PSCRP-BESA Reports No 25 (January 3, 2024)
In 2022-2023, the current and future status of those residents of Latvia who hold Russian citizenship was hotly debated. Many residence permits were revoked, and some people who have not declared their intention to obtain a permanent residence permit or who have not passed the Latvian language exam are even getting ready to be forcefully removed from the territory of Latvia. These legislative measures have drawn further attention not only to the Russian citizens living in Latvia, but also to the ethnic Russians (or Russophones) who have Latvian citizenship and can participate directly in the Latvian political process. How has their electoral behaviour changed after February 2022 and which political forces can now claim to represent their interests?
The Latvian political landscape is much more fragmented and less stable than, for instance, the electoral field in neighbouring Estonia: to participate in parliamentary (Saeima) elections, a party needs only 500 members (a few years ago the bar was set even lower — 200 members), and many parties last no longer than one electoral cycle, being created right before the election. Ethnic Russians make up 24 percent of Latvia’s population (2023); one-third of them do not have Latvian citizenship. As for those who do, they are targeted by several political forces: for more than a decade, the moderate Russian vote has been consolidated by the social-democratic party “Harmony”, which has consistently managed to secure a quarter of parliamentary seats. More radical Russian votes were attracted by the “Russian Union of Latvia” (until 2014 — “For Human Rights in United Latvia”), a rather marginal party that has been unable to pass the 5 percent threshold since 2010.[1] However, in 2022, none of these Russian veterans of the electoral process received representation in the legislature.
The situation with the “Russian Union of Latvia” is clear: it is not considered a reliable political force that could actually represent the votes cast for it. “Harmony” found itself in a difficult position: in 2019, its leader Nils Ušakovs, the charismatic mayor of the country’s capital, left his post and went to represent Latvia in the European Parliament amid allegations of corruption. Later, the party explicitly supported unpopular restrictions and mandatory vaccination against COVID-19 and immediately condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. All of this left the party’s traditional Russian electorate frustrated and disoriented. Someone had to pick up the votes of the “confused Russophones,” and that “someone” happened to be Aleksejs Rosļikovs and his party “For Stability!”.
Rosļikovs used to be part of Ušakovs’s team in Riga City Council, but in 2019 he was expelled from the party for refusing to support the new candidate for the vice-mayor position. After that, together with several other former “Harmony” politicians, he organized anti-vaccination protests, and in 2021 he founded the political party “For Stability!”. His personal biography is far from clear: it is known that he briefly served as a police officer in 20042005, and was vice chairman of the Latvian United police union in 20172023. The party’s ideology includes populist promises of lower taxes and increased social welfare spending, direct (not intra-parliamentary) presidential elections, education in the Russian, granting citizenship rights to all current non-citizens who have resided in Latvia long enough, and leaving the “stagnant” European Union. The positions on education and citizenship, let alone EU membership, are far more radical than the program of “Harmony”, which the new party openly calls a “fictitious opposition” on its website. Quite reasonably, given its electorate, the party and its leader remain silent about the war in Ukraine, without publicly condemning or supporting Russia. All this allowed “For Stability!” to gain the votes lost by “Harmony” and to enter the Saiema with 6.8 percent and 11 deputy seats (out of 100) after the October 2022 elections.
The party’s views have not changed significantly following the elections. It continued to rely on the support of the conservative Russian-speaking electorate, with Rosļikovs publicly defending the Soviet memorial in Riga’s Pārdaugava district (associated by most Latvians with the Soviet occupation) and laying flowers there during unofficial May 9 (Victory Day) celebrations. Rosļikovs and another MP from “For Stability!” Glorija Grevcova gave interviews to Russian and Belarussian state media, leading to an official warning from Latvian security services. During the vote in the Saeima in February 2023 to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine, the MPs from “For Stability!” did not participate in the voting procedure. The position on the EU has also not changed dramatically after “For Stability!” became a democratically elected political force in an EU country: Rosļikovs continues to say that Latvians are “suffering” because of EU policies. However, since November 2023, the party officials have begun to emphasize the need to vote for “For Stability!” in the 2024 European Parliament elections.
Interestingly, in many of its initiatives, “For Stability!” has joined forces with the “Latvia First” party led by charismatic businessman Ainārs Šlesers. Both Šlesers and Rosļikovs have been active in anti-vaccination protests in the past, so it could be called a “COVID coalition.” Despite the fact that the party is led by ethnic Latvians, many Russian speakers see it as a “pro-Russian” actor[2] because of Šlesers’s moderate stance on the political rights of Russian and his desire to maintain economic ties with Russian business. “Latvia First” even had to expel one of its founders, Jūlija Stepaņenko, for refusing to condemn Russia’s actions in Ukraine (she later founded her own conservative pro-Russian party, “Sovereign Power,” which failed to pass the electoral threshold). Together with the “Latvia First” faction in the Saeima (9 seats), “For Stability!” organized several protest rallies in Riga and initiated the collection of signatures to start a referendum on the dismissal of the 14th Saeima (on the premises of its ineffective economic policy).
Notably, the party adheres to the textbook populist strategy of the 21st century: less face-to-face agitation and political lobbying, but more social media activities. “For Stability!” has become the most media-oriented political party in Latvia. Its leader has an active community of followers on Telegram, Facebook, and TikTok, where he constantly uploads short videos (both homemade and professionally produced), photos, and texts. Almost all the content is in Russian (though not always exactly literate), which leaves no room for illusions about the party’s target electorate. Unfortunately for the party, the most popular Latvian MP in TikTok (with 100 thousand followers) Glorija Grevcova had to leave the ranks of “For Stability!” in March 2023: unlike Rosļikovs, she is much more radical and open in her homophobia and support for Russian politics. By calling the atrocities in Ukraine a civil war and dismissing the occupation of Latvia as a “lie”, she jeopardized the party’s public image and its relations with the establishment, so Grevcova had to become an independent MP (and later a single MP from the newly formed “Alliance of Young Latvians”). In addition, it was revealed that she had falsified her personal data when she ran for parliament: Grevcova lied that she had a higher education and worked as a “counselor” in a company where she was, in fact, a firewood collector.
Perhaps the relative success of “For Stability!” is due not that much to the protest vote as to voter confusion. In a situation where Russian speakers do not know who to vote for (for the first time in more than a decade), a populist radical newcomer can easily attract their positive attention. Unlike in previous years, most Russian voters have decided who to vote for less than a week before the October 2022 elections.[3] Directly appealing to the target audience through social media is a new weapon skillfully used by populist politicians. However, we should be cautious about calling “For Stability!” an agent of influence of Moscow: some of its views are quite flexible, and the party, founded in 2021, is rather an heir to a pre-war anti-vaccine populist mobilization with its own political agenda and goals. Polls show that in December 2023, 14 months after the elections, 5.8 percent of Latvian citizens are ready to support this agenda,[4] which is only 1 percentage point lower than before the elections.
The importance of the ethno-linguistic divide in Latvian politics is not going to decline; on the contrary, both external and internal factors point to its growing relevance. Thus, parties that manage to capitalize on the discontent of Russophones will secure the votes necessary for parliamentary representation, unless this discontent changes or disappears (which is an attractive venue for the nationwide parties’ policy, if they realize it). It seems that “For Stability!”, even though it lacks political experience and has a rather weak personal composition, still manages to maintain its initial support base. Perhaps it will continue its attempts to increase it in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in 2024. If the party survives until the next elections (regular or snap), the likely ad hoc coalition will be “Latvia First”: it already exists de facto, as the factions in the Saeima join forces on many issues. Judging by December 2023, this coalition cannot be long-standing, as the two charismatic leaders, Šlesers and Rosļikovs, are unlikely to evenly split the leadership.
More radical actors, such as the “Russian Union of Latvia” and “Sovereign Power,” are likely doomed to remain on the margins of the political field: an agenda openly supporting the policies of the Russian Federation was inappropriate in Latvia even before February 2022, and now the state and public control over radical players has certainly increased. “Harmony,” as the most moderate and well-integrated pro-Russian actor, is now desperately trying to survive; however, more and more public figures are leaving its ranks, including the mayors of Rēzekne and Daugavpils, to create or join small regional movements that are much more flexible in building political alliances. In its current state, the fate of “Harmony” does not look bright, unless it mobilizes all the moderate Russian votes (some of which are now going to predominantly ethnically Latvian parties such as the conservative “Union of Greens and Farmers” and the social-democratic “Progressives”) or merges with some more successful counterpart.
Given the relevance of the topic for Israel, it is tempting to extrapolate the situation with Latvian Russians to the attitude of the Israeli Arabs. Especially during (and after) Operation “Swords of Iron,” Israeli Arab voters may be confused by the positions of Arab parties: some may find these positions ambiguous and some — even disappointing. It is crucial to prevent the creation of a successful radical newcomer that would easily attract Arab voters without serious financial backing, simply through attractive rhetoric on social media criticizing Mansour Abbas and mainstream politicians. The democratic way to prevent this is for nationwide Israeli parties to develop a targeted strategy aimed at Arab citizens.
[1] Zhirnova, L. (2022) Regional trends in electoral support for Latvian parties: the neighbourhood effect. Baltic Region, 14(1), 138-158.
[2] Kažoka, I. (2022) Desire for Stability Versus Desire for Change: Polarization of Attitudes During Latvia‘s General Elections of 2022. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.
[3] Kažoka, I. (2022) Op. cit.
[4] Party ratings: New Unity is in decline, 7 forces would pass to the Saeima. Latvijas Sabiedriskais Medijs.