PSCRP-BESA Reports No 30 (January 17, 2024)
The war has changed Russian society in many ways. One of the most anticipated areas of these changes is related to nationalism, and these changes are certainly taking place. This article will discuss only those changes that are directly related to the Russian nationalist movement, that is, the broad and highly heterogeneous pool of politically active people who define themselves primarily as nationalists. The article is based on monitoring data from the SOVA Research Center, which are integrated into the materials published on the Center’s website in the form of news, open databases, and periodic reports.
Russian nationalists were an important movement in the 2000s, and until the mass protests of the winter of 20112012, it was the Russian March that was the largest opposition event for several years. Then the movement entered a crisis streak, and when in 2014 it split sharply into supporters of Kiev, i.e., the new authorities in Ukraine, and supporters of Donetsk, i.e., the irredentist movement in the eastern regions, a gradual and noticeable decline began. In 2019, the Orthodox nationalist Konstantin Malofeev tried to resuscitate the movement not as an opposition movement, but as loyal to the Kremlin. But the latter did not want such allies, and since 2020, the sharply increased pressure on all social groups has suppressed the attempted revival of Russian nationalism.
Yet at the same time, in 20202023, the Kremlin itself turned more and more toward a national-conservative policy: moral conservatism became increasingly important (the fight against LGBT+ people, condemnation of various types of immoralism, especially after the outbreak of the war, and from 2023 even a campaign to ban abortion), certain elements of Soviet patriotic education were more actively revived, and a semi-official campaign against migrant workers in Russia (mostly from Central Asia) as a threat to public order began; the rhetoric of “protecting Russians” in Ukraine led to a full-scale war, which quickly became positioned as a military confrontation with the West.
Of course, Russian nationalists have supported and participated in the anti-migrant campaign all these years. Also, almost all of them take a position of moral conservatism, although variations are possible here. Most nationalists are skeptical, if not outright negative, of Soviet traditions, but they generally approve of patriotic education, with some criticism of how the authorities do it (criticism of how well officials do their jobs is a common feature of Russian life). The attitudes to the policy in relation to Ukraine, however, are not at all homogeneous.
As mentioned above, the nationalists split in 2014, and that rift has not been overcome to this day. Those who took Kiev’s side were largely White racists rather than Russian nationalists, because for a White racist there is no difference between a Russian and a Ukrainian, and the life of the ultra-right in Ukraine is much freer than in Russia, and there are much fewer “non-Aryan” migrants in Ukraine. At the same time, White racists are much less concerned with the greatness of the Russian state, they think more globally. In practice, this results in such groups largely following the lead of the liberal opposition, but supplementing its rhetoric with their own racist discourse. The difference between 2022 and 2014 is that in 2014 the initial split was roughly 50/50, but since then the pro-Kiev wing has weakened much more than the pro-Donetsk one. Pro-Donetsk nationalists could be loyal or oppositional (and in the latter, case often allied with communists), but in both cases they viewed relations with Ukraine (and beyond) through the prism of confrontation with the West and strengthening of Russian power. By 2022, this wing was clearly dominant. Perhaps this is why the division among the “pro-Donetsk” (let’s call them “patriotic”) nationalists into those who are quite loyal to the authorities and those who are in opposition and constantly denounce all government actions, including the war efforts, became more visible.
Pro-Kiev nationalists have tried and are still trying to campaign and propagandize online, but they easily succumb to pressure from the authorities: almost all of their organizations have effectively ceased operations in Russia as early as 2023. Grassroots activists of this type, usually veterans of neo-Nazi groups or their young associates, sometimes try to join the Ukrainian army or commit sabotage on Russian territory. Their contribution to general sabotage activities (setting fire to military recruitment centers, vandalizing vehicles bearing Z-symbols, etc.) does not look significant, but it exists nonetheless. There have even been attempts to plan terrorist attacks. On the whole, society barely notices these people.
Patriotic nationalists are incomparably more active and visible. They too can go to the front, but, unlike in 20142015, they are practically unable to form their own units. Igor Strelkov, the main hero of the Donbass irredentism of 2014, came closest to this in the fall of 2022, but his plan to create “his own” volunteer battalion failed. Much more material assistance is provided to the army and the population of the frontline regions (both Russian proper and the so-called “new regions”), but even here the state and the organizations directly supervised by it do so much more that the contribution of nationalists is hardly noticeable.
More noticeable is their contribution to the anti-migrant campaign, which since 2021, with a short break for the first six months of the war, has been increasingly actively carried out by a significant part of the country’s political class and media. Here we see, albeit in a weak form, a revival of the forms of activism that gave rise to the political nationalism of the 2000s — participation in localized conflicts with ethnic players and a variety of vigilantism.
The war and the anti-migrant campaign provided patriotic nationalists with a rather sharp increase in popularity on the social media level. The popularity of Telegram channels of both media outlets and individuals belonging to this segment of the political spectrum grew 310 times by the end of 2022, and the popularity of Strelkov’s Telegram channel increased 30 times, reaching almost 750,000 subscribers and making his channel comparable to top political bloggers. In 2023, the growth continued, albeit not as rapid, but still at least 1.52.5 times, although it is likely that anti-migrant rather than military activity played the main role here. However, after Strelkov’s arrest, Vladislav Pozdnyakov, leader of the banned Men’s State and known primarily for his aggressive misogynistic and racist agitation and activities, assumed the position of the most popular person: his main Telegram channel has already gathered about 450,000 subscribers.
In the current context, a Telegram channel that works both as a “party newspaper” and as an aggregator of activist news, and thus encourages readers to take certain actions, is becoming more effective than a traditional type of organization. Of course, to a greater extent this applies to groups and movements disloyal to the authorities. For example, if we consider pro-Kiev nationalists, the audience of the Telegram channel “Natsdem” with its 17,000 subscribers is four times larger than that of the most prominent organization in this segment of the spectrum.
Since the beginning of the war, the authorities have very noticeably and quite expectedly increased the intensity of persecution for allegedly ideologically motivated (going against the official line) and illegal actions. These prosecutions concern all political sectors and almost all non-political segments of society. They concern both acts that would be considered criminal in any European democracy with the rule of law and those that are clearly innocent in this sense, as well as many controversial cases. These persecutions have been systematically applied to nationalists both before and now. But the war has brought about certain changes here as well. But the war has brought about certain changes here as well.
Of course, nationalists have often been and continue to be prosecuted for violent crimes motivated by racial and other group hatred. The level of this violence has been declining for more than a decade, but persecution has a more complex dynamic. In particular, it increased in 2022, although the violence itself declined in an unprecedented way: perhaps the militarized far-right, like the rest of the country, were in a state of shock at what had happened. Since the spring of 2023, however, grassroots far-right violence has begun to rise again. As before, it is perpetrated by autonomous youth groups, but they are completely new, with little or no connection to known nationalist political organizations. As a rule, it is not even known what these groups think about the war.
Pro-Kiev nationalists are often persecuted for sabotage or for anti-war and pro-Ukraine statements. But it should be mentioned that we do not observe a total dismantling or destruction of pro-Kiev organizations by the state — rather, they cease their activities themselves for fear of repressions. We cannot say that the authorities are any tougher on this category of nationalists than on other opponents of the war in comparable circumstances.
If we consider the loyal segment of patriotic nationalists, they are certainly not persecuted. Yet general restrictions apply to them as well — no street actions, even in support of the war, are allowed. Only since mid-2023 some groups of loyal nationalists have been cautiously encroaching on this general ban by participating in (or even organizing) gatherings of local residents against migrants. Political activity is also essentially impossible: the authorities do not approve of it, and no one is ready to go against the will of the state. In local elections, the participation of loyal nationalists, such as the Rodina (Motherland) party, is extremely unimpressive. At the moment, one nationalist, Sergei Baburin, a veteran of the movement, has entered the race for the March 2024 presidential election, but it is unclear whether he will actually be allowed to run.
Opposition patriotic nationalists, naturally, have an even slimmer chance of political participation. And their only attempt in the spring of 2023 to create a political association of even the most amorphous type, the Club of Angry Patriots headed by Igor Strelkov, resulted in the arrest of the latter in July (he is now awaiting trial on charges of calling for extremism) and the Club’s activities being halted. However, Strelkov remains the only one arrested in this segment of the spectrum being halted. The others are still allowed to criticize the authorities, including Putin personally. The state still needs such activists for pro-war political mobilization. Especially because in critical moments, such as the Prigozhin uprising in June 2023, they side with the authorities rather than the rebels.
The question remains open as to whether the authorities will be able to continue to keep nationalist groups that are too radical or simply in opposition to them within the desired limits in the context of war.
Dr. Alexander Verkhovsky – Director, SOVA Research Center, Moscow, an independent initiative focuses on nationalism and xenophobia, the relationship between religion and society, and the formation and implementation of anti-extremist policy in Russia