PSCRP-BESA Reports No 42 (March 19, 2024)
Part 1
The revolutionary rhetoric and practices corresponding to the “second stage of the Islamic Revolution” proclaimed by IRI leaders two decades ago have in some cases proved unproductive in building Tehran’s bilateral relations with a number of Muslim states. This includes post-Soviet Central Asia. As has been shown in our previous essay, the forcible introduction of revolutionary Islam into the countries of the region can strengthen the positions of the rising Islamic opposition. And thus radically destabilize the situation in them, blocking the development of political and economic dialogue with Tehran. Let us consider this situation with concrete examples.
Kazakhstan: a balanced partnership
Iran’s relations with Kazakhstan, which Tehran views as a strong and dynamic partner with great economic achievements, are characterized by sufficient stability. Good political relations have been established between the countries, which contribute to the strengthening of bilateral trade and economic ties. Currently, the country has become a significant exporter of oil and gas, which determines the prerequisites for cooperation with Iran. Iran’s economic interest in cooperation in this sphere consists in importing Kazakh oil to meet the needs of actively developing regions in the north of the country. The remoteness of these regions of Iran from the areas of hydrocarbon production, located mainly in the south of the country, calls for imports from Kazakhstan, which is much cheaper than the cost of transportation through the vast Iranian territory. Iran is experiencing a major shortage of gasoline, which weakens the country’s energy security. Cooperation with Kazakhstan in this sphere partially solves the problem. In addition, projects in agriculture, culture, engineering and technical services, interbank relations and industry are being successfully implemented.
However, despite the growing amount of cooperation between Iran and Kazakhstan, Iran has repeatedly stated that Kazakhstan is only marginally utilizing its potential. The explanation, obviously, should be sought in the fact that the Kazakh leadership, interested in rapprochement with the U.S. and the EU, tries not to foster negative emotions in the West about excessive dynamics in relations with Iran. This obviously pushes Kazakhstan to contain the realization of large joint projects with Iran. It is noticeable that Astana is trying to postpone or leave unanswered numerous cooperation proposals put forward by Iran, focusing only on the attractive transit potential of Iranian territory and increasing its exports to Iran, and is skeptical about major projects of a long-term nature. At the same time, IRI is ready to put up with the current situation, wishing to maintain the level of dialog with Kazakhstan, which has become a true leader among the countries of the Central Asian region. In the relations with Iran, Kazakhstan, apparently, will continue to act with an eye on the U.S. and the EU, trying not to disrupt the status quo.
Recently, however, Iran has allowed moderate criticism of Kazakhstan’s leadership, calling President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev a pro-Russian leader “who ordered security forces to shoot ‘terrorists’“ in order to impose order “without warning.” The IRGC-affiliated publication Fars characterizes Kazakhstan as a country of “widespread repression and corruption.” And online publication «Diplomacy of Iran» wrote in January 2022, during the country’s acute political crisis, that “Kazakhstan looks set to become a new link in the conflict between Russia and the West, as the country is seen as one of Moscow’s most important political partners.”
Uzbekistan: the smell of confrontationalism
Iran’s dialog with the Republic of Uzbekistan is also very controversial. Many aspects of the region’s centuries-old history are linked to Iran. In this context, establishing ties with Iran could mean a gradual return to its roots and its own cultural heritage. This explains to a considerable extent the ease with which Iran, after centuries of no direct contacts with Uzbekistan, has ‘embedded’ itself into local landscape and began to establish quite diverse relations. In more than thirty years, a consistently implemented extensive legal framework has been formed.
However, despite the solid groundwork for integration, Uzbek-Iranian relations still have a distinct smell of confrontation, although a significant rapprochement between the two countries cannot be ruled out in the future. Their positions on regional issues important to both countries have differed significantly over the years. In the sphere of bilateral relations, there is still a chill of mutual distrust, which is explained by the religious factor. The creation of independent Uzbekistan was accompanied by a kind of Islamic boom, which naturally emerged after decades of dictate of official state atheism. The authorities tried to forcefully curb the manifestations of fundamentalism without eradicating its causes. Under these circumstances, the development of bilateral interaction between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, where the principle of governance is based on Islamic laws, was destined if not for harsh rejection by the Uzbek leadership, then certainly not for the most favorable treatment.
At the same time, trade and economic ties have gained the necessary momentum over the past years and have become the foundation of Uzbek-Iranian cooperation. Nevertheless, their scale in no way corresponds to the available potential. As Iran has repeatedly stated, it has only a small part of Uzbekistan’s market at its disposal. However, Iran is optimistic about the prospects of cooperation with Uzbekistan, taking into account the huge potential of Iranian trade with Uzbekistan and the fact that Uzbekistan, being a landlocked country, has no access to the global ocean.
Iran is an optimal partner, as it has a significant advantage in terms of providing transit transportation of Uzbek goods. To date, Iran has already become one of the top ten foreign economic partners of Uzbekistan. Certain fluctuations in the volume of trade turnover in recent years of bilateral relations are explained by crisis periods in the development of interaction between the two countries in the political sphere.
Political dialog between the two countries is rather limited. Tehran believes that political relations between Iran and Uzbekistan have not developed as intensively as bilateral trade relations in recent years and calls for a full-scale expansion of political relations between the two countries. Zigzags in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy predilections have been and continue to draw heightened attention in Iran, as each time they signal a new twist in political reality. The Iranian leadership has been repeatedly alarmed by Uzbekistan’s unconditional support for U.S. foreign policy moves, even when they were not urgently needed. Tehran also negatively assesses Uzbekistan’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, under which Uzbekistan has received military aid for a number of years.
Another political rapprochement between the U.S. and Uzbekistan at the turn of the 2010s triggered a new wave of concern in Iran. Iran realizes that it needs to pursue an even more active policy in the region in order not only to maintain the positions it has already gained, but also to secure new ones. Iran has significant economic resources in its arsenal that it can utilize if necessary. The methods of economic and other preferential treatment through which it seeks to increase its influence can be very effective. In this regard, the December 2023 decision to abolish the visa regime with Uzbekistan is notable. “By doing so … IRI has demonstrated its willingness to open its doors.” .
In the near future, if Iran’s ambitions for regional leadership continue to be accompanied by an equally strong growth of its economic potential, Iran’s role and influence in the Republic of Uzbekistan will likely only increase.
Tajikistan: it’s not all smooth sailing
It is undoubtedly important for Iran to develop dialog with Tajikistan. The two countries have developed the most versatile ties based on mutual attraction to each other due to centuries of common history and their cultural and civilizational proximity. At the same time, due to the pragmatic nature of Iran’s approaches to its relations with Central Asian countries, a logical trend of shifting priorities to trade and economic cooperation has emerged and become a determining factor. These include energy, transportation, water supply, road construction, industry, trade and culture. Both countries consider the problems of terrorism and drug trafficking, stability and security in neighboring Afghanistan to be among the main ones. At the same time, Iranians express concern about the presence of the U.S. military in Tajikistan, warning the Tajik leadership against the danger of being drawn into the U.S. military and political orbit. In August 2022, Tajikistan provided its territory for the “Regional Cooperation 2022” military exercise under U.S. command and with the participation of the U.S. army, which provoked a sharp reaction in Tehran. It should be noted that Tajikistan is the only country in the Central Asian subregion that has structured military ties with Iran, with a military attaché’s office in Dushanbe. The Tajik military establishment has established and maintains contacts with the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the most Islamized and fanatical component of the Iranian power bloc. The IRGC, according to its leadership, is “ready to cooperate with Tajikistan in the fields of engineering and military-medical education, communications and electronics.”
The functioning of almost 200 Iranian companies in Tajikistan at present is an obvious indicator of effective Tajik-Iranian dialog. A solid legal framework for bilateral relations has been established, including some 180 documents on cooperation in various fields. A visa-free regime has been declared between the countries since December 2023.
Unlike the dialog with other post-Soviet countries, the relations between Iran and Tajikistan are part of the concept of creating a “Union of Persian-speaking states”, i.e., Afghanistan, Iran and Tajikistan, based on the ethno-cultural proximity of the peoples of the three countries. Tajikistan demonstrates the greatest interest in the creation of such a union. The increasingly fashionable Aryan ideology in Tajikistan finds understanding in Tehran, where the ideology of pan-Iranianism has not lost its significance even after the Islamists came to power in 1979. It also minimizes Tajikistan’s sense of being an outsider in the Central Asian geopolitical and geo-economic space. The rapprochement with Iran gives Tajikistan an opportunity to assert itself as a country that is the closest partner of one of the significant players in world politics.
Undoubtedly, the expanding network of Islamic educational institutions and various programs for studying the basics of Islam and the Quran in Tajikistan is linked to Iranian influence and assistance from this country. Many students are also getting education in this sphere in IRI. During their years of study in Iran, young people are subjected to massive ideological processing. President Rahmon has repeatedly stated that young people enrolled in Iran study terrorism and extremism rather than religious sciences. In general, in Tajikistan, as nowhere else in Central Asia, a peculiar pro-Iranian stratum has formed, primarily consisting of some religious figures, representatives of the national intelligentsia, including academics, and partly officials who have been trained at various seminars and workshops in Iran. They are actively working to prevent the weakening of Iranian positions in Tajikistan.
Dr. Vladimir Mesamed, Israeli orientalist, expert on Iran and Central Asia, lecturer at the Institute of Asian and African Studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, political commentator.