling out the scenario that, as noted by influential columnist Thomas Friedman of The New York Times, “a protracted war between Israel and Hamas could lead to the redirection of American military equipment, needed by Kyiv, to Tel Aviv… and Ukraine might find itself competing with Israel for supplies of “Patriot” missiles, 155-millimeter artillery shells, and other essential weaponry it desperately requires” [Reference link].
Close assessments have been presented by analysts from the American Institute for the Study of War (ISW). According to them, the Kremlin is already, and is likely to continue, leveraging the Hamas attacks in Israel to advance several information operations aimed at diminishing U.S. and Western support and attention to Ukraine [Reference link]. Furthermore, Polish President Andrzej Duda shares a similar view, suggesting that the escalation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas may play into Russia’s hands in its conflict with Ukraine.
Similar voices are also emerging within Ukraine itself, where concerns are being expressed that in the wake of the dramatic events in the Middle East, Ukraine’s standoff with Russia may recede into the background in the eyes of the West. This includes the potential shift in attention by the media and political figures, as well as the growing prioritization of ammunition supplies to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from American depots on Israeli soil, which were previously allocated to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
According to these opinions, it is also possible that financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine could be reduced, as “the resources of global players are not limitless.” [Reference link]. Nevertheless, almost no one doubts that in the long-term, or at least from a medium-term perspective, Western allies are unlikely to forget about Ukraine because of Israel. The issue, if the concerns for Ukraine become a reality, might arise in operational terms, which would compel Kyiv to seek alternative sources of military supplies capable of meeting the needs of the Ukrainian Armed Forces for at least a few months.
However, any such source could in no way substitute the USA and the Western block – in the event of a real reduction in their supplies. However, such a scenario looks now quite unlikely. The US President Joe Biden was crystal clear by saying that “we (America) can take care of both (Israel and Ukraine) … and still maintain our overall international defense.” [Reference link]. That means, a willingness of the United States and the West to y support Israel in its fight against the Hamas, Hezbollah and their Iranian patrons is unlikely to affect negatively Ukrainian interests.
Prof. Vladimir (Ze’ev) Khanin is the Head of the BESA Post-Soviet Conflicts Research Program (PSCRP) and teaches Political Studies at Bar-Ilan University