PSCRP-BESA Reports No 44 (March 26, 2024)
Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine has changed the entire world and affected all regions, from Africa, Asia and Latin America to Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet space. In order to understand the current geopolitical processes, it is necessary to abandon the old division of the world into Europe, Asia, the Middle East, etc. and switch to viewing the world map in terms of zones of stability. One of such zones of stability (lately — conditional stability) coincides with the borders of NATO countries, the other is the region around China and Southeast Asia. At the center of the Eurasian continent, however, lies an ellipse of tension filled with military conflicts, from Ukraine and the Middle East to Afghanistan and the Indo-Pakistan border. At the center of this ellipse sits the South Caucasus, and the war in Ukraine has the most direct impact on the course of events in the region.
Georgia: filling the voids
Two years of difficult war have weakened Russia systemically, and this has created a kind of void in the region that both regional and external players are trying to fill. Georgia, with a decade-long experience of maneuvering between the interests of Russia, the West and its own, suddenly saw a dizzying prospect in February 2022. The huge neighboring country found itself in isolation, creating vacuum in almost all spheres of Russian reality, and Georgian authorities together with their accomplices began to fill them to the best of their abilities. It would be wrong to claim that Georgia occupies a key position in providing supplies to Russia, but what it contributes is enough for all parties concerned.
Besides, the case of Georgia is important for Russia in another way: to show that more or less tolerable relations are possible after aggression and occupation. And if it is possible with Georgia, why not attempt it in Ukraine. It is important to note that Georgia is a member of Ramstein Group and the only country in the region, and indeed in the entire post-Soviet space, which unconditionally supports all international initiatives and votes against Russia as an aggressor. Georgia ranks among the leaders in terms of public support for Ukraine, despite the fact that this trend coexists in Georgian society with the fear of a major war and Russian aggression, which is skillfully used by the authorities.
Since 2014, Georgian officials, including those who have been subject to criminal prosecution, have been actively involved in Ukrainian politics and granted Ukrainian citizenship. Relations between the Georgian and Ukrainian authorities are strained, especially after an incident involving former Georgian Justice Minister Zurab Adeishvili, who was part of the Ukrainian delegation to the Bundestag. Despite the conflict between Poroshenko and Saakashvili, Georgian authorities are not eager to improve relations with Ukraine, especially with the current government. The case of Saakashvili, who ended up in a Georgian prison as a result of an operation by Russian security services, continues to be a divisive issue. Initially, the Ukrainian authorities did not take any measures to protect their citizen (Saakashvili has been a Ukrainian citizen since 2015). The situation changed in early 2023, when a real threat loomed over Saakashvili’s life, and the Ukrainian authorities could not stay away. This only aggravated relations between the countries.
In the run-up to the elections, the Georgian authorities are comfortable with a state of cold war with the Ukrainian authorities combined with statements of political support for Ukraine as a victim of Russian aggression.
Azerbaijan: exploiting the weakness
Since the onset of aggression against Ukraine, Azerbaijan has sought to use the complications associated with Russia to advance its interests. For decades, relations between Azerbaijan and Russia have been characterized as balanced with elements of competition, especially in the fields of energy and security. However, since the summer of 2022, Azerbaijan has been adjusting its policies to strengthen its position in light of Russia’s current standing.
In September 2022, Azerbaijani armed forces seized strategic heights on the border with Armenia, taking control of the road connecting the center of Armenia with the Syunik region. As a result, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan was the first Armenian leader to finally recognize Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory, as had already been recognized by the entire international community. This coincided chronologically with the successful offensive of the AFU on Kharkiv.
At that time Moscow was not interested in this matter, but then the situation changed dramatically. Russia was seriously and permanently drawn into the Ukrainian conflict. In September 2023, Baku again took advantage of a fortunate coincidence by regaining control over the entire internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan.
The 44-day war, or rather that Russia intervened in it only in November 2020, when Azerbaijani armed forces unexpectedly took Shusha and posed an immediate threat to Khankendi, is also linked to the war in Ukraine. Moscow waited patiently for the changes in the South Caucasus, seeing them as part of the preparations for a major war. After the change in the leadership of the Azerbaijani General Staff, Moscow preferred not to interfere, expecting that after a successful special operation in Ukraine, Azerbaijan would completely come under the influence of the Russian Federation. However, given the strategic importance of Karabakh, Russia was forced to intervene in November.
In July 2022, Azerbaijan and the European Union signed a Memorandum of Strategic Partnership in the energy sector. This allowed Azerbaijan to increase gas exports to Europe. The basic infrastructure for this was created well before 2022 at Baku’s initiative. The Southern Gas Corridor, including the TANAP and TAP gas pipelines, played a key role in this. Once the TANAP-Bulgaria interconnector got operational in 2023, the project secured gas transportation from Azerbaijan to the central and southern parts of Europe. Besides, there are plans to transport energy resources from Central Asia through the South Caucasus to the European market, as well as a project to export “clean energy” (electricity) by cable across the Black Sea to Europe. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and Baku-Supsa oil pipelines play an important role, with projects such as the export of “clean energy” by cable coming to the fore. These projects reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy resources both during the war and in the future.
The development of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route makes it possible to deliver goods from China and, eventually, from India and Southeast Asia, bypassing Russia. The EU plans to invest more than ten billion euros in the development of Central Asian transport infrastructure through Azerbaijan and Georgia, where Azerbaijan is ready to invest in the modernization of railroads. The Caspian-Black Sea railroad inherited from the Russian Empire, which has been improved multiple times, was supplemented in 2017 by the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, which is now seen as a key transport route between Turkey and Azerbaijan.
The war in Ukraine has emphasized Azerbaijan’s active role in foreign policy. Although Azerbaijan refrains from many anti-Russian resolutions on Ukraine, it has provided extensive humanitarian aid to Ukraine and pursued policies for which Baku has been repeatedly commended by President Zelensky. Moreover, in addition to its traditional ties with Turkey, Azerbaijan is actively developing relations with Israel, Central Asian countries and other players in the international arena.
All these developments and projects were made possible by Russia’s strategic weakening during its aggression against Ukraine. However, despite the indications of taking advantage of Moscow’s weakness, Azerbaijan has to maintain a dialogue with Russia, realizing its key role in the region and still very large-scale influence on security and stability in the South Caucasus.
In conclusion, Azerbaijan’s policy towards Russia is aimed at finding a balance between using the current situation to advance its own interests and maintaining constructive relations to ensure security and achieve its goals through dialog. This approach ensures flexibility and adaptability in the geopolitical environment.
Armenia: Ukraine as a tool for demonstrating loyalty to the West
Russia has a strong influence on Armenia due to historical, economic and military ties. Armenia is a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, although it has frozen its participation in the latter. These formal aspects may seem unimportant, but attention should be paid to the system of interstate agreements, the control of Russian companies over strategic sectors of Armenia’s economy, the presence of the Russian military in Armenia and Russian FSB troops guarding Armenia’s borders with Turkey and Iran, as well as “pinpoint” presence on the border with Azerbaijan. Russia has provided security for Armenia for many years, maintaining its status quo since the early 1990s.
For a long time, anti-Russian sentiment in Armenian society was not particularly widespread, especially in the expert community. The first signs of anti-Russian sentiments appeared after April 2016 due to the intensity of clashes and the high number of casualties in the conflict. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan failed to achieve military success, the very fact of the war came as a shock to Armenian society. The protests in Yerevan in the summer of 2015 were mainly related to the increase in electricity prices (which was eventually canceled), but after that security issues became the main concern. The majority of people in Armenia were confident that Azerbaijan, despite the active modernization of its armed forces, would not dare to attack Russia’s ally. Azerbaijan disappointed their expectations, which led to a change in the attitude towards Russia in Armenian society. In addition, after the Velvet Revolution of 2018, discontent with the Kremlin’s support for certain political forces emerged in Armenia.
After the 44-day war, many in Armenia believed that the defeat was the result of collusion between Baku, Ankara and Moscow. However, this viewpoint did not take into account the government’s mistakes in foreign policy and defense. Armenian society began to display anti-Russian sentiments after Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, realizing that such a policy could lead to international isolation. This made them reconsider relations with Russia and look for alternatives, including through cooperation with other countries and organizations. The creation of alternative defense mechanisms became one of the priorities of Armenian foreign policy.
Armenia’s attitude towards the war in Ukraine has changed over time. At the beginning of the conflict, Armenia tried to remain neutral in order not to spoil relations with Russia. However, after the events of 2023, it began to express support for Ukraine more actively, both in diplomatic discourse and in actions to strengthen bilateral ties.
For Armenia, supporting Ukraine has become a way to demonstrate its loyalty to the West. It is also a way to emphasize its commitment to international law and democratic values, as well as some degree of independence from Russia, which may irritate Moscow.
The impact of Russian aggression against Ukraine on Armenia’s foreign policy is multifaceted and complex. The Armenian authorities need flexibility, foresight and the ability to balance between different centers of influence on the world stage. Armenia faces prospects and challenges that require the development of a strategy to ensure the country’s security and prosperity in the new geopolitical environment.
All the countries of the South Caucasus are in anticipation, waiting for Russia’s withdrawal from the war with Ukraine. It is clear that it will emerge from this conflict weakened, but it is not known to what extent. The main question concerns its ability to exert significant influence on the region in the future. But that’s tomorrow’s question, which would have seemed bizarre only yesterday.
Gela Vasadze is a Georgian political analyst and broadcaster based in Tbilisi and Batumi. He is the Head of Regional Programs at the Georgian Strategic Analysis Center.