Search
Close this search box.

Search Results for: Russia – Page 5

There are signs that the current escalation between Armenia and Azerbaijan, far from being incidental to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is driven by Russia’s and Iran’s economic warfare against a competing state and the need to return Europe to dependency on their oil and gas in light of US sanctions. Armenia benefits from the bellicose activity thanks to a sophisticated information warfare campaign in a heated US election year that has been unmatched thus far by Azerbaijan. But Baku can still turn its underdog position around by pursuing an assertive and affirmative policy against aggressors on military, political, media, and legal fronts.
For geopolitical reasons, Russia has been building a chain of separatist states near its borders since the 1990s. However, as Russia’s economy worsens, competition with the West is increasing. As the “breakaways” grow ever more predatory, Moscow is having a difficult time managing geographically diverse separatist regions all at the same time.
Turkey and Russia are embroiled in separate proxy conflicts on multiple fronts in Syria and Libya, but could be on a collision course in the complex political landscape of Yemen. This can be avoided if Turkey does not try for an aggressive Islamist takeover and respects Russia’s desire to share gas profits, exercise political influence with whatever factions end up dominating the sphere, and retain access to strategic waterways.
Russia’s position is crucial in the unfolding US-China competition. There are two likely scenarios. In one, Russia is able to maneuver between the powers and score geopolitical goals in its neighborhood and in the Middle East. In the other, Russia is cast by the West as an outright enemy, leaving little room for compromise and allowing the country to fall further under Chinese influence.
Oil relationships are as unstable and volatile as romantic ones. Following a deadlocked OPEC summit in February, Moscow and Riyadh announced they would ramp up production, sending already low prices tumbling. Since both countries’ budgets are almost entirely dependent on energy exports, this suggests they have decided geopolitical interests trump purely economic ones.
The coronavirus pandemic is causing Russia fundamental problems and putting its entire political system under intense scrutiny. As the death rate rises across its far-flung territories, troubles between Moscow and the regions are increasing. The crisis is prompting questions about the recent set of proposed constitutional changes, and the economy is likely to experience deep shocks—particularly when the effects of the pandemic are combined with those of the recent oil price war with Saudi Arabia.
After a three-and-a-half-year marriage of convenience, Turkey and Russia have come to realize that they are fighting on opposite sides of two proxy wars: one in Syria and the other in Libya. This comes after Russia sold Turkey $2.5 billion worth of S-400 air defense systems, won a multibillion-dollar nuclear plant contract, signed up for a lucrative natural gas pipeline, and widened the gap between NATO and its part-time member Turkey.
US-Iran relations reached a nadir following the killing by US drone strike of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani. As Iran’s isolation grows, its link to Russia is likely to strengthen. Moscow can use Iran’s geopolitical weakness to its own economic advantage by making large sales of Russian military hardware to the Islamic Republic and encouraging deeper cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and Tehran. At the same time, Russia will use the death of Soleimani to constrain Iranian troop activities on the Syrian battlefield and will generally limit Damascus’s dependence on Iran.

Accessibility Toolbar