PSCRP-BESA Reports No 52 (April 23, 2024)
The events that occurred on 26 March 2024, in Tallinn, the capital of Estonia, might predetermine the political development of the entire country for months and even years to come. 41 city council deputies out of 79 voted no confidence in the city mayor Mihhail Kõlvart. The required majority is 40, so Kõlvart, who also chairs the Center Party, lost his seat. Most experts did not believe the vote of no confidence would pass: the ruling coalition, consisting of the representatives of the Center Party and Social Democratic Party, had a solid majority of 43 seats. However, social democratic deputies voted for the motion, thereby pulling the rug from under Kõlvart’s feet and destroying the coalition. They were joined by Igor Gräzin, who left the Center Party two days before the vote, lamenting the lack of intraparty democracy.
The vote of no confidence was initiated by all non-governing factions, namely, “Fatherland” (Isamaa, center-right conservative party), Eesti 200 (center-left liberal party), Reform Party (also center-left and liberal), and EKRE (Estonian Conservative People’s Party, right-wing populists), as well as independent legislators and the aforementioned Gräzin. However, since the social democrats voted against their coalition partners and the possibility of cooperation with the far-right EKRE was rejected by the mainstream parties, the new governing coalition was formed by these parties plus the social democrats minus EKRE. Notably, interim mayor, Madle Lippus (former deputy mayor), was chosen from the Social Democratic faction rather than the Reformists, who received a majority of votes; on Sunday, April 14, Jevgeni Ossinovski, also an active member and ex-chairman of SDP, was elected as the city’s new mayor. In fact, it was the social democrats whose position proved decisive in the ouster procedure; moreover, they were the only ones with first-hand experience of running the capital. The question of how effective a coalition consisting of four municipal factions with widely divergent interests (the views of “Fatherland” and the social democrats are often polarized) is still on the agenda: for instance, Ossinovski’s candidacy for mayor passed the necessary threshold only in the third round of voting.
The controversial effectiveness of the new coalition is the main argument that the ousted ex-mayor is now repeating. However, it is clear that the vote of no-confidence and the whole situation were planned long ago, and all the actors had their own specific reasons for participating in it.
The most obvious pretext is the ruling of the district court, which found the Center Party guilty in a corruption case and imposed a (seemingly unaffordable for the party) fine of 1 million euros. The party leadership was accused of accepting a bribe (disguised as a donation) from the Porto Franco, a company that was planning a major infrastructure project in Tallinn and needed a lower easement price. In 2021, this scandal led to the fall of Jüri Ratas’ government, which consisted of Centrists, Fatherland and EKRE. This is not the first time that the Center Party has found itself at the center of criminal accusations: in 2015 and 2019 it already had to pay large fines.
Nevertheless, the Porto Franco scheme seems to be the last straw of what has been accumulating for years. The head of Tallinn is a key post and asset in Estonian politics; and this post, along with the entire city administration, has been held by the Center Party for almost 20 years, since November 2005. This monopolistic control over municipal power has clearly irritated other parties, especially given the pro-Russian image the Centrists have adopted since the early 2000s to capitalize on the needs of the Russian-speaking population. The latter accounts for 24% of the country’s population and around 37% of Tallinn residents; so the party’s popularity in the capital is not surprising.
However, after 2014 and especially after 2022, the pro-Russian image turned into a problematic asset. The party had to soften its positions on many issues and officially condemn the war, leading to the disillusionment of some Russian-speaking voters and the short-lived success of populist projects such as the KOOS movement. The geopolitical turmoil coincided with personal changes: Edgar Savisaar, founding leader of the Center Party (1991–2016) and former mayor of Tallinn (2007–2015), passed away in 2022. His experience and charisma contributed greatly to the party’s popularity. After the disastrous 2023 elections for the Centrists, new leader Jüri Ratas left the party and joined “Fatherland,” and Mihhail Kõlvart, who has been mayor of Tallinn since 2019, was elected as the new party chairman.
Kõlvart has consolidated the “Russian wing” of the party and is commonly perceived as a defender of the Russian-speaking community (although he is Estonian and Korean by ethnic origin, he is a Russophone). The “Estonian wing” was not ready to put up with such a shift in party leadership, and since September 2023 several prominent (ethnically) Estonian Centrist MPs have left the ranks of the Center Party. Among them are not only the aforementioned Ratas, but also the chairman of the party’s parliamentary faction Tanel Kiik, former Minister of Public Administration Jaak Aab and other experienced politicians. More party members are likely to follow suit, as the party has now lost the opportunity to pay for loyalty with administrative appointments in the capital.
The new coalition agreement, after much debate, was unveiled on Saturday, April 13. While dismantling a system that has been 20 years in the making is a daunting task, the eventual coalition partners see it as one of their primary goals. Plans are underway to reform health care and change public transport routes (although free public transportation will remain in place); Estonian will finally become the sole language of instruction in the city’s schools. The local TV channel and two municipal newspapers, Stolitsa (in Russian) and Pealinn (in Estonian), will be closed – the coalition parties believe they served mainly as propaganda leaflets of the Centrists. Another issue that seems to be crucial for the new coalition concerns symbols in public space: Moscow Boulevard, the Russian Cultural Center and the Russian Museum will be renamed, and Ukrainian Square will be built.
The loss of the capital is another sign of the Center Party’s rapid demise, perhaps the most symbolic since the party has long been associated with Tallinn. In the Riigikogu (the national parliament) elections in 2023, the Centrists received mere 15.3% of the vote (compared to 23.1% in 2019; the party peaked in 2007 with 26.1%). Perhaps the results of the municipal elections to Tallinna linnavolikogu (Tallinn City Council) in October 2025 will make it clear whether the Center Party is dead or alive. It may leave things as they are, or change the name/brand of the party to “renew” the reputation. This may involve forming an alliance with some other party with a relevant agenda. However, this other party would have to be brave enough to enter into a potentially toxic alliance, so it could likely be an extra-parliamentary actor; for example, the Estonian Freedom Party – Farmers’ Assembly might seem a suitable candidate.
Another option for the Centrists is to decisively give up trying to be a catch-all party for all citizens and promote their image as a Russophone player. This move will result in an absolute loss of (ethnic) Estonian votes, but would consolidate the Russophone electorate. Many Russian-speaking residents of Tallinn are afraid that the new city authorities will somehow infringe on their rights and welfare, and fear is one of the most effective motivators of voting. The symbolic move of electing Russophone Ossinovski as mayor seems insufficient, although important, to tame the fears of local Russians, who seem to be frightened not only by the coalition’s promises but also by the Centrists’ propaganda.
A strategy targeting Russians may be reasonable at least at the municipal level: Estonian residents who do not have Estonian citizenship cannot vote in parliamentary elections, but have the tight to vote at the municipal level, and a sufficient part of Estonian Russians have either Russian Federation documents or Estonian non-citizen passports (välismaalase pass, “alien’s passport”). “Fatherland” wanted to include the issue of disenfranchisement of non-citizens in the Tallinn coalition negotiations, but it seems that this problem should be solved at national level. In addition, Tallinn is not the only stronghold of the Russophones: they make up around 74% of the inhabitants of Ida-Virumaa province, located near the Russian border. The last clause of the agreement reads as follows: “The Reform Party, Fartherland, and Eesti 200 consider it important to find and implement in the Riigikogu a legal solution concerning the abolition of municipal voting rights for citizens of aggressor countries. The Social Democratic Party does not support this, but considers it possible that a solution will be found by the factions of the Riigikogu.”
In any case, “nature abhors a vacuum.” The obvious reason why no successful “Russian” ethnic party has emerged in Estonia since the early 2000s is that the Center Party has absorbed the majority of the “Russian” vote. If it loses its influence and appeal, a new player will inevitably emerge to capitalize on the (real and perceived) problems of the Russophone community.
The case of the Center Party shows that an actor that includes ethnic electorates may fall prey to reputational and economic considerations rather than ethno-political contradictions. However, these, in turn, may entail a general actualization of ethno-political dynamics in the country. This experience is not irrelevant to Israel, as political parties are an essential democratic tool for integrating the Arab minority into the broader fabric of society. Which parties will garner the Arab vote, especially after the October 7, is a question that cannot not be left to chance.
On top of that, in ethnically complex societies, achieving the necessary balance in symbolic politics remains a very challenging task. Insufficient attention to the symbolic sphere (including media, urban landscape, etc.) can lead to electoral dissatisfaction and protest voting — in Europe; and to much graver consequences — in the Middle East.